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Abstract 
The discourse on stability of petroleum contracts revolves around how to resoh, e the 
tension between the sovereign right to regulate the petroleum industry and the necessity 
to protect the legitimate interests of foreign investors. The irreversible nature of 
investment in the petroleum sector, the long pay back period in petroleum contracts, and 
the political and commercial risks inherent in petroleum projects necessitates stability 
over the life of the contract as an essential condition for achieving economic interests 
for the main players in the petroleum industry. The stability of a petroleum contract 
involves a complex interaction of the legal, economic and political environment in the 
host country in which it operates and is profoundly shaped by the interplay between 
internal and external factors governing the petroleum industry. 
The aim of the thesis is to examine and analyse the recent trends on stability of 
the petroleum contract in developing countries and economies in transition. Perception 
of petroleum as a finite, non-renewable resource and the attendant public interest 
dimension embedded in the contractual arrangements for its exploitation makes the 
petroleum industry a highly regulated and historically popular area of state intervention. 
Petroleum contracts are also vulnerable to various kinds of change of circumstances, 
which can disturb the economic equilibrium of contracts. Stability mechanisms in legal, 
contractual and economic forms are needed to counter these political, fiscal and 
commercial risks in petroleum contracts. 
The study observes that over the last two decades, the fierce competition among 
the developing countries and economies in transition for attracting foreign investment in 
natural resources exploration and the end of their radical nationalistic feelings and 
hostile attitude towards foreign investment have persuaded them to provide favourable 
conditions in petroleum contracts for the petroleum companies. The study finds that the 
petroleum contracts in these countries during this period have been marked by increased 
stability guarantees, greater flexibility in fiscal terms and increased efforts of the parties 
to make provisions for renegotiation and adaptation of the contract in changing 
circumstances to maintain stability in the contract and to attract foreign investment in 
petroleum projects. 
The growing concerns about negative environmental impact and consequently 
regulatory and liability risks by the host states have appeared as a significant political 
risk factor to the petroleum companies. Similarly, host communities' hostile actions 
spurred by negative social impact of petroleum operations and human rights violations 
at various stages of petroleum development can pose a threat to stability and to the 
economic viability of petroleum projects. 
The study emphasises that integration of environmental and social concerns in 
petroleum development, assessment of environmental and social impacts, consultation 
with key stakeholders in the project design and implementation, equitable distribution 
of economic benefits from the project, respect for human rights of the host community 
in petroleum exploitation are all seen as key issues to be addressed in order to reduce 
negative impacts from project, and to enhance stability of the projects. A clearly defined 
role for the government and company in the area of social responsibility is needed to 
reduce much of the uncertainty about the allocation of responsibilities that they should 
undertake. 
I 
Introduction 
Background of the Study 
Stability in natural resource development agreements in general, and petroleum 
contracts in particular, is considered by the international petroleum companies to be of 
primordial interest to them for deriving expected economic benefits from petroleum 
development projects. A State uses the petroleum contract as a legal arrangement with 
international petroleum companies to explore and exploit its petroleum resources and 
tries to achieve social and economic objectives through meeting its energy needs, 
balance of payment and raising standards of living. Thus, in petroleum contracts, parties 
have a potential divergence of interests that they seek to harmonise through allocation 
of their rights and responsibilities; and stability in the contractual relationship is seen as 
fundamentally important to achieve the long terni but often conflicting objectives of the 
parties. 
Stability is seen as critically important in petroleum contracts as pressure for 
legal, political and technical change is inherent in various stages of their perforinance 
involving long duration. Much of the uncertainty and change of such contracts not only 
ensues from the geological characteristics of petroleum, but also the economic 
characteristics of such contracts such as the substantial investment, and the 
irrevocability of such investment as well as the long pay back period of such enterprise. 
The issue of stability also becomes prominent in petroleum contracts because of the 
legal nature of such contracts since the participants come to the negotiating table with 
differing legal capacity. Legislative power and public interest prerogatives of a State 
party put the company, which is a private party to a petroleum contract, in an unequal 
relationship to the foriner. 
However, history is replete with evidence that the companies' quest for stability 
in petroleum contracts can be more honoured in the breach and change of law and 
2 
operating environment than through strict performance of the contract in its original 
terms. The fact that petroleum resources are finite and renewable in character and are 
often viewed as national patrimony vital for social and economic development - makes 
these contracts highly sensitive in political tem-is and underlines the justification for 
state interference in the legal arrangements for its exploitation. 
Petroleum contracts do not exist in a vacuum, but operate within the legislative 
and regulatory framework of a particular State. The fact that petroleum development 
takes place in the national jurisdiction and that the ownership of petroleum resources is 
vested in the state - reinforces the view that the legal regime of the petroleum contract is 
largely determined by the law of the host states. The implications of this linkage with 
the national legal system are deep and wide-ranging on any stable contractual 
relationship as petroleum contracts operate not only in the present legal framework but 
also in the future regulatory environment of the host state. The state in its public law 
authority can allow petroleum operations by means of licensing and in its capacity as 
legislator on the one hand, it can also derogate from contractual rights and obligations 
by the public interest imperative on the other. 
While much of the earlier conflict between host state and company revolved 
around control and ownership of the venture, which epitomised the hostile relationship 
between the company and developing countries and was one of the principal reasons for 
contract instability, this has largely disappeared now. In the present context, much of 
the instability in the contractual relationship arises from the necessity to regulate the 
foreign investment to preserve national goals. Changing the bargaining power in the 
contractual relationship over the course of the life time of the contract can influence the 
host state to gain the upper hand with foreign investors through regulatory intervention, 
which often goes beyond rational commercial necessity. The host state's regulatory 
3 
intervention ex post to the contract remains a ftindamental concem for the foreign 
investors to the petroleum sector in recent times. 
The last two decades have witnessed a sea change in the attitude of the 
developing countries towards foreign investment. The developing countries, which were 
previously hostile to foreign investment and expressed their grievances against foreign 
investment as 'neo -colonialism', have adopted a positive outlook towards foreign 
investment. The implication of this policy transformation is also reflected in the 
petroleum industry. The transformation of attitude has been mainly driven by factors 
like the overall realisation of potential economic benefits of foreign investment, the new 
discovery of petroleum resources and fierce competition among the developing 
countries for capital and technology to explore them, a movement towards a free market 
economy, the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Caspian region as 
new frontiers of petroleum development. This policy shift has been accompanied by a 
renewed commitment on the part of the developing countries' governments to offer 
incentives, legal protection and the stability of petroleum contracts during this time in 
the context of creating a favourable investment climate. This is more so because an 
improvement in investment conditions and incentives is a reflection of the reduced 
bargaining power of many developing host states in the current global economic climate 
in which the terms and conditions of petroleum contracts are negotiated. The realisation 
that a comprehensive and stable legal framework is conducive for foreign investment 
has influenced the developing countries and economies in transition to provide 
contractual and legal guarantees of stability on a wider scale. 
Similarly, the pragmatic attitude shown by the economies in transition towards 
foreign investment in the last decade has a substantial implication for the oil and gas 
industry. They opened the petroleum sector to foreign investors, which were previously 
exclusively the prerogative of state agencies. In a move for democratic and economic 
4 
reform, the economies in transition have adopted privatisation laws, liberallsed 
investment regimes, and undertaken legal and judicial reform, moved for 
decentralisation, improved labour standards, and refined land tenure systems, and 
enhanced the level of envirom-nental protection. In the complex process of building new 
public institutions and refonning old institutional structures, privatising state-owned 
economic sectors, replacing the command or centrally planned system by local 
planning, the investment climate and legal framework of investment in these countries 
has tended to be unstable and unpredictable. Their undertaking of contractual and legal 
guarantees of stability in petroleum contract simply underscores their realisation that a 
favourable and stable investment climate is necessary to attract more investment in the 
petroleum exploration. 
But this positive attitude and legal and regulatory development relating to 
foreign investment should not conceal the general condition of an unstable investment 
climate for petroleum development in many developing countries and economies in 
transition. An unpredictable regulatory environment, ill-defined property rights, 
unfairness in judicial decisions and in enforcing contracts, the absence of a well- 
developed legal code, high inflation and exchange rate, corruption in the licensing 
process, and bureaucratic red tape combine to make legal and contractual arrangements 
for petroleum development unstable and unpredictable in these countries. 
' Therefore, 
creation of a stable contractual regime, which is charactensed by a sound investment 
climate, adequate legal protection, and competitive fiscal terms, is seen as a sine qua 
non for attracting foreign investment in the developing countries and economies in 
transition. 
1 See, on unstable investment climate in economies in transition, James P. Dorian and 
Eugene M. 
Khartukov, "International Oil and Gas Investment In the CIS", in: Thomas W. Walde, (ed. ), The Energy 
Charter Treaty An East-West Gatewayfor Investment and Trade, Kluwer Law International, The Hague. 
(1996), pp. 37-67; See also Alfred J. Boulos, "Oil industry Perspective on Investment in the CIS/Russia", 
in: Thomas W. Waelde and George K. Ndi, (eds. ), International Oil and Gas 
Investment., Moving 
Eastward? Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, London/Dordrecht/Boston, (1994), p. 223. 
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,, ý However, over the last two decades, the traditional notion of stability of petroleum 
contract, which is generally understood as the creation of an enclave status for the 
contract in terms of freezing the applicable law, has undergone profound changes to 
accommodate flexibility in contract terms in a bid to achieve changing economic 
equilibrium. This mirrors the fact that stability in contract is not an end itself, but is a 
means of achieving the congruent and mutual benefit by the parties from the investment 
in a natural resource project. In the present context, flexibility in the fiscal regime and 
contractual provisions of stability through renegotiability and adaptability of contract 
terms has become main features in the contract drafting and negotiation. Thus, the 
traditional notion of stability of contract which is finuly rooted in the concept of 
sanctity of contract has largely given way to flexibility in approaching the desired 
stability in the contract. The present study shows that the current contractual practice of 
the developing countries and economies in transition bears testimony to this principal 
assertion of a flexible approach in contractual guarantees for achieving dynamic 
stability. 
The growing concerns over the negative environmental impact of petroleum 
operations, which is to some extent inherent in the extractive process, is now considered 
to be one of the principal contentious issues surrounding a stable contractual 
relationship between the host state and company. Furthen-nore, in recent times, the 
social and human rights dimensions of petroleum, which are not absolutely new, have 
assumed a wider significance due to the growing concern about the negative social 
impact of petroleum development, and consequent opposition of civil society to 
resource development and the increased recognition of the role of local and indigenous 
communities in natural resource development projects. 
Failure of the host government and company to consider environmental, social 
and human rights dimensions of petroleum development can generate conflict, 
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litigation, protest campaigns, negative publicity undermining stability of social 
environment of petroleum project, which in turn, can appear to be a significant threat to 
the economic viability of the contract. Therefore, any meaningful discussion of the 
stability of petroleum contracts in the contemporary context should properly underscore 
the importance of these emerging social and human rights dimensions of petroleum 
development and should be taken into account in the contract negotiation process and 
contract planning. 
Objectives and Scope of the Study 
The main objectives of the study are four- fold: 
First: to identify trends and analyse trends and issues on stability in petroleum contracts 
in the selected developing countries and economies in transition. 
Second: to critically assess the effectiveness of contractual and legal mechanisms 
envisaged for the stability in petroleum contracts in developing countries and economies 
in transition. As a necessary background, it has defined the notion of stability in long 
term state contracts 2; and in order to help a grasp of the subject matter it elaborates other 
key concepts such as stability guarantees, fiscal elements and also focuses on new 
paradigms 3 which draw upon environmental and social dimensions of petroleum 
development in their normative context. 
2 State contract is usually defined as a contract made between the State, or an entity of the State and a 
foreign national or a legal person of foreign nationality. State contracts cover loan agreements, purchase 
contracts for supplies or services, large infrastructure projects, and natural resources exploitation 
contracts such as upstream petroleum contracts. See, State Contacts, UNCTAD Series on issues in 
international investment agreements, United Nations, New York & Geneva, 2004, p. 3; See also, 
Transnational Arbitration and State Contracts, Hague Academy of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston, (1988), p. 84. 
3 Given the increasing significance of social, environmental and human rights aspects of petroleum 
development in recent times, and demand for wider stakeholder involvement in the petroleum 
development projects, these aspects can be treated as new paradigms in the petroleum industry. These 
new paradigms are now treated as significant factors in contract negotiation and contract drafting and also 
appearing as driving forces in the change of the notion of stability of petroleum and mineral development 
agreements. See, Malgosia Fitzmaunce and Milena Szumewicz, (ed. ), Exploration of Natural Resources 
in the 21' Century, Kluwer Law International, The Hague (2003); Gao, Z, International Petroleum 
Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions, Graham and Trotman, London (1994); Asbjorn Eide, 
Helge Ole Bergesen and Pia Rudolfson Goyer, (ed. ), Human Rights and the Oil Industry, Intersentia, 
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Third: to generate conclusions that distinguish the reality from the rhetoric of contract 
stability in practical contexts rather than a theoretical one. 
Fourth: to identify environmental, social and human rights risks in petroleum contracts 
and to develop a framework of risk management strategies to counter environmental and 
social risk factors in petroleum development. 
The study has identified the main trends in stability with respect to upstream 
petroleum contractS4 in selected developing countries and economies in transition 
during 1980-2002. As far as the subject matter of the study is concerned, it focuses on 
petroleum contracts only, and it excludes stability issues of other long-term petroleum 
transactions such as gas sales contracts or infrastructure projects such as petroleum 
pipelines, although normative findings of this study may have relevance for other long- 
term contractual arrangements in petroleum and mineral development. The time frame 
of the study is set to analyse the qualitative changes that have taken place in the 
investment climate and the way in which these changes have been reflected in host 
countries' experience while addressing the issue of stability. The study also takes into 
consideration some of the more recent developments that have occurred from 2002 
onwards. The study has examined both original and model petroleum contracts of 
selected developing countries and economies in transition with a view to ascertaining 
the current practice of stability guarantees. The selection criteria for the developing 
countries and economies in transition mainly reflect an attempt at balanced geographical 
Antwerpen, (2000); Adams, Robin G., "Dominant Strategic Themes of the Natural Resources Industry", 
21 Fordham International Law Journal, (1997), pp. 492-502; Donald N. Zillman, Alastair Lucas and 
George (Rock) Pring (ed. ), Human Rights in Natural Resource Development: Public Participation in the 
Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources, Oxford University Press, (2002); John V. 
Mitchell, Human Rights: One More Challenge for the Petroleum Industry? In: John V. Mitchell (ed. ), 
Companies in a World of Conflict, Earthscan Publication Ltd., London (1998), pp. 227-252. 
4 Upstream petroleum contracts are meant primarily for exploration of oil. However, nearly all the 
upstream petroleum contracts provide provisions on natural gas, which can be both associated and non- 
associated in kind and requires different economic framework for their exploration and development. 
While petroleum contracts usually makes provision for utilisation of associated gas, they ask parties to 
negotiate for development of non-associated gas, if found during exploration stage. 
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distribution across the regions as well as their importance as petroleum producing 
countries. The regions and countries that are the focus of empirical study are as follows: 
South and Southeast Asia: Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Thailand and Bangladesh. 
Central and South Africa: Angola, Gabon, Tanzania, Ghana, Sudan, Mauritania, and 
Nigeria. 
North Africa: Egypt and Tunisia. 
South America: Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador. 
Caribbean and Australia: Trinidad & Tobago, and Papua New Guinea. 
Middle East: Qatar, Iran, and Oman. 
5 Russia and Central Asia: Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan 
Importance and Justification of the Study 
Stability in petroleum contracts is of great concern to the players, especially the 
international petroleum industry. But a comprehensive study on various aspects of 
stability in petroleum contracts in the contemporary context has yet to be undertaken. 
Against this backdrop, the study intends to fill the gap. The study alms at drawing 
lessons of the experiences from the developing countries and economies in transition in 
dealing with stability of petroleum contracts. The findings and the insights gained from 
the study may contribute to an enhanced understanding among scholars and 
professionals in the petroleum industry on how the modem notion of stability is 
understood in petroleum contracts, how far contractual and legal stability guarantees are 
effective to mitigate the political risks and what are the emerging new challenges to 
5 All eastern European and central Asian countries are called "Economies in Transition" as they are in the 
process of making transition from the economic systems following a central planning system to those 
based on free market and democracy. The economic conditions in developing countries and a large 
number of EIT are similar in ternis of economic and political development, and the social and 
environmental conditions. See on the similarity between econornies in transition and developing 
countries, Vinod Rege, "Econonues in Transition and Developing Countries: Prospects of Greater Co- 
Operation in Trade and Economic Fields", Journal of World Trade, Vol. 27, No. 1(1993), pp. 83-113; 
Julio Faundez, "Legal Reform in Developing and Transition Countries: Making Haste Slowly", in: Julio 
Faundez, Mary E. Footer and Joseph J. Norton (eds. ), Governance, Development and Globalisation, 
Blackstone Press Limited, (2000), pp. 29-48. 
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contract stability and how these challenges can be addressed through legal and 
contractual mechanisms. 
Research Questions 
Stability of petroleum contracts is deeply shaped by external and internal factors 
surrounding the petroleum industry. Internal factors encompass essentially economic 
and regulatory aspects of the petroleum contracts and industry in a given State. External 
factors include the policy environment in which petroleum industry operates, the sheer 
uncertainty in the external circumstances such as the political and economic situation of 
the host country in which the performance of the contract takes place and also the global 
investment climate. The main question that the study is intended to address: What are 
the "internal" and "external" factors that have shaped the notion of stability in modem 
petroleum contracts in developing countries and economies in transition countries 
during the last two decades? 
In order to answer this main question, the study also addresses some subsidiary 
and related questions such as: why is stability important in a petroleum contract and 
how is it understood in the modem context of contract practice? What are the risk 
factors posing a threat to the stability of contract and how are stability guarantees 
formulated in modem petroleum contracts and how far are they effective? What are the 
factors that trigger a renegotiation and a revision of the contract? How does a petroleum 
contract respond to the demand for stability in the fiscal regime of the contract? How 
does a legal and regulatory change of the environmental regime spurred by the current 
challenge of sustainable development and human rights concerns affect contract 
stability and in what ways, has the petroleum industry responded to these concerns and 
challenges? 
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The study attempts to answer these questions in the light of the experience of 
developing countries and economies in transition in dealing with stability in petroleum 
contracts. In investigating these questions, the study adopts a more applied perspective 
and analyses legal issues and problems on the core notion of contract stability from both 
ftinctional and practical perspectives. 
Methodology 
The study addresses the subject matter with a combination of both an analytical 
approach based on deductive legal reasoning and a historical approach. 
Analytical approach: The legal concepts, issues and problems underlYing the 
stability of petroleum contract have been analysed in the study not purely in legalistic 
and doctrinal terms, but in their practical sense and functional context. The study will 
examine the current context of contractual practice and policy issues at the forefront of 
changing attitudes of developing countries and economies in transition towards the 
protection of foreign investment and the stability of petroleum agreements. 
The historical approach is set out to address the main research question in the 
light of the time frame of the study which explicates the stability issues in the context of 
transformation in investment policies and assesses the current state of law and contract 
practice. 
The present study has been carried out by an empirical study of petroleum 
legislation and contracts of about thirty petroleum producing developing countries and 
economies in transition in order to ascertain basic trends in the stability of modem 
petroleum contracts. 
The study relies on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources 
include petroleum legislation, petroleum contracts, and arbitral decisions while 
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secondary sources include authoritative books, journals, internet sources and other 
relevant publications on the subject. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into three parts. PART one deals with conceptual and theoretical 
underpinning of the notion of stability. Chapter one is the key analytical chapter. It sets 
out parameters in defining the notion of stability in petroleum contracts and its 
importance in petroleum contracts. It provides an analytical framework for the notion of 
stability in petroleum contracts and defines stability in the dynamic context of contract 
negotiation and drafting, which runs as a thread through the subsequent chapters of the 
thesis. It finds that the modem notion of stability has been grounded in flexibility in 
contract terms to highlight the importance of maintaining a long-term relationship in the 
changed context. It concludes that long tenn stability of the petroleum contract is clearly 
predicated on the efficient risk allocation system in the contract, the parties' shared 
expectation of the viability of continuation of the contract, their willingness to co- 
operate with each other, and the overall fairness in the contractual arrangement for the 
achievement of equitable outcomes in ten-ns of the distribution of economic benefits 
between the host states and companies. 
Chapter two is linked to chapter one. It discusses the phenomenon of political 
risks in the petroleum industry and explores how far existing principles of international 
law are effective to protect the foreign investor against political risk of unilateral change 
of petroleum contracts by the host states. It examines doctrinal controversy on 
international legal principles relating to the protection of property rights of foreign 
investors against the background of the current practice of contract and the emerging 
norms of international law. It also sheds light on the concept of sanctity of long tenn 
contract, and the doctrine of mutability of contract. The chapter re-appraises dogmatic 
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views on protection and the sanctity of natural resources agreements founded on 
narrowly defined or ideologically biased concepts and argues that contemporary 
realities call for re-thinking of these concepts. 
PART two relates to contractual, legislative and fiscal instruments of stability 
under petroleum contracts. This PART consists of three chapters. Chapter three explores 
typologies of guarantees of stabilisation clause, reviews objectives, legal effect and 
validity of various types of stabilisation clauses. It notes that a stabilisation clause in 
stricto sensu is a rigid legal undertaking of guaranteeing stability that often falls to 
achieve its objective of investment protection against ex post legislative change. 
Considering the limited legal effect of stabilisation clauses in the strict sense, the 
chapter finds that contractual practice is clearly moving towards economic stabilisation 
clauses which are more flexible but appear to be effective mechanisms for protection 
against political risks of regulatory change. 
Having examined the limitations of stabilisation clauses to respond to a variety 
of changes of circumstances affecting the stability of contract, chapter four focuses on 
the extent to which renegotiation and adaptation of petroleum contracts can allocate the 
risk of such a change of circumstances and whether it can contribute or not to a stable 
contractual relationship. It notes that renegotiation becomes accepted as part of the 
practice of petroleum contract and of doing business in the petroleum industry. 
Renegotiation can be mutually beneficial for the parties provided that they co-operate 
and act in good faith and try to achieve an economic equilibrium of the contract in the 
changed context rather than to exploit the other party. 
Chapter five argues that stability of the fiscal regime of a petroleum contract is 
fundamentally important to the petroleum companies and project lenders and that they 
can justifiably demand that fiscal stability in order to assure themselves that the 
economic assumptions under ying a project will not be undermined by the host 
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country's unilateral interference in the fiscal ternis of the contract. Fiscal stability can be 
approached in different ways in different forins of contract setting such as such as 
incorporation of flexible mechanisms and contractual mechanisms. 
PART three explores new challenges to contract stability such as emergin "9 
issues like environmental legal risks and human rights concerns. Chapter six argues that 
growing concern about environmental impact of the petroleum industry makes 
environmental regulatory intervention an inevitable phenomenon in the petroleum 
industry and finds that environmental regulatory and liability risks have emerged as the 
significant instability factor in the petroleum industry as compliance with environmental 
regulation often has an economic cost to international oil companies (IOCs). It 
considers that the overriding public interest dimension involved in environmental 
protection gives wide scope to host countries' regulatory intervention to falsify the 
contractual stability guarantees. These risks can largely be managed through preventive 
actions of the companies rather than through undertaking legal or contractual guarantees 
of stability. 
Chapter seven shows that heightened public awareness of social and cultural 
impacts of petroleum has brought the petroleum industry into the forefront of human 
rig ts iscourse and subjected the petroleum companies to the scrutiny of their human 
rights and social perfonnance by stakeholders since the early 1990s. Increasing 
understanding of social and human rights dimensions of petroleum development can be 
translated into a risk factor for the companies through concerted host community 
actions. These emerging new facets of political risk warrant both the host country and 
operating company to change their attitude towards the traditional negotiation process 
of the contract. It is observed that the integration of social and human rights concerns 
into a company s policy not only fulfils the requirement of the emerging principle of a 
4; social license to operate', but is also essentlal for the long-tenn survival of the project. 
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PART One 
Stability ofPetroleum Contracts and Investment Protection: 
Concepts, Theories and Instrumentalities 
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This PART sets out the analytical and conceptual framework for the thesis. Chapter I 
defines the notion of stability, highlights rationale and justification of stability is 
important in long-terrn state contracts in general and petroleum contracts in particular. 
and identifies sources of instability in the petroleum contract. It analyses 
instrumentalities in the notion of stability and factors shaping such a notion in 
petroleum contracts. It also provides an initial guideline on contours of stabilitY 
guarantees that can be offered by the host state to the legal regime of petroleum 
contract. 
Chapter two focuses on definition and categories of political risks, actualisation 
of which may amount to a direct or indirect taking of private property. It deals with 
traditional principles of contract law and international law, which can be extended to the 
protection of foreign investment in response to a taking of property of a foreign 
investor. It is shown that traditional principles have been changed by new realities and 
new norms of international law. It argues that orthodox views should be re-examined to 
understand the contemporary views on foreign investment protection and stability of 
contract. The current context of petroleum contract negotiation is characterised by 
mutuality of interests and flexibility in the relationship to be responsive to the changing 
circumstances rather than strictly adhering to doctrinal principles of sanctity of contract. 
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Chapter One 
The Rationale and Instrumentalities for Stability in Long-term State 
Contracts: The Context for Petroleum Contracts 
1.1 Introduction 
Risk and uncertainty are basic features of long-tenn state contracts. The viability of 
long-term contracts depends upon effective and efficient distribution of risk and reward 
between the parties and adjustment to future pressures for change. Long-term state 
contracts including petroleum agreements involve complex legal, economic issues, and 
important policy considerations which suggest that they should not be viewed as 
isolated and discrete commercial transactions, but their performance depends upon the 
sustained relationship between host state and company. 
Stability in the contractual relationship becomes particularly relevant to the 
petroleum contract for the two basic propositions associated with it - that it is 
essentially a long-term contract and that it falls into the category of state contracts. The 
fact that these are of long duration, means that changes of circumstances may eventually 
materialise and may frustrate the objectives of the parties. Therefore, a stable 
contractual relationship is conditioned by the contract's capacity for survival in the face 
of changes of circumstances and by the accommodation of changing expectations in the 
framework of contract and the adjustment of contractual rights and duties in a changed 
context. On the other hand, the legal characterisation of a petroleum contract as a form 
of state contract always raises the issue of the prerogatives of states, which presuppose 
that public interest in one degree or another is always involved and posit the context of 
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broad social, economic, and political conditions under which the contract is entered into 
and is perfonned. 1 
The importance of stability in petroleum contracts can hardly be 
overemphasised. The perception of instability in the legal and regulatory regime that 
governs the contract plays a significant role in the investment decisions of petroleLIM 
companies. At one end of the spectrum, investors assess the stability of the negotiated 
contract by reference to the host countries' political and judicial institutions, law and 
policies, and their attitudes towards foreign investment, which in turn help them to 
detennine the profitability of the project. At the other end of the spectrum, a 
commitment to stability of the legal and regulatory scheme which ensures that the 
foreign investor will receive consistent legal treatment in the future, can increase the 
nil* aullityof the states to attract investment in the natural resource sector. It is axiomatic 
that perception of instability in the overall investment climate of a country can increase 
bargaining costs, delay the exploration envisaged in the project and induce the 
invocation of harsh terms and conditions in petroleum contracts, which can act as a 
deterrent factor in attracting foreign investment. 
The main objective of this chapter is to set out the analytical framework on 
which the rest of the present study is based. It intends to examine the notion of stability 
in petroleum contracts in the light of the present context of contract negoti 1 iation and 
contract drafting and attempts to identify underlying sources of contract instability. It 
also provides some initial guidelines about the factors shaping the notion of stability and 
sheds light on instrumentalities to ensure stability in petroleum contracts. Finally, it 
briefly discusses the nature and kinds of stability guarantees that are offered to the 
international petroleum companies against political and regulatory risks. 
1 George A. Bermann, "Contracts Between States and Foreign Nationals: A Reassessment", in: Hans 
Srnlit, Niniam M. Galston, Serge L. Levltsky, (ed. ), International Contracts, Matthew Bender, New York, 
(198 1), p. 195. 
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1.2 The Notion of Stability in Modern Petroleum Contracts 
In the context of long-term investment contracts, the notion of stability generally refers 
to the preservation of the underlying expectation of the parties created out of the 
contract. It denotes a maintaining of the internal balances and financial assumptions 
behind the contractual undertaking of the parties. Any definition of stability in long- 
tenn state contracts should take into account the temporal and economic dimensions. 
Stability has a temporal dimension to the extent that it requires the continuity of the 
contractual relationship towards its successful completion and the achievement of 
desired objectives as contemplated by the parties. The economic dimension, which is 
also regarded as the most important indicator of a stable contract ordering, implies 
maintaining the contractual equilibrium perceived by the parties throughout the duration 
of the contract. In this regard, contractual equilibrium denotes maintaining stability for 
the fulfilment of the legitimate expectations of the parties over the life of the project 
arising out of such a contractual relationship. The notion of 'legitimate expectation' 
covers not only the profitability of the project for the company but also takes into 
account the economic and social objectives that a state desires to pursue through such 
contracts. 
However, a balanced notion of stability does not seek the continuity of a 
contractual relationship at the expense of its dynamism, but necessarily it recognises the 
evolution of the relationship and change of circumstances which may be inevitable in 
one form or another in long term contracts. This assertion is equally true for petroleum 
contracts and can be testified by the design of contract and contract negotiation that has 
been used by the developing countries in the last decades. In contrast to the simplicity 
of the old concession, modem petroleum contracts are formulated in a much more 
complex manner. The reason for their increasing complexity is the attempt by the 
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parties to ensure that the agreement concluded will, so far as possible, respond to 
changing or unpredictable circumstances. 
I/ 
The climate for foreign investment in the petroleum sector is today very much 
more hospitable than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Modem petroleum contracts are 
drafted in a more flexible manner to ensure that there is a reasonable measure of 
adaptability, particularly in relation to the fiscal regime, which can avoid, or at least 
mitigate, the confrontational issues which led in the past to bitter and destructive 
disputes. Moreover, the petroleum contracts frequently provide provisions for 
renegotiation and adaptation of contract through which contract terms can be modified 
or adapted in case of changed context or on availability of infon-nation or technical 
knowledge that parties could not have anticipated at the time of its conclusion. Thus, the 
modem contractual arrangement emphasises the continuity of the contractual 
relationship through variation or modification of contract terms previously agreed upon. 
Thus, the prevailing notion of stability in the petroleum contract can be best described 
in dynamic terms rather than the static ones, which characterised the earlier concessions. 
This shift in contractual flexibility simply recognises that static notion of stability, 
which adheres to immutability of contract terms and does not admit any variation or 
modification of terms agreed upon, fails to acknowledge the possibility of change at the 
global and national level as a usual phenomenon in long-term contractual relationships. ' 
The complex nature of the modem petroleum contract suggests that stability in 
such contracts should not be viewed as a static phenomenon but rather it should be 
better understood in the dynamic context in which it operates. During its long life time, 
a petroleum contract may confront social and political changes in the host country and 
accordingly contract stability assurance should take into account the possibility of such 
changes. In essence, it requires that the contract should be structured flexibly in order to 
2 See, Noel Fabri, "Stability of Contractual Relations in Long-Term Transnational Agreements", 
Australian Mining and Petroleum Lawyers Association Yearbook, (1987), p. 563,572. 
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channel the pressure of such change through renegotiation and revision of contract for 
the adaptation and adjustment of the contractual relationship. Recognition of mutuality 
of interests of the parties over the long term and a dynamic process of adjustment has 
become the most prominent feature of the modem petroleum contracts. A modem 
notion of stability recognises that stab1lIty and change are not necessarily conflicting 
goals but rather it acknowledges that an accommodation of change may be conducive to 
stability in the long run. Thus, stability in a petroleum contract can be best ensured if it 
is designed in such a way that both parties can gain benefit and protect their legitimate 
expectation over the long-terin relationship. 
2.1 Underlying Sources of Instability in Petroleum Contract 
The performance of a petroleum contract is conditioned by the favourable national and 
international legal, political and market environment. For a variety of reasons, the legal 
and political environment of host governments in which performance of petroleum 
contracts takes place tends to be unstable. The participation of state or state owned 
enterprises in petroleum contracts also has implications for the element of stability in 
the contract since the government may legitimately demand changes in the contract or 
may repudiate burdensome contracts on the grounds that in doing so it is protecting 
national sovereignty or the public interest. Moreover, the legal nature of such contracts 
may vary under different legal systems attaching to them varying degrees of legal force. 
In this connection, it is necessary to examine the main factors that contribute to the 
instability of petroleum contracts and to highlight the casual link between those factors 
that exacerbate such instability. 
21 
2.1.1 Time Element 
The time element refers to the aspect of 'futureness' in long-term state contracts, which 
largely explains the underlying sources of instability. The long duration of these 
contracts subjects them to the vicissitudes of time which distinguishes them from other 
kinds of state contracts of short duration or immediate performance. 3 Indeed, the time 
element is inherent in the nature of the petroleum and mining agreements, and it 
accentuates different kinds of risks to such contracts. Implementation of different phases 
of a petroleum contract involves long periods for the investigation of the prospectivity 
of acreage, implementation of work programme, and other tasks in the exploration and 
development period. The long duration of perfort-nance may accompany the change of 
operating conditions, the political scenario of the host state and investment climate 
governing the petroleum industry or change in political attitude of the host country to 
foreign investment. 
One of the consequences of the long duration of a petroleum contract is 
illustrated by the shifting bargaining strength from company to host state of what is 
known as the 'obsolescing bargain'. 4 In essence, the notion of shifting bargaining 
suggests that petroleum and mining projects with large fixed investments, stable 
technology, and undifferentiated products can face inherent "structural vulnerability" to 
the dynamics of the obsolescing bargain. 5 At the initial stage of exploration, a company 
having technology and capital is in a strong bargaining position as to whether to commit 
or not to the task of exploration in a particular country as the prospects seem uncertain 
3 Henry Cattan, The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa, Oceana Publications 
Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York, (1967), p. 10. 
4 The concept of the 'obsolescing bargain' had been developed by Raymond Vernon to analyse the 
evolution of the relationship between the host state and company with primary emphasis on natural 
resource sector. It suggests that changes in the level of bargaining power and knowledge of the host state 
can lead towards an unstable relationship. See, Raymond Vernon, "Long-Run Trends in Concession 
Contract", Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1967, pp. 81-89. Theodore H. 
Moran, "Political and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment in Developing Countries: Introduction 
and Overview", CEPMLP Internet Journal, www. ceptmlp. or-g, vol. 5, article 6a. 
5 Theodore H. Moran, "The changing nature of political risk", in: Theodore H. Moran (ed. ), Managing 
International Political Risk, Blackwell, (1998), p. 10. 
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and full of fisk. On the other hand, the developing petroleum producing countries 
lacking adequate technology, the necessary finance and with limited knowledge about 
the potential of discovery but being in desperate need to exploit petroleum resources for 
economic development, are in a relatively weak position. But as the exploration 
programme progresses, the bargaining leverage may gradually shift from the company 
to the host government with the increase economic growth and administrative and 
technical capabilities of administering the project by the latter. The concept of an 
'obsolescing bargain' explains the cross-time dimension in the changing relative 
capabilities of the state and the foreign enterprise, and helps to grasp the dynamic 
evolution of relations between host governments and foreign investors in the developing 
world. The time element involved in petroleum contracts also explains that it can be 
subjected to the ordinary commercial risks of long-term commercial transactions. 
2.1.2 Risk Element 
Closely associated with the time element in the petroleum contract, the probability of 
different kinds of risk and uncertainties remains a basic feature of petroleum contracts. 
The difference between risk and uncertainty is fundamental. Uncertainty refers to 
circumstances where it is not possible to predict the nature and probability of future 
events. It implies possible variation in parameters that affect investment evaluation. 
Uncertainty may relate to geology, production, price and cost, investment climate, and 
market. According to Garnaut and Ross, these uncertainties are related with ignorance 
on the part of government and investor about the technical and commercial prospects of 
any particular project, and ignorance of each about the other's motivations and likely 
behaviour. 6 On the other hand, risk is probability distribution of possible future 
6 Ross Gamaut and Anthony Clunies Ross, Taxation of Mineral Rents, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1983), 
p. 26,39. 
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outcomes .7 Actualisation of risk is considered a fundamental threat to the stability of 
international trade and investment and prudent investors are always concerned about 
how to mitigate the risks, which they measure in terms of cost and benefit analysis in 
their managerial decisions. 
The operation of a petroleum project involves geological as well as human 
factors. Risk can occur through both of these factors. Geological aspects of petroleum 
contracts may give rise of special kinds of risks resulting from varying degrees of 
uncertainty associated with the physical characteristics of petroleum operations. The 
main unknown geological factors and uncertainties in petroleum exploration relate to 
the discovery of new resources, the type of resource (oil or gas), the size of deposit, and 
the economic viability of development. On the other hand, risk deriving from the human 
factor arises from an ignorance or uncertainty about the parties' likely conduct and 
market behaviour. For example, changes in laws and policy by the host state affecting 
the financial viability of contract, its administration action leading to breach of contract 
is known as a political risk and poses the most significant threat to stability in contract. 
Petroleum contracts are also vulnerable to commercial risk such as changes due 
to future price developments, error about the future technology and market 
developments as well as ordinary commercial risks occuMng through fundamental 
changes of circumstances which are beyond the control of the parties. However, 
geological and commercial risks assume less significance in the discourse of contract 
stability since these risks correspond to their unique physical factors, and are simply 
beyond the control of parties. On the other hand, political risk in the petroleum industry 
has acquired added significance mainly due to its unilateral nature as it is usually 
triggered by an action of the state which can be motivated by factors that go beyond the 
7 Risk has been defined as the probability that a given event if materialises would adversely affect the 
execution of contract or render the performance of contract impossible. See, Giorgio Sacerdoti, "The 
Source and Evolution of International Legal Protection for Infrastructure Investment confronting Political 
and Regulatory Risks", CEPMLP Internet Journal, www. ac. uk/ceprrAp/joumal/htmal/article5-7a. htm. 
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commercial necessity. The detailed aspects of political risks have been discussed in 
chapter two. The phenomenon of political risk in petroleum contracts can also be 
partially explained by considering legal nature of such contracts. 
2.1.3 Legal Nature of Petroleum Contract 
Generally, the petroleum contract is categonsed as an executory contract since its 
performance takes place over a long period of time and involves carrying out a 
continuing obligation. But more importantly, these contracts are treated as state 
contracts since the state or a state agency is usually one of the contracting parties. 
Instability in most cases occurs in the petroleum contract due to the fact that the state is 
one of the contracting parties and a licensing authority can take measures that have the 
effect of unilateral change in a negotiated contract. This possibility has not been 
diminished by the fact of phenomenal growth of state owned enterprises and that, as a 
result, petroleum contracts are concluded with these state owned enterprises or their 
privatised successors in a number of developing countries. This is due to the State's 
vital interest in the regulation of the private activities of the foreign investors being 
taken for granted under both national and international law. Moreover, the fact that such 
a contract is entered into with the state enterprise does not change its legal nature as a 
state enterprise is seen as part of state apparatus from the legal point of view. In other 
words, the State in its sovereign capacity always keeps its presence directly or indirectly 
in the regulation of exploration and development of its vital resource in its territory. 
From a purely legal point of view, petroleum contracts are different from both 
private contracts and long-term commercial transactions in two aspects -the exercise of 
state sovereignty and the application of public law. The private contracts and long tenn 
commercial transactions concluded between two private parties and based on an equal 
footing are governed by a set of rules under private law and commercial law and they 
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cannot be subjected to direct legislative intervention by the state. Once the contract is 
concluded according to well-established principles of contract law, its validity cannot be 
questioned. The objectives of these contracts being individual profit maximisation 
preclude the possibility of intervention by the State or the courts unless they fail to 
confonn to the legal non-ris and faimess. But due to state involvement and having 
overwhelming economic importance and a developmental dimension, petroleum 
contracts are subject to public law as well as ordinary juridical nonns applicable to the 
private contract. According to Henry Cattan, the differences between State contracts and 
purely private contracts concern one or more of the following aspects: the conditions 
required for the formation of the contract, the subject matter of the contract, the law 
governing the contract, the application of special legal concepts like the regulatory 
power of the state, the grant to the party contracting with the state of special powers and 
privileges, and sovereignty and public personality of the state as a contracting party. 8 
Petroleum contracts also differ from long-term commercial transactions entered into 
with the state or a state agency on the aspect of legal capacity, e. g. in the fornier, states 
act in both capacity dejure gestionis and dejure imperii, whereas in the latter the state 
or state agency acts in a capacity dejure gestionis. 
As far as their legal nature is concerned, it can be fairly argued that petroleum 
contracts partake of both the nature of private law contracts and of public law contracts. 
The private law elements regulate mostly contractual and commercial aspects of the 
contract such as consent of the parties, repudiation, breach, and damages. Contractual 
aspects of petroleum contracts mainly deal with the economic and financial aspects of 
the agreement. For instance, they include strictly financial terms like taxes, royalty, 
bonuses, expenditure and work commitments; other factors which impact on the 
economics such as costs of exploration, relinquishment, development terms, rate of 
8 Henry Cattan, supra note 3, pp. 3-4. 
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recovery of costs and retention of proceeds of crude oil abroad; pricing of petroleum 
royalty, income tax purposes and recovery of costs in production sharing agreements; 
and duration of the concession. 9 On the other hand, public law elements involved in the 
petroleum contract include the very nature of the subject matter of the contract, the 
statutory regulation of the contract, its grants, fonn and conditions under public law, 
and the legislative approval of the contract in some cases and the range of infrastructure 
and utilities support for the performance of the contract. 10 In fact, petroleum contracts 
cover a range of issues that give them a public character and are to be regulated by 
public law. For instance, contract invariably contains provision relating to special 
privileges to the contractor, welfare issues like, housing, education, health, 
conservation, pollution, national security aspect, which are regulated by public law of 
the host country and these provisions provide a perspective of its public interest 
dimension. The public interest dimension in the petroleum contract is mostly addressed 
by the statutory or regulatory clauses incorporated in it. 
The dichotomy between private and public law elements of a petroleum contract, 
which can also be expressed as contractual and regulatory aspects of the contract, 
provides a valuable understanding of sources of its instability in both developing and 
developed countries. The contractual aspects of petroleum contracts are consensual in 
nature and are the expression of a stable individual bargain, while regulatory aspects in 
the contract designed to protect the public interest in the exploitation of the state's 
natural resources can be changed by the employment of the techniques of administrative 
rule making of the State. " Hence, regulatory aspects of the contract can be changed to 
cope with changing needs of society and therefore, it tends to be variable and unstable. 
9 A. Z. Chiati, "Protection of Investment in the Context of Petroleum Agreement", Recueil Des Cours, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987(IV), vol. 204, pp. 27-38. 
1OHenry Cattan, supra note 3, p. 2 1. 
Ie Introduction", Terence Dainith (ed), The Terence Dainith, "Petroleum Licences: A Comparat v in 
Legal Character of Petroleum Licences. - A Comparative Study, Published by Centre for Petroleum and 
Mineral Law Studies, University of Dundee and Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the 
International Bar Association, (198 1), pp. 9-11. 
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Indeed, the consensual element in the state contract can also be substantially qualified 
by the pre-eminence of the public power of the State due to the fact that the basic 
inequality of interests between the parties is inherent in such contracts. 12 Therefore, the 
fact that petroleum contracts are partially governed by public law rules and partially by 
private law rules acknowledges that in the case of a conflict, the public interests, the 
interests of the community as a whole, should prevail over the contractual interests of a 
private party. 
The public interest imperative in a petroleum contract provides a fundamental 
legal basis of state intervention by legislation and regulation and thus, places the private 
party in a legally unequal position compared to the state party in terms of its capacity to 
exercise legislative power. Thus, characterisation of a petroleum contract as having both 
private and public elements clearly reveals that as a matter of established nonn, in case 
of conflict of interest between the private and public interests under the framework of 
these contracts, the latter should prevail upon the fonner. Therefore, legal 
characterisation of the petroleum contract on the basis of public interest imperatives has 
great a bearing on the notion of stability in a state contract. 
It follows from the preceding analysis that in a petroleum contract, the State 
I 
possesses the regulatory power of variation and cancellation of contractual 
commitments, which derives from its responsibility for the protection of public well- 
being and has no parallel in private contracts. 13 This proposition is valid irrespective of 
whether a legal system has defined a petroleum contract as a particular type of state 
contract or not. Because petroleum contracts are granted by the state under its authority 
being derived from public law and they may be subjected to special prerogatives of 
12 TurpM, "Public Contracts", International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (1984), p. 28. See also 
Tarik F. Riad, "Host Countries Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Protection of Foreign 
Investors (Some Reflections on the Recent Kuwait/Aminoil Arbitration Case)", Revue Egyptienne de 
Droit International, (1983), p. 35. 
13 Wolfgang Friedmann, "Social Conflict and the Protection of Foreign Investment", 57 American Society 
of International Law Proceedings, (1963), p. 126,128. 
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public and administrative authorities of the State on the ground of public interest. 
Moreover, the status of these contracts in the legal hierarchy of a country is usually 
detennined with reference to the constitutional law and public law, which can assign to 
these contracts a lower degree of binding force than a constitution and legislation. Thus, 
identification of a petroleum contract having a public interest imperative and 
determination of its legal nature by a constitution and public law have important legal 
implications on the notion of stability of such contract to the effect that the state being 
endowed with special prerogatives can exercise its regulatory power to modify its' 
tenns and conditions. 
3.1 Factors Shaping the Notion of Stability 
The concept of stability in long-terin state contracts is influenced and shaped by the 
various factors and the fundamental principles of the law of contract as mentioned 
below: 
3.1.1 Reasonable Expectation of the Parties 
Fulfilment of contractual promise and perfon-nance of a contract in good faith has 
sometimes been expressed as a requirement of 'reasonable expectation of the parties'. It 
refers to the parties' shared understanding about the contract reached induced by a 
promise and is a key to contractual obligation. The idea that contract should be carried 
out reflecting the reasonable expectation of the parties constitutes one of the most 
important principles of contract law. The idea of reasonable expectation of the parties in 
the context of long-tenn contract denotes the expectation of investors to receive a return 
from investment and adequate financial reward to the host government. The expectation 
that unilateral change or modification of the terms of the contract will not frustrate 
objectives underlying long-term investment is the fundamental norm relating to a long- 
tenn contract. Obviously, there is no universal standard to detennine 'reasonable 
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expectation', but it refers to objective standards of a fair dealing of the parties in a 
particular context. " Parties' reasonable expectation may be qualified by the existing 
contractual context and by changing circumstances. The factors for constituting 
reasonable expectations are, according to the tribunal in the Aminoil award, the original 
text of the concession as well as the amendments, the interpretations, and the behaviour 
manifested along the course of its existence. 
Even circumstances may arise such that the reasonable expectation of the 
parties dictates that contract should be terminated for mutual benefit, particularly when 
perforinance appears to be onerous for the both parties. In this connection, the doctrine 
of "efficient breach" becomes particularly relevant to illustrate the conditions under 
which contract may be terminated demanded by reasonable expectation of the parties. 
The doctrine suggests that a breach of contract is more efficient than perforining where 
the costs of performance exceed the benefits to all parties and thus, breach becomes 
desirable because it can maximise the benefits of the parties. 15 Thus, reasonable 
expectation is not an abstract principle but rather is a context-dependent and flexible 
concept 16 , which can 
be well fitted into the dynamism of a long-term contract. Strict 
construction of the concept of 'reasonable expectation' in the contractual context and its 
rigid interpretation based on consent as the sole basis of contractual obligation may 
prove to be counterproductive to the ultimate objectives of the parties. Rather, the 
reasonable expectation of the parties should be interpreted as a flexible approach to 
contractual obligations, based on fairness and justice, which can better serve the 
interests of the parties. 
17 
14 Catherine Mitchell, "Leading a Life of Its Own? The Roles of Reasonable Expectation in Contract 
Law", 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2003), p. 639. 
15 Roderick Bagshaw, "Inducing Breach of Contract", in: Jeremy Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 135. See also, R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and 
Econoinics, (2"' edn. ), Addision Wesley, Reading, Mass., (1997), p. 215. 
16 Catherine Mitchell, supra note 14, p. 639. 
17 S. M. Waddams, "Good faith, Unconscionability and Reasonable Expectations", 9 Journal of Contract 
Law, (1995), p. 55. 
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3.1.2 Reputational Concern and Reciprocity 
Reputation plays an important role in enforcing the provisions of an investment 
contract. Reputation in relation to long tenn contract perfonnance is generally expressed 
as the credibility and reliability of a contract partner. The host state's compliance with 
contractual commitments can increase its reputation as a credible and reliable partner in 
the long-term investment. On the other hand, a breach of contractual commitment by a 
host state may weaken the investor's confidence in the reliability of the host State. As a 
result, breach of contractual commitment may bring reputational cost for the host state 
in future dealing not only with the companies aggrieved by a breach of promise, but 
also in dealings with all other companies that are aware of the breach. In this sense, 
reputation is not simply a non-economic value but rather is an important source of the 
transaction with a stabilising value. 
In the global context of the investment climate, and market place of long- term 
state contracts, reputation is expressed as credit ratings of governments and companies 
in terms of compliance with contractual promises. Moreover, host states' reputation of 
compliance with contract promises may be used as a valuable indicator for the 
multilateral institutions, lending agencies or banks in deciding on a capital 
18 
contnbution. 
Stability of contract is also enhanced when parties recognise the importance of 
the social norm of 'reciprocity' in their mutual relationship. The social norm of 
reciprocity has a stabilising role in the contractual relationship and can offer a strong 
foundation to contracting parties' commitment to cooperation. 19 At the heart of the 
18 Reputation purports to express "a likelihood of actions in the future, it is mainly based on identifying 
that the past is the best predictor of the future. And and weighing actions in the past -on the assumpti I 
reputation, as used for business purposes, is identical: It relies on identified and accepted actions in the 
past (building up the reputation) to predict the high probability of corresponding action in the future. " 
Thomas W. Waelde, "Contract and Enforceability M International Business: What works? " CEPMLP 
Internet Journal, volume 5, article 8,1999 see, 
http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepnilp/Jýoumal/html/vol5/article5-8. html. 
'9 Robert E. Scott, "Risk Distribution and Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts", in: Fritz Nicklisch (ed), 
The complex Long-term Contract (Structures and International Arbitration), Heidelberg, (1987), p. 80. 
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notion of reciprocity, recognition of mutuality of interests, rights and duties remain 
basic requirements that crystallise a contractual relationship. Thus, reciprocity plays an 
important role in stabilising the relationship as it furnishes a basis upon which a 
contractual relationship can be adjusted to f-Liture contingencies. 
3.1.3 Aggregate Well-being 
In general, a sound investment climate including guarantees for the stability of state 
contracts and their enforcement, which fosters private investment, can lead to economic 
growth and poverty reduction in developing countries . 
20 One of the main objectives of a 
petroleum contract is wealth creation and maximisation of wellbeing of the people of 
the host states. Instability in the contractual relationship and unilateral tennination of 
contract may increase the transaction costs associated with doing business and promote 
economic inefficiency. 21 On the other hand, the important consequence that ensues from 
stability of petroleum contracts is the capacity to promote aggregate well being of 
producing states, petroleum companies and consuming states. The stable contractual 
regime has a beneficial role for the consuming States as it can help secure adequate and 
stable petroleum supply at reasonably stable prices in future. The instability in 
contractual relationships can accompany uncertainty and instability in the markets and 
fluctuation of price of petroleum. From the host government's perspective, stability is 
important because instability in contract can cause decline in petroleum production 
which means a loss of revenue and jeopardising its economic growth. On the other 
See also, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gachter and Georg Kirchsteiger, "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement 
Device: Experimental Evidence" 65 Econometrica, (1997), pp. 833-860. 
20 See, World Development Report, 2005, A Better Investment Climate for Everyone, World Bank, 
Washington D. C., Oxford University Press, (2004). 
21 Transaction cost covers the time, information costs, negotiation costs, monitoring and enforcement 
costs and costs incurred by the parties in negotiating the settlement of, or litigating the adjudication of, a 
contractual dispute. Donald R. Harris, Cento G. Ve1janovski, "The Use of EconorMcs to Elucidate Legal 
Concepts: The Law of Contract", in: Terence Daintith & Gunther Teubner, (ed. ), Contract and 
Organisation (Legal analysis in the light of Economic and Social Theory), Berlin and New York, (1986), 
P. 111. 
32 
hand, oil companies can deliver a projected rate of return through stability in a 
petroleum contract. 
Increasing realisation of the developing countries that economic development 
can be achieved through the full utilisation of natural resources adds to the 
understanding of necessity of contract stability. Natural resource exploration and 
development requires substantial outlays of capital and technology for the building up 
of infrastructure and related facilities, which cannot be afforded by most of the 
developing countries. The last two decades witnessed the developing countries' overall 
realisation about positive impact of foreign investment on economic growth, which, in 
turn, have led them to adopt more favourable conditions and to ensure stability in 
investment contracts in order to attract foreign investment. 22 Many transitional 
economies are also making similar commitments for the stability of legal and 
institutional framework for promoting investment, and sustainable economic growth. 23 
3.1.4 Contractual Equilibrium 
An analysis of the concept of economic equilibrium of long-term contracts may be 
particularly helpful for understanding the economic aspects of the notion of stability in 
long terni state contracts. The underlying objective of the notion of stability implies that 
22 See, generally, Theodore H. Moran, "The Growing Role of Foreign Direct Investment 'in the 
Developing Countries", in: Theodore H. Moran (ed. ), Managing International Political Risk, Blackwell, 
(1998), p. 3. This realisation of necessity of ensuring stability in long-term investment contract can be 
readily discerned from the following statement of the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee that has 
been made in the early 1980s: 
"In any programme for promotion of mutual co-operation or assistance, whether through location of 
major industrial plants or capital participation by way of investments in industrial projects or joint venture 
arrangements for imparting or transfer of technology, it is a matter of fundamental importance for the 
success of any scheme or venture that some sort of stability in the relations between the investor and the 
host governments must be foreseen. This is particularly so where long term arrangements are concerned. 
The investor would need to know in advance the investment climate in the host country particularly in 
regard to the protection of investments as also the conditions for repatriation of capital and income. The 
investor would also need to be satisfied that the terms and conditions on which he has agreed to invest 
could reasonably be expected to continue to be operative for the period of the investment that nothing 
should be done by the host government to the detriment of the investor in derogation of the agreed tern-is, 
J 
and conditions. But at the same time the host government can legitimately expect that investments should 
not be allowed to be turned into instruments of exploitations or the subject matter of political pressure or 
bargaining. " Report of the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee, 22 nd Session, Sri Lanka, 1981,7. 
23 See. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe: South-East Europe Compact for Reform, Investment, 
Integrity and Growth, February, 10,2000, printed in 39 ILM (2000), p. 962. 
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the contractual equilibrium as originally agreed will not be frustrated or changed by the, 
parties' unilateral action or undue behaviour since disequilibrium. in economic 
assumption of contract can cause its instability. The disposition towards a state of 
equilibrium is further premised on the notion of reasonable expectation . 
24 The necessity 
of preserving contract equilibrium as a requirement of stability can be explained in two 
ways: firstly: the government may modify a contract on the ground of public interest, 
but in doing so, it must maintain the economic equilibrium of the contract through 
payment of appropriate compensation to the affected foreign investor; secondly, where 
change of circumstances occurs by unforeseen events that materially affect the 
conditions upon which the contract was originally based, the parties should adjust the 
relationship in order to maintain the original contractual equilibrium. In other words, the 
key to the idea of equilibrium is to ensure that the project remains financially viable 
during the life of the contract. 
\JThe notion of contractual equilibrium has been substantially developed by the 
petroleum arbitral awards and awards by US-Iran claims tribunals. The arbitral tribunals 
have adopted a dynamic approach to contractual equilibrium, which maintains the view 
that contractual equilibrium should not only be defined with reference to contractual 
terms or the original agreed upon-equilibrium, but also in the dynamic sense in terms of 
the existing contractual context. For this purpose, in interpreting contractual 
equilibrium, the arbitral tribunals have taken into consideration not only the initial ternis 
of a contract, but also the subsequent changes of its terms and the adjustment 
relationship by the parties. For instance, in the Mobil Oil v. Iran, the tribunal held that 
the duties and obligations of the parties under the Agreement in dispute "must be 
construed not only pursuant to its initial terms, but also as to whether the manner in 
24 Larry A. DiMatteo, "The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences Into a 
Fuller Understanding of Modem Contract Law", Univers1ty of Pittsburgh Law RevIew, (1999), p. 839, 
872-3. 
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which it was performed and the de facto or de jure amendment during its Ilfe.,, 25 Both 
initial terms of the contract and subsequent conduct of the parties are relevant factors in 
determining contractual equilibrium. The arbitral tribunal used the subsequent conduct 
of the parties as a yardstick to ascertain the meaning of the ambiguous provision of the 
contract and to clarify rights and obligations of the parties in view of their changing 
expectations from the contract. Indeed, the subsequent conduct of the parties may be 
particularly useftil to give effect to the intended purpose of the parties, particularly in 
the case of revision, gap filling or modification of contract due to changes of 
circumstances. For example, in the Aminoil award, the tribunal had taken the view that 
the contractual equilibrium is shaped by the changes in the relationship over the course 
of time that progressively transformed the contractual relationship. According to the 
tribunal, contractual equilibrium can be otherwise expressed as a legitimate expectation 
which consists of economic calculations, the weighing up of rights and obligations, of 
chances and risks that are involved in long-term investment contract. In the Aminoil 
award, the tribunal considered that contractual equilibrium should be taken into account 
both in adaptations of contract during its course and in awarding compensation. 26 
According to the tribunal, for the assessment of that equilibrium, it is not only the 
original text of the contract which is relevant, but also the amendments, the 
interpretations, the behaviour manifested along the course of its existence, that indicate 
how the legitimate expectations of the parties can be modified according to the 
circumstances. 
27 
Contract equilibrium theory provides a framework for evaluating context and 
consequences of change in long-tenn state contracts. Rather than evaluating change in 
isolation, the equilibrium concept focuses parties' changing expectations from the 
contract that may develop in the course of time. Thus, the contract equilibrium concept 
25 16 Iran-U. S. Claim Tribunal Report (1987-III), p. 3,54. 
26 See, Aminoil award, 21 ILM (1982), p. 1034. 
27 kid, p. 1034. 
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provides a valuable tool for judging stability within the contractual relationship in a 
meaningful context. 
4.1 Instrumentalities of Stability of Contract 
The stability of contract is dependent upon various factors such as external factors like a 
sound investment climate governing the overall contract regime, aspects of contract 
design and patterns of contract negotiation as well as extra-legal rules embedded in 
society like co-operation and fairness. The following section sheds light on the 
instrumentalities of stability of long term state contracts, and also attempts to 
conceptualise the stable but dynamic contractual relationship in the petroleum contracts 
on the basis of the following issues: 
4.1.1 Sound Investment Climate 
For the attraction of investment and the stability of the contractual relationship, a 
favourable investment climate in the host state is seen as one of the fundamental 
requirements by the foreign investors. The sound investment climate generally refers to 
proper governi-nent policies and predictability in their operation, secured property rights, 
provision for infrastructure and the well functioning capital and labour markets, 
efficient and stable legal systems and well performing domestic courts to settle the 
disputes impartially. It also addresses the issue of efficient taxation, stable regulation 
and the prevention of corruption in order to minimise the costs and risks to investors. 
According to the late Ibrahim Shihata, the 'investment climate' in the host state 
generally covers three factors: firstly, institutional aspects in the sense of political 
stability, favourable economic policies, the degree of sophistication of financial and 
administrative institutions as well as administrative procedures; secondly, infrastructure 
aspects in particular the availability and efficiency of physical facilities and human 
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resources; and thirdly, legal aspects which include (i) the substantive rules governing 
foreign investment, and (ii)the procedure to be followed in the settlement of potential 
disputes between foreign investors and the host government. 28 Ambiguity and lack of 
predictability in the legal system affecting the contract coupled with the unavailability 
of a credible and independent judicial system can deter the necessary capital flow to a 
capital importing country. Therefore, a legal system having the ability to predict and to 
compete in a market economy is a basic requirement of long term investment. 
Predictability requires a minimum degTee of political stability, economic stability both 
in the macro and microeconomic conditions, and stability in the general legal conditions 
which gives the investors confidence in their personal safety, and protection of property 
and contractual rights against violation of contract or harassment. 29 
The sound investment climate also denotes that the property rights should be 
protected and be well defined by the legal system. In this regard, the host government's 
commitment to international investment treaties including bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties affording protection against expropriation and payment of 
compensation for insecurity of property rights is seen as critically important for a sound 
investment climate. The existence of fair competition rules is also considered as an 
important component of a sound investment climate. The requirement of fair 
competition is generally exemplified by the adoption of unified rules for the 
establishment, treatment, and exit of investment, and their application without bias. 30 
Thus, the investment climate signifies developing open, transparent, stable and non- 
discriminatory policies and a comprehensive legal framework towards foreign investors, 
which are interpreted in a coherent fashion. Therefore, development of a clear, 
28 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, MIGA and Foreign Investment, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston- 
Lanchester, (1988), pp. 7-13. 
29 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, "Good Governance and the Role of law in Economic Development", M: Ann 
Seidman, Robert B. Seidman, Thomas Walde, (eds. ), Making Development Work: Legislative Reform for 
Institutional Transformation and Good Governance, Kluwer Law International, The Hague-London- 
Boston, (1999), P. xxiii-lv. (Preface). 
30 lbid, p. xxiv. (Preface). 
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consistent and fair system of legislation, and regulation is necessary in order to allow 
the foreign investor to assess more accurately and reliably the risks associated with a 
proj ect. 
Stability in the legal framework under which investment is made, has been 
insisted on by various investment arbitral awards recently. For instance, in the 
Metalclad award, the tribunal held that Mexico (respondent) "failed to ensure a transparent 
and predictable framework for Metalclad's business planning and investment. The totality of these 
circumstances demonstrate a lack of orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an investor of a 
Party acting in the expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly In accordance with the NAFTA"" 
Similarly, the tribunal in Tecnicas Medioambien tales award held: "The foreign investor 
expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its 
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that 
will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or 
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations... " 
32 
4.1.2 Risk Allocation, Flexibility and Adjustment 
One of the important tasks of drafters of long- term contracts is to anticipate future 
contingencies that may give rise to risk and to plan a strategy by which various kinds of 
risk may be reduced. The understanding of the nature of risks and problem areas, and 
devising appropriate legal techniques in avoiding these risks is crucial in the design of 
petroleum contract. The planning of future risk, efficient allocation and management of 
such risk is considered as the key to contract stability. Efficient contract drafting along 
with distribution of nsk in the least burdensome way can remove many of the 
undesirable consequences of uncertainty involved in the petroleum contract. Where the 
ftiture contingencies are peculiarly intricate or uncertain, it may seem difficult for the 
ing. Therefore, i contracting parties to allocate optimally all risks at the time of contracti it 
31 Metalclad v. Mexico Award, 40 ILM (2001), p. 35,50, para. 99. 
32 Tecnicas Medioambien tales Tecmed S. A. v. Mexico, Award of May, 2003,43 ILM 133(2004), para. 
154. 
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is necessary in a long- tenn contract that firstly, parties will allocate the risks of future 
contingencies in the least burdensome way; secondly, the parties will agree, either 
explicitly or implicitly, to adjust this initial risk assignment in the light of subsequent 
events so as to realise greater benefits from their joint enterprise. 33 
ýGiven 
the complexity and uncertainty of the future contingency, the adjustment 
of contractual relationships in the context of changes of circumstances and mutual 
planning in a petroleum contract of an extended period is imperative for a continuing 
relationship. Adjustment of the contractual relationship can help to achieve clearly 
understood goals of parties rather than pursuing formal contractual remedies by 
tenninating the contract. Such adjustments can be made by invoking both legal and 
extra-legal mechanisms. One of the essential criteria of adjustment of contract is that 
flexibility should be introduced in contract design as well as in relevant petroleum laws 
and license terms of the host country. Stability of the contract may be enhanced by- 
resolving the inherent tension between flexibility and certainty in the long-tenn 
contract. ýThe need for greater flexibility is a generally accepted condition in current 
discourse on long tenn contracts because flexibility in the design and the tenns of . 
petroleum contracts is commensurate to with their adaptation to changing circumstances 
and thus, promotes dynamic stability. Because, although a particular risk may be 
foreseeable in general, this does not mean that it is foreseeable either in the specific 
tenns or the extent, which eventually materialises. Therefore, a long-tenn state contract 
should be designed by incorporating an 'open-ended' approach, which can leave a wide 
margin for the subsequent variation of tern-is and adjustment. 34 
33 Robert E. Scott, supra note 19, p. 52-53, Anthony Connerty, "Managing Risk and Uncertainty in the 
Modem Petroleum Industry", A paper presented for the World Petroleum Congress 2 nd Regional Meeting, 
Qatar, December, 2003. 
34 See, David Campbell and Donald Harris, "Flexibility in Long-term Contractual Relationships: The 
Role of Co-operation", 20 Journal of Law and Society, (1993) p. 166,170; P. D. V. Marsh, Contract 
Negotiation Handbook, Third edition, Gower Publishing Limited, (200 1), p. 19. 
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One of the major consequences of flexibilisation of the contract terins involves 
re-organisation and adjustment of the contractual relationship at the later phase of such 
a relationship. Effective adjustments of future contingencies can be carried out through 
an efficient risk management strategy, which is effected through mutual cooperation, 
risk sharing agreements (renegotiation clause, adjustment clause), and self-enforcing 
adjustment mechanisms. Such risk adjustment provisions in the contract should fulfil 
two criteria: firstly, these provisions should be drafted with clarity and accuracy, which 
in turn, can reduce the uncertainties of any subsequent adjustment of contingency; 35 
secondly, there should be sufficient flexibility in the design of the adjustment 
mechanism so that adjustment of the relationship should take place not only by 
reference to legal rules fixed in advance by the written contract, but also by reference to 
flexible standards of good faith or fairness. 36 Therefore, readiness to adjust rights and 
obligations in the context of a change of circumstances that disturbs the original 
equilibrium or expectation is a prerequisite for a sustainable contractual relationship. 
4.1.3 Cooperation by the Parties 
A stable contractual relationship is also dependent upon the continuing co-operation of 
the parties towards its successful completion. Cooperation is necessary for adjustment 
of the relationship in its changed context. Cooperation is primarily a non-legal duty and 
transcends legal obligations defined in the contract. But duty for cooperation can be 
introduced in the contract on the basis of a principle of good faith in order to stabilise 
the contractual relationship. 37 Incorporation of a duty to co-operate in the contract 
35 Robert E. Scott, supra note 19, p. 83. 
36 Nagla Nassar, Sanctity of Contracts Re-Visited. - A Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-Term 
International Commercial Transactions, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht (1995), p. 25. 
37 The Contract may expressly contain provision for co-operation. For example, a PSC of Gabon 
provides: "The parties agree to cooperate in all possible ways in order to achieve the objectives of the 
Contract. The Administrator will facilitate the performance of the Contractor's activities by granting it 
any necessary permit, license and access right ad making available to it all the appropriate existing 
facilities and services, so that the parties can obtain the best possible profit from sincere cooperation. " 
Art. 43.2 of the Vanco Exploration and Production Sharing Contract Dated 27 may 1997 between the 
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makes it a binding legal obligation, not merely a voluntary undertaking. Cooperation 
can be viewed as a principle of contract law implying that there is a contractual duty to 
cooperate generally or in certain circumstances and "cooperation may forin a term of 
the contract, either expressly or impliedly"38 or cooperation is seen as a "fonn of 
economic co-ordination. , 39 Since a petroleum contract creates a long- term relationship, 
the parties shall cooperate in good faith for the maximisation of their mutual benefit. 
An effective cooperation depends upon both parties' ability to understand each 
other's interests and their willingness to accommodate them. Co-operation can be 
carried out through continuous formal and informal consultation, information exchange 
and negotiation process. The need for international cooperation involving the major oil- 
producing countries, the multinational oil companies and the oil consuming countries is 
particularly important for the maintaining of price stability in view of its effects on 
world economies. 
40 
The value of cooperation should be appreciated for its potential conflict 
avoidance role as well as deriving maximum economic benefits from the project 
implemented through continuing cooperation. Stability in a long-terin relationship can 
be enhanced by the deliberate and conscious effort of co-operation and recognition of 
interdependence between the parties than upon the design quality of the contract itself. 41 
Similarly, co-operation can play an important role in offsetting asymmetries of 
Republic of Gabon and Vanco Gabon, Inc (Astrid Marin) Astrid Marin Permit G4-18 1, Barrows 
Supplement No. 142 (Central and South Africa), p. 1; See also art. 3.6 of the Qatar model PSC of 2002 
which requires good faith and cooperative working relationship between the government and the 
contractor for achieving objectives of the contract. Qatar Model Development and Production Sharing 
Agreement of 2002 between the government of Qatar and Contractor (North Field) Barrows supplement 
(Middle East) No. 155, p. 1,20. 
38 Elisabeth Peden, "Cooperation' in English Contract Law-to Construe or Imply? " 16 Journal of Contract 
Law (2000), p. 56,57. 
39 Simon Deakin, Christel Lane and Frank Wilkinson, Contract Law, "Trust Relations, and Incentives for 
Co-operation: A Comparative Study", in: Simon Deakin and Jonathan Michie, (ed. ), Contracts, Co- 
operation, and Competition. - Studies in Economics, Management and Law, Oxford University Press, 
(1997), p. 106. 
40 Alfred J. Boulos, "Mutuality of Interests between Companies and Governments -Myth or Fact? " Energy 
Law, '90, International Bar Association Series, Graham & Trotman, London, (1990), p. 7. 
41 Terence C. Daintith, "Contract Design and Practice in the Natural Resources Sector", in: Fritz 
Nicklisch (ed. ), The Complex Long-Term Contract (Structures and International Arbitration), Heidelberg 
(1987), p. 165. 
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relationships in contracting parties under a state contract and thus, decrease uncertainty. 
However, an effective cooperation requires a shift in attitude of the parties from narrow 
individual utility maximisation and opportunistic behaviour to the goal of promoting 
community of interest through sustenance of the contractual relationship. 
4.1.4 Fairness 
The concept of fairness has an important role to play in the shared expectation of 
perfonnance of and stability in the contract. Generally speaking, fairness is a nonn that 
municipa courts take into account in detennining the validity of a contract. Fairness in 
the contract is generally expressed in the notion of 'fairness in the exchange', which 
requires that a balance should be struck between fairness and freedom of contract. It is 
now well established that the minimum degree of fairness in the contract should be a 
relevant factor in the enforceability of contracts. To put it differently, durability and 
enforceability of the contractual relationship is dependent upon the rules of the contract 
42 being just and being justly applied . The modern law of contract has witnessed a 
ftindamental shift from adherence to freedom of contract under classical contract to a 
concern with fairness in exchange, which has been manifested in increasing intervention 
by the state and judiciary in the contract on the ground of absence of substantive 
fairness in exchange. For example, the state can impose legislative control on price 
regulation for market stabilisation and to ensure competitiveness, while courts can apply 
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equitable doctrines in order to ensure substantive fairness in the contract. 
The norms of fairness provide an umbrella for a number of doctrmes that 
revolve around the substantive fairness of the exchange and are deeply embedded in 
legal systems. For example, the civil law's notion of 'just contract' and the common law 
doctrine of 'unconscionability' or the doctrine of 'inequality of bargaining power') come 
42 Larry A. DiMatteo, supra note 25, p. 907. 
43 P. S. Atiyah, "Contract and Fair Exchange", 35 UniversIty of Toronto Law Journal (1985), p. 1,3. 
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within the fairness penumbra under which 'freedom of contract' and validity of contract 
can be challenged by the court. 44 The variables of these doctrines have often been 
expressed in well known legal concepts relating to contract like fraud, duress, incapacity 
or undue influence which can be applied by the court to judge the validity of and 
fairness in contract. Fairness as a requirement of contract validity can be expressed both 
in a substantive and procedural sense. Norms of substantive fairness govern bargaining 
solutions or outcomes, while procedural fairness refers to the tactics used to reach an 
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agreement, without respect to the outcome. According to Hugh Collins, three distinct 
concepts of substantive fairness may be encountered: first, in cases involving the 
fairness of the price, the criterion is likely to be one connected to the market price; 
second, for challenges to ancillary terms, it refers to a combination of the ideas of 
balance of advantage and conforinity to reasonable expectations; third, in connection 
with subsequent events which arguably render the contract unfair in its application, the 
comparison lies with the original balance of advantage at the time when the contract 
was fonned . 
46 Procedural fairness refers to the absence of Eraud,, duress, incapacity or 
undue influence in the contractual relationship. An expansive interpretation of 
procedural fairness will also include the duty to cooperate, good faith in negotiations, 
and a duty to adjust the contract in good faith. 
In the context of long-term contracts, fairness is seen as not only the requirement 
of the original arrangement of the contract, but also as a prerequisite over the whole 
duration of the contract. Because the risk of change in the 'rules of the game' may occur 
if the contract is perceived to be fair initially, it may appear to one of the parties to be 
unfair and exploitative subsequently. Thus, the perception of unfairness in the contract 
may provide the justifiable ground for one of the patties for breach of contract. For the 
44 Spencer Nathan Thal, "The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining 
Contractual Unfairness", 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (1988), p. 17,2 1. 
4' See, Epstein, "Unconscionablity: A Critical Reappraisal", 18 Journal of Law and Economics, (1975), p. 
293. 
46 Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract, Third Edition, Butterworths, London, (1997), p. 253. 
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long-term sustainability, negotiation of the petroleum contract should confonn to the 
general standard of fairness. 
In a petroleum contract, fairness should be reflected In the process of negotlatlon 
and the outcome of the contract, e. g., the arrangement of fair government take as well as 
a fair return for the international oil company. An evolving relationship between a 
foreign company and a host government when it is charactensed by the concept of 
fairness can enhance stability of such relationship. A requirement of substantive fairness 
that contractual gains are divided in an equitable manner, can serve the purpose of 
efficiency and cooperation from the standpoint of utility maximisation. 47 
According to Thomas Franck, government's fairness-driven action emanating 
from its political system often appears grossly unfair across the cultural, social and 
political divide separating the investors and the host polity since values and expectation 
of foreign investors emanates from sources other than the political system of the host 
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state and therefore, sharply contrasts with those of the host states . Fairness discourse 
should be used, according to Thomas Franck, as an end to create a high degree of 
mutuality of expectations between the participants in an international investment 
transaction and to formulate a legitimate framework within which future, unanticipated 
disputes can also be addressed through such discourse. In his view, fairness discourse in 
investment agreement involves addressing salient distributive issues and mutuality of 
expectations and establishing operational procedures within which faimess-discourse 
can be continued. 
49 
The lack of substantive fairness in the petroleum contract may lead to the 
following consequences: firstly, the perception that terms and conditions of a particular 
contract are unfair may lead to a unilateral change or abrogation of contract by host 
47 F. H. Buckley, "Three Theories of Substantive Fairness", 19 Hofstra Law Review (1990), p. 33,48. 
48 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, (1995), p. 440. 
49 lbid, p. 440. 
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state irrespective of the fact that the contract is well drafted; secondly, governinent's 
fairness motivated action on the basis of public interest may lead to other kinds of 
interference with contractual rights and resultantly, it can lead to contract instability; 
thirdly, private parties can ask for reviewing or terminating the contractual relationship 
at the later phase of contract perfonnance on the ground of fairness. 
5. Forms of Guarantee of Contract Stability 
5.1. Host State's Measures 
Generally, host States provide guarantees of protection for the foreign investors and the 
stability of investment agreements by legislative guarantees and contractual 
mechanisms in investment agreements. Petroleum contracts in a given country operate 
in a general and broader legislative framework, which consists of commercial law, 
general tax law, labour, safety, and environmental regulations. More specifically, 
investment legislation like investment codes, investment and promotion law and 
petroleum and mining laws does not only provide a basis for the authorisation of 
exploration and forins of contract but also lay down provisions for investment guarantee 
of protection of investment and stability of contract regime. 
5.1.1 Legislative, and Constitutional Guarantees and Policy Statement 
The foreign investment code and legislation of developing countries lays down detailed 
rules and principles governing foreign investment, with a view to attracting foreign 
investment by providing various incentives and guarantees to the foreign investors 
reflecting their need for security and profit on the one hand and to protect national 
interest and economic development of the state by imposing some measures of control 
over foreign investment on the other. Provision for stability of investment agreements is 
commonplace in the investment codes and legislation of many developing countries for 
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encouraging and promoting foreign investment . 
50 States may guarantee stability of the 
petroleum agreement through legislation, policy statement and constitutional provision. 
For example, article 17 (1) of the Federal Law of Russia concerning Production Sharing 
Agreements states: 
The terms and conditions of the agreement shall retain theirforcefor the entire duration of its validity. 
Amendments to the agreement may be made only agreement between the parties and at the request of one 
of the parties in the event of a significant change in circumstances in accordance with the Civil Code of 
the Russian Federation. ' 51 
Some developing countries have also entrenched a stability guarantee in their 
constitutions. 52 Undoubtedly, a constitutional guarantee of stability can offer a greater 
degree of protection from abrogation of these contracts in a meaningftil way as it can 
not be changed by the usual legislative procedure. But only a few countries have 
undertaken such a constitutional guarantee. Stability guarantees of petroleum contract 
and legal arrangements for petroleum development have also specifically been found in 
petroleum legislation. Such legislative assurances of stability are offered by those 
50 See, 1992 Vietnam Foreign Investment Law, article 21 lays down that "in case there is any change in 
the law of Vietnam which may do harms to the interests of .. foreign investors, the State shall have 
adequate measures to guarantee the interest of investors. " Stability guarantee of legislation are also found 
in the investment laws of Ukraine of 1993, (Art. 9), the Azerbaijan law on the Protection of Foreign 
Investment of 1992 (art. 10), Turkmenistan law of 1992 (Art. 20) and Russian law of 1995, which provide 
that the law as it stood at the time of the enterprise's initial registration will remain valid for 10 years 
from the registration date. See also Foreign Economic Contract law of the People's Republic of China art. 
40, March, 21,1985. Art. 57 of the Decree of 2350 of the Kazakhstan on Oil, June 28 of 1995 guarantees 
of contractor's rights-"The protection of contractors' right shall be guarantees in accordance with the 
legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Amendments and additions to said legislation deteriorating the 
position oa Contractor shall not apply to the contracts signed prior to the adoption of such amendments 
and additions. Guaranties established by this Article shall not extend to any amendments to the legislation 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan on defense, national security in the area of ecological security, as well as 
healthcare. " 
51 See, Federal Law 225-FZ 1995 "Concerning Production Sharing Agreement" as amended by Law 19- 
FZ of 7 January, 1999, Barrows Basic Oil Laws and Contracts (Russia and NIS countries) Supplement 
no. 35, p. 99. 
52 The Constitution of Peru of 1993 contains the following general principles on the legal stability and 
guarantees granted to oil investors under the law. Article 62 of the Constitution provides that freedom of 
contract, expressly protected and recognised by the Constitution, guarantees that the parties may reach 
valid agreements pursuant to the rules in force at the time of entering into the relevant contract; and that 
the contractual terms so agreed between the parties can not be modified by laws or other rules, regardless 
of their hierarchy. Article 62 finally provides that the state may establish and furnish guarantees and 
stability by means of contracts with force of law and that such contracts cannot be modified by the 
legislation. This means that these contracts cannot be modified by any law, and even less by other legal 
rules of a lower hierarchy. See Jorge A. Bustamante, "Oil and Investment Legislation in Peru", 6 Oil and 
Gas Law and Taxation Review (1996) pp. 225-226. 
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countries, which have no stable macroeconomIc policles, predictable regulatory 
framework, possibility of political risks, but are in acute need of foreign investment. In 
general, investment and petroleum laws provide three kinds of stability guarantees: 
stability of treatment of foreign investor 53 and stability of legislation 54 and stability of 
the investment agreement as a whole. 
The legislative guarantee of stability may be provided in three ways: firstly by 
expressly containing a provision of stability of legal regime of contract in investment 
law, petroleum laws, decrees, or governmental orders that the applicable law will not be 
changed during the entire period of contract; secondly, ratification of petroleum 
contracts by legislature of the host country 55 ; and thirdly, the promulgation of a special 
law granting supremacy to the contractual provisions of the concession agreement over 
any legislative rules adopted in the future. 56 At first sight, it seems that in questions of 
hierarchy, a legislative guarantee of stability has greater legal value than contractual 
guarantees as part of an individually negotiated agreement by the executive organ of 
state or state enterprise. But, placing investors' reliance for a stability guarantee by 
53 For example, article 18 of the Mauritanian code, which grants long term tax treatment to firms offering 
4 capital importance to the development of the country' and providing evidence of a minimum amount: 
"Long term tax treatment is intended to guarantee to approved firms the stability of all or some tax 
burdens incumbent upon them during a maximum period of twenty-five years, increased where 
appropriate by normal setting up periods of up to five years. During the period of application of the long 
term tax system, no modification may be made to the tax base and collection rules, or to the rates 
provided by this system in favour of the beneficiary firm.... " Cited by Nour Eddine Terki, "The Freezing 
of Law Applicable to Long-Term International Contracts", Journal of International Banking Law, 1991, 
p. 45. 
54 For example, in the Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab Countries", the 
principle of stability has been described as prerequisite for a "secure" investment climate. The Unified 
Agreement seeks to facilitate the introduction of the principle of stability In the domestic legislation and 
legal systems which apply to the investor so as to ensure, in particular, that the Arab investor is not 
exposed to repeated changes in such legislation and system. 
55 In Sierra Leone, all major agreements relating to petroleum and mining projects are ratified by 
Parliament and published as a schedule to the Act. In Azerbaijan which has no legislation on investment 
law on energy sector, and PSC regime do not have the legal status of a contract but each agreement 
signed prior to its implementation requires approval of the parliament and has the status of the law of the 
Azerbaijan. An important provision for the ratification law for each PSA is that specific guarantees are 
given regarding the precedence of the PSA over any future amendments or new legislation. 
56 This trend is followed in Egypt. See, e. g,, Law No. 218 Authonsing the Concession Agreement for 
Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation between the Arab Republic of Egypt, EGPC and SA., AM Oil & 
GAS, Official Gazette, July 27,1995, at 30, quoted in pertinent part in Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "The 
Particularity of the Conflict Avoidance Methods Pertaining to Petroleum Agreements", 11 Foreign 
Investment Law Journal (1996), p. 272,274-75. 
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legislation can be somewhat precarious as the State can repeal the relevant legislation 
and it cannot be held to have bound itself vis-a- vis other states or foreign companies by 
including 'guarantees' in its laws. Moreover, the generality of these legislative measures 
on stability can undennine their efficacy. It has rightly been pointed out: 
"Their non-specific content, as well as their unilateral character-for they are usually contained In 
constitutional or statutory provisions or in policy statements-diminish greatly their practical importance 
for the foreign investor. The main significance of such provisions lies in their representing formal 
expressions of an attitude favourable to private foreign investment and in their constituting a suitable 
background for more specific measures. 1957 
However, these legislative guarantees of stability are not without having some 
legal value and significance because these guarantees are reflected in model and actual 
petroleum contracts. Legislative provision for a stability guarantee makes the state a 
credible commitment to a potential investor. The legal significance of the legislative 
guarantees lies in the fact that many petroleum producing developing countries provide 
only legislative guarantee and IOCs rely on such stability guarantees for the protection 
of their investment in the absence of a contractual guarantee. According to Roland 
Brown, ratification by a legislative instrument should be seen as only marginally 
relevant to the issue of stability. 58 Because, the promulgation of a special law giving the 
concession agreement the binding legal force necessary to secure the supremacy of the 
vested contractual rights or legislative approval of the contract regime does not alter the 
contractual character of the petroleum contract or convert them into statutory rules. 59 
But ratification of contract by legislature has more stability implication than 
general legislative offer of stability since it gives additional sanctity to the individually 
negotiated contract. Such legislative approval of the contractual regime may provide an 
additional safeguard to the foreign investor since revocation of such contract involves 
57 A. A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, Columbia University Press, New York 
and London, 0 962), p. 122. 
58 Roland Brown, "Contract Stability in International Petroleum Operations", The CTC Reporter, No. 29 
(Spring 1990). p. 3. 
59Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, supra note 56, p. 276. See also, Henry Caftan, supra note 3, p. 29. 
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further legislation which involves a higher level of political authority to change the 
contract than the ordinary executive power like an executive decree to change it. 
Furthermore, legislative approval of contract may attach more enforceability to the 
contract when it is concluded between state enterprise and IOCs. The reference to 
stability in domestic laws can also facilitate the insertion of a stabilisation clause in the 
contract. Such legislative guarantee and policy statements may be valuable to a potential 
foreign investor in so far as he, by analysing them, may achieve a reasonable knowledge 
of the political climate of the country. 60 In brief, legislative guarantee of the stability of 
a petroleum contract can enhance the stability of a petroleum contract by elevating the 
contract to a higher level in the national legal system and can strengthen the binding 
force of the contractual mechanism of stability. 
5.1.2 Contractual Mechanisms of Stability 
Contract as a legal arrangement is generally preferred over the legislative framework by 
the IOCs for securing stability in host governiment/company relations. As govennnent 
may revoke or change legislation, legislative frameworks tend to be less stable. On the 
other hand, contract as a specific legal instrument dealing with the relationship and with 
negotiated terms reflects a shared understanding and bargaining strength of the parties 
to reach at clearly understood goals of parties. Being individual in character, contract 
can be designed solely to fit into the specific requirement of investment involved. 
Generally, contract is negotiated on the basis of a model contract prepared in each 
country; and terms and conditions of a model contract can be varied in order to tailor it 
in particular circumstances. 
60 Ingrid Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing Countries, Gower Press, (1973), 
pp. 27-29. 
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Furthermore, petroleum contracts usually contain diverse provisions that aim at, 
i. nter alia, stability in the legal relationship between the parties .61A state may 
pronounce sanctity of the fundamental provisions of the contract prohibiting unilateral 
change of such provisions. 62 But the most important means of contractual guarantee of 
stability is stabilising applicable law of the contract, which is fonnulated through 
stabilisation clause. The other contractual mechanisms of stability include a dispute 
settlement clause, an applicable law clause and flexible mechanisms like renegotiation 
and automatic adjustment, review and revision, and adaptation clause. Stabilisation 
clauses intend to stabilise the terms of the agreement and try to insulate the contract 
from a future change of legislation that may pose a negative effect on the contractual 
relationship. The dispute settlement clause which submits the petroleum agreements to 
international arbitration, also acts as stabilisation technique to the extent that it 
neutralises the host state's jurisdictional power in resolving contractual disputes 63 and 
by removing uncertainty regarding the forum of dispute resolution. Its availability in the 
petroleum contract can reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of political nsk as it 
provides that disputes will be settled by neutral third party and a successful arbitral 
award against a concerned state by an international tribunal may have some negative 
impact on reputation on such state and in attracting foreign investment by it. 
6' For example, article 7 of the Establishment Agreement dated 14 October 1992 between the Republic of 
Niger and Niger Hunt Oil Company (Djado area) provides: The State guarantees to the company, for the 
duration of this agreement, the stability of the general, juridical, economical, financial and fiscal 
conditions as they have been determined by the legislative and regulations in force on the date of 
signature of this Agreement, as well as the provisions of this Agreement. " Printed in Barrows supplement 
(South and Central AErica) No. 13 1, p. 12. 
62 For example, clause 12 of the Thailand Concession agreement of 2003 states that government will not 
unilaterally change the bases concerning the concessionaire's rights, benefits, rights and duties in the 
following matters: the use of land as exploration blocks and production areas; bringing alien personnel, 
machinery, equipment, and tools; relinquishment of areas; exemption from certain taxes, duties and 
levies; pricing of petroleum; export of petroleum and retaining and remitting abroad money in foreign 
currency and liability to royalty. Petroleum Concession No. 7/2546/64 awarded to Nucoastal (Thailand) 
Limited on 17 July, 2003, Barrows (Asia and Australasia) No. 161, p. 106. 
63 Bertrand Montembault, "The Stabilisation of State Contracts Using the Example of Oil Contracts: A 
Return of the Gods of Olympia? " International Business Law Journal, No. 6, (2003), p. 593,603. 
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An applicable law clause assures certainty regarding which law will be 
applicable to the contract among the various legal systems e. g. international law, trans- 
national law or law of host state. Although the above contractual mechanisms are 
conceptually distinct from each other, they play an important role in stabilising the 
host/company relationship. These contractual mechanisms for stability in contract will 
be analysed in more detail in the chapters to follow. 
5.2. Stability Measures by the Home State and Multilateral Institutions 
Measures of the home states of the foreign investor and multilateral institutions to 
mitigate political risk also play an important role in stabilising the individual agreement 
as well as helping to create a stable investment climate in the developing world. 
Although their efforts of political risk mitigation strategy primarily aim at the protection 
of private investment, these can contribute to the enhancing of contract stability in an 
indirect way. The detailed analysis of form and content of these measures is beyond the 
scope of the present work, but it will be pertinent to highlight the stability implications 
of these measures in brief. Generally, a home government's and multilateral 
institutions' undertaking towards protection of foreign investment and stability in 
investment agreements take the following forms: 
Firstly, the developed states and multilateral agencies afford protection of 
investment and contractual commitments made between states and investors under the 
framework of bilateral and multilateral investment treaty (for example, Energy Charter 
Treaty, 1994). The bilateral and multilateral investment treaties emerged to circumvent 
the uncertainty in the international law relating to the protection of foreign investment. 
These treaties aim at a stable basis of legal relationships between the capital exporting 
and the capital importing countries and to afford security and protection of private 
investment by extending a number of legal guarantees such as national and most- 
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favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, constant protection and security 
of investments in accordance with international law, prohibition of arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures, and dispute settlement by neutral arbitration. In addition to 
their role of protection and promotion of foreign investment, they also advance some 
measures of stability in the treatment of foreign investors under an investment 
agreement through disciplining the future conduct of a host State. The presence of a 
treaty obligation of the host states regarding the protection of investment can deter them 
from recourse to politically motivated action. 
Secondly, they offer an investment insurance scheme for encouraging the flow 
of private capital into developing countries and to afford protection to such investment 
64 by providing a guarantee of compensation to the private investor against political risk . 
Public Insurance schemes sponsored by individual home governments and by 
multilateral institutions against political risk are widely applied as a risk management 
strategy and a conflict avoidance tool in the petroleum industry. 65 Public insurance 
schemes cover political risks of nationalisation, non-convertibility of foreign exchange, 
expropriation, political violence and sponsored by home state, private insurers and 
66 
multilateral agency in order to reduce the foreign investor's exposure to political risk . 
By offering insurance schemes, they tend to exert pressure upon a host government 
against excessive and unwarranted intervention by the host state in the contractual 
functioning of the agreement. Apart from these, private insurance is also prevailing to 
64 M. Rowat, "Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: 
The Cases of ICSID and MIGA", 33 Harvard International Law Journal (1992), p. 103. 
65 The main sources of public insurance are: The World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA); the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporations, the various national insurance 
scheme (e. g. OPIC-U. S. A; ECGD-UK; EDC-Canada; GIGS-Germany; MITI-Japan, etc) Instances of 
private insurance are: Lloyds of London (U. K) and the American International Group (U. S. A. ). See, Abba 
Kolo, "Managing Political Risks in Transnational Investment Contracts", CEPMLP internet Journal, 
www. cepn-ilp-o , vol. 
1, article 4. 
66 Paul E. Comeaux and N. Steephan Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law, 
Oceana Publications INC., Dobbs Ferry, New York, (1997), p. 15 1. 
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protect investment contract from various kinds or risks as well as potential loss that may 
67 be suffered by company. 
Thirdly, they often secure financial participation in the investment projects 
including those of petroleum development. Through project financing, home countries, 
bilateral and multilateral financing and investment agencies provide equity against 
future cash flow and share the some of the risks of investors. Project finance becomes a 
valuable strategy of risk management and risk sharing as it plays an important role in 
lowering the scope of political risks by deterring the host country's politically motivated 
measures targeted to investment agreements. 68 It has been correctly observed that: 
"The fundamental role of national and multilateral financial institutions is precisely to help 
reinforce the credibility of coninlitments embodied in international investment agreements. While 
their presence may involve the commitment of some capital (or the provision of some insurance), it 
is their participation per se that is important, their stake in guarding against fundamental 
transformations or abrogation, their influence as "prominent victims" if host authorities behave 
precipitously. 9,69 
The financial involvement of multilateral institutions and other lenders in the fonn of 
project finance can enhance a host country commitment to the investment contract and 
mitigate political risk to some extent as the abrogation of such a contract by the host 
state can invoke punitive sanctions against it by project financiers. 
Fourthly, western capitalist states, notably, the USA, frequently use direct or 
indirect political pressure, formal economic sanctions through law, indirect sanctions by 
denying new loans, cessation of aid or delaying new aid authorisations to the countries,, 
67 As noted by one commentator, 'private insurers may be willing to include additional risk beyond those 
covered by public insurers, such as terrorisrn, contract frustration, business interruption, licence 
cancellation, or contract repudiation, as well as an enhanced definition of net loss. " George K. Foster, 
"Managing Expropriation Risks in the Energy Sector: Steps for Foreign Investors to Minimise their 
Exposure and Maximise Prospects for Recovery when Taking Occur" 23 Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law (2005), 36,50. 
68 Theodore H. Moran, "Lessons in the Management of International Political Risk from the Natural 
Resources and Private Infrastructure Sectors", in: Theodore H. Moran (ed), Managing International 
Political Risk, Blackwell, (1998), p. 7 1. See also, Andrea L. MacDonald, "Challenges in the Financing of 
International Oil Operations", in: Theodore H. Moran (ed. ), Managing International Political Risk, 
Blackwell, (1998), p. 12 1. 
69Theodore H. Moran, supra note 68, p. 82. 
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which expropriate or interfere with foreign property. They can also exercise their loan- 
denying influence in multilateral financing institutions, in order to deter pnvate capital 
flow and to maintain a stable property regime for foreign investors . 
70 The imposition of 
economic sanctions by many capital exporting States on companies that block all 
commercial relations through import and export embargo and boycotting all channels of 
transport and communications with host states have been widespread practice in the last 
decades. 71 Thus, the fear of a backlash of contract breaches by host states also plays a 
role in stabilising the contractual relationship on the apprehension that some measure of 
economic sanctions may be imposed by the investor's home state for such breaches. 
The above measures of stability by home governments or financial institutions 
that represent external mechanisms of stability are shaped by the legal order extraneous 
to the contract and law of the host state. They play in important role in maintaining the 
contract stability by external disciplining of future state conduct having expropriatory 
effect on state contracts. However, these measures are indirect in nature since these 
cannot be directly invoked by the contractor, a private entity. 
6. Summation 
This chapter noted that petroleum contracts contain many of the typical structural 
elements of long -term contracts like extended duration, uncertainties, risk and 
consequently require a different of set of assumptions from private contracts, 
commercial transaction and even short-term state contracts. The requirement of stability 
in petroleum contracts is a direct consequence of these factors. Stability in the 
70Hickenlooper Amendment of USA, which Congress enacted to mandate the cessation of aid to any 
country that seizes American property and does not take any steps toward paying 'ftill' compensation 
within six months. See, Charles Lipson, Standing Guard. - Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries, Berkeley, University of California Press, (1985), Kenneth A. Rodman, Sanctity 
Versus Sovereignty The United States and the Nationalization of Natural Resource Investments, 
Columbia University Press, New York, (1988), pp. 10-11. 
71 See details on risk of sanction in oil industry, Thomas Walde, "Managing the Risk of Sanction in the 
global Oil and Industry: Corporate Responses under Political, Legal and Commercial Pressures", 36 
Texas International Law Journal, (2001), pp. 183-229. 
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contractual relationship should be seen essentially as a dynamic phenomenon that 
necessarily accommodates future pressure for change and resolves tension between 
flexibility and certainty. The preservation of stability in the contractual relationship can 
be approached from the following ways: Firstly, stability in the contract requires an 
appropnate contract design that should be reflected in the specific form and content of 
the contract. The stability of the petroleum contract depends to a significant extent upon 
an efficient risk distribution system within the contract. An open-ended approach to 
contract design can enhance flexibility in risk distribution and ensure adjustment of 
contractual rights and obligations in the changed context. In this regard, the dynamic 
notion of contractual equilibrium can provide a valuable tool to evaluate the changing 
expectation of the parties that occurs through a change of circumstances and to judge 
the existing context of contract. 
Secondly, stability should be approached by non-legal norms like trust, 
knowledge, reputation, cooperation and commitment to compliance in order to ensure a 
durable and lasting relationship. 
Thirdly, in order to ensure stability in the contract role of efficient risk 
management strategy to deal with mainly non-commercial risks it should be highly 
appreciated by the contracting parties. Petroleum contracts operate in the overall legal, 
cultural and institutional setting of the host state. Risk management strategy consists of 
both contractual and non-contractual mechanisms involving the host states' and 
investors' home states' legal and policy measures. 
Fourthly, a moral ordering of the contract in terms of its conformity with a 
general standard of fairness and a reflection of fairness in tenns and conditions of the 
contract not only with reference to the initial contract formation but also to the expected 
outcome can facilitate contract stability. The parties' objective understanding of fairness 
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and its application in contract negotiation and contract adjustment can help to achieve 
their shared objectives from the contract. 
The next chapter will discuss political risk factors which are considered as the 
main instability factor in petroleum contracts and then, it will review the relevant legal 
principles on protection of foreign investment that are invoked in cases of unilateral 
change or abrogation of petroleum contract caused by actualisation of those political 
risks. 
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Chapter Two 
Political Risks in the Petroleum Industry and Protection of Foreign 
Investors: A Review of Legal Principles 
1. Introduction 
The stability in petroleum contracts depends much on their ability to survive political 
risks to which foreign investors may be exposed by the host state. The political risk to 
which foreign investors may be exposed - is usually seen as resulting from the 
phenomenon of an asymmetrical relationship between the host state and the foreign 
company as explained in chapter one. The perception of political risk is a significant 
constituent of the investment climate in a given State. Political nsk being assumed to be 
country- specific phenomenon as it is shaped by social, economic situations, political 
risk perception may vary from country to country. 
Petroleum companies usually make a political risk assessment before 
committing any investment and they use indicators such as political stability and 
investment climate, prospective change at the political and policy levels and past history 
of expropnation and nationalisations in making such a risk assessment. They attempt to 
quantify political risks in terms of their financial impact on the investment. In fact, the 
perception of political risk is often taken into an investment decision, which can be 
reflected in adding a risk premium to the envisaged rate of return on investment or 
demanding a faster payback period in a bid to mitigate the financial impact of 
actualisation of such political risk. 
This chapter intends to explore the phenomenon of political risk in the 
petroleum industry and discusses the kinds of political risk the petroleum industry faces 
today. In view of the increasing significance of regulation as a significant component of 
in the petroleum political risks, it examines the scope and context of regulation 
in the light of relevant petroleum arbitral and investment awards. Then it proceeds to 
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deal with principles of legal protection of foreign investors under international law and 
deliberates on how traditional international law principles relating to the protection of 
the foreign investor have been challenged by the developing states and these norms 
have been redefined by the arbitral awards and contractual practice in modem times. 
2.1 Defining Political Risks 
The issue of political risk remains a matter of continuing concern for foreign investors 
despite the fact that a state may assume the undertaking of a formal commitment to the 
stability of contract. In essence, political risk is a governmental interference with the 
operation of natural resource development projects that often leads to conflict between 
the corporate goal of profitability and public interest goal. Political risk has been 
defined broadly as contingencies generated by political events and processes, which 
have a negative effect on the magnitude and distribution of cash flows. These 
contingencies are usually generated by the forces external to the industry and involve 
some sort of governmental action or inaction. ' Political risks are different from mere 
commercial uncertainties or acts of nature. Rather, they conjure up the spectre of 
arbitrary or capricious behaviour on the part of the host government, which will in some 
way threaten foreign investment. 2 Political risks include dramatic actions of government 
like nationalisation, expropriation, cancellation of contract, refusal to perfonn contract, 
which may ultimately lead to abrogation of foreign property or may pose a threat to the 
profitability of the proj eCt. 3 Political risks also include more subtle forms of 
governmental interference, such as arbitrary increases of tax rates, discriminatory 
actions, forced renegotiation, currency inconvertibility or non-transferability, 
1 Louis T. Wells, Jr., "Good and Fair Competition: Does the Foreign Direct Investor Face Still Other 
Risks in Emerging Markets? " in: Theodore H. Moran, (ed. ), Managing International Political Risk, 
Blackwell, (1998), p. 15. 
2 John Kinha, "Investing in Developing Countries: Minirriisation of Political Risk", I Journal of Energy 
Natural Resources Law (1983) p. 89,90. 
3 See, Theodore H. Moran, "Political and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment in Developing 
Countries: Introduction and Overview", CEPMLP Internet Journal, www. cepmlp. org/joumal/html 
58 
export/import control, price control, change of laws or regulations, devaluations, 
restricting investors' access to necessary facilities and supplies, restriction of 
repatriation of profits, pressuring the investor to sell the enterprise at unfairly low rates, 
4 
and imposing local labour requirement . It may also include activities of other organ of 
state such as discriminatory or arbitrary interpretation of existing laws by judiciary in 
favour of the host state or local companies or inconsistent application of laws by 
regulatory authorities. 
In defining political risk, it is necessary to make a distinction between the 
political risk generated by political events including revolution, cancellation of contract 
by successor government, violent conflict, which are more dramatic in nature and 
governmental regulations in the form of legislation, regulations, which are less dramatic 
in nature and treated as non-nal functions of government. However, political risk should 
be distinguished from mere political instability involving the political dynamics in a 
host state like change of governments. 
A traditional but important distinction made between different kinds of political 
risks is between political risks caused by direct and indirect taking of property of 
foreign investor. Direct 'taking' denotes ways and means by which a sovereign state can 
take legal title of property through out right nationalisation or expropriation, which 
results in deprivation of ownership5, while 'indirect taking' mainly occurs through 
actions which prevent the investor from exercising rights to property or deprive his 
4 In recent times, many of the investment disputes under oil and gas agreements have arisen out of such 
subtle way of state interference. For example, in Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador (London Court of International Arbitration AdmiMstered Case No. UN 3467) (final 
award dated I" July 2004), the arbitration filed by company against the Republic of Ecuador arising from 
the state authority's decision to end reimbursements of value added taxes collected on oil exports. While 
the arbitral tribunal rejected Occidental's contention that the decision to end the reimbursements 
constituted an expropriation, it concluded that the decision was discriminatory and violated the 
obligations of fair and equitable treatment and fully protection and security set forth in the US-Ecuador 
Bilateral Investment Treaty. See, http: //Ita. law. uvic. ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFmalAward 
- 
00 I. pdf 
' 'Nationalisation' refers to a taking of foreign owned property as part of a general program of social or 
economic reform, with compensation often being provided, although this is not always the case. 
'Expropriation' refers to a taking of an individual piece of property for a particular purpose, whether 
foreign-owned or owned by a national of the expropriating state. 'Confiscation' is often used to describe a 
taking without compensation and discriminatorily targeted a group of foreign investors because of their 
race or nationality. 
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contractual rights, though he may retain nominal ownership of his investment. 6 Indirect 
taking may occur by de facto expropriation caused by single act or by creeping 
expropriation that refers to a series of actions that increasingly impose restrictions and 
controls on foreign investment enterprises so as to make it difficult for them to carry out 
the business. 7 There is no substantive difference between de facto or creeping 
expropriation in terms of effect of actions constitutive of such indirect taking. However, 
the temporal element in creeping expropriation may give rise to an intricate problem as 
to the determination of an identifiable point of time when it occurs because the indirect 
diminution of the value of property may be so gradual in eroding the property rights that 
foreign investors may not be able to exercise a legal remedy in appropriate time. 8 
Over the past decades, indirect taking of property through regulatory 
interference or a change of rules by the host government has emerged as the dominant 
fon-n of state interference with foreign investment. On the other hand, the phenomenon 
of outright expropriation of foreign private property has declined in frequency due to 
various factors such as the end of the decolonisation process, the emergence of modem 
contractual arrangements in the petroleum and mineral sector by which ownership of 
these enterprises was transferred to the host state, developing countries' perception of 
6 See, award of Middle East Cement Shipping in which dispute concerned an alleged expropriation by 
Egypt of Middle East Cement's interests in a cement distribution enterprise through decree prohibiting 
import of all types of Portland cement, which resulted in a halt of the activities of the Middle East Cement 
branch of Egypt. The tribunal held that Egypt's decree prohibiting the import had the effect tantamount to 
expropriation although the investor could exercise nominal ownership of the rights. Middle East Cement 
Shipping and Handling vs. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID case No. ARB/99/6) 18 ICSID Review- 
Foreign Investment Law Journal (2003), p. 602, at p. 628, para. 107; See also, Metalclad award where the 
claimant, a U. S. investor was refused a building authorisation for a landfill plant from the local authorities 
in Mexico through proclamation of 'Ecological decree', despite the investor had received guarantees from 
the federal authorities that it had acquired all necessary licenses In order to make this investment. The 
tribunal held that the Mexican government had indirectly expropriated Metalclad's investment. Metalclad 
Corporation Vs. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/1, Award, 30 August, 2000,16 ICSID 
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal (2001), 168, at p. 189, para. 70. 
7 On distinction between de facto and creeping expropriation, see Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed vs. 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/00/2, award, 29 May 2003, printed in 43 ILM 133, 
para. 114. See also, Rudolph Dolzer, "Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property", 1 ICSID Review - 
Foreign Investment Law Journal (1986) p. 41,63. 
8 Rosalyn Higgins, "The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law", 
Recuell des cours, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1982 (111), p. 353, Stephen J. Korbmi, 
"Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestments in LDCs", 34 International Organisation (1980), p. 65,68. 
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negative consequences of expropriation like resorting to arbitration, tennination of 
foreign aid, loss of credibility in attracting foreign direct investment, movement towards 
liberalisation and privatisation, realisation of positive impact of foreign investment upon 
national economy, and the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties providing 
enhanced protection to foreign investors, and the development of risk mitigation 
strategies by private investors. 9 
Historically, the petroleum sector is well-known as an area of state intervention 
due to its strategic character and its potential role in the overall development process 
and its use as a major instrument of public policy. 10 For a variety of reasons, the 
petroleum project can assume political dimensions and is susceptible to the political 
dynamics of the host state: 
-the magnitude of the undertaking which often can have important internal and external 
economic effects; 
-the duration of the projects which can outlast periods of fundamental political and 
social change; 
-the irreversibility of the extraction of the country's non-renewable resources; 
-the creation of export-oriented industry; 
-highly developed economic enclaves in otherwise underdeveloped areas; and 
-the historically founded image of foreign petroleum and mining investments. 
" 
9 See also, Detlev F. Vagts, "Foreign Investment Risk Reconsidered: The View from the 1980s, " 2 ICSID 
Reveiw-FILJ, (1987), pp. 1-18 (discussing various aspects of political risks short of direct expropriation 
since 1980s. ) 
10 For example, article 302 of the Constitution of Venezuela of Dec. 15,1999 states: "The State reserves, 
through appropriate Organic Laws and for reasons of national interest, the petroleum activity and other 
industries, exploitations, services, and goods of public interests and strategic character. The State will 
promote the national refining (for treating) of basic products derived from the exploitation of non- 
renewable natural resources, With the objective of assimilating, creating, or innovating technologies; 
generating employment and econornic growth; and creating wealth and public well-being. " See, Uisdean 
R. Vass, Leopoldo Escobar, "Venezuela's New Constitution gives rise to new legal issues on 011, Gas 
Investment", Oil and Gas Journal, April 10,2000, p. 27. 
11 Fabian G. v. Schlabrendorff, "Political Conditions in Developing Countries", in: Christian Kirchner et 
al, Mining Ventures in Developing Countries, Vol. I (English version by William J. Mahoney), Kluwer, 
Deventer, (1979), p. 39. 
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Political risk may also occur due to potential financial uncertainties surrounding the 
contract. As the project progresses, a host of initial assumptions and projections by the 
parties relating to costs and revenues may be changed. For instance, if geological 
conditions prove more favourable than expected or the price rises, the investor may reap 
greater profits than anticipated and then the host government can raise questions about 
the fairness of the original agreement and can have recourse to a forced renegotiation of 
the contract. 
The nature and forms of political risks have undergone evolutionary change in 
the course of time. Apart from traditional modes of political risks mentioned above, new 
forms of political risks are emerging in a rapidly changing world posing a threat to the 
stability of petroleum contract. The new forms of political risk include ethnic and 
religious tensions, political opposition to the foreign investment, terrorist attacks, civil 
war and rebellions which may affect petroleum operations, orgamsed crime, and 
increasing activism of national and international stakeholders demanding accountability 
of multinational corporations. Corruption appears to be another important political risk 
factor in investing in petroleum development in both developing countries and 
economies in transition. Petroleum contracts entered into through bribery to the 
government officials or autocratic government can be cancelled or amended by the 
successive government on the ground that the contract is more favourable to the foreign 
companies. Corruption in these countries is increasingly treated as a barrier to foreign 
investment as it increases transaction costs, makes procedures for licensing and tax 
more unpredictable and can deny the protection of law for property ng ts. 12 
Environmental regulatory change and imposition of new liability for 
environmental degradation by the company has emerged as a significant risk factor in 
12 See Sandy Markwick, "Trends in Political Risks for Corporate Investors", in: Theodore H. Moran, 
(ed. ), Managing International Political Risk, Blackwell, (1998), p. 44-56; Thomas W. Waelde, "Law, 
Contract and Reputation in International Business: What Works", 2 Business Law International, (2002), 
p. 291. 
62 
the petroleum industry in the last two decades. Moreover, in the modem context, 
sources of political risk may not necessarily be generated from the traditional host 
governments' action but rather may originate from the wide ranging sources like 
activities of the non-state actors such as NGOs, terrorists and revolutionaries, labour 
unions, uman rights and enviromnental groups, indigenous people, which are beyond 
the control of state authority. Many of these new kinds of political risks may be inspired 
by the negative perception that companies are not socially responsible for their 
activities, or economic benefits of the project is not shared equitably with the affected 
communities which brings inequality in the society. The un-conventional political risks 
generated by the non-state actors pose new challenges to the foreign investors because 
neither these risks can be addressed by the traditional legal principles of investment 
protection or the state authorities can be made responsible for damage caused to a 
foreign investor. These risks perception and the possible ways of mitigating such risks 
have been dealt with in chapters six and seven in Part three of this study. 
In the realm of indirect 'taking' of property, most of the governmental 
interference with private property takes place through government's pervasive 
regulatory power. Given the magnitude of the role of regulation in interference with 
property rights, it is necessary to focus on the scope and justification of regulation. 
2.2 Scope and Justification of Regulation 
Regulatory risk implies the probability of governmental regulation to affects property 
and contractual rights of private individuals. Thus, regulatory risk can be best described 
as interference with property rights by regulation opposed to physical interference. 
Regulatory risk can turn into regulatory taking when regulation affects the economic 
viability of a project or encroaches upon the property rights of a foreign investor. 
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Regulation has been defined as the "public administering' policing of a private 
activity with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest. ")13 Regulation can 
interfere with property rights by governing, altering, controlling, guiding, regulating the 
private property or activity in some way. 14 In most of the developing countries and 
economies in transition, regulation is central to the governance and political system. So 
far as the scope of regulation is concerned, regulations may broadly be distinguished 
from social and economic points of view. Social regulation is concerned with public 
interest, which deals with inter alia matters of health and safety, environmental 
protection, and consumer protection. On the other hand, economic regulation deals with 
disciplining the market conditions by the prevention of market failure or controlling 
industries with monopolistic tendencies. ' 5 
Generally, the philosophical and legal basis of regulation may be attributed to 
four principal reasons: First of all, States enjoy inherent power to enact law and regulate 
their economies. Foreign investment and international law also recognises a broad 
competence of States to regulate their economies. 16 
Secondly, the concept of the welfare state, wherein the role of government in 
relation to maximise well-being of the people is gaining an increasing acceptance. In 
recent years, government intervention in the industrial and commercial life of a nation 
has become commonplace. In both developed and developing countries, it is perceived 
that the State should intervene in the market place in order to restore justice and equity 
and to obviate menace of excessive capitalism. Regulatory intervention is considered as 
the primary role of the State for the maintenance of public order and security, for 
13 Barry M. Mitnick, The Political Economy ofRegulation, Columbia University Press, New York, 
(1980), p. 4. 14 lbid, p. 2. 
15 Anthony 1. Ogus., Regulation. - Legal Form and Economic Theory, Clarendon Press: Oxford, (1994), pp. 
4-5. 
16 See UN General Assembly Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over natural resources of Resolution 
1803(XVII), the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties states that each state has the right to 
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with 
its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and priorities. 
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correction of market failures, as well as for the furtherance of social, political and 
economic Policy. 
17 
Thirdly, there is a growing understanding and recognition of the 'social 
function' of property, that property should promote certain social ends. The social 
function of property manifests its public dimension (jus publicum), which denotes that 
property can be subject to the "public right. " The public dimension of property can be 
distinguished from its private dimension, which embraces elements of private 
ownership (jus persona). The public dimension of property legitimises the state's role in 
restricting private uses that would cause a negative impact on society. So, the concept of 
the social function of property imposes some degree of limit of the right of ownership 
for the serving common interests of individuals and community. 18 In the LIAMCO 
award, the tribunal in discussing the historical evolution of the concept of property, laid 
emphasis on the "social function" of property to the effect that property is to be 
"subservient to the public interest of the Community represented by the State" and the 
"old sacred character of property has become subject to the influence of social 
objectives" both in domestic and international law. " 19 The tribunal continued: "natural 
resources, in general, do not belong any more to the owner of the land, but to the 
Community represented by the State, as a privilege of its sovereignty. 5ý20 The tribunal 
held that "the right of property, including the incorporeal property of concession rights, 
is inviolable in principle, subject to the requirements of its social function and public 
"See, Gunther Jaenicke, "Consequences of a Breach of an Investment Agreement Governed by 
International Law, by General Principles of Law, or by Domestic law of the Host State", in Dicke, D. C. 
(ed) : Foreign Investment in the Present and New International Economic Order, vol. I (Proceedings of 
ILA Conference, Vienna, 1987). See also Theodore H. Moran, supra note 3. 
" Seidl-Hohenveldem, "The Social Function of Property and Property Protection in Present-day 
International Law", in: Frits Kalshoven, Pieter Jan Kuyper and Johan G. Lammers, (eds), Essays on the 
Development of the International Legal Order in memory of Haro F Van Panhuys, SIJTHOFF & 
NOORDHOFF, (1980), pp. 77-97. The author claims that social function property is a general principle 
of law recognised by civilised nation and has been recognised in modem discourse of human rights 
through various human rights treaties. 
19 LIAMCO Award, 1977,62 ILR, p. 184. 
20 LIAMCO, ibid, p. 185. 
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well being. ). )2 
1 The notion of a social function of property is now well embedded in 
national laws and constitutions of many developing countries. 
Fourthly, the regulatory power of the State may also derive from the investment 
and natural resource development agreements which may spell out that preservation of 
environment, safety, welfare to be regulated by the law of the host state. The scope of 
the contractual provisions may be defined with reference to the relevant laws of the host 
countries. 
2.3. Dilemma of Regulation 
Social regulatory intervention in the natural resource industry in many developing 
States poses a dilemma of protecting private property on one hand and to regulate it for 
the perceived social well-being on the other. Dolzer notes this dilemma in the following 
way: 
"A basic inclination to support the private sector and at the same time to regulate private property 
has been a characteristic trait of modem states both in the Western hemisphere and in the Third 
world. " 
22 
This can also be explained by the fact that the boundary between the govenunent's 
legitimate right of regulation and the legitimate interest of the foreign investor in the 
protection of its rights is difficult to define as the reasonableness of regulation depends 
upon the social context of property rights and the legal tradition of a particular country. 
In general, there are some broad and established criteria for the determination of a 
reasonable regulation, which are non-discrimination, public purpose and respect for the 
relevant treaty standard. In fact, in the identification process of legitimate regulation, the 
issue of public purpose behind the governmental action appears to be a recurrent theme. 
The public purpose has no precise meaning; rather it conjures up governmental actiong 
21 Ibid, p. 196. 
22 Rudolf Dolzer, supra note 7, p. 41-43. 
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which serves the broader social interest in contrast to the private one. For example, 
government's inherent right to pass legislation of general application relating to public 
health, safety, moral or welfare is not considered as regulation for taking purposes 
though it may affect incidentally property and contractual rights. 23 In such 
circumstances, regard has to be given to, whether these regulations are undertaken in 
good faith and on non-discrimination prmciples, irrespective of the fact that they run 
counter to specific contractual and legal undertakings of protection of foreign 
investment. Under international law, these governmental measures are not considered to 
constitute indirect taking because of the legitimate and public purpose behind such 
regulations. 
However, the concept of public purpose is essentially a matter, whose contour is 
to be defined with reference to the standard of national laws. Since the perception of 
public purpose may vary depending upon the social and economic context and the 
public value system of a State, the concept of public interest has always a question 
begging character. Determination of "public interest" remains always within the domain 
of the domestic court of the host state and it can hardly be challenged by an 
international tribunal. In Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the Iran-US Claims tribunal acknowledged it: "a precise definition of the 'public 
purpose' for which an expropriation may be lawfully decided has neither been agreed 
upon in international law nor even suggested"24 and also held that "as a result of the 
modem acceptance of the right to nationalise, the terni 'public purpose' is broadly 
interpreted, and that States, in practice, are granted extensive discretion. , 25 
23 See also Vaughan Lowe, "Regulation or Expropriation? " 55 Current Legal Problems (2002) p. 447. 
According to him: "neither general measures that only accidentally affect investments, nor measures that 
discharge a government's obligations to achieve a reasonable reconciliation between competing interests 
within a society, should be regarded as takings. " pp. 460 -61. 
24 Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 15 Iran-U. S. Claim Tribunal Report (1987-11), p. 
189,233. 
25 Ibid, p. 233. 
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In determining what constitutes a proper regulation, reference sometimes has 
been made to the concepts of eminent domain and the police power of the government 
to differentiate between govenu-nental regulations according to their purposes. The 
exercise of eminent domain and the police power by a state have different legal 
implications on state contracts. 26 Generally, the power of eminent domain is the power 
of government to acquire private property, whether tangible or intangible in nature, with 
the duty to compensate the owner, which is seen as an inherent attribute to the 
sovereignty. Eminent domain also includes the power to acquire rights of a private party 
in a contract, provided judicially determined compensation is paid. On the other hand, 
the concept of police power, which is to be exercised by the state for the welfare of the 
public as a means of regulating the activities of private entities, do not involve any 
obligation on the part of the government to compensate. Therefore, the most significant 
factor in understanding whether an indirect taking through regulation takes place or not 
will be decided on the fact whether the state's legislation in question falls within the 
scope of its 'police power' or 'eminent domain'. 
The dichotomy of these two competing ideas is sometimes clarified by 
discussing domestic jurisprudence on taking of property, most notably with reference to 
constitutional jurisprudence on taking in the USA. The Fifth Amendment of the US 
Constitution which holds: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation", refers to the eminent domain doctrine and the just compensation 
requirement for taking of property. This 'Taking clause' of the USA's constitution 
limits the govemment's ability to undermine the profitability of private property and 
this principle is considered as an implicit term in contractual obligations. 27 On the other 
hand 
, it is also equally recognised 
in the USA that general legislation passed for the 
protection of public health, public safety or general welfare, i. e. for purposes falling 
26 James N. Hyde, "Economic Development Agreements", Recull des Cours, The Hague, 1962 (1), p. 298. 
27 The Contract clause of the United Stated reads: "No State shall pass any law impairing the obligations 
of Contracts" U. S. Constitution Art. 1, Section 10, Clause 1. 
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within the "police power 15 cannot involve the taking of property even when they may 
interfere with contract rights. 28 In the USA, utilities and other industries dedicated to a 
public purpose are subject to state police power legislation. In cases of most legitimate 
regulations based on police power, the government is not obligated to pay compensation 
to the affected private entity. 
A convincing argument in this regard has been put forward by Susan Rose- 
Ackerman, according to whom, one of the important thresholds in determining the 
boundary between eminent domain and policy can be identification of the capacity in 
w ic te govenunent is acting. According to her, whenever the government acts as the 
buyer of a particular asset e. g., takes resources for a public project using the power of 
eminent domain, it amounts to a taking and govemment should pay compensation at a 
'fair market value'. But when the government acts as a policy maker, compensation 
should not be the general rule. 29 
The police power of the state is widely recognised and applied by the modem 
welfare states in one form or another encompassing a wide range of issues such as anti- 
trust, consumer protection, securities, environmental protection, and land planning 
legislation . 
30 It is long recognised that these regulations are regarded as essential to the 
'efficient functioning of the state' and related to the 'normal functioning of public 
service. ' International courts and tribunals have also consistently afforded to the states a 
28 F. A. Mann, "State Contracts and State Responsibility", 54 American Journal of International Law, 
(1960), p. 572; see also, Jan G. Laitos, "The Public Use Paradox and The Taking Clause", 13 Journal of 
Energy, Natural Resources, and Environment (1993), p. 9 (on distinction between eminent domain and 
police power. ) 
9 Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Disentangling Deregulatory Takings", 86 Virginia Law Review (2000), 1435. 
30 For example, see the Mexican Constitution, article 27 provides: Ownership of the lands and waters 
within the boundaries of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, 
the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property. 
Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public use and subject to payment of 
indemnity. 
The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property rights the limitations dictated by 
the public interest, as well as to regulate, for the collective good, the use of natural resources susceptible 
to appropriation, to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth, to conserve them, to achieve the 
well-balanced development of the country and the improvement of the living conditions of the rural and 
urban population. Constitution of Mexico, Chapter one, art. 27, in Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World (April 1988 & Suppl June 1998). 
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broad discretion in exercising their police powers for pursuit of legitimate goals. In 
Iran-U. S. arbitral award of Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates 31 where the 
compensation sought by a claimant for the seizure of his liquor licence by the US 
Internal Revenue Service, the tribunal rejected it on the grounds of police power. The 
Tribunal said: 
a State is not responsible for loss of property or for other econornIc disadvantage resulting from 
bona fide general taxation or any other action that is commonly accepted as within the police 
power of States, provided it is not discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon 
the property or to sell it at a distress price... 902 
Basing itself on sovereign power, the police power tends to be unlimited and 
uncertain. But states can hardly be held accountable for the exercise of police power 
under international law, which can be regarded by investors as a threat to stable 
ordering of an investment contract. Therefore, a balance should be struck between 
state's legitimate rights to regulate foreign property and investment-backed expectation 
of the foreign investors to Yield its reasonable return. While police power as a legitimate 
authority of the state to enact legislation should be recognised, its' use as a defense for 
state interference with property rights should be construed narrowly and should be 
subject to the scrutiny of judicial review. 33 Because allowing interference with property 
rights through unrestricted and wide application of uncompensated police power 
31 23 Iran-US Claim Tribunal Report (1989-111), p. 378. 
32 Ibid, p. 387. See also Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Interlocutory Award, 9 Iran-U. S. Claim 
Tribunal Report (1985), p. 248,275. It was held that "an accepted principle of international law that a 
State is not liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bonafide 'regulation, within the accepted 
police power of states. " See also, The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States: states that a State need not provide compensation for loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bonafide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of 
the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not discriminatory and is 
not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the state or sell it at a distress price. " 712. 
33 In Techmed award, the ICSID tribunal observed: "The principle that the state's exercise of its sovereign 
powers within the framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its 
powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is undisputable. Another 
undisputed issue is that the framework or from the viewpoint of the domestic law of the State, it is only in 
accordance with domestic law and before the courts of the State that the deterrnination of whether the 
exercise of such power is legitimate may take place. And such determination includes that of the limits 
which, if infringed, would give rise to the obligation to compensate an owner for the violation of its 
property rights. " Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed vs. United Mexican States, ICSID Case no. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, award, 29 May 2003, printed in 43 ILM (2004) 133, para. 119. 
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regulations can encourage governments to expand the scope of the police power to 
avoid compensated acquisition of private property by eminent domain . 
3" Thus, police 
powers are to be respected so long as they are not incompatible with a reasonable 
expectation of the private parties to the contract and they do not cause significant 
instability in their expectations. In fact, police power is now increasingly regulated and 
scrutinised by judicial review in those countries, where the property right is considered 
as an inalienable human right and constitutionally guaranteed; and private property can 
be taken away only in accordance with due process of law. 
The next section sets out to assess the main principles of legal protection on 
foreign investment in the context of expropriation or indirect taking of petroleum 
contracts in the current perspectives of contract practice. 
3. Principles of Foreign Investment Protection: Re-examining Orthodox Views 
In response to a host government's unilateral change in petroleum contracts and 
exercise of legislative power in a manner amounting to direct or indirect taking 
mentioned above, IOCs have often attempted to assert sanctity of contract by invoking 
contract principles under national law and relevant rules and principles of international 
law. It will be useful to examine these principles and rules in the analytical framework 
and to assess their relevance in the present context. 
3.1 Notion of Sanctity of Contract 
The principle of sanctity of contract is as old as the law of contract itself It denotes that 
the contract is the outcome of 'reasonable expectations' of parties" and should be 
respected and protected from its violation or breach. The concept is based on the 
economic necessity of commercial and business transactions that effective economic 
34 Willaim A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and Politics, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, (1995), p. 20. 
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activity is not possible without some measure of reliable promises and predictability in 
the contract and the enforcement of such promises. The concept of sanctity of contract 
has been reinforced by the notions of freedom of contract and autonomy of the parties 
under classical contract law of the nineteenth century during which the law of contract 
was treated as the indispensable instrument of capitalism and enterprise. Sanctity of 
contract is based upon the basic tenet that property and contractual rights have to be 
protected in order to further the development of stable economic relations among the 
countries. 35 The concept has also been extended sometimes to state contracts and is 
grounded in the estoppel principle that by entering into such contracts, States accept 
voluntarily restrictions on their sovereignty, and therefore, they are bound to fulfil their 
obligations to the contract to the same extent as private persons. 
Absolute sanctity of concession agreements had often been asserted by foreign 
investors during 1950s and 1960s and upheld in some of the arbitral awards in order to 
36 
atiord foreign investors protection against state intervention in the contract. It had also 
figured prominently in the academic writings of western scholars during this time. 37 
Two important derivatives of the concept of sanctity of contract are: the doctrine 
of pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of acquired rights, which are mainly applied 
under international law. Another important variation of the notion of sanctity of contract 
is intemationalisation of contract theory, which seeks to fortify long-term state contract 
35 Martin Domke, "Foreign Nationalisations ", 55 American Journal of International Law (196 1), p. 616. 
36 See, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. award, 1952 ICJ Rep. 93 162; In this Case, the tribunal held that: "When 
there are so many countries in need of foreign capital for the development of their economy, it would not 
only be unjust, it would be a grave mistake to expose such capital, without restriction or guarantee, to the 
hazards of the legislation of countries in which such capital has been invested. " See also Sapphire award, 
35 ILR (1967), p. 171. 
37 To quote one commentator: "If a contract, validly concluded, were not binding, then international law 
would be deprived of a decisive foundation and a society of States would no longer be possible. 
International law and with it also the sanctity of contracts, results by a necessity from the inevitability of 
social intercourse. The binding force of contracts is an obligation which exists, not only vis a vis the 
contracting parties, but also vis a vis the international community as a whole. In the system of 
international law, which stands over States, the sanctity of contracts is not to be rationalised away. " Hans 
Wehberg, "Pacta Sunt Servanda", 53 American Journal of International Law (1959), p. 775,782. 
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from the state interference by locating such contract beyond the realm of international 
law. 
The next sections proceed to examine these variables of the notion of sanctity of 
contract and to assess the relevance of their application to state contracts in general and 
to petroleum contracts in particular in the light of petroleum arbitration awards, the 
contemporary practice of international law and the practice of petroleum contracts. 
3.2 Principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda 
The pacta sunt servanda principle is the direct corollary of the doctrine of sanctity of 
contract and presupposes that contracts made by solemn promises by the parties must be 
respected. The principle had originated from natural law in ancient times as the 
governing law of private contract and is deeply rooted in religion and ethics. 38 But 
subsequently it has been applied to the international law of treaties 39 and is recognised 
as a principle of customary international law. Since the ftinction of treaties is to express 
the shared intentions, expectations and objectives of the parties, pacta sunt servanda is a 
reflection of that shared expectation of the international community embodied in the 
treaties. The pacta sunt servanda principle is the basic principle regulating relations 
between the sovereign nation states that are supposed to be based on an equal footing. 
The question arises whether the principle is applicable to the state contracts and if 
so. to what extent. The application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda to the 
concession agreements had been widely supported by commentators and upheld by 
arbitrators in arbitral awards unequivocally during 1950s and 1960s . 
40 According to 
38 Gormley, "The Codification of Pacta Sunt Servanda by the International Law Commission: The 
reservation of Classical norms of Moral force and Good faith", 14 St. Louis University Law Journal 
(1970) p. 371. 
39 See, article 26 of Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties, 1969 provides: "every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them In good faith. " 
40 According to Carlston, "Concession agreements are as vital to the functioning of the international 
economy as they are to the national economy. International law has recognised this fact in rules, which 
harmomse the reasonable interests of the national sovereign with those of the international society. 
Concession agreements are not vulnerable to the unilateral exercise of sovereign power destroying the 
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them, the principle of pacta sunt servanda as a general principle of law is found In all 
nations and the principle is valid exactly in the same manner in respect of contracts 
between states and private companies. 
41 
However, applicability of this principle to state contract is often criticised on 
various grounds: firstly, on the ground of conceptual difference between treaty and state 
contracts. On the conceptual ground, it has been suggested that the principle is not 
applicable to state contracts which are concluded between two unequal partners, i. e., 
between a State and a foreign private party. Since pacta sunt servanda is a principle of 
international law, it is inappropriate for the state contracts, which are predominantly 
governed by municipal law. Thus, it is disputed that the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda should be applicable to state contracts because in applying pacta sunt 
servanda a distinction should be made between private law contracts and an 
international treaty. In a treaty which is concluded between two states, one state cannot 
use its own municipal law to vary its treaty obligations simply because it is governed by 
international law. On the other hand, the state contract is generally governed by the law 
of the host state, which as a sovereign entity can change the applicable law to the 
contract . 
42 The Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal also endorsed this view in the Amoco case 
where arbitrator Virally held that the principle of pacta sunt servanda does not bind the 
state to a private contract as it does to a treaty, and that "in no system of law are private 
fabric of public and private rights, which they create. " Kenneth S. Carlston, "Concession Agreements and 
Nationalisation", 52 American Journal of International Law, 1958, p. 261,279. See also Leo T. Kissam 
Edmond K. Leach, "Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of Concession Contracts", 28 
Fordham Law Review (1959-1960) p. 177,207-211. 
41 Wehberg stated: "The life of the international community is based not only on relations between 
States, but also, to an ever-increasing degree, on relations between States and foreign corporations or 
foreign individuals. No econorrUc relations between states and foreign corporations can exist without 
the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda. " supra note 37, p. 786. In the Sapphire (1963) case, Judge 
Calvin stated: "It is a ftindamental principle of law, which is constantly being proclaimed by 
international Courts, that contractual undertakings must be respected. The rule "pacta sunt servanda" 
is the basis of every contractual relationship" Sapphire award, 35 I. L. R. p. 181. 
42 D. W. Bowett, "State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for 
Termination or Breach", 49 British Yearbook of International Law (1988), p. 49,54-55. 
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interests permitted to prevail over duly established public interest, making impossible 
ý543 actions required for the public good . 
Secondly, given the necessity of stability in the contractual relationship, there is 
a view that the principle of pacta sunt servanda can be applied to the state contract but 
like other legal principles it is not an unqualified one and admits many exceptions and 
thus , it 
has only limited application to such contracts. " Under international law, the 
pacta sunt servanda principle is to be qualified by the equally important principle of 
rebus sic stantibus of the international law of treaties. The analogy of principle of rebus 
sic stantibus is extended to the state contract on the basis that in a long-term agreement 
the expectations of the parties or circumstances may change in the course of time. 45 The 
application of rebus sic stantibus principle can supplement pacta sunt servanda I- 
principle and can enhance the effectiveness of pacta sunt servanda by tempering its 
rigidity and can make contractual relations more dynamic and equitable. 46 According to 
Schwebel, exaggeration of the pacta sunt servanda principle would defeat many of Its 
objectives, increase instability, and lead to exaggerated versions of the rebus sic 
stantibus principle, and he suggested that this can only be avoided if due regard is given 
47 
to the need of constant renegotiations of state contracts . 
43 Amoco Finance Inc., v. Iran-U. S. Claim Tribunal Report (1987-11), 189,243. 
44 According to Robert Jennings, "It is wrong to suppose that pacta sunt servanda must apply tout court in 
all cases or in none. No mature law of contract is absolute, and few principles of law are to be understood 
without qualification.. .. Neither the principle of acquired rights nor the principle of pacta sunt servanda is 
therefore to be regarded as being necessary absolute or unconditional in its application. As so often in law 
it is a question of drawing lirMts and defining exceptions. " Robert Jennings, "State Contracts in 
International Law", 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961) p. 177. 
45 According to Arsanjam, such changes may take various kinds, most important of them being changes in 
situations that make the enforcement of an agreement inequitable to the participants or incompatible with 
community policy; changes in base values are those changes M the relative power of parties that affect the 
values at stake, either in terms of the high cost for performance, making it favourable only to one party, or 
which effect a major change on the legitimate control of a State over its people and territories; changes in 
the outcomes of agreement have a severe and detrimental effect on one party; the value distribution may 
be so unequal and unjust that unilateral termination is inevitable. Mahnous H. Arsanjani, International 
Regulation ofInternal Resources, University Press of Virginia, (198 1), pp. 314-315. 
46 H. S. Zakariya, "Changed Circumstances and the Continued Validity of Mineral Development 
Contracts", in: Kamal Hossain (ed. ), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order, Nicholas 
Publishing Company, New York, (1980), p. 275. 
47 Schwebel, "International Protection of Contractual Arrangements", American Society of International 
Law Proceedings (1959) p. 266,273. 
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It should be argued that while the application of the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda to state contracts cannot be ruled out, it should be acknowledged that it has no 
, 4.. ausolute application to such contracts but rather it should be qualified by another 
international law principle of rebus sic stantibus to ensure equity and JII *ust'ce in the 
contractua re ationship in the case of ftindamental change of circumstances. In such 
circumstances, application of absolute sanctity of contract may appear to cause inj ice ust 
to the other party. 
Thirdly, the application of absolutistic version of pacta sunt servanda to state 
contracts, especially natural resources development agreements, has been seriously 
challenged by the new nornis of international law like pennanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, which recognises the state's inherent right to nationalise or 
expropriate in appropriate circumstances. 
A 
Apart from these conceptual and ideological oppositions to the pacta sunt 
servanda principle, more importantly, its application to state contracts is further 
qualified by the public interest consideration, which hardly matters in treaty relations, 
but treated as an important factor in shaping contractual relationships in stke contracts 
including petroleum agreements. 
3.3 Doctrine of Acquired Rights 
The doctrine of acquired or vested rights is a logical extension of the notion of the 
sanctity of contract and signifies that the acquired rights of the foreign Investor should 
be respected and protected. According to this doctrine, property rights validly acquired 
under the law cannot be expropriated or destroyed. The doctrine of acquired rights has 
been defined in the following way: "A vested right is a right which cannot be interfered 
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9948 with save in conformity with the term under which that right was granted . It has been 
claimed that the doctrine is recognised by the law of civilised nations and considered as 
of great importance to the future of investment. 49 The philosophical basis of the doctrine 
lies in the movement of private foreign capital in the interdependent world and necessity 
of protection of such private property across the political boundary, which is one of the 
important foundations of modem capitalist society. 
Traditionally, acquired rights were identified with physical property rights 
rather than contractual property rights. Thus, earlier concession agreements, which 
vested the ownership of acreage to the foreign oil companies, indeed involved the 
alienation of rights relating to physical property in land from the state to the company. 
This vested right of the foreign investors in relation to physical ownership was held 
inviolable and protected under traditional international law. Even in the early 1960s, the 
doctrine was vigorously afforded protection by the international tribunals. For instance, 
in the Sa hire award, the Tribunal recognised that respect for acquired rights under a PP 
concession is one aspect of the general principles of law recognised by international 
tribunals . 
50 The principle has also been endorsed by the Aramco arbitral award, which 
considered the concessionaire's right as having the nature of acquired rights and that 
States are bound to show respect to acquired rights. " 
48 Rosalyn Higgins, "The International Law Perspective", in: Terence Daintith (ed. ), The Legal Character 
of Petroleum Licenses. - A Comparative Study, published by Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law 
Studies, University of Dundee and Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the International Bar 
Association, (198 1), p. 40. 
49 The PCIJ In the case of Certain German Interests in Upper Silesia held that the principle of respect for 
vested rights ... forms, part of generally accepted international law.. "1926, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 7 at 2235; Garcia Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility, International Law Commission, Special 
Rapporteur, A/CN. N/l 19(26 Feb. 1959) in Year Book of the International Law Commission, (1959), Vol. 
2, p. 8) 
50 Sapphire award (1963), 35 ILR (1967), p. 136,183-84. 
51 Saudi Arabia vs. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) award (1958), 27 ILR (1963) p. 117, The 
Tribunal stated that: the concession has the nature of a constitution, which has the effect of conferrmg 
acquired rights on the contracting parties. ... Nothing can prevent a State, in the exercise of its 
sovereignty, from binding itselfIrrevocably by the provisions of a concession and from granting to the 
concessionaire irretractable rights. Such rights have the character of acquired rights. Should a new 
concession contract incompatible with the first, or a subsequent statute, abolish totally or partially what 
has been granted by a previous law or concession, this would constitute a clear infringement, by the 
77 
The doctrine of acquired rights was valid particularly during colonial times 
when the foreign investors exercised exclusive title to the petroleum and mineral 
resources under the concession agreements. But the traditional notion of vested or 
acquired rights was seen by the newly emerged sovereign developing states as 
inequitable and an exploitative tool for the foreign investor, and was challenged by the 
new norms of international law predominantly articulated by them. The most important 
challenge to the doctrine came from the development of the concept of the permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, which questioned the very idea of vested rights as 
being incompatible with the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
The modem version of acquired rights is constructed by jurists and arbitral tribunals to 
include contract or concession as property rights instead of physical ownership, which 
formerly vested in the concessionaire. This construction of the concession agreement as 
a species of acquired rights came as a response to the articulation of the concept of the 
pernianent sovereignty over natural resources by the developing States, which 
demanded the inalienable right to their land as sovereign rights, and secondly, a 
changing notion of property rights, which is now extensively interpreted to include both 
tangible and intangible property, which has an economic value. Furthermore, most 
importantly, the traditional concept of acquired rights has lost its former character in the 
present context as modem petroleum contracts vest ownership of the petroleum 
resources exclusively in the State and IOCs are only given licences to explore and 
develop petroleum resources. 52 
second contract, of acquired rights or a violation, by the subsequent statute, of the principle of non- 
retroactivity of law, with the only exception of rules of public policy. 168. 
52 See, generally on the transformation of old petroleum contract, Samuel K. B. Asante, "Restructuring 
Transnational Mineral Agreements", 73 American Journal of International Law (1979), pp. 335-371. 
Regarding modem contract practice, see for example, clause 2.3 of the Brazil's Model ANP Concession 
Agreement for the Exploration, Development and Production of Oil and Gas of 2001 states that "Oil and 
natural gas deposits which exist in the Brazilian national territory belong to the Federal Government, in 
accordance with article 3 of the Petroleum law. The Concessionaire shall only own the oil and natural gas, 
which are actually produced and received by it at the Production metering point. Barrows (South 
America), Supplement No. 147, p. 15. 
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The shift of the concept of acquired rights from physical property to contractual 
rights has important legal consequences for foreign investment protection as it creates 
an external regime of protection of foreign investment through international arbitration 
and its violation can give rise to the State's obligation of payment of compensation to 
the private party. It has been rightly pointed out by Somarajah that construction of 
acquired rights based on an extensive interpretation of property rights has the effect of 
locating their protection in the supranational and external system beyond the nation 
state, and is used by the foreign investor as a convenient mechanism to afford them 
protection through the international legal system. 53 Even this modem construction of 
acquired rights is not an indefensible one to restrict the power of the state to take 
measures in protection of the essential national interest of people. 54 
3.4 Theory of Intern ation alis ation of Contract 
The theory of internationalisation of contract is mainly a construction of the arbitral 
decisions on petroleum related disputes. It intends to give broader level of protection to 
the foreign investor by asserting that state contracts should be governed by international 
standard and rules and as such, these contracts should be immunised from local laws 
and norms by virtue of which a host state can take unilateral actions that violate 
contract. The genesis of the theory can be found in the Sapphire award, in which the 
tribunal held that "these concessions give the contract a particular character, which lies 
partly in public law and partly in private law" and "this contract has therefore a quasi- 
international character, which release it from the sovereignty of a particular legal 
53 See, M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, (2000), pp. 65-66. 
54 Ian Brownlie remarks that "When a concession is made with the foreign interest, it is quite unrealistic 
to treat this contract as a fundamental law, overriding the power of legislation within the state concerned 
and producing rigidity in the economy. No doubt constraints will exist in the sense that states wishing to 
receive foreign investment will suffer adverse consequences if agreements are treated lightly. Each side 
must expect to take certain risks. What foreign investor cannot expect to obtain is an acquired right, so to 
speak, to influence and even control the economy of the host state as a result of legal doctrine which 
purport to create indefensible rights for foreign investor. " Brownlie, "Legal Status of Natural Resources", 
Recueil Des Cours, The Hague (1979: 1), p. 253,309. 
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system. 9955 The 'intemationalisation' of contract theory had been elaborated in the 
Texaco arbitral award in which the sole arbitrator Dupuy held that nationalisation of the 
concession by the Libyan government was held to be in breach of contract because that 
entire contractual relationship was internationalised as the deeds of concession involved 
were contracts "within the domain of international law". Dupuy based the proposition of 
internationalisation of contract on the following grounds: (1) these agreements are not 
administrative contracts in nature; (ii) the UN General Assembly resolutions purporting 
to assert exclusive competence of the host state in matters of nationalisation are not 
positive international law; (iii) deeds of concession fall I ic into the category of an econom" 
development agreement. The last ground points to the fact that since concession 
agreement is 'economic development agreement' involving a substantial investment, 
long duration and its association with the government's economic plan, would be 
sufficient to internationalise the contract irrespective of the fact that whether the 
agreement is governed by national law or it does not contain a clause for international 
arbitration. Finally, Dupuy held that the Libyan government was required to provide 
compensation in the form of restitutio in integrum as a "normal sanction for non- 
perfonnance of contract obligation" under an internationalised contract. 
To sum up, according to these arbitral awards, internationalisation of contract 
takes place in the following ways: firstly, where the contract refers to "general 
principles of law" or "international law" as applicable law or there is a absence of 
choice of law in a contract; secondly, where a contract contains a provision for dispute 
settlement through international arbitration; thirdly, if a contract contains a stabilisation 
clause; fourthly, the concession agreement is 'economic development agreement' in 
nature. The legal consequences that would ensue from internationalisation of contract 
are the following: first, it raises the possibility of "elevating" contracts between a State 
55 Saphire International Petroleum Ltd. V National Iranian Oil Co. 35 ILR (1967), p. 136,171,173. 
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and foreign national to international treaty status; second, the State cannot unilaterally 
terminate or abrogate the contract by its sovereign power; third, compensation should be 
paid in case of a breach of such an intemationalised contract in the form of restitutio in 
integrum. It is necessary to examine the normative aspect of the theory and assumptions 
regarding its legal consequences. 
It should be mentioned that the theory of internationalisation of contract has 
been subjected to criticism on both normative and technical grounds. From the 
viewpoint of the normative aspect of the theory, it has been claimed that the arbitral 
awards, which mainly articulate the theory, reflect a doctrinal trend that started in the 
1950's, and is no longer valid at the present time. It has been argued that the theory of 
internationalisation of contract points to a pervasive limitation of the host state's 
sovereign authority within its own territory. 56 The internationalisation theory has been 
also criticised as essentially self-serving and designed to support a very partisan, 
capitalist approach to contractual disputes. 57 According to Somarajah, the theory of 
internationalisation of contract represents a norm of international law created largely by 
decisions of arbitral tribunals delivered during colonial times and not relevant at the 
present time . 
58 In his account, weakness of these arbitral awards justifying 
internationalisation lies in the fact that they were made during a climate of coercion, 
often to provide a legal cloak for what could have been achieved by coercion in the 
colonial period. The objective of the nornis contained in these arbitral decisions is the 
maximisation of the protection to be given to private foreign investment through 
diplomatic intervention, economic coercion and other forms of sanction. 59 
56 A. A. Fatouros, "International Law and the Intemationalised Contract", 74 American Journal of 
International Law, 1980, p. 134. 
57 Derek William Bowett, supra note 42, pp. 51-52, 
58 M. Sornarajah, "The Myth of International Contract Law? " 15 Journal of World Trade Law, (1981) 
P. 190. 59 Ibid, p. 192. 
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Apart from the above criticisms on normative aspects, the theory has been 
attacked more on the following technical grounds: 
First, it cannot be said that mere inclusion of international law or general principle of 
law in contract as a governing law should elevate the contract to international treaty 
status because multinational companies are yet to be fully recognised as subjects of 
international law and they do not enjoy the same kinds of rights and obligations as a 
State. 60 A contractual relationship between a State and a foreign private party, even 
though governed by international law, does not belong to the international legal system 
per se. 
61 
Secondly, the assertion that the absence of applicable law or the use of 
international law or general principle of law as applicable law of contract 
internationalise petroleum contract - does not hold valid today. Because there is a strong 
argument of in favour of host law as applicable law if there is no express mention of it. 
It is long recognised that it is the law of the host State that should be applicable in the 
state contract in the absence of provision on applicable law. 62 Such an assertion is 
further justified by the 'objective theory' on the choice of law clause, according to 
60 Oscar Schachter, says: "A clause stipulating that the proper law of the contract is international law or 
general principles of law does not transform the contract into an international agreement within the 
meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It goes no further than to authorise an 
arbitrator to have recourse to cognate rules of international law or general principles of law that may be 
applied to the contract. For example, reference might be made to the principle of rebus sic stantibus or the 
various rules on invalidity" See, Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, Martinus 
NJjhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, (1991), p. 309. 
61 Ibid. p. 309. See also Amerasinghe draws a similar conclusion: "A mere choice of law (international 
law) can not, therefore, convert a breach of such a contract by a State into a breach of international law 
vis a vis the alien's State. " C. F. Amerasinghe, "State Breaches of Contracts with Aliens and International 
Law", 58 American Journal of International Law (1964), p. 881,906. For instance, in the Aramco award, 
the Tribunal rejected a contention made on behalf of the company that the concession agreement should 
be "assimilated to an international treaty governed by the law of Nations. " See, 27 ILR (1963), pp. 165- 
167. The tribunal held that concession agreement should be governed by the law of Saudi Arabia because, 
according to tribunal, "this is the law of the country with which the contract has the closest natural and 
effective connection, unless another law is designated by the conclusive conduct of the parties. " 27 ILR 
(1963), p. 167. 
62 PCIJ in the Serbian Loans case stated: "any contract which is not a contract between states ... is based 
on the municipal law of the same country. " (1929) PCIJ Series A., No. 20, p. 41. In the Aramco award, 
the contract in dispute had no express provision on applicable law and therefore, the arbitral tribunal 
considered the law applicable to the dispute and found that, because the subject matter of the agreement 
dealt with the exploitation of oil in Saudi Arabia and one of the parties to the agreement was the State of 
Saudi Arabia, the law to be applied to the agreement was the law of Saudi Arabia. 195 8,27 ILR 117 
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which, in the absence of express provision on applicable law, the law applicable to the 
contract should be that of the host state mainly because the principal place of 
performance of the contract is within the territory of the host state and it is the law of 
the host state with which the contract is mostly closely connected. 63 
In the present context, internationalisation theory has lost its efficacy as the 
overwhelming shift of modem petroleum agreements towards the "re-localisation" 
through explicit prescription for the applicability of the legal system prevailing in the 
host state. 64 Moreover, petroleum contracts can never be completely intemationalised 
despite the international law or general principle of law is designated as applicable law. 
This is because many aspects of petroleum contracts are to be governed by the law of 
the host state though the applicable law of the contract is international law. For instance, 
the movements of expatriate staff, the employment of local labour, social legislation, 
and customs and exchange regulations are always to be governed by the law of the host 
state, though the applicable law is intemational law. 65 
Thirdly, a provision for international arbitration in state contracts cannot 
assimilate it to an international treaty status because the primary purpose of providing 
for the arbitral settlement of investment disputes is to remove the disputes from the 
jurisdiction of the domestic courts of the host state to the international arbitration for the 
purpose of ensuring neutrality and justice. A provision for international arbitration or 
international law or general principles of law as governing law does not give a private 
63 In objective determination of choice of law clause, forum of the contract, the nationality of parties, the 
language used in the contract, the place where it is to be performed the place of breach of contract, the 
place where the subject of matter of contract is situated is generally taken into consideration. See, 
Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, Kluwer Academic Publishers, (2002), pp. 
229-30. 
64 Ahmed S. El-Kosheri and Tarek F. Riad, "The Law Governing a New Generation of Petroleum 
Agreements: Changes in the Arbitration Process, " I ICSID Rev. -F. I. L. J., (1986), p. 267. 
65 See, Georges R. Delaume, "State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration", 75 American Journal of 
International Law (198 1), p. 784,796. 
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party a recourse to international law remedies based on the international law of state 
responsibility except through diplomatic protection by his State of nationality. 66 
Finally, the argument that mere characterisation of petroleum contracts as 
economic development agreements converts them into intemationalised contracts so as 
to provide protection to the private parties under international law, requires careful 
examination. The resolution of this issue depends upon the normative understanding of 
whether petroleum contracts can be identified as a form of 'economic development 
agreement'-a proposition which purports to afford companies legal protection such as 
compensation o restitutio in integrum under international law. In fact, the value-laden 
terminology of an 'economic development agreement', which is long being used by 
many commentators and arbitral tribunals to refer to natural resource development 
agreements, is not universally accepted. 67 For instance, Lupis criticises such 
categonsation as -too far the other way... " and "... developing nations may then feel 
that the exploitation for example, of their natural resources, is only in their interest and 
foreign investor is actually carrying on his enterprise as economic aid, a view point 
which is surely unrealistic. ' 68 Secondly, the categorisation of petroleum contracts as 
economic development agreement in an effort to afford absolute legal protection to 
foreign investor is also disputed and discarded in the subsequent arbitral tribunals. 
66 Oscar Schachter, supra note 60, p. 307-8. 
67 For instance, natural resource development agreements are sometimes referred to as 'economic 
development agreements' by some publicists and arbitral awards as, according to them, these agreements 
confer economic development on host state. See, e. g., McNair, "The General Principles of Law 
Recognised by Civilised Nations", 33 British yearbook of International Law, (1957), pp. 1-4; James 
N. Hyde, "Economic Development Agreement", Recueil des Cours (1962-1), 282-83; Curtis, "The Legal 
Security of Economic Development Agreements", 29 Harvard Journal of International Law (1988), 316; 
Texas Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company vs. Government of the Libya Arab 
Republic, 17 ILM (1978) pp. 1-37. However, in view of historical context of inequitable contractual 
arrangement in the past and both state party and company's economic interest involved in such contract, 
some commentators describe them as state contracts, which is more value neutral. According to one 
commentator, "the growing practice of localismg state contracts, together with substantial support for the 
doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, combined with the numerous arbitral awards 
rejecting the notion of long term development agreements as an internationalised form of state contract 
would seem to leave little scope for recognition of the concept of EDAs" Stephen 1. Pogany, "Economic 
Development Agreements", vol. 7, No. 2, ICSID Review-FILJ (1992), p. 1,20. See also, Esa Passivirta, 
Participation of States in International Contracts, Lakimieshitan Kustanus, Helsinki, (1 990), p. 104. 
68 1. De Lupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in Developing Countries, Gower Press, (1987), pp. 
42-43. 
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There is hardly any evidence in State practice that customary law imposes an implied 
condition of international protection into concession or development agreements 
between States and private companies. 69 
To conclude - the 'intemationalisation of contract' theory intends to 
incorporate universal rules and standards as governing nonn of state contracts in order 
to ensure predictability and stability of contractual relationship by eliminating political 
risk of change of host state's law and regulation. But it is clear from the above analysis 
that the theory of internationalisation of contract has neither been supported by 
sufficient arbitral decisions nor approved by all commentators. However, given the 
transnational character of petroleum agreements, and international public policy 
considerations involved in such contracts to a certain extent, ruling out 
internationalisation effects altogether would not be a realistic option. International law 
which articulates the morality of the world community and international public policy 
has a certain effect on interpreting these agreements as going beyond the domestic 
interest of a State. To the extent that nation states incorporate international law 
principles in their constitutions, they are bound to respect those principles in 
formulating laws and policy and also in the conclusion of a state contract. The practice 
of petroleum contracts' provision on dispute settlement through international arbitration 
procedure in order to ensure impartial treatment of the private party ascribes an 
international character to them to some extent. 
From the preceding discussion, it can be said that the classical notion of absolute 
sanctity of contract, which has been purported to be justified by the invocation of the 
traditional Principles of pacta sunt servanda and acquired rights, has been challenged 
and rationalised by the newly emerged norms of international law like permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and the modem practice of natural resource 
69 Oscar Schachter, supra note 60, p. 3 10. 
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development agreements. In modem times, instead of absolute sanctity of contract, there 
is a clear trend towards the mutability of contract in order to take into account the 
reasonable expectations of parties regarding the necessity of accommodating changes 
and of ensuring fairness in the contractual relationship. The last section highlights the 
necessity of mutability of long term state contracts including petroleum contracts, which 
has considered as the dominant paradigm that is replacing the doctrinal trend of absolute 
sanctity of contracts. 
4. Mutability of Long-term State Contracts 
The concept of mutability of contract implies under national law that there is no 
absolute sanctity of contract but rather that it is mutable for reasons like changed 
circumstances, fairness, social well being and protection of the weaker party to the 
contract. The doctrme of mutability recognises that long-term contracts, especially, 
natural resources agreements are dynamic in nature and they should be capable of 
surviving the changing expectations of the parties. This assumption is consistent with 
the prevailing trend in modem contract law which holds that the notion of freedom of 
contract can be challenged by the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power, and more 
generally the idea that fairness should be a condition of validity of contract and the role 
of the courts is not merely to enforce contracts but also to ensure that a minimum degree 
of fairness is observed. 70 In the modem context, the state regulates freedom of contract 
in order to protect certain interests,, either of the state itself or of parties who need 
protection from the abuse of economic power. 71 According to one commentator, there 
are two moral justifications for limiting the freedom of contract, firstly, limitation 
results from inherent injustice in the free market economy where individuals begin the 
bargain with different endowments of money and opportunity and that this manifests 
ý -70 Spencer Nathan Thal, "The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining 
Contractual Unfairness", 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (1988), p. 17,2 1. 
71 Peter Nygh, Autonomy in International Contract, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1999), p. 2. 
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itself in the form of unequal bargaining positions in the market; secondly, the doctrine 
of freedom of contract fails to distinguish between unequal outcomes, which were the 
result of a fair bargaining procedure, and those which were the result of exploitation. 72 
The State can interfere with the contractual rights through the medium of 
applicable law to the contract, as most of the state contracts are governed by the law of 
the host state. P. S. Atiyah correctly remarks that there is a growing recognition that 
even where the parties enter into a contract as a result of some voluntary conduct, rights 
and duties of the parties under the contract are largely defined by the law of the host 
state, and not of the parties' real agreement. 73 
In the modem era, fairness has emerged as the dominant paradigm to govern 
contractual relations, and it seeks to modify the idea of unrestrained freedom and 
sanctity of contracts of the nineteenth century. Thus, the notion of contract sanctity 
supported by classical contract law has been supplemented by competing considerations 
of justice, paving the way for the emergence of a new contractual morality that is 
predominantly based on the idea of fairness. 74 Modem welfare states intervene in the 
market place of economic transactions through their regulatory power in order to ensure 
fairness and justice in such transactions. This interventionist attitude of the State to 
contracts, which requires a contract to be modified on the grounds of equity and social 
justice has directly challenged the traditional 'will theory' of contract. The increasing 
power of the state to regulate conditions of employment, to prohibit restrictive business 
practices and to protect the consumer in the market-place has considerably eroded the 
notion of the sanctity of contracts under classical contract law. 75 
72 Spencer Nathan Thal, supra note 70, p. 22, see also, B. Reiter, "The control of Contract Power", I 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (198 1), p. 347. 
73 P. S. Atlyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1979), p. 734. 
74 K. M. Sharma, "From "Sanctity" to "Farriess: An Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts? ", 18 New 
York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law (1999), p. 95,100. 
75 M. Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalised Property, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, (1986), 
P. 110. 
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Similarly, the necessity of limited mutability is now recognised in the realm of 
natural resource development agreements, where public interests inevitably come to 
play an important role because these contracts are viewed as embodying public 
expectation about proper regulation of natural resources, which are regarded as vital to 
the economic growth and general welfare of the people. It is widely recognised that a 
state enters into such public law contracts on behalf of its citizens, representing their 
collective interests, whereas the main motivation behind the private party's participation 
in such contracts remains economic profit. The public interest not only authorises the 
governmental authority to exercise powers, but also places it under a duty to exercise 
76 such powers as part of its responsibility to the public . 
In the sphere of long-term state contract, freedom of contract based upon party 
autonomy has been significantly challenged by the consideration of preserving social 
interests and the need for protection of the weaker party to the contract. This is in line 
with states' concern with the protection of public interest in order to guarantee fair 
exchange in the contract. Modem States enact laws and make regulations to control the 
behaviour of the parties to the commercial transaction as well as investment agreements. 
The scope for the party's autonomy in foreign investment contracts has also become 
limited as a result of the design by developing countries of sophisticated foreign 
investments laws to cover essential aspects of the foreign investment in their 
jurisdiction. It is now well established that there is no unqualified application of sanctity 
of contracts in long term state contracts. Rather, the prevailing view is that, entering into 
a contract, a State does not necessarily waive its sovereign right to intervene in the 
contract for public interest and fairness. This view is equally applicable to both 
developed and developing countries. In developed countries, freedom of action of 
public authorities in relation to contract of a public law nature is well recognised. 
76 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "State Contracts with Aliens: The Question of Unilateral Change by the State 
in Contemporary International Law", 9 Journal of International Arbitration, No. 4, (1992), pp. 141-17 1. 
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Practice followed by the UK and the Nordic countries, in respect of petroleum and 
mineral resources shows that the UK amended all the petroleum production licenses 
unilaterally in the late 1970s and Norway in 1972 decided to change the ternis of 
payment of the royalties due in the connection with the exploitation of the Ekofisk oil 
field to secure an increased proportion of oil company profits and an increased degree of 
control of their activities. 77 Thus, the mutability of long-term contracts is not peculiar to 
developing countries only. In the Aminoil arbitral award, while the tribunal attributed to 
the value of sanctity of contract and pacta sunt servanda, it also recognised the 
necessity of accommodating changes in the concession agreement in view of the fact 
that the a profound and general transfon-nation took place in the Middle East, and 
throughout the world since 1948.78 
It should also be admitted that a dogmatic assertion of the absolute sovereign 
nghts of the state to amend or terminate or regulate the contract is not acceptable. The 
concept of pennanent sovereignty of natural resources which advocates a state's 
inalienable right to nationalise foreign property, also accept the limitations on State 
sovereignty that the natural resources contract should be observed in good faith . 
79 Two 
major covenants on human rights also acknowledge that while the sovereign states have 
the right "freely to dispose" of resources and investment, they are subjected to "any 
obligation arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle 
of mutual benefit and international law. "80 But the principle of good faith should not be 
equated with absolute sanctity of such contract. In Amoco International Finance 
77 See, Peter Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights: The Case of North Sea Oil, Academic 
Press, (1983); Terrence Daintith and Ian Gault, "Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Licensing and Taxation of 
North Sea Oil Production", 8 The Cambrian Law Review (1977), p. 27. 
78 See, Aminoil award, 21ILM (1982) 976. 
79The United Nations G. A. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
1962 (Resolution 1803 (XVII) paragraph 8 provides that "Foreign investment agreements freely entered 
into by, or between, sovereign states shall be observed in good faith. " 
80 See, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and International Covenant on Social 
and Economic Rights, 1966. 
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Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran the Iran-U. S. claim 
tribunal observed: 
The quoted rule, however, must not be equated with the principle pacta sunt servanda often 
invoked by claimants in international arbitration. To do so would suggest that sovereign States are 
bound by contracts with private parties exactly as they are bound by treaties with other sovereign 
states. This would be completely devoid of any foundation in law or equity and would go much 
further than any state has ever permitted in its own domestic law. " 81 
It should be strongly argued that the principle of mutability does not suggest that 
the State has an unlimited power of modifying or terminating the contract, but rather 
that it attempts to strike a balance between the States' social and public interests 
requiring a change of contract and investment backed by the expectation on which the 
foreign investor relies so that a reasonable degree of stability of contract should be 
maintained so as to allow investors to earn their expected cash flows. Therefore, only 
limited mutability is allowed to balance the conflicting interests of the state party and 
the foreign private party. Limited mutuality of contract based upon the reasonable 
expectations of the parties can indeed promote stability rather than causing instability. 
Strict performance of contract in the event of a change of circumstance may be contrary 
to shared expectations of the parties and can be regarded as a breach of good faith as 
such performance in such circumstances can generate resentment and discontent leading 
to a breach of contract. 
The modem petroleum contract's provisions on renegotiation and revision of their 
terms in case of changes of circumstance and onforce majeure and hardship clauses for 
resolving the situation of changed circumstances in order to bring adaptability and 
flexibility in the contractual relationship- recognises the limited mutability of these 
contracts. This has been further elaborated in chapter four. 
81 15 Iran-U. S. Claim Tribunal Report, (1987-11), p. 189,242-243. 
90 
5. Summary 
This chapter examined the phenomena of political risks in the petroleum industry and 
arrived at the conclusion that a host government's actions by way of regulation or other 
measures leading to the unilateral change of contractual obligations or modifying 
previous y operating conditions of a contract remains a constant source of concern for 
the international petroleum companies from the 1980s onwards. Despite the 
privatisation and liberalisation movement and developing countries' favourable attitude 
towards foreign investment, political risk mainly in the form of regulatory intervention 
will remain unabated in the foreseeable future mainly because of the need to regulate 
private activity and the natural resources development contracts as camed out by the 
foreign entity which may have significant social, economic and environmental impacts 
in these States. 
It has been observed in this chapter that legitimacy and effectiveness of 
traditional public international law rules on the protection of foreign investment have 
been challenged and these are proved to be inadequate to deal with the issues of sanctity 
of contract. In fact, the traditional theories and concepts relating to protection of 
investment agreement relating to natural resource development have undergone a 
profound change in recent times. Such changes have occurred mainly in response to 
social, economic and political transfonnations that have taken place in many developing 
countries. The host states-IOCs relationship which was characterised as one of hostility 
began to turn into a cooperative enterprise from the 1980s onwards, when developing 
countries tried to get away from their nationalistic sentiment to a pro-investment regime 
in order to attract foreign investment to accelerate their economic development. This 
happened concomitantly with the restructuring of the petroleum industry itself with the 
emergence of modem contractual arrangements. This chapter takes the view that the 
absolutistic view of sanctity of contract has been rationalised and modified by the 
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pragmatism and realistic attitude of both developing countries and companies towards 
long-term contracts, which warrants that in appropriate circumstances contracts be 
mutable for a variety of reasons. 
Realism rather than old dogmas has become the guiding principle in defining the 
long-term contractual relationship. Pragmatism has come to play a greater consideration 
than the dogmatic legal principles that were previously advanced and instead of absolute 
sanctity of contract and unrestrained state sovereignty stability of the contract with 
necessary limited mutability is now an accepted feature of natural resource development 
agreements including petroleum contracts. It is in this context that the host states started I 
to offer legal guarantees and to introduce flexibility in contract tenns to ensure stability 
in the petroleum contract against the political nsk perception of companies for 
achieving mutuality of interest. 
The subsequent chapters deal with the contractual and legal mechanisms of 
stability guarantee used in modern petroleum contracts to manage political risks. 
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PART Two 
Contractual, Legislative and Fiscal Instruments of Stability of 
Petroleum Contracts: Modern Trends and Their Effectiveness 
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Contractual arrangements for petroleum development can be seen as an allocation of 
rights and responsibilities of the parties, and a mechanism of coordination of the mutual 
interests. The petroleum contracts also make provisions for stability in the contractual 
relationship and creation of a framework of investment protection in the light of needs 
and interests of foreign investors. The main objectives of Part two are: 
-To iscern trends on stability mechanisms under petroleum contracts 
-To critically assess the effectiveness of contractual mechanisms in ensuring the 
stability of contract. It examines these issues by surveying the model and actual 
petroleum contracts of the developing countries and economies in transition. 
Chapter three focuses on stabilisation clauses as a key strategy of political risk 
management and analyses their legal validity and efficacy in the contemporary context. 
The analysis is carried out not in purely legal ternis, but in its policy and political 
economy context. 
Chapter four investigates trends in renegotiation and adaptation in petroleum 
contracts and for this purpose, it looks into contractual provisions and arrives at the 
conclusion that current contractual practice is directed towards renegotiation and 
adaptation for achieving flexibility and stability in the contractual relationship. 
Chapter five is devoted to an analysis of fiscal stability which lies at the heart of 
the discussion of the economic rationale of contract stability and in this regard, it 
examines contractual practice in detail and concludes that flexibility in the design of 
fiscal terins to respond to new situations and legal and other contractual guarantees are 
imperative for maintaining economic equilibrium and stability of contract. 
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Chapter Three 
Validity and Efficacy of Stabilisation Clauses: Legal Protection vs. 
Functional Value 
1.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was argued that involvement of the state as a contracting party 
in a petroleum contract always raises the possibility of unilateral change or premature 
termination by virtue of the state's sovereign legislative power. Against this backdrop, 
foreign investors in natural resource development projects have always sought stability 
guarantee as protection from the unilateral exercise of state power to change the terms 
of the contract by legislation or regulation. Stabilisation clauses figure prominently as 
contractual mechanisms for the promotion and protection of foreign investment in the 
negotiation of modem petroleum contracts. Stabilisation clauses have generated much 
academic debate regarding their juridical nature, efficacy and legal validity. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the legal nature of stabilisation clauses; to 
identify the scope and different categories of stabilisation clauses; to explore their 
purposes, and to examine their legal effect and validity in the light of arbitral 
jurisprudence and contract practice. In detennining the validity and efficacy of 
stabilisation clauses, the chapter also explores the functional relationship between 
stabilisation clauses and applicable law. 
Taking into consideration the developmental dimension of petroleum contracts, 
the chapter also focuses on political economy aspects of stabilisation clauses in order to 
explain the developing state's adherence to such contractual obligations despite their 
frequent opposition to the legal effect of such clauses. 
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1.2 Defining Features of Stabilisation Clauses 
Foreign investors as risk-averse entities always seek a stable contractual relationship for 
yielding of the investment on the basis of the legal regime that was known at the time 
the investment was made. Given the necessity of a fair return from the investment and 
the uniqueness of petroleum contracts in terms of their legal nature, a mechanism is 
required to address much needed concerns for stability in the contractual regime. The 
stabilisation clause is a contractual device developed in response to such concerns for 
stability and it attempts to insulate the petroleum contracts from change in the legal 
environment surrounding them. The stabilisation clause is essentially a phenomenon of 
long tenn state contracts in contrast to private contracts, commercial contracts or short 
tenn state contracts because the latter forras of contracts are not usually vulnerable to 
political or regulatory risk. 
The stabilisation clause is a fonn of governmental guarantee in a negotiated 
petroleum contract, which usually provides that the terms negotiated under the contract 
between a state and a foreign national will not be altered unilaterally or tenninated by 
the state through the promulgation of legislation or regulation. In essence, stabilisation 
clauses aim at the prevention of legislative intervention into the negotiated contract 
regime. In the ultimate analysis, the stabilisation clause is a legal mechanism for the 
protection of foreign investors from state interventions in a petroleum and mineral 
resource development project through legislative or administrative measures. ' Thus, the 
stabilisation clause may be defined as a contractual device that is used in a long term 
contract relating to natural resource development, and in particular petroleum projects, 
in order to maintain a stable contractual relationship between the host state and foreign 
investor by preventing the host state from introducing new legislation or changing 
' See, also, Margarita TB Coale, "Stabilisation Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions" 30 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (2003), p. 217, (Stabilisation clauses has been defted as 
a 'specific commitment by the foreign country not to alter the terms of the agreement, by legislation or 
other means, without the consent of the contracting party'. 
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legislation, or unilaterally changing the contract terms in ways that affect the contractual 
equilibrium as discussed in the first chapter. In this sense, the stabilisation clause is 
different from the stability provision found in legislation and regulations, governmental 
orders, and decrees of the host states to attract foreign investment. To put it into another 
way, a stabilisation clause is a device to protect property rights of the foreign investors 
in the host state by imposing a legal and contractual constraint upon the state's 
sovereign power of legislation. 
As petroleum contracts involve a long duration, the stabilisation clause is a sui 
generl .s approach to deal with the effect of the time element in the contractual 
relationship by way of providing guarantees to the companies about the consequences 
of a change of applicable law to such contracts. So far as its legal nature is concerned, 
the stabilisation clause is substantive in nature as it deals with the rights and obligations 
of the contracting parties and also to the extent that a breach of a stabilisation clause 
will lead to changes of rights and obligations of the parties substantially. Consequently, 
breach of a stabilisation clause will be treated as breach of contract and can give nse to 
legal dispute between the parties. In that sense, stabilisation clauses carry the same 
degree of weight and legal force as do other contractual provisions of a substantive 
nature. 
1.3 Scope of the Stabilisation Clause 
Stabilisation clauses have both spatial and temporal dimensions. So far as the spatial 
dimension is concerned, the scope of stabilisation clauses may be either comprehensive 
or limited. A stabilisation clause is comprehensive in scope when it encompasses a 
restriction upon a change of the whole range of legislative competences by the host 
state. A stabilisation clause of comprehensive scope attempts to completely insulate 
contractual undertakings from any change of applicable law by a host state. On the other 
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hand, the stabilisation clause may be of limited scope where the competences are 
applicable to specific legislation such as tax laws, labour law or social welfare law, the 
law relating to repatriation of rights, stabilisation of export-import provisions and ftee 
transferability of currency. In terms of efficacy, the stabilisation clause of limited 
competence tends to be more effective and is preferable to the developing countries 
because of its narrower focus on legislative competence which gives to them more 
psychological comfort than comprehensive stabilisation clauses, which may be treated 
by them as a waiver of legislative power to a significant extent. The modem contractual 
practice indicates a preference for the adoption of stabilisation clauses with a narrower 
scope. 
Regarding the temporal aspect, stabilisation clauses address the time element 
inherent in the petroleum contract, the long term performance of which may encounter 
legal change affecting It. 2 Stabilisation clauses try to isolate the contract from legislative 
change during its life time and as such it is formulated to remain valid as long as the 
duration of the contract. 
1.4 Typologies of Stabilisation Clause 
The fonnulation of particular types of stabilisation clause is a result of the bargainingý 
process and strength of the parties and reflects a balancing of the opposite interests of 
the state and private parties. The stabilisation clauses may be broadly divided into three 
categories: stabilisation clauses in the strict sense; intangible clauses and economic 
stabilisation clauses. 
1.4.1 Stabilisation Clause in the Stricto Sensu: A stabilisation clause in the stricto 
sensu intends to ensure that the law applicable to the petroleum contract will not change 
2 Nagla Nassar, Sanctity of Contracts Re- Visited: A Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-Term 
International Commercial Transactions, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht (1995), p. 115. 
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over the life of the project. This is a more traditional approach which tries to impose an 
absolute block on the legislative competence of the host states. Such clauses may take 
the following forms: 
a. A stabilisation clause may freeze the municipal law of the host state on the day the 
agreement is made, and incorporate it into the agreement. The freezing clauses aim at 
stabilising the state's law in force at the time the agreement is signed for the whole 
period of the contract. The broad implications of this type of clause suggest that the 
subsequent legislation will not affect the contract regime. 
b. A stabilisation clause in which the host state promises that later legislation will not 
apply to the relations between the parties to the agreement. This kind of clause does not 
purport to grant a waiver of state sovereignty to legislate; rather it implies that 
subsequent legislation will not apply to the contract. 
c. A stabilisation clause that when there is a contradiction between the new law and 
provisions of the agreement, the latter will prevail. 
A stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu is consistent with the pi-inciple of non- 
retroactivity of laws, which denies retrospective effect to new legislation on existing 
contracts and asserts the respect of vested rights acquired under such contracts or by 
previous legislation. 3 
1.4.2 Intangible Clause: In general, an intangible clause denotes that contracts will not 
be modified or abrogated except by the mutual consent of the contracting parties. The 
intangible clause is widely used in petroleum contracts. These clauses do not contain an 
explicit waiver of legislative sovereignty but rather seek to prevent unilateral 
modifications of contract by the host State. A typical example of an intangible clause is 
as follows: 
LIAMCO award, 20 ILM (1981), p. 31, para. 60. 
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"This contract shall not be annulled, amended or modified in any respect, except by the mutual consent in 
writing of the parties hereto. " 
The juridical nature of such clauses suggests that it is more consensual in nature 
because it requires the mutual consent of the parties to change the contractual 
obligations. The main difference between the stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu and 
an intangible clause is that while the former intends to protect the IOCs from host 
states' legislative intervention into the contract through changes in the applicable law or 
the enactment of new legislation, the latter aims to protect the IOCs from the host 
state's exercise of administrative power to change or modify the contract unilaterally. A 
sta 1 isation clause in the stricto sensu limits the legislative competence of the State, 
whereas the intangible clause shields the investor against the exorbitant powers of the 
5 
government acting as public authority to change the contract terms. 
The requirement of mutual consent for modification of contract may also be 
implied where the contract in question is silent about express consent but one of the 
parties' unilateral actions amounting to the effect of change of contract terms has been 
acquiesced by the conduct by other party. Thus, in the absence of express provision, 
mutual consent of the parties can be deemed to be given by their subsequent conduct 
approving unilateral changes to the contract terms by one of the parties. 
1.4.3 Economic Stabilisation Clause: This kind of stabilisation clause requires that the, 
host state will not enact any legislation or take any administrative measure subsequently 
to the contract, which has the effect of aggravating the costs of the project or if 
subsequent legislation should adversely affect the foreign contractor's rights, the parties 
Art. 17.2 of the Production Sharing Contract of Indonesia between Pertarruna and Overseas Petroleum 
Investment Corporation and Treasure Bay Enterprise Limited 1995, Basic Oil Laws and Concession 
Contracts, Barrows Supplement (Asia and Australisia) Supplement No. 149. 
5 p. Weil, "Les clauses de stabilisation ou di' intangibilite inserees dans les accords de developpement 
econornique, in Melanges oferts a Charles Rousseau, (1974), pp. 301-344. Translated and quoted by A. Z. 
El Chiati, "Protection of Investment in the Context of Petroleum Agreement", Recueil Des Cours, The 
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, vol. 204, (1987), p. 115. 
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will consult to determine the economic consequences of such a change and the host state 
will restore the foreign contractor's economic loss that will help continue the 
perfon-nance of contract. An instance of the first type of economic stabilisation clause is 
as follows: 
Article 43.1 of a PSC of Gabon (1997) states: 
"... the State guarantees to the Contractor, for the duration of the Contract, the stability of the financial 
and economic conditions insofar as these conditions resultfrom the Contract andftom the regulations in 
force on the Effective Date. 
The obligations resulting from the Contract shall not be aggravated, and the general and overall 
equilibrium of the contract shall not be affected in an important and lasting mannerfor the entire period 
of validity hereof However, adjustments and modification of these provisions may be agreed upon by 
mutual consent. 9ý6 
An example of the second type of economic stabilisation clause is as follows: 
Article 17.1 of the Vietnam Model PSC of 2004 provides: 
"If after the effective date, existing laws and regulations are amended or annulled or new laws and 
regulation are introduced in Vietnam,... in any case adversely affecting the economic rights or benefits 
expected by the contractor ftom this contract,... the parties shall meet and consult Promptly with each 
other and make such changes to this contract as are necessary both to maintain the Contractor's rights, 
benefits and interests hereunder and to ensure that any revenues or incomes or profits,... derived or to be 
derived under this contract ... shall not in any way be diminished as a result of such changes... )17 
The economic stabilisation clause of the second type is more popular than the first type 
and is increasingly being incorporated in petroleum laws or codes, investment laws and 
6 Vanco Exploration and PSC dated 27 May 1997 between the Republic of Gabon & Vanco Gabon, Inc. 
(Astrid Maine), Barrows Supplement No. (South and Central Africa)142, p. 80. See another example of 
economic stabilisation clause: "The Contractor shall not be subject to any legislative provision which 
would give rise to an aggravation, whether directly or mdirectly, in the charges and obligations from this 
Contract and from the legislation and regulation in force on the date of signing this contract, unless as 
mutually agreed upon by the Parties. " Article 27.3 of Hardman/Elixir Production Sharing Contract Dated 
8 September, 1996 Between Mauritania and Hardman Petroleum (Mauritama)Ply & Elixir Corp. Ply Ltd. 
Barrows Supplement (South and Central Africa) No. 143, p. 54. 
7 Art. 17.1 of the Vietnam Model PSC of 2004, Barrows supplement (Asia and Australasia) No. 164, p. 
130. 
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petroleum contracts. 8 Because this kind of economic stabilisatIon clause does not seek 
to prevent the enactment of subsequent legislation but tries to mitigate its adverse 
impact on the economic equilibrium of the contract, it is more compatible with the 
notion of the legislative freedom of the State. 
,,, -'This type of stabilisation clause is also sometimes referred to as a hybrid type of 
stabiýhsation clause since it tries to balance the state's interests by retaining its sovereign 
power of legislation and imperative of economic interest of the private party through 
adaptation and commercial adjustment of contract. In essence, these clauses do not 
intend to limit the legislative sovereignty rather they seek to maintain the economic 
integrity of contract through an adjustment of the relationship. 
t The economic stabilisation clause can be distinguished from other kinds of 
stabilisation in tenns of its ways of dealing with political risk. The stabilisation clause in 
the stricto sensu and the intangible clause intend to prevent the political risk ex ante of 
host state legislation, while economic stabilisation clause deals with mitigation of 
political risk occurred through ex post legislation having an economic impact on 
contract. 
2 The Purposes of Stabilisation Clauses 
Stabilisation clauses are set out to serve the following purposes: 
8 For example, article 17(2) of the Federal Law of Russia concerning production sharing agreement says: 
"In the event that, during the period of validity of the agreement, the legislation of the Russian 
Federation, the legislation of constituent entities of the Russian Federation and legal acts of local 
government bodies establish norms which deteriorate the commercial results of the investor under the 
agreement, amendments shall be made to the agreement which guarantee the investor the commercial 
results which it could have received under the legislation of the Russian Federation, the legislation of 
constituents entities of the Russian Federation and legal acts of local government bodies which were in 
force at the time of concluding the agreement. The procedure for making such amendments shall be 
defined by the agreement. " Federal Law 225-FZ 1995 concerning "Production Sharing Agreement" as 
amended by Law 19-FZ of 7 January, 1999, Barrows Basic Oil Laws and Contracts, (Russia and NIS 
Countries), Supplement No. 3 5, p. 99- 100. 
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2.1 Protection from Political Risk 
The availability of legal protection in the host countries' law and contractual 
arrangements against political risks is considered to be one of the most significant 
factors that are taken into account by the foreign investors in the long tenn, and capital 
intensive projects. The first and foremost function of a stabilisation clause is seemingly 
to protect foreign investors from subsequent changes in the law of the host state that 
may result in a direct taking, such as nationalisation or expropriation, or indirect taking 
of property of the foreign investor. As security of investment is the paramount 
consideration in the natural resources industry, the stabilisation clause attempts to 
immumse the contract from the subsequent changes in the applicable law or regulatory 
intervention that modifies the contractual equilibrium. 9 As noted by one distinguished 
author, stabilisation clauses aim to stabilise the petroleum agreements by neutralising 
the effect of prerogatives of the host state which allow it to unilaterally modify the legal 
environment of such agreements. 10 
The stabilisation clause is essentially a mutually negotiated contractual provision 
that attempts to mitigate the political risk which is occurred by exercise of sovereign 
powers granted under the public law. Given the fact that existing principles of 
international law are inadequate and uncertain to protect foreign investors from the 
state's unilateral change, a private party (foreign investors) will usually resort to 
contractual mechanisms of stabilisation clause, arbitration clause and choice of law 
clause in order to deal with political risk. However, one of the main objectives of the 
stabilisation clause as a form of legal protection is to maintain the sanctity of contract. 
9 See also, Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, MartinUs Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, (1991), p. 314; S. K. Chatterjee, The Stabilisation Clause Myth in Investment Agreements, 5 
Journal of International Arbitration, (1988), pp. 97-111; Chiati, supra note 5, p. 115. According to 
Delaume, the purpose of stabilisation clause is "to reach a compromise between the sovereign 
prerogatives of the State involved and the legitimate quest of the private party for stability of status 
consistent with sound business judgement. " Delaume, Transnational Contracts: Applicable Law and 
Settlement of Disputes, law and Practice, Booklet 8(issued July 1983), p. 39. 
10 BertTand Montembault, "The Stabilisation of State Contracts Using the Example of Oil Contracts: A 
Return of the Gods of Olympia? " International Business Law Journal, No. 6, (2003), p. 593,599. 
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In this regard, stabilisation clauses act like a security of the investor's expectation. As 
the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda cannot be directly incorporated in 
state contracts, the foreign investors insist on the contractual mechanism of a 
stabilisation clause which tries to reinforce this principle. 
The extreme version of interpretation of the stabilisation clause as having the 
effect of a principle of pacta sunt servanda has been discussed in the Aramco award in 
which the tribunal affirmed that stabilisation clauses are fully and juridically binding 
upon the contracting State as a direct application of general principles of law and 
wit out any need to rely upon a given domestic legal system; and the State cannot 
invoke a subsequent legislative act or a governmental public law measure in order to 
abrogate or restrict the legal situation secured for the foreign private party by virtue of 
his agreement with the State without engaging its responsibility. " The extreme 
protectionist aspect of stabilisation has also been affirined in the arbitral award LETCO 
v. Liberia in which the tribunal remarks "this clause must be respected, especially in 
this type of agreement. Otherwise, the contracting state may easily avoid its contractual 
obligations by legislation. Such legislative action could only be justified by 
nationalisation which meets the criteria described above. " 12 According to Amador, 
stabilisation clauses of concession agreements incorporate not only express, but the 
specific concrete commitment on the part of the contracting state not to change the 
tenns of the contractual relationship. ' 3 
But such an extreme interpretation of the protectionist effect of a stabilisation 
clause often fail to take into account dynamic changes that can occur in the life time of 
contract and necessity of accommodation of such changes through legal or regulatory 
measures. It has been argued that the stabilisation clause in stricto sensu has only a 
" Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 27 I. L. R. (I 963) p. 168. 
12 See Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) vs. Government of the Republic of Liberia, (ICSID 
case No. ARB/83/2) 26 ILM(I 987), 647. 
13 F. V. Garcia-Amador, "State Responsibility in Case of "Stabilisation" Clauses", 2 Journal of 
Transnational Law and Policy, (1993), 23,49-50. 
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limited role of protecting foreign investors from political risks in view of the fact that 
norms of state contract are profoundly shaped by public policy consideration which are 
different from those of the foreign investors and as a result, legal and regulatory 
intervention can become inevitable in the contractual arrangement. 
2.2 Legal Certainty 
Legal predictability and certainty is considered a core element of any legal system for 
its efficacy. The notion of legal certainty is derived from the general principle of law 
that law should be certain and predictable to a reasonable degree. 14 Legal predictability 
of the applicable law of long-term contracts including the petroleum agreements has 
important significance in determining the legal rights and position of the parties. Legal 
certainty is an important factor because by eliminating speculation as to what the law is 
and avoiding a need for interpretation, clanfication, or explanation that arises from the 
lack of a clear rule, certainty promotes efficiency for the commercial and investment 
transaction. The stable legal system requires a reasonable degree of certainty and 
continuity in law by which one can be able to predict the reasonable profit outcome 
from enterprises - remains a significant consideration in investment decision. 
' 5 Frequent 
change and fluctuation of applicable law to achieve narrow political interest may 
jeopardise the stability in the contractual relationship. Predictability requires stability in 
the general legal conditions of the governing contract for creating confidence of the 
14 Certainty of rule and judicial decision is important factor in any legal system. "The maintenance of 
reasonable security of expectations has seemed so compelling as one of law's ends-In-vlew that there is a 
whole armory of legal ideas and legal institutions designed to provide it: constitutional provisions like the 
guarantee against ex post facto criminal laws, judicial policies like that embodied in the emerging 
doctrine of prospective operation of overruling decisions, and indeed, the principal of stare decisis with its 
special force, as you will have observed, in the "reliance areas" of the law where it is realistic to assume 
that action was taken on the strength of known judicial precedents. " Paul E. Loving, "The Justice of 
Certainty", 73 Oregon Law Review, (1994), p. 743,749; Harry W. Jones, "An Invitation to 
Jurisprudence", 74 Columbia Law Review (1974), 1023. 
15 Legal certainty and predictability in applicable law of investment agreement has been discussed and 
emphasised in recent investment arbitral awards. See e. g, Award in Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company vs. The Republic of Ecuador, emphasises on the stability of the legal and business 
framework as an essential element of fair and equitable treatment. Paras. 183,192. 
http: //ita. law. uvic. ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward_00l. pdf 
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investor in the investment climate and providing security of his property and contractual 
rights. 16 Petroleum contracts, which create a contractual regime governing the 
relationship between the host state and IOCs require a reasonable degree of certainty 
and predictability in the legal regime of the host state that governs such contractual 
relationships. 
One of the important purposes of stabilisation clauses is to ensure predictability 
and certainty in the legal regime of contract since foreign investors often have to invest 
in the countries, whose political and legal systems may be uncertain or unstable to deter 
foreign investment. Since the future behaviour of government is uncertain, a 
stabilisation clause aims at policing state behaviour through stipulation of some 
restrictions on the legislative power of the State. 
2.3 Promotion of Foreign Investment 
The driving force behind the host state's desire of inclusion of a stabilisation clause also 
stems from the necessity of promoting foreign investment. Given the fact that the legal 
protection afforded by a stabilisation clause is disputed as discussed below, the 
promotional role of stabilisation clauses should be highly emphasIsed In order to fully 
appreciate the developing countries' undertaking of such a contractual obligation. The 
arbitral practice, as discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter, shows that the legal 
protection function of stabilisation clauses is uncertain and questionable, but its 
promotional function has come into the forefront of the discussion about the efficacy of 
these clauses in view of the fact that the presence of stabilisation clauses in a petroleum 
contract can act as a psychological boost to give confidence to investors at the initial 
stage of the investment. It can act as an incentive to facilitate foreign investment in 
natural resources development which invariably involves huge capital. 
16 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Good Governance and the Role of Law in Econorruc Development, in: Ann 
Seidman, Robert B. Seidman and Thomas W. Walde, (eds), Making Development Work: Legislative 
Reform for Institutional Transformation and Good Governance, The Hague, 1999, (preface, p. xxiii-iv). 
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The promotional value of stabilisation clauses is also explained by the fact that 
relatively new petroleum producing states which are desperately in need of technology 
and capital to explore the petroleum can offer a guarantee of a stricter version of 
stabilisation clauses to attract foreign investment. With weak bargaining strength and 
relatively weak legal systems, these countries offer stability guarantee to the IOCs, 
which are less familiar with the geological prospectivity and legal conditions of doing 
business in these countries. On the other hand, countries, whose geological 
prospectivity in petroleum is well established over a long period of time and have a 
tradition of respect of contract and their political and legal systems are familiar to the 
IOCs, the latter do not usually insist on such host states to undertake extensive stability 
guarantees. 
3. Validity of Stabilisation Clauses 
Although there is uncertainty as to the consequences of the violation of such a clause, 
there is a considerable authority to support the view that a stabilisation is valid under 
national and international law. The legal validity of stabilisation can be premised on the 
following grounds: firstly, since stabilisation clauses are concluded by mutual consent 
of the parties by virtue of their autonomy of will, the parties intend them to be valid 
undertakings. 
Secondly, the legal validity of a stabilisation clause is also affirmed because a 
State enters into a petroleum contract under the fTamework of its public law by virtue of 
which it can renounce the exercise of public law prerogatives of amending the contract 
by inclusion of a stabilisation clause in such contract. The public law of a State usually 
confers on it the legal authority of administering and regulating the petroleum and 
mineral regime. Thus, by undertaking a contractual obligation under a stabilisation 
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clause, the State is acting dejure imperii in granting within its public powers by giving 
certain legislative immunity to the private contracting party. 17 
Thirdly, the legal validity of stabilisation clause also can be premised on the 
principle of estoppel- a well established general principle of law, the analogy of which 
can also be applied to a petroleum contract that -a state should be forbidden to deny its 
position which it assumes voluntarily and upon which the foreign investor has also 
relied. 
However, the legal validity of stabilisation. clauses has been challenged by the 
two fundamental principles: firstly, it has been suggested that the stabilisation clause is 
invalid as it goes against the permanent sovereignty over natural resources. ' 8 The 
principle of pennanent sovereignty over natural resources denotes that states own the 
natural resources within their territory and that they may dispose of those resources as 
they fit such states are entitled to nationalise natural resource concessions-19 The 
developing states argued that the principle of PSNOR has assumed the character ofjus 
cogens -a customary norm from which no derogation is permissible. But the prevailing 
view suggests that the stabilisation clause is valid despite the invocation of the principle 
of PSNOR for the following reasons: (i) a stabilisation clause is not inconsistent with 
permanent sovereignty over natural resource since the state's freedom of contact 
remains intact despite its assumption of the principle of PSNOR. This is true 
irrespective of the fact that whether the principle has assumed the status Ofjus cogens or 
not. Even if it is conceded that PSNOR is ajus cogens norin of international law, it does 
17 Ahmed S. El-Kosheri and Tarek F. Riad, "The Law Governing a New Generation of Petroleum 
Agreements: Changes in the Arbitration Process", 11 CSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, 
(1986), p. 266. 
18 See, e. g., M. Sornarajah, "The Myth of International Contract Law", 15 Journal of World Trade Law, 
(198 1), p. 187. 
19 See, G. A. Res. 1803,17 U. N. GAOR Supp. (no. 17) at 15, U. N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G. A. Res. 3171, 
28U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U. N. Doc. A/9400 (1973). 
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not necessarily exclude the state's legal capacity to assume contractual obligations by 
entering into a contract with the foreign investor. 20 
The modem notion of sovereignty is functional and limited which tacitly accepts 
limitations upon the state in the increasingly interdependent world despite the fact that 
PSNOR is a binding rule of international law. Thus, legal controversy relating to 
relationship between stabilisation clause and pennanent sovereignty over natural 
resources have lost much of its relevance in the modem context of investment 
negotiation. (ii) Continuing State practice of adopting stabilisation clauses in the 
petroleum contracts even after the formulation of PSNOR indicates that there is no 
contradiction between the two principles, but rather that they can co-exist. " (iii) 
PSNOR should not be understood as unfettered rights of the State, rather it is limited by 
the principle of good faith; the obligation to respect the other States' right under 
international law; the obligation not to cause trans-boundary pollution and the 
obligation of the state to use its permanent sovereignty for the benefit of its 
population. 
22 
Secondly, it has been argued that the stabilisation clause is invalid as it imposes 
a limitation on state sovereignty and curtails legislative power of the state. Inclusion of 
a stabilisation clause in the petroleum contract results in a shift of balance of power to 
the private party to the detriment of the state. 23 This 'sovereignty' argument against 
stabilisation clause has been invoked invariably in all petroleum arbitrations, but the 
20 See Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, Kluwer 
Law International, Second Revised Edition, The Hague, (1995), p. 222. Christopher T. Curtis, "A 
stabilised economic development agreement represents a judgement on the part of the contracting state 
that the cost of foregoing some degree of future regulatory flexibility is justified by the anticipated 
benefits of the investment. No rule of jus cogens should prevent states from implementing that judgment. 
When a state accepts obligations under a stabilised agreement, it is bound only by the rules it sets for 
itself based on its judgement of its own best interests. " "The Legal Security of EconorrUc Development 
Agreements", 29 Harvard International Law Journal, (1988), p. 317,361. 
21 Christopher T. Curtis, supra note 20, pp. 350-351, see also Moshe Hirsch, The Arbitration Mechanism 
of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Graham and Trotman/Martinus 
Nijohf, Dordrecht, (1993), p. 149. 
22 See, Franz Xaver Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague/London/Boston, (2000), pp. 97-107. 
23 See, George R. Delaurne, "The Proper Law of State Contracts Revisited", 12 ICSID Review-FILJ, 
(1997), p. 24. 
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common view that has emerged from the arbitral awards is that a stabilisation clause 
cannot be declared as invalid on the ground of state soverei gnty. 24 
The argument of sovereignty has been implicitly abandoned by the UN 
resolutions. The resolution of PSNOR and Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of 
the States do not contain any language suggesting that a State, in the exercise of its 
sovereignty, may abandon contractual commitments voluntarily undertaken. 25 
Moreover, the resolution 1803 on PSNOR provided for the obligation upon the states to 
respect agreements entered into for the purpose of developing natural resources. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that a stabilisation clause is a legally 
valid undertaking as parties have voluntarily accepted it as a limitation upon their will. 
Thus, it can be argued that the state agrees to include a stabilisation clause by virtue of 
its sovereign capacity, which limits its legislative competence like in the same capacity 
it enters into agreement with the foreign investors. 26 The stabilisation clause should be 
24 In the Texaco award, the sole arbitrator Dupuy stated: 
"There is no need to dwell at any great length on the existence and value of the principle under which a 
State may within the framework of its sovereignty, undertake international commitments with respect to a 
private party. This results from the discretionary competency of the State in this area ... The result is that a State can not invoke its sovereignty to disregard commitments freely undertaken through the exercise of 
this same sovereignty, and can not through measures belonging to its internal order make null and void 
the rights of the contracting party which has performed its various obligations under the contract. " Texaco 
award, 17 ILM (1978), p. 1,23-24, para. 66,68. The arbitral tribunal in Revere Copper also recognised 
that 
"... in order to meet the aspirations of its people, the Government may for certami periods of time 
impose limits on the sovereign powers of the State, just as it does when it embarks on international 
financing by issuing long term government bonds on foreign markets. " Revere Copper, 17 ILM (1978), 
1321,183 1. See also A GIP v. Popular Republic of the Congo, the tribunal held that 'stabilisation clauses 
freely accepted by the Government do not affect the principle of its sovereign legislative and regulatory 
powers and that, M the present case, changes in the legislative and regulatory arrangements stipulated in 
the agreement simply cannot be invoked against the other contracting party. ICSID award of Nov. 30, 
1979,21 ILM (1982), p. 726 at Sec. 86. 
25 See also the International Law Association's (ILA) Declaration on the Progressive Development of 
Principles of Public International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order, 1986 which 
affirms the ability of states to bind themselves under international law by means of economic 
development agreements. The Declaration provides that while permanent sovereignty is inalienable, a 
state may accept obligations with regard to the exercise of such sovereignty, by treaty or by contract, 
freely entered into' and that a state's power to nationalise, expropriate, exercise of eminent domain or 
otherwise transfer of property or rights in property' is 'without prejudice to legal effects flowing from any 
contractual undertaking. " International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Second Conference 2,6-7 
(1987) (para. 5.2). quoted in Curtis, supra note 15, p. 354. 
26 The traditional notion of sovereignty in terms of supreme authority and unlirMted power has been 
changed. The modem notion of sovereignty is more ftinctional and cooperative as it is long accepted that 
States have to cooperate and accept international obligations to pursue their interests within the 
increasingly internationally interdependent order. See generally on this aspect, Franz Xaver Perrez, supra 
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treated as self-imposed but temporary limitations on the sovereignty of host 
governments. However, the stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu should not be 
construed as an absolute block on the legislative power of the state. A construction that 
the stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu merely intends that any legislation 
subsequently enacted that may have particularly adverse impact upon the contract 
regime will not be applicable to it - can be more compatible with the notion of 
legislative freedom of a State. 
It must be, however, acknowledged that a state can disregard such a voluntary 
contractual undertaking in exceptional circumstances like an overriding consideration of 
public interest, but in doing so, the state must not discriminate and must act in good 
faith. State action in violation of a stabilisation clause should be justified by the 
overriding concern for the public interest, not merely to achieve some political 
o. ectives. The states should not resort to arbitrary action in disregarding their 
contractual commitments that have been assumed voluntarily. 
Finally, we can conclude that drafting and interpreting stabilisation clauses as 
unlimited and absolute limitations on the State's legislative or administrative 
competence is more likely to be challenged on the ground of sovereignty. Rather, 
formulation of the stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu as a limited undertaking in 
terms of duration and scope tends to be a more valid obligation and an effective 
protection mechanism for foreign investors. 
4. Legal Effect of Stabilisation Clauses 
The legal effect of stabilisation clauses depends, to a great extent, upon the particular 
fonn of the clause. The following section discusses the legal effect of various kinds of 
stabilisation clauses. 
note 22; W. Michael Reisman, "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law", 84 
American Journal of International Law, (1990), 866. 
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4.1 Effect of Stabilisation Clause in the Stricto Sensu 
The legal effect of a stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu centres on whether its 
presence in a petroleum contract can change the legal nature of such a contract to turn it 
into 'enclave status'; or whether nationalisation or expropnation of petroleum projects 
or a unilateral change or tennination of contract containing a stabilisation clause by the 
host states should be treated as an unlawful act under national and international law. 
4.1.1 Prohibition of Nationalisation or Expropriation 
An important issue with respect to the legal effect of the stabilisation clause in the 
stricto sensu revolves around the question which plagued the arbitral tribunals for a long 
time: can the clause prohibit nationalisation and expropriation of foreign contractual 
enterprise? An extreme version of the legal effect of a stabilisation clause based on 
pacta sunt servanda claims that a stabilisation clause prohibits lawful nationalisations 
by a State. This argument holds that states as well as private parties must observe their 
agreements even under circumstances in which the investment commitment no longer 
fosters the public interest. Accordingly, nationalisation of the foreign owned enterprise 
in breach of the stabilisation clause is a wrongful act and nationalisation could only be 
justified by a fundamental change of circumstances. 27 Such a view had been also 
endorsed by the arbitral tribunal in the Texaco award 28 in which the arbitrator decided 
that the act of nationalisation by the Libyan Govenunent was in breach of the 
stabilisation clause and was an illegal act under international law. 
27 Tschanz, "The Contributions of the Aminoil Award to the Law of State Contracts", 18 International 
Lawyer, (1984), 245,278; See also, T ven Stabilisation.. Cla. uses- 
in EconorMc Development Agreements", 28 Virginia Journal of International Law, (1987-88) 1015,1035; 
See also, Christopher Greenwood, "State Contracts in International Law-The Libyan Oil Arbitrations", 53 
British Yearbook of International Law, p. 63. 
28 Texas Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic, 17 ILM (1978), p. 3. 
112 
But this argument was discarded in the subsequent arbitral awards in which it 
was held that nationalisation is always a lawful act and stabilisation clause cannot forbid 
a state's right to nationalise under international law. In the Liameo award, the tribunal 
found that nationalisation that is non-discriminatory and not accompanied by a wrongful 
act or conduct is not a breach of a stabilisation clause. In the Aminoil 29 award, the 
tribunal held that while a straightforward and direct reading of the stabilisation clauses 
can lead to the conclusion that they prohibit any nationalisation, such an assumption is, 
according to tribunal, erroneous and accordingly, it held that the limitation of a state's 
right to nationalise being a "particularly serious undertaking" and its existence could not 
be presumed in the absence of express language. 30 The Aminoil award implicitly 
suggests that limitations on a sovereign right to nationalise may be possible, but such 
restrictions would have to be explicit and reasonable. Finally, in the Aminoil award, the 
tribunal held that a stabilisation clause has to be interpreted restrictively, and should be 
construed to provide protection only against a measure having a confiscatory character. 
Thus, it can be fairly argued that despite the forin or wording of the particular 
stabilisation clause, it cannot prohibit lawful nationalisation which is recognised as a 
state's inherent right under international law as a contractual obligation cannot prevail 
upon the general norm of international law. 
29 Article 17 of the 1948 Concession Agreement reads as follows: 
The Shaikh shall not by general or special legislation or by administrative measures or by any other act 
whatever annul this Agreement except as provided in Article 11. No alteration shall be made in the terms 
of this Agreement by either the Shaikh or the Company except in the event of the Shaikh and the 
company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of both parties to make certain alterations, 
deletions or addition to this Agreement. " Government of the State of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil 
Co. (Aminoil), 21 ILM (1982) 976. 
30 The award of the Aminoil had been criticised by many authors- Prof Higgins finds the Tribunal's 
interpretation of the stabilisation clauses "implausible as a matter of construction and unpersuasive as a 
matter of reasoning. " "The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law", 
176 Recueil des Cours, Hague Academy of International Law, 259, at. 304. (1982-11); According to 
Tesan, "the tribunal rendered the stabilisation clauses superfluous by depriving them of any specific 
meaning. If the requirement that the nationalisation not be confiscatory is part of general international 
law, then the stabilisation clauses add nothing to what would be the usual legal situation. " Fernando R. 
Tason, "State Contracts and Oil Expropriations: The Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration", 24 Virginia Journal of 
International Law, (1984), p. 323,344-45. See the separate opinion of Sir G. Fitzmaunce in the award. 
His main contentions are that stabilisation clauses do not need to be express to be effective; that this 
clause was express anyway; and that the character of the concession or of the stabilisation clause had not 
changed due to subsequent negotiations and amendments. AMINOIL, 21 ILM. at 1051-53. 
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Another implication that follows from the Aminoil award is that a stabilisation 
clause may be valid as a temporary limitation upon the state sovereignty if it is limited 
to a relatively short period. On the other hand, the formulation of a stabilisation clause 
for an unreasonably long period like 60 years may provide justifiable grounds for its 
breach in the light of profound social and economic changes in a country. 31 Thus, 
according to the Aminoil award, legal specificity of such a clause in tenns of its duration 
and the scope of application and explicit mention about legal consequences that may 
ensue from its breach can undeniably enhance its legal effect. 
The next section focuses on the legal effect of stabilisation clauses on the 
internationalisation of contract. 
4.1.2 Intern ation alis ation of Contract 
The legal effect of stabilisation clauses has sometimes been attributed to 
internationalisation of contract on the premise that contracts containing stabilisation 
clauses assume an international character and consequently, the obligations stipulated in 
these agreements partake of the nature of international legal obligations. Therefore, the 
rights and obligations of the parties under the petroleum contract are to be governed by 
international law and unilateral termination of a contract containing a stabilisation 
clause constitutes an internationally wrongful act. Indeed, some arbitral awards tribunals 
have recognised the intemalisation effect of a stabilisation clause and cited the 
abilisation clause as one of the important factors that indicate that petroleum contracts stab 
has been intemationalised to the effect that the contract should be subject to principles 
of international law so as to remove the contract from the purview of municipal law of 
" See also report of the Secretary General of the United Nations of 7 May 1981 on permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources: "A recurrent provision, even in very recent contracts, is the freezing 
of the tax regime applicable at the time of the negotiation. Some of the freezing clauses negotiated at 
present tie the hands of the Government for a very long period. Long and comprehensive 'freezing' 
clauses seem to run counter to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, although it 
may be conceivable that provisions to stabilise the fiscal regime for a reasonable period, so as to assure 
loan repayment, for example, can be found acceptable under specific conditions. "E/C/ 119, p. 24, para 68. 
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the host state. In the Texaco award, professor Dupuy argued that the presence of a 
stabilisation clause inter alia changed the legal nature of the Libyan petroleum 
32 concessions and converted such concession into internationallsed ones .A similar 
position was upheld in the award of AGIP (1979), 33 where the tribunal found the 
nationalisation of an Italian company to be contrary to Article II of the 1974 
Agreement which contains a stabilisation clause wherein the stability of the Company's 
status had been guaranteed for a period of 99 years. It was with regard to this stability 
provision that the Tribunal established that it was necessary to apply international law in 
conjunction with Congolese law. 34 The tribunal held that "a stabilisation clause's 
applicability results not from the automatic play of sovereignty of the contracting state 
but from the common will of the parties expressed at the level of international juridical 
order. -)735 
The internationalisation effect of stabilisation clauses has also been supported by 
some commentators who have taken the view that the very essence of a stabilisation 
clause prohibits a state from unilaterally modifying the state contract, and suggests that 
instead of the law of host states, international law governs the state contracts. 36 
According to another group of authors, the mere presence of a stabilisation clause 
cannot fully intemationalise the contract. According to them, a stabilisation clause only 
in combination with a general principle of law or international law as applicable law or 
arbitration clause can fully internationalise the contract. 37 For instance, according to 
32 Texaco award, 17 ILM, The stabilisation clause, clause 16(2) f the concession agreement, reads as 
follows: This Concession shall throughout the period of validity be construed in accordance with the 
Petroleum Law and the Regulations in force on the date of execution of the agreement of amendment by 
which this paragraph (2) was incorporated into this concession agreement. Any amendment to or repeal of 
such Regulations shall not affect the contractual rights of the Company without its consent. 
33 ICSID Arbitral tribunal, 21 ILM (1982), p. 726,727-28. 
34 lbid, at 736. 
35 AGIP Company v. Popular Republic of the Congo(1979), 21 ILM (1982), p. 726,735. 
36 Christopher Greenwood, supra note 27, p. 53. See also, Richard B. Lillich, "The Law Governing 
Disputes under Economic Development Agreements: Re-examining the Concept of Internationalisation" 
in: Richard B. Lillich and Charles N. Brower (ed. ), International Arbitration in the Twenty First Centurt- 
Towards Judiciliasation'and Uniformity, Transnational Publishers, New York (1994), p. 100; Timothy 
B. Hansen, supra not 27. 
37 F. V. Garcia-Amador, supra note 13, pp. 33-34. 
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Gunther Jaenicke, the stabilisation clause, in combination with a clause providing for 
international arbitration, is a strong indicator of the intention of the parties to insulate 
the investment agreement from the reach of the law of the host state, and the host state 
thereby implicitly accepts the competence of the arbitral tribunal to judge on the validity 
and on any alleged impairment of the "stabilisation clause" by applying national as well 
as international legal standards. 38 
The full implication of the theory of internationalisation has been discussed in 
the preceding chapter, which showed that the theory has lost much of its appeal on 
normative and technical grounds. The grounds also hold true for the present discussion. 
It is submitted that mere insertion of a stabilisation clause cannot internationalise the 
contract to the effect that breach of such stabilised contract amounts to violation of 
international obligations. In this regard, two additional arguments can be put forward 
for such an assertion: firstly, stabilisation clauses do not intend to confer any 
international right or obligations upon the state party in the absence of express words; 
and secondly, the increasing use of economic stabilisation clauses in an effort to avoid 
uncertainty regarding consequences of a breach of traditional freezing clauses negates 
the thesis of internationalisation of contract. 
4.1.3 Payment of Compensation 
In view of the fact that a stabilisation clause cannot prevent a state from exercising its 
inalienable right to legislate for an overriding public purpose, there is an overwhelming 
case in support of the argument that the main legal consequence of a breach of a 
stabilisation clause is the financial restriction upon the state, which signifies that 
compensation must be awarded in the case of breach of stabilisation clause. This 
38 Gunther Jaemcke, "Consequences of a breach of an investment agreement governed by International 
law, by general principles of Law or by domestic law of the host state", in Dicke, D. C. (ed) : Foreign 
Investment in the Present and New International Economic Order, vol. I (Proceedings of ILA 
Conference, Vienna, 1987). 
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proposition is equally applicable whether the contract in question is concluded with the 
state authority or the state enterprise. The tribunal in the Aminoil award also admitted 
that "these provisions are far from having lost all their value and efficacy on that 
account since, by impliedly requiring that nationalisation shall not have any 
confiscatory character, they reinforce the necessity for a proper indemnification as a 
condition of it. )'39 There is a consensus among the majority of authors that the relevance 
of a stabilisation clause is not that it will be specifically enforced, but rather it should be 
treated as the most pertinent factor that makes certain that damages should be awarded 
and in some cases, it may entail a higher amount of compensation. 40 According to them, 
an anticipated cancellation of a contract having a stabilisation clause would give rise to 
a special right to compensation. In view of the fact that compensation becomes payable 
to foreign investor in case of breach of investment contract for lawful nationalisation 
recognised as a customary principle of international law, it is plausible that a breach of a 
contract should entail a higher amount of compensation. However,, it is 
difficult to determine such "higher amount of compensation" as contractual or arbitral 
practice does not provide any guidance. There is also a divergence of opinion in this 
regard. One group of writers hold that specific performance of contract or restitutio in 
integrum are a proper remedy if the contract containing a stabilisation clause is 
i breached .41 This view suggests that the relief available to a 
foreign investor for breach 
or repudiation of a stabilised contract is damages in the amount that will place the 
dispossessed companies as far as possible in the economic situation in which they 
would probably have been if the seizure had not taken place. Those damages include not 
39 21 ILM. at 1023 
40 See, Eduardo Jimenez De Arechaga, "International Law in the Past Third of a Century", Recueil Des 
Cours, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, (1979), p. 307, Paul E. Comeaux, N. Stephan Kinsella, "Reducing Political 
Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilisation Clauses and MIGA & OPIC 
Investment Insurance", 15 New York Law School Journal of International & Comparative Law, (1994), 
p. 30-31. See also, Esa Paasivirta, Participation of States in International Contracts, LakirMeslliton 
Kustannus, Helsinki, (1990), p. 17 1. F. V. Garcia-Amador, supra note 13, p. 49-50, Oscar Schachter, supra 
note 9, pp. 314 -15. 
41 See, Christopher T. Curtis, supra note 20, P. 365. Gunther Jaenicke, supra note 38. 
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only the full value of the lost property and contract rights, but also any additional 
consequential damages that the foreign investor may have suffered as a result of the 
government's wrongful action. According to a second group of commentators, the 
proper remedy for breach of a stabilisation clause is financial damages, which includes 
42 actual loss suffered as well as lost profits or prospective gains (lucrum cessans) . But 
determination of lost profit may pose many practical difficulties in actual circumstances. 
Arbitral practice also suggests that there is uncertainty in this area of foreign 
investment. In the Texaco award, the arbitrator awarded restitutio in integrum taking 
into account the stabilisation clause as one of the factors as a justification of such 
compensation. On the other hand, in Liamco v. Libya 43 , the presence of stabilisation 
clause was one of the factors considered in the award of "equitable compensation" by 
the tribunal. In the Aminoil award, the presence of a stabilisation clause was an 
important element in the tribunal's justification of the award of damages. Although the 
tribunal rejected Aminoil's claim for the monetary value of a restitutio in integrum, as 
well as the Government's proposed net book value method, the tribunal adopted that the 
aim of the foreign company has to be to obtain a "reasonable rate of retum', 44 taking 
into consideration the legitimate expectation of the parties. In this regard, the tribunal 
considered that the stabilisation clause was one of the factors that created for Aminoil "a 
legitimate expectation that must be taken into account' 45 . Thus, arbitral practice also 
does not suggest that compensation consisting of both actual loss as well as future 
profits is the norm in case of breaches of the stabilised agreement. 
The legal effect of a stabilisation clause so far as compensation is concerned 
should depend on the legality of measures taken by a State. In this regard, a distinction 
should be made between legal and illegal measures taken by the state. If the legislative 
42 Eduardo Jimenez De Arechaga, supra note 40, p. 307. Timothy B. Hansen, supra note 27, p. 1040. 
43 Liamco award, 62 I. L. R. at 217-18. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Aminoil award, 21 ILM, para 159, p. 1037. 
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or regulatory measures taken by the states are non-discriminatory and for the public 
interest and therefore, the stabilised contract is breached by this lawful nationalisation 
or expropriation, the compensation that becomes due is one to be calculated on the basis 
of fair market value- a standard also accepted by the arbitral awards. Moreover, the fair 
market value automatically includes some discounted value for future earnings. But if 
the action taken by the state is illicit since they are not for a public purpose and are 
discriminatory, the compensation due for the breach of stabilised contract should 
46 
include both actual loss and ftiture profits as punitive measures . 
While it should be acknowledged that the presence of a stabilisation clause is 
one of the most important factors that makes awarding compensation certain, 
determination of a higher amount of compensation is inherently problematic. It would 
depend not only on their interpretation by the particular tribunal in question, but also on 
conditions prevailing in the industry as a whole, the legal nature or forinulation of the 
stabilisation clause, and the legality of measures undertaken by the state. Considenng 
all these factors, it may be suggested that in case of a breach of a stabilisation clause, 
fair and equitable compensation becomes payable. The contractual practice is also 
consistent with this line of argument. Petroleum contracts of several countries which 
contain stabilisation clauses, explicitly mention the provision of fair and equitable 
compensation for nationalisation or expropriation of the contractor's rights. For 
example, Article 43.2 of Model PSC of Gabon of 17 April 1991 states: "Any 
nationalisation or total or partial expropriation of the contractor's right shall entail fair and equitable 
compensation in accordance with the internationally known standards and principles. 
47 The same 
contract also makes provision for a stabilisation clause. 
46 See also A. Z. El Chiati, supra note 5, p. 165. 
47Model PSC of Gabon dated 17 March, 1991 between the Republic of Gabon and International 
Companies, printed in Barrows Supplement No. (South and Central Africa) 118, p. 57. See also Article 8 
of a petroleum contract of Niger which provides: 
"The States assures the company and its shareholder that it does not Intend to nationalise the Company 
nor to dispossess it of nay of its present or future property or profits, 
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4.2 Legal Effect of Intangible Clauses 
The intangible clause restricts the administrative capacity of the host state to change the 
terms and conditions of a petroleum contract but implicitly allows accommodation of 
changes of contract terms by mutual consent for the greater interest of the parties. A 
breach of an intangible clause will be treated as a breach of contract and accordingly, 
compensation should be paid by the defaulting party to the affected one. However, the 
scope of rights and obligations including the amount of compensation resulting from 
such a breach of contract would be determinable by the international arbitrator taking 
into consideration of the intent of the parties, the ternis and conditions of the contract 
that changed unilaterally and circumstances compelling the party to make such a 
change. 
4.3 Legal Effect of Economic Stabilisation Clauses 
The economic stabilisation clause is remedial in nature since it focuses on the' 
indemnification of economic consequences of legislation, rather than preventing the 
enactment of legislation. This type of economic stabilisation clause seeks readjustment 
of the contractual relationship through indemnification of loss to the affected private 
party through payment of appropriate compensation. The economic stabilisation clauses 
are gaining in popularity because of their restrictive approach and in view of the fact 
that they attempt to provide a compromise between conflicting rights of the state's 
legislative freedom on the one hand, and the legitimate expectations of private parties to 
financial equilibrium of contract on the other. Because such stabilisation clause does not 
necessarily exclude the possibility of new regulation which results in change of 
If through exceptional circumstances or a crisis situation, nationalisation measures become mandatory, 
the State agrees, in compliance with *international law, to compensate any nationallsation measures by 
paying a fair and equitable indemnity without reflection of any reduction due to prior public notice or 
announcement, in freely convertible currency, within a reasonable period of time. " Establishment 
Agreement Dated 14 Oct. 1992 between the Republic of Niger and Niger Hunt Oil Company, Barrows 
Supplement No. (South and Central Africa) 13 1, p. 13. 
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applicable law to the contract, but it intends to remedy the negative impact of such 
regulation on contract. 
,/ 
The main objective of an economic stabilisation clause is to achieve the financial 
equilibrium of the contract as conceived at the time it was made. In this regard, the 
4 equilibrium' of the contract is determinable by the various factors including the 
definition of the term itself in the contract, the surrounding circumstances and the 
adjustment made by the parties voluntarily in the contractual relationship over the 
course of the contract duration. The resultant consequences for subsequent legislation 
a cting the economic equilibrium of the contract can be mitigated either by way of 
payment of compensation to the party or other equitable solution including modification 
of thecontract ternis as may be agreed by the parties. 
The increasing use of the economic stabilisation clause can be explained by the 
fact that the traditional stabilisation clause with its effect of freezing the applicable law 
does not always safeguard the interests of the foreign investor particularly when the host 
countries adopt much legislation with a view to providing financial incentives which are 
favourable to the foreign investor. In such circumstances, a stabilisation clause in the 
strict sense may work to the detriment of the foreign investor and tend to protect the 
interests of the host country. Therefore, the formulation of a stabilisation clause to 
prevent legislation in question which is likely to affect the economic equilibrium of the 
contract or to mitigate any adverse economic impact of the enacted legislation is more 
effective than the stabilisation clause in the traditional sense. 48 
,/ Furthermore, the economic stabilisation clause 
is a more flexible device of 
stability, which compromises between the state's exercise of legislative and regulatory 
power in relation to the contract and viability and continuation of contract through 
adjustment of t he contractual relationship by way of provision of compensation. This 
48 See also, Nour Eddine Terki, "The Freezing of Law Applicable to Long-Term International Contracts", 
Journal of International Banking Law, (1991), p. 44. 
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flexible approach also explains its increasing popularity among many developing 
countries and economies in transition. Moreover, the scope of an economic stabilisation 
clause is usually narrow in the sense that it seeks to prevent the enactment of legislation, 
which may have an adverse economic impact upon the contract equilibrium. This legal 
specificity of economic stabilisation limits the scope of the legal effect of such 
stabilisation clauses to the compensation payable to the foreign investor in the event of 
its breach and can enhance its effectiveness. The increasing acceptance of economic 
stabilisation clauses reflects the uncertainty associated with the amount of compensation 
payable in the case of a breach of a stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu as manifested 
in the several arbitral decisions in this regard. However, a delicate question arises as to 
how to assess the economic impact of new regulation. In this regard, it can be suggested 
that the criteria of economic equilibrium of contract can be used in assessing negative 
impact of new regulation that can avoid the complicated process of determination of 
compensation under international law and also help the parties to avoid having recourse 
to costly arbitration which may arise from disputes on the breach of a stabilisation 
clause in the strict sense. 
5. Relationship between Stabilisation Clauses and Applicable Law Clause 
The stabilisation clause cannot act in isolation rather it closely interacts with other 
contractual provisions, especially, the applicable law clause. Indeed, a close connection 
exists between the stabilisation clause and the applicable law clause because both deal 
with the law governing the contract, albeit in different ways. The legal effect of 
stabilisation clauses is shaped by the formulation of the applicable law clause. The 
applicable law can also have a great bearing upon the interpretation of a stabilisation 
clause by the international tribunal or municipal courts. 
122 
Much of the controversy about the legal effect and validity of the stabilisation 
clause relates to its relationship with the applicable law of the contract. The legal effect 
of a stabilisation clause will depend in large part on: whether the law applicable to the 
contract is the domestic law of the State Party or the non-municipal legal system. 
Indeed, three situations may occur in this regard: firstly, the contract may be governed 
by the national law of the host state. The general trend regarding the applicable law is 
towards choosing the law of the host state. The application of the municipal law in state 
contracts as applicable law to the contract is generally preferred by the host states. 
Secondly, a contract may be exclusively governed by international law or a general 
principle of law or principle and practice of petroleum industry, or principles of law 
common to more than one country. This becomes rather a rare practice toady. Thirdly, a 
contract may be governed by domestic law and in case of failing of domestic law, it will 
be governed by international law or it may be governed both by municipal law and 
international law or decisions of international tribunals or principles of petroleum 
industry. 49 
Corresponding to the above situations, different implications of the legal effect 
of the stabilisation clause may arise. As a consequence of the application of the 
municipal law of the host State, any change of the applicable law by the host state 
49 Model PSC of Turkmenistan of 1997-art. 29(l)-This Agreement shall be governed by, interpreted and 
construed in accordance with the law of Turkmenistan and as applicable, the principles of international 
law and the decisions of international tribunals and international treaties to which Turkmenistan is a 
party. Article 26.1 of the Model Production Sharing Agreement of Ghana of 1995 says: This Agreement 
and the relationship between the State and GNPC on the one hand and Contractor on the other shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Ghana consistent with such 
rules of international law as may be applicable, including rules and principles as have been applied by 
international tribunals. Model Production Sharing Agreement of Ghana of 1995 between the Government, 
the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation and Contractor, Barrows Basic Oil Laws and Petroleum 
Contracts, Central and South Africa, Supplement No. 122, p. 74. Article 28.1 of Shell-Chma Petroleum 
Contract states: For the purpose only of this Contract its validity, interpretation and implementation shall 
be governed by the laws of the People's Republic of China and such laws shall be publicly available. 
Failing such laws of the People's Republic of China, general international practice and principles shall be 
applicable. China-Shell petroleum Contract, 9 August 1996 between China National Petroleum 
Corporation and Shell Exploration (China) Ltd. (Deep Horizon Qingshui Block, Liaohe, Bohai Bay 
Basin), Barrows Basic Oil Laws and Contracts, Asia and Australasia (Supplement no. 142), p. 64. Article 
34 of Mozambique Model PSC of 2000 (Bid Round) says that this agreement shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the law of the Republic of Mozambique and such rules of International Law 
as may be applicable. Barrows Supplement No. 146, (Central and South Africa). 
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would affect the contract by way of modifying contractual obligations. Thus, it can also 
be argued that if the applicable law is that of the State party to the contract, the intended 
legal effect of stabilisation clauses in the stricto sensu is negated if such applicable law 
is amended by the state by virtue of sovereignty. In fact, the applicable law may be 
changed by the host state on various gTounds-constitutional validity test of legislation, 
inconsistency with peremptory norms of international law, or public policy. 
Constitutional interpretation of applicable law by the courts that particular legislation is 
against the constitutional norms may render the applicable law to be amended. 
Constitutional and legal constraints on the contracting capacity of the state have 
significant legal implications for the validity and enforcement of the stabilisation clause 
if the contract in question is governed exclusively by the law of the host state. The post 
contract public policy considerations may lead the host state to amend the applicable 
law which significantly affects the efficacy of the stabilisation clauses in the stricto 
sensu. 
If the applicable rule is non-municipal law such as international law or general 
principles of law or practice of petroleum industry, it is assumed that the stability of 
contract is enhanced since the state cannot amend such laws or principles by its 
legislative capacity and these non-municipal legal systems evolve slowly compared to 
municipal law. Thus, there is a common perception that stabilisation clauses tend to be 
more effective when the contract is governed by such a non-municipal legal system that 
can afford greater protection to the investor from fragility of municipal law. As a matter 
of fact, IOCs prefer the international law or general principles of law as applicable law 
because these laws are not amenable to change by the parties and can withstand the host 
state's unilateral legislative power to change the terms of contract. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the subjection of a state contract to a 
non-municipal law is not by itself a complete guarantee of contractual stability, since 
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international law recognises the host state's legislative and regulatory competence and 
to nationalise the private party's contractual rights, notwithstanding any guarantees 
contained in the contract. 50 Moreover, even the fact that the petroleum contract is 
governed by international law or a general principle of law it is always subject to 
overriding mandatory public law rules by virtue of which the State can interfere with the 
course of the contract when its vital interests are at stake. These overriding mandatory 
rules, which can override the choice of law clause substantlally, restrict the scope of 
party autonomy to choose the non-municipal law as applicable law .51 The mandatory 
public rules generally can cover wide ranging issues involving protection of the public 
interest such as the law relating to conservation, and anti-pollution laws; import-export 
rules; foreign exchange regulations; competition laws; taxation laws; measures of 
embargo, blockade or boycott, expropriation, nationalisations and confiscations. 52 The 
application of these overriding mandatory public rules by the host states may 
substantially reduce the effect of internationalisation of contract by way of insertion of 
international law as an applicable law of the contract. 
Conversely, the fact that the applicable law is exclusively law of the host state, 
in interpreting the stabilisation clause the total exclusion of international law or general 
principle law in the governing petroleum contract is neither possible nor desirable 
because even in the absence of non-municipal law as applicable law, the international 
tribunal may take into consideration some mandatory rules of public international law 
50 Christopher Greenwood, supra note 27, p. 53. 
" Giuditta Cordero Moss, Lectures on International Commercial Law, CEPMLP Internet Journal, 
www. cepinlp. org/joumal, vol. 14,2003, p. 92; See on mandatory rules, P. Mayer, "Mandatory Rules of 
Law in International Arbitration", 2 Arbitration International, (1986), pp. 274, According to P. Mayer, "A 
mandatory rule is an imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international relationship 
irrespective of the law that governs the relationship. To put it another way: mandatory rules of law are a 
matter of public policy (ordre public) and moreover reflect a public policy so commanding that they must 
be applied even if the general body of law to which they belong is not competent by application of the 
relevant rule of conflict of laws. ... In matters of contract, the effect of a mandatory rule of the 
law of a 
given country is to create an obligation to apply such a rule, or indeed simply a possibility of so doing, 
despite the fact that the parties have expressly or impliedly subjected their contract to the law of another 
country. " P. 275. 
52 See, A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the Context 
of State Contracts: An Overview", 7 Journal of International Arbitration, 1990, pp. 53-64. 
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like the international minimum standard for the protection of foreign investor or general 
principles like the obligation to act in good faith or the denial of justice. 53 An 
application of such mandatory rules of a non-municipal legal system in interpreting 
provisions of petroleum contracts including stabilisation clauses can not be contracted 
out by the parties. 
In the situation of the third type where supra-national law applies failing of 
domestic law, it is assumed that the former only intervenes in effect to complete or 
corroborate the latter which is silent on a given point. 54 
6. Legal Value of Stabilisation Clauses 
Theoretically, it is possible to conclude that the stabilisation clauses in the stricto sensu 
are legally valid contractual undertakings, in practice, their efficacy can be severely 
eroded since there is always the possibility that a State can exercise its inalienable 
sovereign power to enact legislation as it may deem appropriate in the public interest. 
Thus, the possibility that the stabilisation clause may be violated by changes in 
legislation by the host state by virtue of constitutional limitation on legislative power, or 
for overriding public interest diminishes significantly the legal and protectional value of 
the stabilisation clause. But the stabilisation clause which derives its legal validity from 
mutual consent must have some legal value. It would be unfair to reject the protective 
value of a stabilisation clause altogether. As already observed, the protective value of a 
stabilisation clause lies not in barring the state fTom exercising leg, slative power for 
immanent public interest, but lies in the fact that the presence of stabilisation clause 
makes the award of compensation more certain in the case of its breach and in some 
cases, it may entail a higher amount of compensation, if the action of the state in 
53 See, Rosalyn Higgins, "The International Law Perspective", in: Terence Daintith (ed. ), The Legal 
Character of Petroleum Licenses. - A Comparative Study, published by Centrefor Petroleum and Mineral 
Law Studies, University of Dundee and Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the International Bar 
Association (1981), p. 35. 
i4 Bertrand Montembault, supra note 10, p. 610. 
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question is not founded on good faith and the non-discrimination principle. Thus, the 
presence of a stabilisation clause strengthens the bargaining power of the IOCs to 
extract an amount of compensation from the host state. In this sense, the stabilisation 
clause has a deterrent effect on a state's behaviour by discouraging it to actions in 
violation of such a clause. 
Furthermore, it should be conceded that in reality, only a few countries assert 
their unfettered right to exercise legislative competence to amend or abrogate such 
contracts. There are only very few contemporary instances of a breach of a stabilised 
contractual relationship. Indeed, a stabilisation clause as a legal protection mechanism 
seeks to give to the agreement more binding force, and adds emphasis, intensity, and 
strength to the petroleum contract. 55 
The stabilisation clause can also be used as an interpretative tool by the domestic 
courts as well as international tribunals in interpreting and giving meaning to the 
contract in question by defining the substantive rights and obligations of the parties. In 
fact, arbitral tribunals may interpret the legal implications of other contractual clauses in 
the light of the formulation of the stabilisation clause. Although the arbitral 
jurisprudence on stabilisation clauses is inconsistent and fraught with ideological 
conflicts, nevertheless, their interpretation of stabilisation clauses helped to clarify other 
legal concepts associated with long term state contracts. 
Thus, denying any legal significance to the stabilisation clause would undennine 
the host government's credibility to undertake any contractual commitment which 
would , in turn, reduce the scope 
for long term investment. On the other hand, crediting 
the stabilisation commitment with some legal value would make the contractual 
relationship more efficient since it would give the government a tool to enhance its 
55 Thomas W. Waelde, George Ndi, "Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International 
Law Versus Contract Interpretation", 31 Texas International Law Journal, (1996), pp. 236-37. 
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credibility and reputation as a reliable contract partner. 56 Although a stabilisation clause 
cannot intemationalise the contract, a failure to respect it may amount to a breach of 
contract which can lead the parties to dispute settlement through arbitration. In this way, 
resorting to arbitration by an international tribunal for breach of stabilisation clause 
o vious y has some negative impact on the host state's reputation and it may entail a 
huge cost to defend such a breach in an international tribunal. 
7. Political Economy of Stabilisation Clauses 
Too much emphasis on the legal aspect of stabilisation clauses tends to ignore the 
underlying economic rationale behind the acceptance of stabilisation clauses by 
developing countries. This assumption explains why so many developing countries 
accept stabilisation clauses despite their formal assertion that such clauses go against 
their sovereign legislative power and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
This apparent paradoxical behaviour of many developing states may be explained in 
tenns of their weak bargaining position at the initial phase of natural resources 
development which compels them to accept such protective undertakings for the foreign 
investor and to develop the scarce resources to accelerate their economic development 
and welfare of the people. This developmental implication associated with petroleum- 
contract explains the rationale of undertaking a contractual mechanism which is often 
perceived by them as a restriction upon their sovereignty. Thus, the adoption of 
stabilisation clauses can make a country with petroleum resources a much more 
attractive location for investment in the petroleum sector. Indeed, many petroleum 
producing developing countries have adopted the stability requirement of an investment 
agreement as a part of their overall investment policy. It should be mentioned that since 
the 1980s onwards, many developing countries have adopted a liberal investment 
56 lbid, p. 259-260. 
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regime, which insists on the rule of law and the stability of the legal regime, based on a 
pre-existing set of rules. A liberal investment regime generally ensures the proper 
functioning of the market and provides adequate legal protection to the foreign 
investment against political and regulatory risk. One of the yardsticks of effectiveness 
of a liberal investment regime is its emphasis on longevity of investment agreements in 
order to Yield expected benefits from such agreements. Thus, much of the significance 
of stabilisation clauses lies in their instrumental value as they are used as a means of 
encouraging foreign investors and in this sense, they have an important role of "market 
function" to play in developing countries. 57 The developing countries, beset with 
economic difficulties, have realised that one of the best ways in which their economics 
can be developed is by encouraging foreign investments, and the legal protection of 
those investments is one way to achieve that objective. 
The host governments of developing countries accept stabilisation clauses under 
the pressure of economic needs and use these clauses as a means of establishing a 
secure and favourable legal regime to attract foreign investors who have the skill, 
capital and technology for the extraction of natural resources. The reputational concern 
of the states for a contractual commitment for foreign investment is also one of the 
factors that lead them to accept a stabilisation clause. Thus, stabilisation clause should 
be seen as an integral part of the global investment climate in which developing 
countries are competing against each other to attract foreign investment in their natural 
resources sector. Thus, developing countries accept such a stabilisation clause in order 
to gain an economic advantage by attracting foreign investment in the petroleum sector 
by making its investment climate more competitive and favourable to the foreign 
investor, not always out of a sense of legal obligation that implies legal compliance of 
these provisions in the strict sense. 
57 Esa Paasivirta, supra note 40, p. 171. 
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8. Summation 
This chapter reviewed the contractual practice of stabilisation clauses and found that 
the contractual mechanism of the stabilisation clause remains one of the most 
significant legal guarantees of stability of contract and is preferred by the foreign 
investor to legislative guarantees since the stabilisation clause takes into consideration 
the individual bargaining situation of a particular agreement and its possibility of 
enforcement in the individual petroleum projects. However, the long term survival of a 
contractual relationship between the host state and private party through a stabilisation 
clause always requires reconciliation of the tension between the legislative freedom and 
public interest of the state party. The validity and legal effect of a stabilisation clause 
can be questioned and be limited by the concept of omnipresent public interest. This 
apparent contradiction between the stabilisation clause and public interest can be 
explained by the fact that the relationship between sovereignty by virtue of which the 
stabilisation clause is entered into and the public interest by which State can challenge 
it, is not clear under international law because it confirms both sovereignty and public 
interest. Thus, while the legal validity of a stabilisation clause should be duly 
acknowledged, their legal effect can be diminished by the consideration of public 
interest. 
From the forgoing analysis, it can be discerned that the stabilising function of a 
stabilisation clause remains uncertain and questionable since its legal validity is subject 
to states' constitutional limitations upon legislation and considerations of overriding 
public policy. Although the protectional value of stabilisation as a means of investment 
security is disputed, its promotional role to attract foreign investment and functional 
role of enhancing legal culture of respect for property and contractual commitment of a 
state has rightly been emphasised. As a means of promotion, the stabilisation clause is 
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seen as an essential incentive to the foreign investors to invest in the petroleum sector. 
This has been manifested through the widespread practice of stabilisation clauses which 
indicates that the developing states competing for investments in petroleum 
development requires to provide much needed legal security for expectation. 
The chapter noted that from a historical perspective, stabilisation clauses have 
undergone substantial transfonnation in their fonn and content, dictated not only by 
changing expectations of the parties but also by changing scenarios in the investment 
climate. One of the important aspects of this transformation is treatment of the 
stabilisation clause as an economic instrument for the preservation of equilibrium of 
contract rather than a pure legal mechanism to prevent the host state's exercise of 
legislative power. The freezing clauses make the contract a rigid instrument by 
insulating the contract from the changing environment which can give rise to conflict 
between the parties when such a change becomes inevitable and its consequent breach 
can lead the parties to seek a legal remedy by way of compensation. In contrast, the new 
generation stabilisation clauses which are also called economic stabilisation clauses 
make the contractual framework flexible and dynamic throughout the duration of the 
contract as the host country changes its laws and regulations having disequilibrium 
effect on contract, contractual equilibrium can be restored through renegotiation of 
contract. The declining trend of using traditional freezing clauses manifests they have 
lost much of their utility as an investment protection device but remain a promotional 
device. On the other hand, the intangible clause and the economic stabilisation clause 
are gaining ground both as protectional and promotional mechanisms, and devices for 
mutability of contract. Thus, it can be argued that the economic stabilisation clause in 
conjunction with the intangible clause can better serve the purpose of stability by 
introducing flexibility than the traditional freezing clause which aims at insulating the 
contractual relationship from the changing environment of contract. 
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Chapter Four 
Renegotiation and Adaptation of Petroleum Contracts: The Quest for 
Equilibrium and Stability 
1.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 it was noted that the main focus of stabilisation clauses is to prevent 
political risks and that they are incapable of dealing with the wide range of changes of 
circumstances that may test the provisions of a petroleum contract. Petroleum contracts 
need to survive the change of circumstances that may occur from external factors owing 
to their long-term nature, and the uncertainty associated with exploitation of petroleum 
resources, and which are often beyond the control of the parties. This chapter considers 
the role of renegotiation and revision as a process of dealing with external and internal 
changes, a role long recognised as an acceptable part of the long-term contractual 
relationship established by a petroleum agreement. Petroleum contracts like many other 
long-terin contracts need renegotiation, revision and adaptation for various reasons such 
as introducing flexibility, ensuring a stable contractual relationship and achieving the 
desired economic outcome from the project in the event of changes of circumstance. 
Although de facto changes or informal renegotiation is quite a common practice in long- 
tenn contracts , it 
is recognised that substantive provisions in law and contract in this 
regard can facilitate the parties' demand for the establishment of renegotiation on the 
footing of legal rights. An appropriate procedural provision for renegotiation within the 
legal and contractual framework is also seen as an essential condition for the orderly 
operation of renegotiation. Unlike earlier concession agreements, modem petroleum 
contracts incorporate various provisions allowing renegotiation, revision and adaptation 
of contract terms in order to meet the changing needs and entitlements of the parties in 
the context of new circumstances. The increasing phenomenon of the contractual 
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mechanism of renegotiation can be explained by the necessity of internal regulation of 
external change of circumstances affecting the contract. 
The natural resource industry had experienced many incidents of renegotiations 
of the contracts during the 1960s and 1970s as the newly emerged developing countries 
wanted to restructure, and revise the natural resources agreements on the perception that 
such agreements concluded during the colonial era, were inequitable and exploitative 
arrangements or sometimes they revised these contracts purely as a result of inspiration 
of nationalistic sentiment. The normative basis of renegotiation and revision of natural 
resource agreements had been furnished by a number of declarations, policy statements 
and resolutions by the LNO, OPEC and other international organisations during this 
time. ' These 'soft law' pronouncements coupled with the new international economic 
order by the UNO had institutionalised and set out the normative framework for the 
revision of the natural resource agreements in view of the desire of the developing 
countries to restructure existing legal arrangements in the light of the new world order. 
Apart from this ideological goal, the need for flexibility in contractual relationship 
through renegotiation or revision has also been reinforced by commercial necessity to 
achieve mutually congruent interest from long term contract. ' 
' OPEC's Resolution No. XVI. 90 of 1968 declared that governments have a right to renegotiate contracts 
when trans-national corporations serving as operators receive "excessively high net earnings after taxes. " 
Report of the Group of Eminent persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on 
Development and on International Relations, United Nations Document E/5500/Rev. LST/ESA/6 of 
1974, while recognised the host state's power to modify the contract through legislation, recommended 
for the inclusion of the renegotiation or review clause in the natural resource agreements in view of the 
unilateral action by the host state can entail disproportionately high costs in terms of the future flow of 
investments. P. 38; See also Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Administrative Council of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1974 and 1975; Programme of Action on the 
establishment of a New International econorn1c Order, 1974 ; the Ad Hoc Inter-Governmental Working 
Group of the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations. 
2 For example, the U. N. Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations adopted in 1986 also 
recommended that transnational corporations should engage in renegotiation even without a relevant 
contractual clause: "Contracts between Government and transnational corporation should be negotiated 
and implemented in good faith. In such contracts, especially long term ones, revision or renegotiation 
clauses should normally be included. In the absence of such clauses and where there has been a 
fundamental change of the circumstances on which the contract or agreement was based, TNCs, acting in 
good faith, shall/should co-operate with Governments for the review or renegotiation of such contract or 
agreement. " The Draft Code of Conduct on TNC, UN Document E/1983/17/Rev. /as amended by 
subsequent negotiation up to January, 1986, printed in: Vol. 4, No. 1, ICSID Review-Foreign In,. 'estment 
law Journal (19 8 9), p. 13 5. 
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This chapter intends to explore the underlying causes of renegotiation and adaptation of 
petroleum contracts, analyses objectives that host governments and companies seek to 
pursue through renegotiation, looks into the legal nature of renegotiation and the 
adjustment clauses of contracts, surveys contractual practices by examining the relevant 
contractual provisions, and highlights the consequences of such renegotiation and 
revision of contract. 
The chapter also highlights the gap filling provisions of the petroleum contracts, 
and explores different contractual provisions that are intended to act as adaptation 
mechanisms. Lastly, it discusses the role of third parties in contract adjustment in cases 
of failed renegotiation and focuses on the extent to which such third party involvement 
can adjust petroleum contracts. 
1.2 Underlying Causes of Renegotiation and Adaptation of Petroleum Contract 
The rationale of renegotiation and adjustment of long term contracts in general and 
petroleum contracts in particular can be attributed to their vulnerability to changes of 
circumstances due to the highly fluid and unpredictable international economic 
environment in which they operate; their incompleteness and the necessity of ensuring 
justice, equity and fairness in contractual arrangements. The underlying assumptions 
behind renegotiation and adjustment can be premised on the following broader grounds: 
1.2.1 Change of Circumstances 
It is not unusual that changes of circumstances may occur during the life of the 
petroleum contract that alter materially the parties' expectations with respect to the 
outcome and the desirability of the continuation of the contract. The change of 
circumstances may be of such magnitude that it may either render the execution of the 
contract fully or partially impossible, or make the performance onerous for a party to 
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the contract. In the circumstances of change, in most cases, the intention of the parties 
and the commercial and economic rationality suggests that contract should be adjusted 
by renegotiation, revision or modification of its terms and conditions in order to 
continue the contractual relationship rather than its abrupt end. The necessity of 
mo i icat on of contractual obligations due to supervening circumstances is recognised 
in major legal systems, albeit in varying degrees. 
1.2.2 Incompleteness of Contract 
Long-term contracts like petroleum contracts can never be perfectly drafted because the 
parties' ability to predict all the events that may affect the contract in future is limited. 
The fact that petroleum contracts are negotiated under conditions of considerable 
complexity and uncertainty means that it is not possible for the parties to specify in 
advance every conceivable contingency in the contract. Moreover, the transaction costs 
of negotiating every possible future change and ex ante specification of contract details 
may be too high to discourage the parties to narrate the future contingencies in detail 
and how to mitigate them. 3 Thus, petroleum contracts are bound to be incomplete in 
specification of detailed terms of its some aspects. The limited ability of the parties to 
predict all future situations and to anticipate the parties' rights and obligations in those 
situations often compel them to leave the certain terms of the petroleum contract open. 
In such circumstances, as the relationship continues, the parties may make the necessary 
adjustments to fill-up some of the gaps to the contract or to change the initial terms. For 
example, petroleum contract's provisions such as natural gas clause, unitisation 
3 An incomplete contract has been defined as contract which "will be silent about the parties' obligations 
in some states of the world and will specify these obligations only coarsely or ambiguously In other states 
of the world" 0. Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press: Oxford, (1995), p. 23. 
Williamson explains the incompleteness of long term contract by concept of 'bounded rationality', which 
holds that there are inherent limitations upon human foresight, cognition, and calculative ability. See, 0. 
E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1996), p. 6. See also, 
0. Hart and J. Moore, "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation" 56 Econometrica, (1988), p. 755-785; 
see also, JW Carter, "The Renegotiation of Contracts", 13 Journal of Contract Law (1998), p. 1,3; Alan 
Schwartz, Joel Watson, "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting", Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization, (2004), p. 2,3. 
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arrangement, commerciality of discovery, work programme, joint development, and 
, J, abandonment clause are designed in the open terms and the subsequent negotiation may 
appear to be inevitable in order to develop these incomplete terms of contracts, when 
complete and full information becomes available in this regard. This remains the 
fundamental justificatory assumption behind adaptation and revision of long term 
contracts. The detailed aspects of change of circumstances have been discussed in 
subsequent part of this chapter. 
1.2.3 Differing Cultural Attitude 
Renegotiation or revision can be necessitated by the difference in cultural attitude, 
business practices, ideologies, political and legal system among the participants to the 
state contracts, which can be manifested in later stages of the performance of the 
contract. For example, parties from western societies generally view contracts as the 
legal relationship that is based upon the legal concepts and principles which attach value 
to the sanctity of the contract. Accordingly, they emphasise written and detailed contract 
drafting in order to define the rights and obligations of the parties in clear terms leaving 
little possibility of subsequent change of contract tenns by the parties. According to the 
western legal tradition, which highly values the 'rule of law', it is generally expected 
that the parties should comply with the contract terms. In contrast, under far eastem and 
Asian cultures, which hold different concepts and ideas governing the structure of a 
commercial relationship, forinal law and written contract is considered less important 
for regulating commercial transactions. The parties from eastern cultures tend to 
perceive the contractual relationship as 'relational', which is to be shaped by mutual 
trust and societal norms rather than an external standard of law. On this view, the long- 
term contract is seen as a preliminary expression of a relationship which is expected to 
be performed through continuing adjustment of the relationship between the parties and 
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the adjustment of future contingencies. Accordingly, they assume that any long-term 
relationship includes an implicit principle of flexibility and adjustment of the 
relationship and a commitment to renegotiate the terms of the transaction in the event of 
4 
a change of circumstances. Therefore, parties from a different culture may have 
different expectations with respect to their obligations and entitlements in the 
performance of long term contracts and the renegotiation of contract that may follow 
from a divergence of perceptions by the parties. 
1.2.4 Perception of Initial Unfairness 
Initial unfairness in contract caused by use of superior bargaining skill or economic 
duress or lack of information remains one of the important reasons for revision or 
renegotiation of natural resources ageements. The perception of initial unfairness andi, 
unconscionability of the contract terms arises where one party has taken advantage of 
the other party's economic distress or urgent needs, or of his ignorance or lack of 
bargaining skill in entering into a contract, as a result of which the contract as a whole 
becomes disadvantageous to the other party. 5 In such circumstances, weaker party may- 
demand the revision of the contract at the later phase of contract perfon-nance when he 
achieves a stronger bargaining position, capability and resource. This relative change in 
n, k ,ii abilities and power of the host state can pose a threat to contract stability by the political 
risk of expropriation and in these circumstances renegotiation of contract remains a 
viable option for the survival of the contract. The perception of initial unfairness was 
4 See, Jeswald W. Salacuse, "Renegotiating International Business Transactions: The Continuing Struggle 
of Life Against Form", 35 International Lawyer, (2001), 1507,1514-21, Philip J. McConnaughay, 
"Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West Commercial Relationship", 41 Virginia Journal 
of International Law (2001), p. 427, Arthus T. von Mehren, "Some Reflections on Japanese Law", 71 
Harvard Law Review (1958), 1486; Thomas Walde and Abba Kolo, "Renegotiation and Contract 
Adaptation In the International Investment Projects: Applicable Legal Principles and Industry Practices", 
5,21(2000); See also Rene David & John E. C. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, (1985), 
3 rd edition, pp. 28-3 1 (discussing that in far-eastern societies, "the very notion of law is rejected, and 
social and commercial relations are governed by extra-legal means. ") 
5 See, Ole Lando, "Renegotiation and Revision of international Contracts: An Issue in the North-South 
Dialogue", 23 German Yearbook of International Law (1980), p. 37-58. 
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one of the main reasons for wide scale renegotiation of petroleum contracts in 1960s 
and 1970s. 
1.2.5 Changes of Competitive Position 
Renegotiation and adaptation of the petroleum contract can also be triggered by a 
subsequent grant to or acceptance of better conditions by one party in later agreements 
in areas such as fiscal arrangements, price structure, methods of production, and 
marketing and development of the production area. 6 Thus, the host government may 
request a renegotiation o contract if the same company has accepted substantially 
different conditions in a later agreement with another country. Conversely, a company 
may ask for renegotiation of the existing contract if the host government has 
substantially altered its policies in a later agreement with another party. 
Often, necessity of renegotiation is not caused by single factor but may conjure 
up a complex process and can be triggered by a combination of a number of factors 
mentioned above. 
1.3 Objectives of the Parties in Renegotiation and Adaptation 
The objectives of host states in the renegotiation and revision of contracts may differ 
significantly from those of IOCs. The host state may request a renegotiation of contract 
for changed economic policies, internal political factors (negative campaign of the 
opposition parties, NGOs, and civil society), perception of the imbalance of the 
6 David N. Smith, and Louis T. Wells, "Conflict Avoidance in Concession Agreements, " 17 Harvard 
International Law Journal, (1976), p. 65, Thomas W. Waelde, "Revisions of Trans-national Investment 
Agreements: Contractual Flexibility in Natural Resources Development", Lawyers of the Americas, p. 
265,294; See, e. g., clause 12 (2) of Thailand's concession agreement of 17 July, 2003 states that: "In the 
event of fundamental changes in bases concerning the concessionaire's benefits, rights and duties in 
countries which are located in the same region, or in any other country whose petroleum production is 
comparable in quantity to that of Thailand and whose petroleum is exported for sale in the same market as 
that of Thailand, the Minister and the Concessionaire may mutually agree to change the said bases 
concerning the Concessionaire's benefits, rights and duties in conformity with such changes. " Petroleum 
Concession No. 7/2546/64 awarded to Nucoastal (Thailand) Limited, Barrows supplement (Asia and 
Australasia) No. 161, p. 120. 
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economic equilibrium of the contract (price increase, windfall profits), political 
perception of oil companies as neo-coloniallst, need for increased resources .7 The 
host 
government may seek to achieve diverse goals through a renegotiation of the petroleum 
contract such as - to gain greater control of the economy for the government and 
citizens; to secure an increase in revenue from the project; to promote economic self- 
reliance; to combat economic imperialism; to implement an ideology; to implement a 
policy of joint venture between foreign investors and state corporations; to obtain 
governinent control of major productive enterprises; to promote state monopolies; or to 
gain access to new technology. 8 
In contrast to earlier renegotiations, modem renegotiation does not occur so as to 
confer benefit solely upon the host states. Renegotiation of a petroleum contract may be 
asked by the companies prompted by the consideration of the economic viability of a 
continuation of the project in its original forrn, and for restoring the equilibrium of the 
contract that has been affected by the political risks of the host state. The company can 
ask for a renegotiation of the petroleum contract if the commerciality of discovery is not 
viable to continue the project in its original form, or the technical difficulty or 
geological conditions have made development of the fields unprofitable for the 
company. Therefore, modem practice of renegotiation is not necessarily directed at 
achieving benefits sought by the host government. On many occasions, it is also 
intended to create more favourable conditions and terms for the companies. For 
instance, in Nigeria, PSC between Chevron Texaco and Nigerian govenunent have been 
' See case studies on renegotiation on natural resource agreements by Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and 
Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, second revised and enlarged edition, Kluwer Law 
International, (1995). It was found in the case studies that renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper 
Agreement (Papua New Guinea) during early 1970s, the Jamaican Bauxite renegotiation in 1970s, Ghana- 
Valco renegotiation in the early 1980s caused by perception of imbalance of the economic equilibrium of 
the contract due to unexpected profitability of the venture and disproportionately low income tax to host 
states. Distrigaz-Sonatrach renegotiation due to deep consequences of the oil crisis on the international 
oil market during early 1980s, renegotiation of Freeport's Ertsberg Mining Agreement (Indonesia) caused 
by changed econornic policies, and most favoured treatment during 1970s. pp. 51-124. 
8 Paul Kuruk, "Renegotiating Transnational Investment Agreements: Lessons for Developing Countries 
from the Ghana-Valco Experience", 13 Michigan Journal of International Law (1991), p. 43, William A. 
Stoever, Renegotiations in International Business Transactions, Lexington Books, (198 1), pp. 345-47. 
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renegotiated in 2001 to accommodate 70: 30 profit split (in the company's favour) for a 
first 350,000 barrels of profit oil down from the previous 80: 20% splIt. 9 
Furthermore, renegotiation is not always a uni-directional process so as to 
benefit the host state or company. In many cases, a renegotiation may be invoked by 
both parties for achieving their mutually reinforcing economic interest of the project, for 
preserving good future relationship and maintaining their reputation in the global 
market place. ' 0 
A fundamental shift that has taken place in the objectives of parties to 
renegotiate the petroleum contract is that while earlier renegotiations were 
predominantly motivated by political reasons, objectives of modem renegotiation are 
more rationalised and mostly motivated by the economic rationale of adjusting contract 
terms to preserve contractual equilibrium or respond to oil price change. This may be 
seen as a decline in the influence of political ideologies and a rising focus on economic 
interests or the parties. Such a shift is demonstrated in contract drafting and current 
practice of renegotiation of contract. For instance, in the context of high oil price 
scenano over the last five years, petroleum contracts of some developing countries have 
been renegotiated to reap wind fall profits gained by the companies. For instance, in 
Venezuela passed new law in 2004 to raise royalty rate from 1% to 16.67% for heavy 
oil to respond price increase and as a result, existing petroleum contracts have been 
renegotiated to fit the new law. " Nigeria has passed law to acquire participation interest 
at the five sixths of the IOCs interest in the existing and future contracts allocated or to 
9 The PSC covers the deepwater OPL250 licence. See, Petroleum EconorrUst, January, 2002, (News in 
brief), p. 43. 
10 For instance, PSC of Equatorial Guinea of 1997 (Block G) has been renegotiated in January, 2000 to 
bring changes, inter alia, in its fiscal regime and stability provisions. Through amendment of the contract, 
royalty regime has been changed to incremental daily production rate to cumulative 
field production rate, 
terms of cost recovery and sharing of profit oil have been more favourable to the host state and making 
production bonuses not cost recoverable; and inclusion of stability of fiscal terms which goes M 
favour of 
the company. See, First Amendment to the Production Sharing Contract for Block 
G, (Offshore) of 
Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Barrows supplement (South and Central Africa) No. 153, pp. 1-11. 
" See, Robert Olson, Populism Redux, Petroleum Economist, December, 2004, pp. 10- 12. 
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be allocated in deep water blocks and as such existing contracts have been renegotiated 
to implement this law. 12 
1.4 Defining Renegotiation and Adaptation 
Renegotiation can be defined as a consensual process of change in the terins and 
conditions of the contract in order to redefine the rights and obligations of the parties 
under the contract in a changed context. Renegotiation should be based on consensual 
process of the parties that can be beneficial for both parties and a consensus based 
renegotiation, which is responsive to external change or new situations, and can 
promote contract stability by strengthening the contractual relationship. The 
renegotiation can take place either by way of process prescribed by the provisions of the 
contract or extra- contractual procedures which are generally approved by the legal 
system followed by the parties. However, renegotiation or revision clauses do not 
always prescribe the procedures to renegotiate or revise the contract. But once they are 
prescribed in the contract, they are always consensual in nature and a legally valid 
means to reach a renegotiation of contract. 
The expression "adaptation" can be used in a narrow and broader sense. In a 
narrow sense, it implies a process of contract adjustment through a number of 
provisions, which are otherwise known as adaptation clauses. On the other hand, 
adaptation in the broader sense implies readjustment of the contractual relationship 
which can be achieved by both renegotiation and adaptation clauses. The adaptation 
clauses allow contract changes by following predetennined procedures and they are 
designed for the filling of gaps in contracts. Thus, renegotiation can be distinguished 
from adaptation in the narrow sense in two respects-renegotiation is more clearly 
12 See, Deep Water Block Allocation to Companies (Back - in -Rights) Regulations 2003. Article 1(3) 
says that all prospecting licenses issues before the commencement of the regulation shall be deemed 
modified by the provisions of the regulation. Barrows supplement (South and Central Africa) No. 160, p. 
91. 
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directed to a material change of the contract, and it points more clearly to the process of 
common effort of the parties than to the result. 13 On the other hand, the adaptation 
clause intends to clarify or fill the gaps in the contract and its application clearly leads to 
adaptation or also restructures the contract to some extent. Renegotiation can be 
distinguished from adaptation in narrow sense by the fact that renegotiation usually 
entails a lengthy consultation process and a reviewing of the whole situation. On the 
other hand, adaptation in the narrow sense is usually a less time consuming process, and 
can be carried out through a pre-determined procedure laid down in the contract and 
even it may be completed without any consultation between the parties in some cases. 
More importantly, the renegotiation clause often deal with external events to contracts, 
adaptation clauses deal with problems of a more contractual nature involving technical 
or financial difficulties. Thus, the renegotiation clause and adaptation clause serve 
conceptually different purposes and the implementation of renegotiation clause involves 
often a more complex process than the adaptation clause. 
1.5 Scope and Criteria of Renegotiation 
The scope of renegotiation of petroleum contracts may vary widely depending upon the 
circumstances of each case and the scope of disagreement among the parties on the 
issues involved. The scope of renegotiation may be as broad as to cover the revision of 
whole contracts or it may be narrow requiring change of only a specific provision or 
provisions of the contract. 
What should be the criteria for renegotiation or a revision of contract? 
Renegotiation often requires different criteria from those of entry negotiation of the 
contract because renegotiation often takes place at the operational stage of the project 
when the parties are in an irreversible position but their mutual needs and circumstances 
13 Norbert Hom, "The Concepts of Adaptation and Renegotiation In the Law of Transnational 
Conunercial Contracts", in: Norbert Hom (ed. ), Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contract in 
International Trade and Finance, Kluwer, Deventer, (I 985), p. 9. 
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may warrant certain changes in the contract for the continuation of the relationship. 
Renegotiation can be distinguished from negotiation in the first instance by three 
important factors: (1) increased mutual knowledge, (2) increased transactional 
understanding, and (3) increased mutual linkage. ' 4 The adjustment of contract through 
renegotiation or revision is carried out more usually on the basis of extra-legal means 
like trust, co-operation and reciprocity and power relationships than purely legal 
techniques that are followed in the initial negotiation of conclusion of contract. Very 
often, in the renegotiation process formal legal standards become irrelevant although the 
original contract always remains the fundamental premise upon which such a 
renegotiation should be proceeded on. Renegotiation requires the parties to act in 
cooperative way, negotiate in good faith and with earnest desire to reach an acceptable 
solution. In the renegotiation of the contract, the parties should observe the following 
objective criteria for deriving maximum benefit from it: 
First, fairness and good faith should be the basic criteria of renegotiation or 
revision or filling gaps in the long-term contract. Both the request for renegotiation and 
the conduct of both parties during the renegotiation process should be based on good 
faith and faimess. 
Secondý renegotiation should be based on mutual cooperation and trust because 
a confrontational renegotiation process may create a bad image for the parties, which 
carries reputation costs for future investment. A cooperative model of renegotiation of 
contract should be the preferred way for gaining maximum benefit from renegotiation of 
contract. The concept of a cooperative model of renegotiation' requires that parties 
respect one another's legitimate interests, and parties should be constrained to pursue 
their self-interest. Such renegotiation leads to a co-operative outcome. 
" Jeswald W. Salacuse, supra note 4, pp. 1507,1509 see also William Stoever, supra note 8, p. 331. 
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Third, economic criteria of preserving contract equilibrium which indicate that 
in the case of a deteriorating economic status of the contract due to subsequent events 
renegotiation can be invoked by the parties to restore contractual equilibrium in the new 
context. In restoring the equilibrium of the contract, the parties should adhere to two 
basic rules: Pareto optimality which suggests that through renegotiation, the position of 
the both parties can be better off or the position of one of them can be better off without 
worsening the condition of other party. Secondly, renegotiation process should be 
guided by the 'no profit or no loss' rule which dictates that no party gains any undue 
economic benefit or incurs loss by renegotiation. Thus, an efficient renegotiation tends 
to work for the interests of both parties. An efficient renegotiation should be based on 
rational calculation of preserving the expectations of the parties that revolve around the 
contract. 
Fourth, international competitiveness of the project should be considered in 
renegotiation process and outcome. In renegotiating the contract, parties should look at 
the terms of parallel or more recent agreements, tax or investment legislation of other 
countries so that it can be internationally competitive and fair to both parties. 
1.6 Triggering Events: Definitional Problems 
The boundary of renegotiation depends upon the scope of disagreement of the parties or 
triggering events for renegotiation mentioned in the contract. Many petroleum contracts 
define triggering events in the contract in order to determine the scope of renegotiation 
in advance. The elaboration of triggering events in the contract provides the legal basis 
upon which renegotiation can be proceeded upon. A well-defined set of triggering 
events may avoid disputes between the parties regarding the identifiable point on which 
renegotiation should proceed. However, the types of triggering events may vary from 
contract to contract depending upon the parties' ability to anticipate the potential 
144 
problems. The triggering events may include a variety of factors such as tax increase, 
materialisation of specific risk, and changes in the financial and economic 
circumstances relating to the petroleum industry or interval of specific time period. 
The scope of renegotiation may depend upon the nature of formulation of 
triggering events. If triggering events are formulated in imprecise language, 
renegotiation can be carried out in a wide variety of circumstances, which parties could 
not have anticipated. Thus, the imprecise language on triggering events introduces 
flexibility in the contract. On the other hand, imprecise formulation of triggering events 
can be widely interpreted and discretion of its broad interpretation can cause instability. 
A balance should be struck between flexibility in the definition of triggering events that 
may cause instability and a requirement of concreteness of the definition of events in 
order to attain certainty. Therefore, events triggering the renegotiation should be 
carefully weighed by the necessity of contract stability so that trivial events having no 
major economic consequences, should not be considered for renegotiation of contract. 
The triggering events should be under the control of both parties because their control 
by one party may lead to a dispute between the parties. Well-defined triggering events 
may prevent an opportunistic renegotiation by circumscribing the discretion of wide 
interpretation of the change of circumstances for triggering renegotiation. It is also 
essential that in invoking the triggering events, the parties must act in good faith. 
2.1 Contractual Practices of Renegotiation 
The legal basis of renegotiation or revision can be found in most of the cases from the 
express provisions of the contract, or in some instances from the relevant legislation of 
the host country. However, even in the absence of clear contractual or legislative 
sanction, the duty to renegotiate long-term contract is inferred from the economic 
rationality of the continuation of such contract and interdependence of the relationship 
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of the parties created. by the involvement of huge physical and capital investment and 
the fact that maintaining the relationship seems more beneficial in economic terms 
rather a break down of it. 15 Historically speaking, the practice of incorporating 
renegotiation and revision clauses in petroleum contracts is a recent phenomenon. Due 
to the weak bargaining power of the host states, the earlier concession agreements 
hardly contained any provision of renegotiation or review clauses. The IOCs were 
reluctant to include renegotiation or review clauses for the following reasons: First, such 
clauses may reduce contract stability as they increase uncertainty and risk in business 
transactions and therefore, go against the principle of the sanctity of the contract. 
Second, complexity involved in drafting appropriate renegotiation clauses may raise the 
overall cost of the transaction. Third, the events that trigger renegotiation may be within 
the control of the host state, raising the possibility that the process could be used 
unfairly to alter the agTeement. 16 
But the increasing realisation on the part of the companies that renegotiation or 
adaptation clauses can facilitate an orderly adjustment of terms of contract in the event 
of change and therefore, eventually might be beneficial for both parties, has led them to 
accept such contractual provisions. Indeed, in modem petroleum contracts, provisions 
for renegotiation or a revision of contract have become a commonplace and it is 
increasingly realised that these clauses can strengthen the binding force of contract 
instead of an undermining stability in the contract. These provisions also reflect 
dynamic stability as underlying theme of modem petroleum agreements. 
Obviously, explicit provision for renegotiation ensures predictability in the 
, tontract 
in a way that parties can acknowledge that in the appropriate circumstances 
renegotiation may occur. In case of absence of express provision, but renegotiation 
" See, generally, M. Sornarajah, "Supremacy of the Renegotiation Clause in International Contracts", 5 
Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1988), pp. 97-114; Gillette, "Commercial Relationality 
and the Duty to Adjust Long-term Contracts", 69 Minnesota Law Review (1985), p. 521,554. 
16 John Y. Gotanda, "Renegotiation and Adaptation Clauses in Investment Contracts Revisited", 36 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, (2003), p. 1463. 
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becomes inevitable, the host states may proceed to renegotiate the contract forcefully. 
Therefore, insertion of an express provision of renegotiation or revision clause may 
avoid subsequent conflict that may arise regarding the duty of renegotiation of contract. 
Through providing for express provision for renegotiation, both parties realistically 
recognise the possibility of a change of circumstances in the long term relationship and 
set out a clear legal framework within which such change of circumstances can be dealt 
with. The explicit provision for renegotiation or revision of the contract provides ex 
ante risk allocation devices which helps to avoid the conflict between the parties that 
may lead to recourse to arbitration or litigation. The express provision in this regard 
binds both parties to negotiate in case of a change of circumstances and in good faith to 
decide what changes should mutually be agreed upon in the contract for the common 
interest and what procedures are to be applied in such a renegotiation process. Thus, the 
explicit provision of renegotiation removes uncertainty about the parties' likely rights 
and duties in the change of circumstances which in turn, ensures predictability about the 
parties' likely conduct in the process of renegotiation and revision. 
A survey of the petroleum contracts suggests that a provision on renegotiation 
and revision of contract may be found in the following circumstances: 
2.1.1. Changes in Economic Equilibrium of Contract 
Vast numbers of petroleum contracts make provision for renegotiation in case of 
changes of economic equilibrium of contract caused by a host country's legislative and 
regulatory measures; and most of these provisions obligate parties to reach an equitable 
solution. Such obligation of renegotiation stems from the fact that the host 
government's change of applicable law of contract affects substantially the position of 
one of the parties and jeopardise economic balance of the contract. Such renegotiation 
provisions usually exist in conjunction with an economic stabilisation clause. An 
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economic stabilisation clause is many ways similar to a hardship clause, but is not 
identical to it as in a hardship clause a change of circumstances envisaged is usually 
beyond the control of both parties. On the other hand, in an economic stabilisation 
clause, the change in the equilibrium of the contract is induced by the legislative or 
regulatory measures of the host states, which are clearly within the purview of their 
control. 
In this regard, a representative clause reads as follows: 
Article 34.12 of Model Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement of Qatar of 
1994 states: 
"Whereas thefinancial position of the Contractor has been based, under the Agreement, on the laws and 
regulations in force at the effective date, it is agreed that, if any future law, decree or regulation affects 
Contractor's financial position, and in particular if the customs duties exceed ... percent during the term 
of the Agreement, both Parties shall enter into negotiations, in goodfaith, in order to reach an equitable 
solution that maintains the economic equilibrium of this Agreement. Failing to reach agreement on such 
equitable solution, the matter maybe referred by either party to arbitration pursuant to Article 31. "" 
This agreement refers to an 'equitable solution' to maintain the equilibrium of the 
contract without expressly mentioning an amendment of the contract terms. 
Economic stabilisation clauses of petroleum contracts of some countries may 
provide for readjustment of the contract term and for indemnification of the contractor 
for the financial losses incurred by it after renegotiation. " Petroleum contracts of some 
countries provide for amendments to the agreement enabling the contractor to obtain 
" Barrows, Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts, (Middle East), Supp. No. 124,1(1995). 
18 For example, the Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement concluded on November 10,1995 between 
the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic and a consortium of oil companies provides as 
follows: 
"... In the event that any Government Authority invokes any present or future law, treaty, 
intergovernmental agreement, decree or administrative order which contravenes the provisions of this 
Agreement or adversely or positively affects the rights or interests of Contractor hereunder, including, but 
not limited to, any changes in tax legislation, regulations or administrative practice, or jurisdictional 
changes pertaining to the Contract Area, the terms of this Agreement shall be adjusted to re-establish the 
economic equilibrium of the Parties, and if the rights or interests of Contractor have been adversely 
affected, then the State entity shall indemnify the Contractor for any disbenefit, deterioration in economic 
circumstances, loss or damages that ensue therefrom... "Barrows, Basic Oil Laws and Concession 
Contracts, (Russia &NIS), Supp. No. 23,1(1993). 
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c anticipated economic results' 19 or a "restoration of the economic rights of the parties"20 
following renegotiation of the contract. Thus, the legal consequence that follows from 
the effect of economic stabilisation is essentially a renegotiation of the contract resulting 
either in payment of compensation to the affected party or an adjustment of contract 
terrns; or it may combine both of them. Such renegotiation of contract aims to achieve 
the economic integrity of the contract. Although the request for renegotiation of the 
contract is generally made by the host states, the economic stabilisation clause shows 
that a request for renegotiation can be made by the IOCs when performance of the 
contract becomes financial onerous to them. 
2.1.2 Periodic Revision Clauses 
The explicit provision allowing the review of the contract at fixed intervals is also, 
frequently used in order to bring orderly and systematic change in the contract. The 
periodic revision clause is more general in nature and may cover a wide range of 
differences of opinion between the parties that may arise in the course of performance. 
A typical example of such periodic revision of a contract is as follows: 
Article 31(2) of the Sudanese model PSC of 1993 states: 
"The Minister and Contractor shall annually, or at such times that either of them may request, consult 
each other to review and discuss such amendments, modifications, revisions or clarifications as either 
19 Article 16.6 of the Model Production Sharing Agreement of March 20,1997 for Petroleum Exploration 
& Production of Turkmenistan contains a similar provision: 
"Where present or ftiture laws or regulations of Turkmenistan or nay requirements imposed on Contractor 
or its subcontractors by any Turkmen authorities contain any provisions not expressly provided for under 
this Agreement and the implementation of which adversely affects Contractor's net economic benefits 
hereunder, the Parties shall introduce the necessary amendments to this Agreement to ensure that 
Contractor obtains the economic results anticipated under the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
Barrows, Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts, Russia &NIS, Supp. 26,75 (1997). 
20 Model Contract for Oil & Gas adopted by the Republic of Kazakhstan by decree 108 of January 17, 
1997 provided in Section 28 that in case: "amendments and additions to legislation ... cause a 
deterioration in the status of the Contract, " paragraph 16 shall apply. The latter provides that the parties 
shall meet "and in case consensus is reached, introduce such amendments or alterations into the contract, 
which are necessary to restore the economic interests of the Parties to their status as of the moment of 
signing the Contract. See also, article 13.10 of the Model PSC of Mozambique, (Bid Round 2000); 
Barrows Basic Oil Laws and Contracts, (South and Central Africa) supplement no. 146; article 37(4) of 
the model PSC of Angola, Barrows supplement (Central and South Africa), No. 149, Angola Model PSC 
of 1999. 
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party may deem appropriate to ensure the fair and equitable operation of this Agreement in view of 
changing circumstances in the petroleum industry, and taking into consideration prevailing conditions in 
the Sudan ,. 
21 
Sometimes, periodical revision may take place on the interval of much longer time. For 
example, Article 17 of the Nigerian PSC of 1999 of Deep Offshore basin states that - 
"The provisions of the PSC decree are liable to review after a period of 10 years from the date of the 
commencement and, everyfive years immediately thereafter". 22 
The periodic revision usually takes place in a relatively less formal manner and it 
e nil, nables the parties to learn how to live up to their expectations through negotiation and 
change of contract terms. Such a programmed and regular revision of contract helps to 
avoid a major dispute between the parties. But the major disadvantage of a periodic 
revision clause is the cost associated with frequent negotiation. 
2.1.3 Hardship Clauses 
Usually, the hardship clause contemplates the situation when there is a fundamental 
alteration in the initial economic balance in the rights and obligations of the parties in 
the event of change of circumstances, and as a result, one party is being placed in a 
disadvantageous position, and hence makes it burdensome for him to perform the 
contract. The most important legal consequence that follows from the application of the 
hardship clause is that the ternis and conditions of the contract would be readusted in j 
the light of hardship circumstances in order to re-establish the equilibrium of the 
ý co ract. The hardship clause always conveys some economic connotation and imposes 
a duty on the parties to renegotiate the contract. 23 The economic effect of hardship on 
21 Sudan Model PSA dated 29hAugust 1993 between the government of the Sudan and State petroleum 
corporation, Barrows Supplement No (Central and South Africa) 12 1. 
22 Deep offshore and Inland basin production Sharing Contracts, Barrows supplement (central and South 
Africa), No. 149. 
23 See, Article 6.2.2 of The UNDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contract deals with effects 
of hardship clause and provides that in case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request 
renegotiations. See also, the 2003 version of the ICC hardship Model clause which defines hardship 
situation: "where a party to a contract proves that: 
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the relationship of the parties can be explained in two different ways: either the cost of 
performance of the contract by the disadvantaged party has increased substantially or 
24 the value of the performance a party receives has diminished to a significant extent . 
The hardship situation can be triggered by major Dolitical, economic, social and 
technical developments occurring during the performance of the contract. Three major 
criteria should be met for the requirement of hardship clauses: first, the event in 
question must be unforeseeable and must be beyond the control of the party claiming 
hardship and must not result from a default or failure to perform by that party. Thus, 
change of circumstances should not be self-induced. Second, 'change of circumstances' 
should be fundamental and substantial in character so as to destroy the equilibrium of 
the relations of the parties. Hardship may not be invoked unless the alteration of the 
25 
equilibrium of the contract is fundamental . The normal business risks that do not 
create any burden on the parties should not be taken into account for the hardship 
purpose otherwise this would undermine the foundations of a market economy and the 
stability of the contract. 26 Third, after the hardship situation, the usual procedure 
prescribed is that the parties would meet and review the new circumstances and adjust 
their relationship. As hardship consists in a fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of 
the contract, the disadvantaged party is entitled to request the other party to enter into 
afthe continued performance of its contractual duties has become excessively onerous due to an event 
beyond its reasonable control which it could not reasonably have been expected to have taken into 
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract; and that 
b) it could not reasonably have avoided or overcome the event or its consequences, the parties are bound, 
within a reasonable time of the invocation of this clause, to negotiate alternative contractual terms which 
reasonably allow for the consequences of the event. " Hardship has been defined by UNCITRAL in its 
Legal guide on Drawing up International Contracts for Construction of Industrial Works as "... economic, 
financial, legal or technological factors that cause serious adverse consequences to a contracting party, 
thereby rendering more difficult the performance of his contractual obligation. " A/CN. 9/SER. B/2, United 
Nations Publication Sale No. E. 87. V. 10, p. 242. 
24 See, definition of hardship adopted by UNIDROIT Principles: Article 6.2.2, Published by the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 1994, p. 146. 
25 David Yates, "Drafting Force Majeure and Related Clauses", 3 Journal of Contract Law (1990-91), p. 
186,208. See commentaries on Article 6.2.2, Published by the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT), 1994, p. 147. "Whether an alteration is "fundamental" in a given case will of 
course depend upon the circumstances. If, however, the performances are capable of precise measurement 
in monetary terms, an alteration amounting to 50% or more of the cost or the value of the performance is 
likely to amount to a "fundamental" alteration. " 
26 Dietrich Maskow, "Hardship and Force Majeure", 40 American Journal of Comparative Law 
(1992), 657,662. 
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renegotiation of the contract. Thus, the fundamental assumption behind the hardship 
clause is contract adaptation rather than termination. 
Article 13.14 of the Bangladesh model PSC of 1997 has couched the hardship clause in 
the following manner: 
"If at any time during the term of this Contract there are substantial changes in economic circumstances 
affecting its performance, which either Party reasonably considers is causing it to suffer economic 
hardship, the Parties shall meet together within thirty days after written notice of these circumstances to 
consider, whether any, adjustment(s) in the terms and conditions of the Contract are reasonably justified 
to alleviate the hardship. , 
27 
Here twofold use of word 'reasonably' suggests that contracting party should invoke 
hardship clause situation in good faith and only in situation involving 'substantial 
changes in economic circumstances' that substantially affects it economic position and 
consequent adjustment in the terms and conditions of the contract should be warranted 
by real necessity of alleviating such hardship. This put constraints on the arbitrary 
invocation and interpretation of hardship situation. 
Hardship clauses create either an obligation to use best endeavours to 
renegotiate in good faith with a view to alleviating the difficulty or an automatic ,ý 
variation of the contract in a pre-detennined form. 28 However, contractual practice 
suggests that mere a hardship situation does not imply an obligation to revise the 
contract, unless the parties explicitly provide for that. 
29 
2'Bangladesh model production sharing contract, 1997, CEPMLP Collection; See also, Article 26.3 of the 
Model Petroleum Agreement of Ghana of 1997 states: 
"Where a Party considers that a significant change in the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
Agreement was entered into, has occurred affecting the economic balance of the Agreement, the Party 
affected hereby shall notify the other parties in writing of the claimed change with a statement of how the 
claimed change has affected the relations between the Parties. 
26.4: The other parties shall indicate in writing their reaction to such representation within a period of 
three months of receipt of such notification and if such significant changes are established by the Parties 
to have occurred, the Parties shall meet to engage in negotiations and shall effect such changes in, or 
rectification of, these provisions as they may agree are necessary. 1997 Model Petroleum Agreement 
between the Government, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation & Contractor, printed in Barrows Basic 
Oil Laws and Concession Agreements, (Central and South Africa) Supplement no. 139, p. 76. 
28 David Yates, supra note 25, p. 206. 
29 See, R. W. Bentham, "Legal problems in Hardship situations in the Oil Industry Context", in: 
International and Comparative Petroleum Law (A Collection of Background Readings, Materials and 
References), R. W. Bentham and B. W. K. Sas (1988), CEPMELP, pp. 23-24. 
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It should, however, be admitted that, in contrast to long term commercial 
or the transactions, the hardship clause Is not frequently used in the petroleum contract f 
following reasons: first, force majeure clauses are now broadly formulated to cover 
unforeseen situations that also give nse to hardship situations; second, the frequent use 
of self-adjusting fiscal mechanisms to deal with windfall profits or exorbitant price 
increases and the use of economic stabilization clauses in petroleum concessions and 
production sharing agreements obviates the necessity of incorporation of formal 
hardship clause; third, apprehension on the part of the foreign investors that the 
imprecise nature of a hardship clause can leave discretion to the host state for broad 
interpretation of a 'change of circumstances' and thus, it can lead to contractual 
instability and provide an opportunity to the State party to evade its contractual 
obligations. 
30 
2.2 Legal Nature of Renegotiation Clauses 
The legal validity of revision or renegotiation clauses is undisputed as these clauses are 
inserted into contracts by exercising autonomy of the party. Such clauses generally 
obligate the parties to undertake negotiation in good faith with a view to reaching an 
agreement. But to what extent do they compel the parties to reach an agreement? It is a 
well-established principle that an obligation to renegotiate a contract obligates the T 
parties only to negotiate, but it does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement. In 
rin transactions this regard, the practice of international state contracts and other long te 
demonstrates that renegotiation clauses only contain an obligation on the parties to i, 
make the best possible efforts to reach an agreement, but they do not bind the parties to 
30 See, Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo, supra note 4, p. 47; Stefan Kroll, "The Renegotiation and 
Adaptation of Investment Contracts", in: N. Horn (ed. ), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes, Kluwer 
Law International, (2004), chapter XX. 
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actually reach an agreement. 31 Such a contention had long been supported by the 
decisions of the international tribunal and arbitral awards. 32 More notably, in the 
Aminoil award, the tribunal after considering the extent of the obligation to negotiate 
contemplated in Article 9 of the Supplemental Agreement, held that "an obligation to 
negotiate is not an obligation to agree. ý933 
Negotiation contemplated under a revision or renegotiation clause, however, is 
not a mere fon-nality, but entails a serious legal obligation to engage in best efforts to 
reach an agreement. The criterion of best efforts can be defined in terms of good faith 
and commitment to the fulfillment of the parties' obligations towards renegotiation, 
which include a willingness of the parties to negotiate and consider the needs and 
interests of the other party, the demonstration of flexibility in mutual demands, and the 
sharing of relevant information between the parties. 34 By agreeing through a 
renegotiation clause, both parties are legally obliged to cooperate in the renegotiation 
procedure with a view to achieving an equitable solution. 
For example, article 29 of the Concession agreement of Egypt of 1996 states that "Any changes in 
existing legislation or regulations applicable to the conduct of Exploration, development and production 
of petroleurn, and which significantly affect the economic interests of this agreement to the detriment of 
Contractor, contractor shall notify EGPC of the subject of legislative or regulatory measure. In such case, 
the Parties shall negotiate possible modifications of the agreement designed to restore the econornic 
balance thereof, which existed on the effective date. The parties shall use their best efforts to agree on 
amendments to this agreement. " Barrows supplement (North Africa) No. 134. 
32 In the case of Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (1931) the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in its advisory opinion found that parties' obligation under a revision clause: "... is 
not only to enter into negotiations, but also to pursue them as far as possible, with a view to concluding 
agreements ... But an obligation to negotiate 
does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement, nor in 
particular does it imply that Lithuania by undertaking to negotiate, has assumed an engagement, and is in 
consequence obliged to conclude the administrative and technical agreements indispensable for the re- 
establishment of traffic on the Landwarow-Kaisiadorys railways sector. " P. C. I. J., Series A/B, No. 42, at 
116. In the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ 'defined the duty ensuing ftom a revision clause as 
placing': "The parties ... under an obligation to enter 
into negotiations with a view to arriving at an 
agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for 
the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are under 
an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case 
when either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it. " (1969) 
ICJ Rep. 4, para. 85, at 47. 
33 24 ILM (1982) 976. 
34 Nagla Nassar, Sanctity of Contracts Revisited. - A Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-Term 
International Commercial Transactions, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, (1995), p. 181; Klaus 
Peter Berger, "Renegotiation and Adaptation of International Investment Contracts: The Role of Contract 
Drafters and Arbitrators", 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2003), 1347, pp. 1364-1365. 
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What is the legal consequence of the reftisal to negotiate when it is expressly 
provided for? Most of the petroleum contracts are silent as to consequences of refusal to 
renegotiate. It can be suggested that since it is a concrete legal obligation creating rights 
and duties of the parties, a refusal to negotiate should therefore be treated as breach of 
contract and the affected party should be compensated by the defaulting party. 
What is the legal consequence of failure of the parties to reach an agreement 
after the renegotiation effort? The practice of petroleum contracts on renegotiation does 
not provide clear guidance in this regard. In such cases, it is a well established principle 
35 that mere failure to reach an agreement is not a breach of contract. The failed 
negotiation does not raise any liability if the parties have negotiated in good faith. But 
failed negotiation can be regarded as a breach of contract only when if it is proved that 
one of the parties has not acted in good faith. 
These issues have been discussed elaborately in the Wintershall A. G. arbitral 
award. In this case, the claimants alleged that the Government of Qatar had breached the 
contract by rejecting the proposal for the joint development of natural gas after its 
discovery by them. The claimants argued that the Government had a duty to negotiate in 
good faith for a gas utilisation plan. The arbitral tribunal held: "Even accepting the view that 
there was a duty to negotiate in good faith, it is clear that such a duty does not include an obligation on 
the part of the respondent to reach agreement with respect to the proposals made by the claimants. " 
36 
The tribunal also held that the parties did not enter into further contractual arrangements 
for the utilisation of non-associated natural gas by virtue of such clause and there was 
not a violation by the respondent of any duty to negotiate in good faith regarding this 
matter. 
37 
35 See also, Piero Bernardim, "The Renegotiation of the Investment Contract", 13 ICSID Review-Foreign 
Investment Law Journal, No. 2, (1998), p. 410,419. 
36 Wintershall A. G., Et Al v. The Government of Qatar, 28 ILM (1989), p. 798 814. 
37 Ibid. 
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3.1 Consequences of Renegotiation 
The successful renegotiation can lead to adaptation of contractual relationship in 
changed circumstances and can bring economic, social and political benefits to the host 
country and economic ones to the companies. The renegotiation of the contract may 
result in either restoration of the original equilibrium of the contract or a new 
equilibrium in the light of the changes in economic assumptions under the contract 
considering the necessity of achieving an equitable solution to both parties in the new 
circumstances. In this way, renegotiation can be turned into an optimal risk sharing 
process. The renegotiated terms of the contract may be beneficial to the IOCs by 
preserving the contractual equilibrium through ensuring the anticipated benefits from 
the project. The renegotiated settlement may not only be beneficial to the parties in the 
present context of contract but also it may have a positive impact upon their future 
relationships. 
The goal of equity and fairness in the contractual outcome is the primordial issue 
of contract revision and adaptation. In the case of a contract that is perceived to be an 
inequitable arrangement from the very beginning or it becomes an exploitative one 
subsequently, the renegotiation of such a contract brings fairness and equity in the 
contractual outcome. 
Renegotiation of contract in a changed economic and social context can reduce 
the scope of political risks because by undertaking to renegotiate the agreement in cases 
of a change of circumstances, the state binds itself to conduct negotiations with the 
private investor rather than taking a unilateral action. The successful renegotiation or 
review process helps the parties to reach an equitable solution which eventually 
facilitates stability in the contractual relationship by promoting confidence, trust and 
reliability between them. On the other hand, it helps the parties to avoid resorting to 
costly arbitration process as a means of dispute settlement. 
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4.1 Adaptation Clauses in Petroleum Contracts 
Adaptation clauses aim at an adjustment of the contractual relationship through filling 
gaps in the contract, or automatic adjustment which may result in change in the terms 
and conditions of the contract. Both kinds of adaptation clauses are incorporated in the 
petroleum contract to introduce a planned change in the contract. 
4.1.1 Gap Filling Clauses 
Due to the geological uncertainty and limited information available at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, petroleum contracts do not precisely define certain terms and 
leave these tenns open on the ground that they will be negotiated at a later stage when 
ftill information becomes available for developing those terms. Parties like to keep the 
ternis open voluntarily because parties to the long-terin contract are generally risk 
averse. 38 Many long-tenn contracts use these gap-filling clauses because of the 
difficulty of drafting these clauses in comprehensive manner. These provisions 
introduce inherent flexibility in the contract on the one hand, and reduce the costs of 
contracting by avoiding drafting the detailed aspects of the contract on the other. A 
prominent example is the natural gas clause in petroleum contracts. The petroleum 
contract usually contemplates that while associated natural gas can be flared or utilised 
if it has commercial value, in the case of discovery of non-associated natural gas, the 
parties will negotiate a further arrangement for the appraisal regarding its 
commerciality, development, and marketing in domestic and international markets. In 
this regard, natural gas clauses in most of the production sharing agreements provide 
certain principles for negotiating the non-associated natural gas including a basic 
methodology for pricing the natural gas, and principles of allocation of the natural gas 
38 Mark P. Gergen, "The Use of Open Ternis in Contract", Columbia Law Review, (1992), p. 997,1006. 
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among the parties to the agreement and a provision regarding a work programme for 
evaluating the discovery. 39 The natural gas clause usually obligates the parties to 
negotiate in good faith for gas exploitation projects if non-associated natural gas is 
discovered 
. 
40 The contract may also need to be amended if the discovery of crude oil or 
non-associated natural gas does not warrant commercial development. 
Apart from the gas clause, the petroleum contracts contain many other 
provisions that intend to fill gaps in the contract. For example, a problem may arise at 
the later phase of the contract regarding the detennination of commerciality of the 
discovery and it is usually settled by negotiation between the parties. If the discovery is 
marginal or non-commercial, the company may propose a modification to the contract. 41 
Adaptation of the contract by way of its change and amendment may also take 
place in the development phase, production programme, unitisation arrangements in the 
event of a change in the technical conditions or economics used in the formulation of 
these stages and such changes are usually carried out in accordance with the applicable 
law and with the best practice of the oil industry. 42 The contractor may also amend the 
Annual Work programme and its annual budget with the purpose of adapting them to 
the eventual start of a subsequent phase or the inclusion of amendments or operations 
39See, on the natural gas clause in petroleum contracts, R. Doak Bishop, "The Duty to Negotiate In Good 
Faith and the Enforceability Of Short -Term Natural Gas Clauses in Production Sharing Agreements", 
CEPMLP Internet Journal, vol. 2, article 1, www. cepmlp. org., p. 2, Kamal Hossain, "Gas Clauses in 
Petroleum Arrangements", in: Nicky BeredJick & Thomas Waelde (ed. ), Petroleum Investment Policies in 
Developing Countries, Graham & Trotman, (1988), pp. 165-174. 
40 A typical gas clause is as follows: Article 20.2 of the Model PSC of Mozambique (Bid Round, 2000) 
states that where non-associated natural gas is discovered in the contract area and the discovery is of 
potential commercial interest to the Government, ENH and the Contractor will meet together with a view 
to reaching an agreement on the production, processing and sale of such gas. Article 20.3 says that such 
negotiations between the Government, ENH and the Contractor will be undertaken in good faith. See, 
Model PSC of Mozambique (Bid Round, 2000), Barrows Supplement (South and Central Africa), No. 
146. 
41 Peter D. Cameron, "Government - Company relations after the Contract: Reconciling Objectives and 
Strategies for Long-term Relations", in: Kameel I. F. Khan, (ed. ), Petroleum Resources and Development 
(Economic, Legal and Policy Issues for Developing Countries), Belhaven Press, London & New York, 
(1987), p. 110-111. 
42 See, Clause 9.4,10.3,12 of Model ANP Concession Agreement for the Exploration, Development and 
Production of Oil and Gas between national Petroleum Agency, Brazil, and Contractor, March 2001, 
Barrows Supplement (South America) No. 147, p. 36-37. 
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contemplated in relevant plans, programmes and amendments adopted pursuant to this 
agreement. 
43 
Furthermore, provisions for the abandonment, the restoration of sites after 
exploration and extraction, the development of oil fields under joint development 
programmes are usually negotiated and developed at the latter stage of contract 
performance as detail elaboration of these issues may involve protracted negotiation at 
the time of conclusion of contract. 
A common provision regarding automatic adaptation of contract terms is the 
progressive reduction of the concession area, that encourages a speedy exploration and 
development of the concession area so that relinquished area can be used for other 
beneficial purposes by the host States. Such automatic reduction is consistent with the 
host State's desire for the exercise of sovereignty over its lands as well as it adapts the 
contractual relationship automatically in the stipulated time period depending upon the 
terins of the individual contract. 
4.2 Clauses of Mixed Character: Renegotiation or Adaptation of Contract 
Petroleum contracts contain some provisions that can give rise either to renegotiation or 
to adaptation depending upon their formulation in each contract. The provisions that can 
partake of the nature of both kinds of clauses are the following: 
4.2.1 Force Majeure Clause 
The force majeure clause has become a common element in long- term contract 
planning in order to deal with the occurrence of unforeseeable events that are beyond 
the control of the parties and that render perforinance of the contract impossible, either 
temporarily or pennanently. The underlying notion of the force majeure clause is to 
43 See, e. g., clause 16(2) of the Model ANP Concession Agreement for the Exploration, Development and 
Production of Oil and Gas of between National Petroleum Agency of Brazil and Contractor, March 200 1, 
Barrows Supplement (South America) No. 147, p. 45, 
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'k 
an usolve the parties from the liability of performance of contract in case of supervening 
events which would otherwise amount to a breach of contract. However, in many force 
majeure situations, an absolute excuse from performance is not desirable, in particular, 
when such relationship can be ad usted through the efforts of the parties. In such i 
circumstances, a continuation of the relationship is seen by the parties to be more 
commercially viable than absolving them from the performance of the contract. 
An analysis of force majuere clauses in long term contracts reveals that they 
have the following procedural steps: the first, stage involves defining force majeure 
either with reference to the catalogue of events that constitute force majeure or theýj 
adoption a of definition of force ma eure under a legal system; the second step deals, 
with the determination of whether the event was reasonably beyond the control of the 
I ap 
party invoking the force majeure clause; the third step involves the legal consequences 
of the events on the performance of the contracts; and the fourth is deten-nining whether 
44 the procedural requirements set forth in the force majeure clause have been met . 
Force majeure differs from hardship in respect of its legal consequences. The 
factual situations constituting hardship and force majeure may be the same, but hardship 
basically deals with the adjustment of contract terms through a restoration of the 
economic equilibrium of the contract; on the other hand, the force majeure clause 
primarily deals with contractual liability arising out of non-performance of the contract 
caused by the supervening events. But the force majeure events may result in the 
adaptation of contract if the events lead to mere temporary impossibility of performance 
rather than permanent one. However, both clauses are employed as techniques in the 
context of changed circumstances to achieve justice in the particular situation. 
Force majeure clauses are common provisions in petroleum contracts, though 
their content may vary considerably. The petroleum contract may define force majeure 
44 See, P. J. M. Declercq, "Modem Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations of 
Commercial Impracticability", 15 Journal of Law and Commerce, (1995), p. 213,230. David Yates, supra 
note 25, p. 202. 
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clauses either illustrating a list of events 45 or adopting its definition under a legal 
system. Such reference to the legal system may be made to the code or law of the host 
state applicable to the contract, general principles of law or international law or 
international commercial practice. The events under the force majeure clause are 
fon-nulated by the parties in order to tailor them to the specific requirements of the 
contract in question. In some cases, the contract may contain both definitions of force 
majeure as well as illustrative events constituting force majeure. 46 
The force majeure clauses usually impose a set of obligations upon the party 
invoking force majeure and claiming relief under them such as - to notify the other party 
specifying circumstances of force majeure and its causes and consequence; burden of 
proof of force majeure events; duty to make best efforts to overcome and mitigate the 
effect of force majeure; consequences of non-compliance with these procedural rules. 
The duty to make 'best efforts' usually includes the exercise of 'reasonable care and 
I diligence'; and 'reasonable endeavours' to avoid the consequence of the event of force 
majeure. 47 The force majeure clause may also require the affected party to resume 
compliance with its contractual obligation and conditions within a reasonable period of 
48 
time after the force majeure events have disappeared. 
So far as the effect of force majeure is concerned, the petroleum contracts 
usually stipulate that (i) suspension of performance-if performance becomes impossible 
45 The Force majeure events may include natural phenomena or calarruities, earthquakes, typhoons, fires, 
wars declared or undeclared, hostilities, invasions, blockades, riots, insurrection, civil disturbance and 
acts of government, strikes, or industrial disputes, any other act planned by the worker beyond the 
control of the parties; acts of terrorism; laws, treaties, rules, regulations, decrees, orders, actions or 
inactions of any governmental authority which prevent, hinder or impede contractors' conduct of 
operations, or which substantially impairs or threatens contractor's rights under the agreement. See Model 
PSC of Mozambique (Bid round 2000), Barows Supplement (South and Central Africa) No. 146, p. 
39; Venezuela Model Operating Services Agreement of 1993, Barrows supplement No. 117, (South 
America), p. 49; Azerbaijan PSC dated 19 April 1999 between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, and 
Kura Valley Development Ltd and SOCAR Oil affiliate, Barrows supplement (Russia and NIS), No. 44, 
p. 66. 
46 Model PSC of 1990 Mozambique for Offshore Southern Mozambique, Barrows supplement No 119, 
(Central and South Africa), p. 166. 
47 Article 29.2 and 29.3 of the 1997 Model Exploration and EPSA of Qatar, Barrows supplement (Middle 
East) No. 150, pp. 55-56. 
48 Clause 17 of Model License Contract of Peru, 2000 for Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbon, 
Barrows supplement (South America) no. 148, p. 7 1. 
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due to force majeure, the parties shall be excused from the performance of their 
respective obligation during the continuance of force majeure events; (ii) adjustment of 
contract- a period equivalent to that suspended period requires to be added to the time 
ong nally stipulated in the petroleum contract. Such time period may include the period 
of delay or prevention of fulfilment of the obligations under the agreement, the period 
necessary for the restoration of the damage caused by the event of force majeure, and 
period necessary for the commencing the work-shall be added to all time . 
49 (111) 
termination of the contract - if the force majeure event continues for a certain time 
peno 50 or the effect of force majeure becomes permanent; then each party is entitled to 
cancel the contract. 
The extent of the duration of automatic extension of time for the performance of 
the contract depends upon the magnitude of the situation occurred by the force majeure 
events. However, the events constituting force majeure should be construed narrowly so 
that it does not unnecessarily undermine the spirit of the cooperation of the parties to 
continue the performance. 51 After the occurrence of the force majeure events, both 
parties may be obliged to consult and cooperate to remove the consequences of the force 
majeure situations with a view to finding an equitable solution and to resuming the full 
operation as soon as possible. 52 
The force majeure clause is a mere adaptation clause when it requires adjustment 
of contractual relationship through the extension of performance of contract by pre- 
determined procedures, particularly when force majeure event affects the performance 
of contract temporarily. 
49 1997 Model Exploration and PSA (EPSA) of Qatar, Barrows Supplement (Middle East) No. 150, p. 56. 
50 For example, article 29.5 of the 1997 Model Exploration and PSA (EPSA) of Qatar states that if the 
event or events giving rise to force majeure continue for a period of twenty-four months, then either party 
may, by written notice to the other Party, terminate the agreement. Barrows supplement No. 150, (Middle 
East), p. 57. 
51G. R. Delaume, "Excuse for Non-Performance and Force Majeure in Economic Development 
Agreements", 10 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, (1971), p. 257. 
52 Article 25.3 of China ARCO Contract dated 3 May 1993 between China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation and ARCO China Inc, Barrows supplement 150, (Asia and Australasia) p. 111. 
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Some petroleum contracts may provide that the parties may agree to amend the 
agreement or terminate the contract depending on the extension and seriousness of the 
effects of force majeure. 53 In such a case, the parties' effort to reach an agreement to 
amend the contract after force majeure amounts to the renegotiation of contract as it 
intends to alter the material terms of a contract. To the extent that the effects of force 
I 
majeure events can lead to an adaptation of contract through the addition of suspended 
lime without any change of contract terms or renegotiation of contract by way of 
material change of contract terms, will depend upon the gravity of the situation, and the 
degree of consultation and cooperation between the parties and the circumstances of the 
particular case. However, renegotiation is not a usual consequence of force majeure_and 
it can occur only in exceptional circumstances when ftill operation of the project needs 
some modification of contract terms. Renegotiation of contract in such case 
accompany both addition of suspended time to the original contract as well as' 
modification of contract terms to resume the operation of the project. 
The modem petroleum contract practice on force majeure clause reveals a trend 
for the survival and continuation of the contract rather than its breakdown because most 
of the force majeure clauses require the parties to resume the operation of the contract. 
Instead of a rigid approach of discharging contractual obligations in case of supervening 
events, force majeure clauses in modem petroleum contracts are formulated to provide a 
flexible solution that seeks to adapt the contractual rights and duties to the changed 
circumstances. The role of force majeure clause in contract adaptation becomes 
particularly important when the contract in question does not contain any renegotiation 
clause or hardship clause and the force majeure clause remains the-2nly contractual 
mechanism 
., 
to deals with problem of change of circumstances. 
. 
In. fact, a broad 
fon-nulation of force majeure clauses in modem petroleum contracts indicates that these 
53 Clause 32.3 of Model ANP Concession Agreement for the Exploration, Development and Production 
of Oil and Gas between National Petroleum Agency of Brazil and Contractor, March 2001, Barrows 
Supplement (South America), No. 147, p. 67. 
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clauses are now widely drafted to cover such events that can be conveniently dealt with 
under hardship clauses. 54 To the extent that hardship types of situations are included in a 
force ma eure clause, renegotiation can also be triggered by such force majeure clauses, ' 
in appropriate circumstances. 
4.2.2 Most-Favoured Company clause 
The most favoured company clause aims to give foreign companies the same benefits 
and advantages, which might subsequently be given to new companies. 
55 This 
contractual clause may trigger renegotiation or adaptation of contract depending upon 
the degree of competitive advantages gained by other companies. 
4.2.3 Most Favoured Nation Clause 
This clause intends to benefit the host state in the first agreement in the event of a 
subsequent grant of better conditions by the company to another State in a later 
agreement. In the context of the prevailing favourable climate for the foreign investor 
and the developing countries' need for foreign investment in the natural resource 
industry, the most favoured nation clause is rarely used. 
The question whether most favoured clauses give nse to renegotiation or 
adaptation of the contract will depend upon the formulation of a particular clause - e. g., 
its requirement as to negotiation between the parties to amend the contract or 
adjustment of rights and duties through a pre-determined procedure. 
54 See, Hubert Konarski, "Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses in International Contractual Practice", 
International Business Law Journal, No. 4, (2003), p. 407. 
55 An example of such clause is as follows: article 29.4 of Papua New Guinea's standard Petroleum 
Agreement of May, 1994 states: 
An oil company shall not be subject to or limited by regulations or statutes that are less favourable to the 
oil company than the regulations and statutes of general application which apply to other persons dealing 
with exploration and development of petroleum resources in Papua New Guinea, nor will regulations or 
statues relating to exploration and development of petroleum resources in Papua New Guinea and control 
thereof be applied to the oil company in a manner in which they are generally applied to other to which 
they are applicable. Department of Mining and Petroleum, Papua New Guinea, 1994, CEPMLP 
Collection. 
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5.1 Adaptation by the Third Party 
There is no assurance that renegotiation of contract will always be amenable to a 
solution acceptable to both parties. What happens if parties are unable to reach an 
agreement after renegotiation of a contract? In such cases, three possible situations may 
arise: firstly, the renegotiation clause may be silent as to the consequences of a failure to 
renegotiate. In such circumstances, the contract may be terminated or it may continue in 
effect upon its original tenns when no agreement is reached, subject to the condition 
that the parties have negotiated in good faith. Secondly, in case of failure to reach an 
agreement, the contract may refer the matter to the third party such as a court, arbitral 
tribunaL conciliator, expert, or interveners; thirdly, the contract may not only refer the 
matter to such third party, but also specify the scope of power of the third party 
regarding the adaptation or modification of the contract. 
Indeed, the revision and adaptation of the contract by a third party is a much 
debated issue and can give rise to complicated legal problems. The third party 
adaptation or revision of the contract addresses the tension between the principle of 
party autonomy to make adaptation on the one hand and the necessity of stability of 
contract by its adjustment when the parties fail to reach an agreement. The most 
---------- --- 
pertinent question arises whether a third party has an autonomous power or right to 
modify or revise the contract. To what extent can the third party adapt the contract by 
modification or change of the contract? Is the third party's decision enforceable like the 
award of an arbitration or a court's decision? In this connection, three kinds of functions 
of a third party generally arise: resolving legal disputes concerning determination of 
legal rights and duties of the parties under the contract; adaptation of contract by way of 
filling of gaps in the contract which can be called otherwise adaptation in the narrow 
sense; adaptation of contract by the modification of contract terms that amount to a re- 
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writing o the contract or creation of a new contract. While the first and second kinds of 
functions fall legitimately within the jurisdiction of the third party, the last category of 
activity goes beyond its jurisdiction. 
The adaptation of the contract by way of modification by a third party is 
generally opposed on the following grounds: first, the third party lacking background 
knowledge of a complex long ten'n contract is inherently unable to understand all the 
complicating problems involved in the contract adaptation in the same manner the 
parties wou . 
56 Second, the third party can exercise of its power arbitrarily and in such 
case, one the parties to the contract can refuse to recognise and enforce the decision of 
third party. Third, delegating such a power to the third party goes against the concept of 
party autonomy as parties to the contract are deemed to be in a position to judge their 
interests best. Therefore , it 
is argued that adaptation by way of modification of contract 
terms should be left to the parties themselves who will find a solution relying on the 
good faith, sense of cooperation and mutability of interest. 
The contention that the arbitrator cannot adapt the contract through the re- 
writing of the contract is based upon the traditional distinction maintained between 
jurisdictional arbitration (for example, adjudicating rights and duties of the parties in the 
light of their past conduct of what is known as legal dispute); and contractual arbitration 
(for example, adaptation and shaping future relations of the parties through modification 
of the contract terms or re-writing a contract tenn. ) There is a widely held view that 
only legal disputes are arbitrable. Under the umbrella of legal disputes, the arbitral 
tribunal can interpret the relevant clauses of the contract, as these questions involve the 
detennination of the scope of a legal right or obligation of the parties and hence, fall 
within the purview of the definition of legal disputes. On the other hand, a difference of 
opinion between the parties as to the way to adjust the contract or changing the tenus of 
56 See, Norbert Hom, "Changes in Circumstances and the Revision of Contracts in some European Laws 
and International Law", in: Norbert Horn (ed. ), supra note 13, p. 23. 
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contract so as to amount to a re-writing of the contract and consequently shaping the 
future relationship between the parties cannot be said to be a legal dispute and hence, 
cannot be arbitrated. 
It is a well-establi shed principle that a third party can adapt and supplement the 
contract by filling up the gap in the contract or by clarifying and interpreting 'open 
tenns' of the contract in accordance with the intention of the parties expressed in the 
contract, and commercial usages. 57 However, the question arises whether such gap 
filling is a function of an 'expert' resulting in an expert opinion and thus, it has no 
legally binding force; or whether it is a function of an arbitration tribunal meaning that a 
decision of the tribunal should have enforceability like an arbitral award. To resolve 
this, it has been suggested that such gap filling activity either by an expert or an 
arbitration tribunal is based upon real differences in the parties' view and therefore, it 
constitutes disputes in the broader sense, not merely disputes in the juridical sense. 58 As 
such, the decision of an arbitral tribunal or an expert should be final and binding. 
On the other hand , it is well 
founded that a third party cannot adapt or revise the 
contract through the modification or change of the contract terms so as to impose a new 
contract in order to detennine the future relationships between the parties. Such a power 
is not pen-nissible as it goes against the spirit of cooperation of the parties. In the 
Aminoil award, this point has been stated succinctly: 
"There can be no doubt that, speaking generally, a tribunal cannot substitute itself for the parties in order 
to ... modify a contract unless that right is conferred upon 
it by law, or by the express consent of the 
parties ... arbitral tribunals cannot allow themselves to 
forget that their powers are restricted. It is not open 
to doubt that an arbitral tribunal-constituted on the basis of a 'compromissory' clause contained in 
relevant agreements between the parties to the case ... could not, by way of modifying or completing a 
57 Wh. Debevoise, "The Arbitrability of Gaps in Long-Tenn Scientific, Technical and Industrial 
Development Contracts, " 17 Harvard International Law Journal (1976), p. 122; See, Nagla Nassar, supra 
note 34, p. 171 -75. 
58 Heinz Strolibach, "Filling Gaps M Contracts", 27 American Journal of Comparative Law (1979), p. 
479,482. 
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contract, prescribe how a provision (for the determination of the economic equilibrium) must be applied. 
For that, the consent of both parties would be necessary. , 59 
From the above decision, it can be argued that express consent of the parties is 
needed for the giving of power to the arbitrator to adapt the contract by way of change 
of its terms as it will go against party autonomy. Thus, mere reference to arbitration in 
the case of failure by the parties to agree on the tenns of the revision will not be 
sufficient to imply a power of contract adaptation by third party. 60 
5.2 Practice of Third Party Adaptation in Petroleum Contracts 
The practice of third party adaptation of petroleum contract can be discerned in the 
following ways: 
Firstly, in many cases, economic stabilisation clauses in the petroleum contract 
provide that if the parties fail to reach an agreement after negotiation, then either party 
may refer the matter in dispute for determination to the arbitration under the 
agreement. 61 Thus, if a party refers to a failed renegotiation to the arbitral tribunal, in 
such a situation, the following possible situation can arise: the arbitral tribunal can 
interpret relevant clauses, detennine whether triggering events for renegotiation have 
occurred or not, and ask the parties to resume negotiation to reach an agreement when it 
thinks that tennination is not desirable by the parties. The arbitral tribunal can also 
examine whether the conditions for renegotiation are fulfilled, and can determine 
liability of the parties in the event of a failure to agree which can be attributed to the bad 
59 Kuwait v. Aminoil 21 ILM, 976,1016 (1982). 
60 Piero B emardini, supra note 3 5, p- 42 1. 
61 See, article 26.4 of Sudan Model PSC dated 29th August 1993 between the government of the Sudan 
and State petroleum corporation, supplement 1211. Similar provision is found in article 40.2 of the PSC 
between Total/Amoco/Marathon/Texaco and Government of Kenya. Barrows supplement Central and 
South Africa, no. 124, p. 71, and Ugandan PSC, see, Fma (Petrofma) PSA of March 1991 between the 
Government of Uganda and Fina Exploration Uganda b. v. Barrows supplement Central and South Africa, 
No. 125, p. 52. See also Concession agreement of Egypt of 1996, article 29 of which states that failing to 
reach an agreement between the parties, the dispute may be submitted by either party to arbitration. 
Barrows supplement (North Africa) No. 134. 
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faith on the part of a party. 62 In detennining economic equilibrium of the contract, the 
arbitral tribunal can determine the extent of the compensation to be made to the affected 
parties considering all the relevant circumstances. In restoring equilibrium, the tribunal 
will seek to make a fair distribution of the losses between the parties. It will depend 
upon the loss incurred by the party, the extent to which one of the parties has taken a 
nsk and the extent to which the party entitled to receive a performance may still benefit 
from that performance. 63 
Secondly, some contracts may not only refer to the failed renegotiation to the 
arbitral tribunal, but also delineate the scope and power of the arbitral tribunal to modify 
the contract for an equitable solution. For example, the Sudanese contract states that the 
arbitrators in such events, shall be empowered to determine whether a material change 
in conditions has occurred, and modifications, if any are necessary to the agreement to 
restore the contractor's economic rights and benefits to an equivalent level. 64 This refers 
to the arbitration tribunal's power to adjust rights and duties in the light of past conduct, 
which suggests that they can determine the damages to be paid to the affected parties, 
and modify the contract terms to restore the economic equilibrium of the contract. Such 
power of contract modification goes beyond the traditional jurisdictional function and 
involves a contractual element of defining future relations, which should be given same 
degree of legal enforceability as is usual for an arbitral award. 
Thirdly, the practice of filling gaps involving issues of technical or financial 
nature by way of expert determination is somewhat familiar in petroleum contracts. 
Some contracts provide to the effect that a clear demarcation is to be made regarding the 
62 See, Wolfgang Peter, supra note 7, p. 250. 
63 See, commentaries on effects of hardship under LNIDROIT Principles: Article 6.2.3, p. 154. 
64 
Article 26(4): In the event that the parties are unable to agree within ninety days notice, then 
either party may refer the matter in dispute for determination to the arbitration under this agreement. The 
arbitrators in such event, shall be empowered to determine whether a material change in conditions has 
occurred and the modifications, if any, necessary to the agreement to restore contractor's economic rights 
and benefits to a level equivalent to what they would have been, had such not occurred. Sudan Model 
PSA dated 29h August 1993 between the government of the Sudan and State Petroleum Corporation, 
supplement 12 1. 
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function of the expert and arbitral tribunal leaving the resolving of technical issues and 
gap filling in the contract to the expert, on the other hand, all other disputes to be 
resolved by the arbitration tribunal. For example, Article 27.2 of the Turkmenistan 
Monument Resources PSA of 1998 states that if the parties fail to arrive at an agreement 
on technical matters including a disagreement concerning classification of petroleum 
and matters relating to the sharing and determination of the value of the petroleum, the 
parties shall refer the matter to the expert. On the other hand, all other disputes 
concerning the validity, interpretation, fulfilment, or breach of this agreement shall be 
resolved by the arbitration tribunal. 65 
The gap filling of a contract involving technical or financial issues can also be 
resolved by the arbitration tribunal with the help of expert evidence. However, 
sometimes, the disputes are simply referred to expert or arbitration tribunals and it is 
stated that the decision of the expert or arbitration tribunal will be final and binding, 
which , in turn, suggests that given the long duration and for the sake of stability, the 
arbitration tribunal or expert should assume such power of gap filling in the petroleum 
contract in the event that parties fall it by negotiation. But third parties' power of 
contract adaptation should be carried out with objectivity to achieve the objective of the 
contract in line with the intention of the parties expressed in terms and conditions of the 
contract. 
While the third parties' power of adaptation of gap filling in petroleum contract 
is recognised to a certain extent, their jurisdiction to modify contract in case of a 
reference to failed renegotiation should be defined in clear terms in the contract and 
such Jurisdiction should be the last option and subject to well defined criteria such as an 
equitable solution, maintaining equilibrium or fairness in a contract. An express 
65 Barrows Supplement No. 33, (Russia and NIS), pp. 80-8 1. 
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provision with well-defined criteria of third party adaptation should be seen as a pre- 
requisite in this regard. 
6. Summary 
It is argued in this chapter that modem petroleum contracts aim at a dynamic evolution 
of the relationship through the various contractual provisions on renegotiation and 
adap- tation. Renegotiation and adaptation of contract have proved to be a desirable 
means of maintaining contract stability and flexibility in view of the dynamic economic 
changes that may take place at the global and national level in which these contracts 
operate. Indeed, renegotiation and revision of the petroleum contract is now an accepted 
practice in the petroleum industry and recognised as a means of protection of the I 
legitimate interests of both parties. There is a growing realisation that renegotiation of 
the petroleum contract prompted either by contractually defined triggered events or 
good faith and mutual understanding in the absence of a renegotiation or review clause 
does not cause insecurity to the investors but rather they promote stability in the 
contractual relationship. The renegotiation, adaptation and revision clauses reinforce the 
mutability of the contract and soften the rigour of sanctity of the contract and strike a 
balance between certainty and fairness and increase the efficiency in contract 
performance. Sanctity of contract through rigid adherence to the contract ten'n may turn 
the contract into an exploitative one and lead to an unfair outcome; on the other hand, 
flexibility by renegotiation and revision can ensure fairness in the outcome of the 
contract. However, implementation of these provisions requires the parties' cooperation 
and willingness to reach an agreement towards an equitable solution. 
The chapter demonstrated that the adaptation of the contract by the third party 
should be carefully weighed by the factors of impartiality of the third party, respecting 
the parties' autonomy to detennine their future relationship and third parties' 
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understanding of the parties' complex relationship in a long term contract on the one 
hand, and the necessity of stability and equitable adjustment of the contractual 
relationship on the other. However, any such power of adaptation should be expressly 
mentioned in the contract and subjected to well defined standards and compatible with 
the reasonable expectations, interests and goals of the parties. 
-/Apart 
from renegotiation, revision or adaptation clauses, contract stability and 
financial equilibrium of contract in changing circumstances depends on how fiscal 
terms and conditions are formulated and nature of tax system adopted in a petroleum 
contract. The next chapter discusses the issue of fiscal stability in the petroleum contract 
and examines legal and contractual approaches to fiscal stability. 
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Chapter Five 
Stability in the Fiscal Regime of Petroleum Contracts: Utility of 
Contractual Mechanisms and Progressive Tax System 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess stability in the fiscal regime of petroleum 
contracts in the light of contractual ternis and conditions and prevailing trends of 
taxation in the petroleum industry in developing countries and economies in transition. 
As the petroleum contract involves significant capital risk and long duration, the quest 
for a stable return from the petroleum project remains a constant source of concern for 
IOCs. The importance of stability of the fiscal regime of contracts can hardly be 
overemphasised as the perception of instability in the fiscal regime, which may result in 
a diminution of expected cash flows, is always a significant factor that is taken into 
account by the IOCs in investment decisions in the petroleum sector. Even an attractive 
fiscal system may not bring much needed foreign investment if a reasonable degree of 
stability is not ensured in the fiscal and taxation arrangements of the contract. Political 
risk perception in the host state induces the IOCs to demand for guarantees of fiscal 
stability including a guarantee against any new taxes as well as against changes in tax 
rates and changes in the rules for calculating taxable income existing at the time of the 
agreement and guarantees of convertibility of exchange and remittability of funds. 
The project lenders including multilateral financing and private finance 
institutions, who often finance petroleum projects, have stakes in the stability of the 
fiscal regime in order to assure themselves that the economic assumptions underlying a 
project, including revenues, taxes, repatriation and other economic factors, will not be 
undennined by the host country's unilateral interference in the fiscal tenns of the 
contract and jeopardises the ability of the project to repay the debt service of lenders. 
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Thus, they have a considerable interest in the stable cash flow from the petroleum 
proj ect. 
The notion of stability in the fiscal regime has evolved concomitantly with the 
evo ution of contractual forms, mainly with the emergence of a system of production 
sharing contracts. Contractual arrangements in the petroleum industry have been 
adjusted continuously to reflect the changing bargaining strengths of both host state and 
IOC, and the economic and social objectives of petroleum projects that parties seek to 
achieve. Stability in the fiscal regime of the petroleum contract Is conditioned by both 
internal and external factors. Internal factors refer to the formulation of efficient, 
appropriate fiscal and economic ternis in the petroleum contract that can ensure the jr- 
necessary stability in its fiscal regime. Stability in the law, policy and regulation of the 
host state is related to the external aspect of the fiscal regime of the contract. Stability in 
the fiscal regime is also conditioned by external factors like fluctuating price and market 
demand, which dictate that petroleum contracts have to respond to these external 
variables. 
This chapter intends to examine the concept of stability in the fiscal system in 
petroleum contracts, to analyse the fiscal system in the petroleum contract in brief and 
then, to identify the criteria of a stable fiscal regime. In this connection, the chapter also 
attempts to shed light on different kinds of tax regime and contractual forms, which are 
inextricably linked with the analysis of fiscal stability. Then it proceeds to highlight the 
contractual mechanisms and legislative responses introduced by the developing 
countries in addressing the need for fiscal stability in modem petroleum contracts. The 
chapter concludes that modem petroleum contracts have moved towards greater 
flexibility in economic rules and valuation methods governing the contract. It has also 
been argued that the rate of return based progressive tax system that distributes risks 
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and rewards between parties, is a more flexible means and its use can enhance stability 
in the contractual relationship. 
1.2 Fiscal Regime in Petroleum Contract 
The fiscal regime of a contract comprises a set of contractual, legislative, and business 
impositions that determine the economic benefits and burdens of the parties under the 
contract. A fiscal regime in a petroleum contract comprises both contractual terms that 
are to be individually negotiated on the basis of uniqueness of each project and the 
general taxation law and policy of a country. Accordingly, the fiscal regime of the 
petroleum contract has two main elements: firstly, the contract specific elements which 
comprise a profit sharing scheme under a production sharing contract, taxes and 
(royalties and additional profit taxes) and the financial incentives (accelerated 
depreciation, amortizations, capital allowances, depletion allowances, tax holidays, loss 
carry forward). These contractual elements of fiscal regimes are directly associated with 
the operation of the petroleum industry. Secondly, fiscal impositions such as income 
taxes, withholding taxes, and general business and administrative levies including 
custom duties, stamp duty, property taxes, value added taxes and local or regional 
governmental levies, are usually of general application. The tax regime and fiscal 
impositions in petroleum contracts differ according to the risk perceptions of the 
investors, the geological potential and the particular needs of the host country. 
While fiscal terms under old concession agreements were imposed 
predominantly in the framework of petroleum agreements, most of the fiscal terms of 
modem petroleum contracts tend to be incorporated in legislation of general 
itions incorporated in the legislative scheme are application. ' The general fiscal imposi III 
more vulnerable to political risk than a contractual provision on fiscal regime in two 
' See, Malcolm Gillis, "Evolution of Natural Resource Taxation in Developing Countries", 22 Natural 
Resources Journal, (1982), p. 619,646. 
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ways: the State as a sovereign entity has an inherent power to impose a new tax law 
upon the IOCs; secondly, the State can change existing tax law§, by its all embracing 
legislative competence within its territory. 
The fiscal structure of a petroleum contract can again be categonsed on the basis 
of the timing of payment- i. pre-production payment- which includes different kinds of 
bonuses, area or surface rental fees, bidding and information fees; ii. post production 
payment based on production which includes royalty and income tax. Modem 
petroleum contracts also contain provisions relating to social and economic 
development in the host state, such as, the provisions for employment, training of 
nationals, transfer of technology, use of local goods and services. These non-tax 
benefits sought by host countries may also have direct financial implications on the 
profitability of a petroleum project for the IOCs. 
An understanding of the fiscal structure of a petroleum contract is essential in 
order to determine what should be the appropriate 'govemment take' as well as the 
'reasonable return' by an IOC from a given petroleum development venture. The 
(government take I is a generic term, which implies a total share of government take 
from a given venture through bonus, royalty, direct participation, income tax, 
withholding tax, domestic supply obligation and other taxes. 'Government take' has 
been legally defined as 
"the set of legal rules, contractual clauses and conduct of parties tending towards achievmg an adequate 
and foreseeable government share in the economic outcome of a successful operation based upon an 
agreement where the mining risk is taken up by an individual". 2 
While the company primarily sees the fiscal regime as an allocation of financial 
benefits and burdens of the project between parties, host countries may perceive it as an 
instrument to encourage an optimum development of their natural resources, resource 
conservation, enviromnental protection and promoting domestic processing of natural 
2 Guillermo J. Cano, "The Contract as a Mechanism for Taxation: Analysis of the Government Take", 9 
Oil and Gas Law and Taxation Review, (1987/88), p. 260. 
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resources. 3 Conceivably, from the host government's perspective, tax law and fiscal 
policy carries social and political objectives, which is typically broader than the 
objectives of the private industry. Apart from revenue collection, governments often 
view taxes as a means of encouraging or discouraging various kinds of private sector 
4 decisions. Integration of social and political objectives in the fiscal regime by the host 
states may often come into conflict with the profit objectives of the company, 
particularly when the fornier wants to change its tax laws and fiscal policy subsequent 
to the contract in order to achieve these objectives from the project. 
1.3 Criteria of a Stable and Effective Fiscal Regime 
A sound tax regime is of paramount importance to carry out a petroleum project 
successfully as it determines the commercial viability of undertaking a petroleum 
contract to a great extent and acts as an incentive to invest by the companies. A sound 
fiscal regime that is firmly established under a clear legal framework and that clearly 
sets out the financial burdens of the parties, defines price criteria in adequate tenns- is 
seen as a general requirement by the IOCs to invest in the project. A stable fiscal regime 
is generally to be identified by the criteria of predictability of profitability and 
expectation that it remains stable during the whole period of exploration and production. 
Therefore, a fiscal stability of petroleum contract can be defined as maintenance of 
stability in the economic assumptions underlying the contract equilibrium, which is 
generally expressed in economic rules governing 'government take' and 'company take' 
and taxes applicable to the contract. The fiscal stability, in a dynamic sense, needs to be 
addressed in order to meet the changing expectations of the parties under the contract. A 
fiscal regime to be effective and stable should generally fulfil the following criteria: 
3 Kameel 1. F. Khan, "Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third World-A Law and Policy 
Perspective", 22 Journal of World trade, 1988, p. 22, Craig Emerson, "Taxing Natural Resource 
Projects", 4 Natural Resource Forum, (1980), pp. 123-145. 
4 James Otto, Maria Luisa Batarseh, John Cordes, Global Mining Taxation Comparative Study, (second 
edition), Institute for Global Resources Policy and Management, Colorado, (2000), p. 7. 
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a. Fairness- Fairness in the fiscal regime requires that the tax burden should be 
distributed fairly and arbitrary tax liabilities should be avoided. Taxes should be 
imposed in a non-discriminatory manner and should be applied equally to foreign and 
local investors and to private and state-owned enterprises. Discrimination or excessive 
taxation should be avoided in view of their adverse effects on prospective foreign 
investors. 
b. Efficiency -A stable and effective fiscal system should be also an efficient one in an 
economic sense. A fiscal system is an efficient one when it is designed in a way that can 
be operated in an optimal way to reduce the investor's risk perception, cost effective in 
terms of administration and contains incentives for its compliance. An efficient fiscal 
system encourages investors to investment as well as avoids their distorting behaviour 
like gold plating, over investment and premature field abandonment. An efficient fiscal 
system should be intrinsically equipped with mechanisms for reducing risks, be 
convenient in the administration of tax with regard to timing and payment and should be 
flexible enough to be responsive to changes of circumstance. 5 An efficient fiscal regime 
of the contract distinguishes between petroleum projects in terms of their level of 
prospectivity. The efficiency of a fiscal regime has been measured in the following 
way: the way the regime distributes risk and rewards associated with exogenous risk 
factors such as commodity price fluctuations, geological risks, and risk of major shifts 
in technology; the extent to which the regime provides the proper incentives for 
investment; the extent to which the regime is stable and self-enforcing and the extent to 
which the contract maximises the returns to be distributed among the primary parties. 
6 
An efficient fiscal regime also ensures that any modification of the fiscal regime does 
5 Bryan Land, "The Rate of Return Approach to Progressive Profit Sharing in Mining", in: James M. Otto 
(ed. ), Taxation of Mineral Enterprises, Graham & Trotman, London, (1995), p. 95. 
6 Charles R. Blitzer, Panos E. Cavoulacos, Donald R. Lessard, "Contract Efficiency and Natural Resource 
Investment in Developing Countries", Vol. 19, No. 1, Columbia Journal of World Business, (1984), p. 
13. 
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not accrue any unfair advantage to one of the parties, but rather acts for mutual benefit 
and protects legitimate interests under contract for both parties. 
c. Neutrality - Neutrality in relation to petroleum taxation implies that the tax should be 
esigned in such a way that it provides neither an artificial inducement nor 
iscouragement to private investment decisions. Thus, a neutral tax system does not 
distort the investment decision. Under a neutral fiscal regime, investment would be 
made in those projects which yield greater value than the economic costs involved in 
them. A taxation system based on economic rent calculated by profitability of the 
project is more neutral than the taxation system based on production such as severance 
tax or royalty. 7 
d. Certainty - Fiscal regimes should be all-inclusive at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract and should contain a full list of all taxes, duties and charges that will be 
applicable in the future and should be applied in consistent manner. 8 There should be a 
reasonable degree of certainty of the meaning and intent of tax rules. The tax system 
should avoid giving too much scope of discretion to the government to administer it as 
wide discretion creates an opportunity for the bureaucrats to arbitrary interpretation of 
tax rules and their application. Similarly, the fiscal regime should not be stated in 
contradictory and ambiguous terms, because ambiguity in a tax system can lead to a 
discretionary interpretation, which in turn may increase risk. In order to ensure a certain 
degree of stability in a petroleum contract, contractual arrangements should specifically 
stipulate that the fiscal regime will not be unreasonably modified during the life of the 
project and the tax base. If modification of the fiscal regime becomes necessary to reach 
7 The concept of economic rent or resource rent denotes the total gross revenue derived from a particular 
project InInus operating costs, total capital investment, and other incidental costs incurred to carry out the 
project. See, Ross Garnaut and Anthony Clunies Ross, Taxation of Mineral Rents, Clarendon Press: 
Oxford (1983), pp. 26-27. See, also, Kjell Sunnevag, "Investigation of the Neutrality of the Petroleum 
Fiscal Regimes", Journal of Energy Finance & Development, volume 2, Number 1,1997, pp. 137-160. 
8 Paul Fortin, "Substantive criteria to assess the fiscal regime of a developing country", in: Mineral 
Taxation and Investment, Selected Papers-International Seminar on Mining Taxation Montreal, Sep. 30- 
Oct. 4,1991, Published by the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum for the UN, pp. 
22-23. 
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an equitable result, it should be based on predetermined conditions or parameters that 
would allow the investor to predict the rate of return of the project with a certain degree 
of accuracy. 
e. Competitiveness - Competitiveness of a given fiscal regime depends not only upon a 
sound legal and regulatory framework but also a relative degree of geological 
prospectivity of petroleum resources. The fiscal regime must be viewed not only in 
relation to the domestic investment context of a country and the social needs of its 
people but also in relation to the prevailing global investment opportunities and context. 
An effective fiscal regime should be designed in a way to improve the competitive 
position of a particular country to the comparable tax laws and fiscal regulations of 
other countries. 
In order to investigate further the efficacy of a fiscal regime to ensure stability, it 
is pertinent to discuss the concept of flexibility in contract, which is often measured by 
the degree of progressiveness and regressivity of the tax regime as formulated for a 
given petroleum contract. 
1.4 Progressive and Regressive System of Tax 
The type of tax and the fiscal impositions that are used in a contract has important 
implications for its stability and efficiency. One of the criteria of stability in the 
petroleum contract is to ensure flexibility in its economic terms to cope with a change of 
circumstances. Flexibility has long been recognised as a yardstick to measure the 
progressiveness and regressiveness of the fiscal regime of a given contract. A fiscal 
regime can be said to be progressive, when it reacts progressively to a variation in oil 
prices, field sizes, development costs and operating costs. The main economic criterion 
of progressive tax is that the tax rate increases with an increased tax base. Under a 
progressive system, government take increases with the corresponding increase in actual 
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profitability of each project. A progressive contract system is, therefore, sensitive to the 
actual profitability and is more likely to achieve maximum revenue to the government 
when profitability of the project increases. In this regard, progressivity should be 
measured by taking into account not only the amount of production, but also the 
economic profitability of the project based on the market price of petroleum. A tax 
system that is based on expected economic rent and contains an inherent flexibility that 
increases or decreases in such economic rent resulting in corresponding variations in the 
government takes, can assure the continued receipt of a reasonable share of economic 
benefit to the gove=ent and at the same time, can reduce discretionary change in the 
tax system. 
9 
-' On the other hand, regressivity of a fiscal system is identified with fixed or 
higher rate of royalty and income tax, a higher amount of bonus payment, and a fixed 
rate of profit splitting in production- sharing arrangements, which are unrelated to the 
level of production and profitability. 10 A regressive fiscal system thus always tends to 
be inflexible. Under a regressive or inflexible system, the government take decreases 
while the actual profitability of a project increases with substantial increase of oil price, 
which may lead to the political risk of the contract being modified by the host state 
unilaterally. " On the other hand, a progressive fiscal system can provide an accurate 
return for both host state and IOC from a given project, which in turn may reduce the 
political nsk of expropriation by the host state. A progressive fiscal regime can act as an 
incentive to investors depending upon the size of the field. Such a progressive fiscal 
regime is particularly needed for small and marginal fields, which involve a higher cost 
9 See, Alexander G. Kemp, Peter D. A. Jones, "Reforming the Alaskan Petroleum Fiscal System: A 
Positive Sum Game", 2 Journal of Energy Finance and Development, No. 1, (1997), pp. 48-80 
10 Raymond F. Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations & Agreements in the Developing Countries, 
Resources for the Future, Washington, D. C., (1984), p. 136. 
1 Honore Le Leuch, "Contractual flexibility in new petroleum investment contracts", in: Nicky Beredjlck 
and Thomas Walde (ed. ), Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing Countries, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Graham & Trotman, London, (1988), p. 95. 
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but comparatively less profit. 12 The necessity of progressive fiscal regime is much more 
evident at the present time when much of exploration of petroleum is to be carried out 
in remote places or deep sea where adverse geological conditions may make petroleum 
discovery commercially marginal one. 
4.1 Contractual Forms: Implications for Stability of Contract 
Irrespective of the types of contracts, the ultimate objective of the parties is to achieve 
an equitable share of returns depending upon the commercial discoveries, operating 
costs and oil prices in world market. Although it would be too simplistic to say that a 
choice of particular form of contract may affect the investment decision, use of the 
contractual form that attempts to minimise different kinds of risks has a particular 
bearing on contract stability. For example, a contract used as a mechanism for 
establishing the fiscal regime through self-enforcing rules can ensure a greater degree of 
stability as there is less need for negotiation seeking to fetter the tax power of the host 
state. 13 Furthermore, contract forms which allocate risk in an efficient manner and 
distribute economic rent in an equitable way, tend to be more stable than the contracts 
that allow one party to capture all the profits. 14 In this regard, it will be useful to reflect 
on various forms of petroleum contracts in relation to their implication on stability: 
4.1.1 Modern Concession Agreement: The concession agreement consists of tax 
systems which act as both profit and risk distribution mechanism. It may contain a 
complex set of taxes including bonuses, royalty, income tax and additional profit tax. 
12 See also, Mont P. Hoyt, "Increasing Exploration Incentives in International Petroleum Agreements", 
Seminar on Petroleum Contracts, Tunis, September 30 to October 2,1986, pp. EI (11-12). 
13 Dr. S. K. Date-Bah, "The Contract as a Mechanism for Taxation", 6 Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law, (1988), p. 43. 
14 Charles R. Blitzer, Panos E. Cavoulacos and James L. Paddock, "Risk-bearing and Contract Design: 
are stable contracts feasible? " in: Kameel I. F. Khan (ed. ), Petroleum Resources and Development, 
Belhaven Press, London and New York (1987), pp. 173-181. 
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The fiscal arrangements of concession agreements are to be mostly legislated than 
contractually defined and thus, are less self-enforcing and vulnerable to legislative 
change. Stability and neutrality in the fiscal regime of concession agreements depends 
upon how these agreements respond to windfall profits caused either by higher than 
expected discoveries or increase in the price of petroleum. Fiscal regime of a concession 
agreement which contains the concept of 'economic rent' in the royalty and tax system 
of the concession agreement can be more flexible and stable. 
4.1.2 Production Sharing Contract: The general principles of the production sharing 
contract are the following: overall management of petroleum operations vested to the 
state; cost recovery for the company of all exploration, development and production 
costs from a portion of production; a profit oil split of the remaining production 
between the state and the oil company; the oil company bears all exploration risk and is 
reimbursed only in the event of a commercial discovery. The rate of both cost recovery 
and profit petroleum may vary, depending on various factors like geological and 
economic conditions. For instance, adverse geological conditions like deepwater 
exploration involving high risks and substantial investment may allow higher cost 
recovery or profit oil in favour of the company. 
Initially, the fiscal tenus of PSC was based on a rigid fonnula of a fixed rate of 
profit oil split (85% govenunent/15% contractor under Indonesian PSC of 1969) 
regardless of profitability. However, modem PSCs have shifted from the traditional flat- 
rate profit split to a progressive or incremental profit split which ensures that the state's 
share increases with the increase of annual production. In some countries, production 
sharing and cost recovery may be negotiable. " The negotiability of profit shanng and 
15 Egypt 1999 model PSC, Russian PSC law of 1995 as amended in 1999. 
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cost recovery allows flexibility in the production sharing scheme and obviates the 
necessity of imposing income tax for deriving economic benefits for the host state. 
It is sometimes asserted that the reason for the popularity of the production- 
sharing concept in developing countries lies not in economic reasons but for its political 
appeal of ownership of resources since it is possible to extract the same economic 
benefits for the government from the respective contractual arrangements. This 
argument becomes largely redundant because in modem concessions, ownership of 
petroleum is also vested in the state under the relevant law and the host governments 
can exercise the same degree of authority over the management and ownership of the 
petroleum operations in the concession agreement like the PSC. The PSC is popular for 
both the host states and companies mainly for its flexibility in its negotiation process 
and its proven effectiveness and adaptability in very different settings. The basic 
implication of the PSC pertaining to contract stability is that it can be operated through 
self-enforcing rules specified in the contract through the provisions on cost recovery and 
profit oil. The flexible mechanisms of the PSC can ensure stability in the following 
ways: 
Firstly, The PSC can greatly decrease the likelihood of pricing conflicts between 
host country and the IOCs as the revenue consists in petroleum, rather than a portion of 
profits derived from the sales of oil. 
16 It can also minimise conflict in other respects like 
minimum work expenditures and commercial discovery by laying down explicit rules in 
this regard. 
Secondly, flexible elements of the PSC can respond to a different production 
level by changing the allocation of profit oil without resorting to any amendment of 
taxation law. Since its first introduction, the PSC system has continuously evolved to 
adjust numerous differences both in petroleum potential and costs. The flexible scheme 
16 See, Robert Fabricant, "Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry, " 16 
Harvard International Law Journal, (1975), p. 303. 
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of cost recovery and profit sharing can be easily tailored to the peculiarity of each 
country and the needs of local conditions. This flexibility of PSC ternis can reduce the 
political risk perception of outright expropriation since the contractual relationship can 
be adapted automatically when there is significant variation in production and price rate. 
However, it should be mentioned that the stability and neutrality of the fiscal regime of 
a PSC can be undennined if the sliding scale or the negotiated cost recovery and profit 
sharing is based on the mere purpose of revenue collection by the government rather 
than directed at achieving economic rent on the basis of a rate of return approach. Thus, 
PSCs with flexible fiscal mechanisms based on an economic rent concept can create an 
'enclave of stability' within the contract and can enjoy a greater degree of transparency 
than other types of contracts. 
Thirdly, negotiated fiscal elements of the PSC can be more stable than the fiscal 
elements of concession agreements e. g. tax-royalty, which are mostly dealt with in the 
legislative framework. Moreover, the PSC makes different arrangements for the fiscal 
scheme for oil and gas allowing flexibility into the contract. A PSC regime having a 
flexible production sharing and cost recovery formula has an advantage for companies 
of not having to develop expertise in the host country's often complex or unfamiliar tax 
regime. 
But even fiscal regime of a PSC may become unstable and unattractive if it 
comprises a large number of government and administrative levies, which can be 
changed by the governments' administrative discretion and the State's legislative 
power. 17 This bewildering and complex set of tax and fiscal impositions in the PSC 
17 For instance, Russia's law of PSC of 1995 imposes profit taxes, payment for the use of the subsoil, 
VAT, signature and production bonuses, rentals; royalty, land/water/forest fees, employers' social and 
medical contributions, makes the PSC regime unattractive, which in turn, discourages foreign investment. 
See, Ernest Chung, "Petroleum Investment in the Russian Federation-Russian Federation Federal Law 
No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (December 30,1995)", 37 Harvard International Law 
Journal (1995), 551,556; James L. Smith, "Taxation and Investment in Russian Oil", 2 Journal of Energy 
Finance & Development, No. 1,1997, p. 5-23; William P. Streng, "Russian Federation Tax Legislation 
impacting Russia Based Oil and Gas Operations: Endless (? ) Transition", Houston Journal of 
International Law, (1993), pp. 553-631. 
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regime may obviously bring instability to the contract as it confers upon the host state a 
wide scope to change the tax laws. 
4.1.3 Service Contract: Under the service contract, the IOC is employed as a hired 
agent and is usually reimbursed in cash in the form of a fee for its service to the host 
state. There are two main types of service contract: risk service contracts and pure 
service contracts. Risk service contracts require the Contractor to take all the risk 
associated with exploration and development. In return, if exploration efforts are 
successful, the government allows the contractor to recover those costs through sale of 
the oil or gas and pays the contractor a fee based on a percentage of the remaining 
revenues. In a pure service contract, a private petroleum company agrees to perfonn 
certain specified services for the government in return for fixed payments. The 
govenunent bears all or part of the exploration risk itself. 
Generally, a mechanism of flexibility called 'price cap' is used in the service 
contract to cope with the circumstances of price volatility. It refers to a cap on the 
quantity of petroleum that may be lifted to remunerate the contractor. For example, 
under the Iranian service contract, if the price falls, the quantities of oil required to meet 
the agreed payment schedule increase in order to fulfil the required fee of IOCs. 18 
5 Mechanisms of Fiscal Stability 
It appears axiomatic that in order to achieve stability in the petroleum contract, it is 
essential that there should be flexibility and fairness in the whole fiscal arrangement. It 
is evident from the last two decades' experience of the developing countries that a rigid 
approach to the fiscal regime can not bring fairness and the desired outcome from a 
given petroleum project. As a result, the developing countries have moved towards a 
18 Rahail Ali, "Iranian Oil and Gas: A Legal Framework", Oil and Gas Law and Taxation Review (1999) 
p. 300. 
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more pragmatic and flexible approach in the fiscal regime through incorporation of 
various flexible mechanisms in the terms and conditions of the contract as well as in the 
accounting procedure. While profitability is always variable depending upon various 
circumstances, fairness in respective returns from a project should be seen to be a 
constant goal of the parties. Therefore, developing countries have attempted to bring the 
necessary flexibility to the fiscal regime in order to maintain stability and equilibrium of 
the contract. Apart from the flexible mechanisms that mainly deal with profitability at 
with production level, stabilisation clauses and legislative measures are commonplace 
for guaranteeing the stability of the tax regime of the contract. Therefore, fiscal stability 
mechanisms can be conveniently grouped into the following kinds: 
Firstly: flexible mechanisms, which include a sliding scale into cost recovery, 
sharing of profit oil, state participation, royalties; and adoption of fiscal arrangements 
based on the rate of return approach, the R factor; and a resource rent tax or progressive 
tax system, which is usually implemented by way of an additional profit tax. 
Secondly: stabilisation clauses as contractual means of stabilising tax law of the 
host countries and offshore accounts for maintaining predictability in foreign exchange 
convertibility. 
Thirdly: legislative measures including the guarantee against unilateral 
modification of tax law and financial incentive 
5.1 Flexible Mechanisms 
Flexibility in the economic terms and conditions of the contract is particularly important 
with regard to their responsiveness to changes of circumstances triggered either by the 
level of production and change in geological conditions or the external market 
conditions such as a change in the petroleum price in the world markets. To put it in 
other words, the flexibility in the fiscal system can be identified by its using the 
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following indicators: geological conditions (onshore vs. offshore, shallow vs. 
deepwater, established vs. frontier areas), price level, and production level. Flexible 
mechanisms in relation to the fiscal regime refer to the self-adjusting capacity of the 
economic tern-is of the contracts to different situations through flexible provisions such 
as sliding scale mechanisms, rate of return approach, 'R' factor and resource rent tax in 
petroleum contracts. The sliding scale as a priori self-adjustment mechanism is 
concerned with variation in production level. 
5.1.1 Sliding Scale 
In petroleum contractual arrangements, royalties, cost recovery, profit oil and bonuses 
can be levied as a fixed share of production which may be unrelated to the profitability 
of the project. On the other hand, the sliding scale is essentially an internal contractual 
mechanism, which seeks to ensure that the fiscal term to be adjustable concerns 
production level, price and field size. The concept of sliding scale can be described as a 
mechanism, which sets parameters to measure return from a given petroleum project on 
the basis of a different level of production or profitability. Thus, any upward or 
downward change can be implemented with the level of production through adjustable 
parameters of the sliding scale. The main advantage of a sliding scale is that the rent of 
the governments can be maximised when the aggregate production from the project are 
increased without jeopardising the expected profit of the company. It can increase 
efficiency in risk and reward distribution from the project and promote a stable 
relationship by reducing the probability of reaping windfall profits by the company. 
According to Daniel Jofmston, a sliding scale is a 
"mechanism in a fiscal system that increases effective taxes, and/or royalties based upon profitability or 
some proxy for profitability such as increased levels of oil or gas production. Ordinarily each tranche of 
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production is subject to a specific rate and the term incremental sliding scale is sometimes used to further 
identify this. "19 
Factors and conditions that may trigger sliding scales are: production rate, water 
depth, price of petroleum, onshore vs. offshore, remoteness of locations, oil v. gas, 
crude quality, and distance from shore. The sliding scale can introduce flexibility in the 
development of both large and smaller fields. A sliding scale for progressive sharing of 
the profit product may reduce the possibility of revision or renegotiation of the terms of 
contract. Contract tenns which are generally subject to sliding scales, are profit oil split, 
royalty, cost recovery limits, tax rates, state participation. Sliding scale in royalty can be 
introduced on the basis of level of production. 20 Sliding scale cost recovery usually 
takes place by the introduction of change in the annual maximum limit of recovery. 
Sliding Scale into Sharing of Profit petroleum is invariably done by a progressive rate 
into the production sharing contract on the following incremental production: 
-a progressive rate in accordance with the daily production level; 
-a progressive rate in accordance with the cumulative production; and 
-a progressive rate based on the rate of return, which usually takes into account the 
profitability of operations. 
But the sliding scale based on either average daily or average annual production 
may be progressive with respect to field size, but can be inflexible and regressive to the 
price of petroleum if it is not adjustable to the change of price. On the other hand, a 
sliding scale which is based on economic rent calculated on a rate of return approach 
can ensure more neutrality and stability in the production sharing contract, as 
19 Daniiel Johnston., International Exploration Economics, Risk and Contract Analysis, Penn Well, 
Oklahama, (2003), pp. 42-43. 
20 Among the countries that offer sliding scale royalties are China, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Colombia, 
Egypt, Peru and Nigeria. Columbia introduced a sliding scale royalty based on field production in its 
model association contract of 1999. For instance, Peru's new royalty regime is based upon both sliding 
scale, which is variable by R factor sensitive to the performance of a given field in the preceding year; 
and fixed royalty which applies from commencement of exploitation. The new royalty regime has been 
enacted by Supreme Decree No. 017-2003-EM; see, Carlos Quiroz, Will the New Peruvian Royalty 
Regime Foster New Investment in Petroleum Exploration? International Energy Law and Taxation 
Review, Issue 10 (2003). 
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government's share of profit oil increases when the achieved rate of return increases. 
Therefore, sliding scale based on economic rent and ROR approach should be 
preferable because it is measured on the basis of actual profitability. The next section 
discusses the 'Rate of Retum' approach. 
5.1.2 'Rate of Return' (ROR) Approach 
The ROR is used by host governments mainly on an undiscounted basis in order to 
assure them to receive higher and constantly rising payments if the project turned out to 
be successful. The 'Rate of return' refers to an arrangement in which the investor is 
allowed to eam an agreed rate of return before profits are shared with the government. It 
is flexible to a variation in profitability from all indicators like price increases, field 
sizes, and investment costs. It is applied on a life of project basis, in which year to year 
cash flows are accumulated forward until the ROR threshold is achieved. In other 
words, it takes into account the aggregative amount of the costs a company has to bear 
from the effective date to the exploration, appraisal and development expenditures plus 
a time factor. ROR approach is different from the traditional 'payback period' method 
which is calculated as the time required for generating a positive project cash flow to 
recover foreign investors' initial investment. This method is rarely used in petroleum 
contracts for its several drawbacks: firstly, it promotes a short-term attitude; secondly, 
the payback hurdle rate may be subjective. 
On the other hand, the ROR approach is popular because it has several 
advantages: Firstly, it is based on achieved profitability instead of anticipated 
profitability. Secondly, the ROR system is self-adjusting since it can respond 
automatically to an unpredictable change in profitability of the project and thus, it 
adjusts govenunent take to all the variables such as prices, production and CoStS. 
21 
1 Bryan Land, supra note 5, p. 99. 
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Thirdly, an ROR revenue structure can easily be integrated into different contractual 
regimes. For example, in licensing systems, it can be used as an additional profits tax, 
while in a production sharing system it can be used to determine the split of profit oil. 
Fourthly, since it provides acceptable results under different economic scenarios, it 
contributes to contractual stability by eliminating the need to ex post revise the fiscal 
terms. 22 
A delicate problem, however, arises as to what is an acceptable 'rate of retum' to 
both the host government and company. Resolving this problem is necessary in order to 
detennine the appropriate sharing of resource rent between the host government and 
IOC. The established practice in this regard is that an investor should receive a 'fair and 
reasonable return'. But a further problem arises in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable return on investment as there is no definitive yardstick to measures such as 
fairness and reasonableness. A generic approach may be that a threshold of rate of 
return should not be higher than the average returns of investors on comparable 
investments. 23 In determining 'fair and reasonable' rate of return, factors like operating 
and exploration costs, objective assessment of risk premium, the variables that affect the 
project, changing circumstances-all these should be taken into consideration. 
5.1.3 IR' Factor 
The R factor is defined as accumulated receipts actually received by the IOC divided by 
accumulated capital expenditure and operating costs. Thus, R implies ratio of 
cumulative net receipts to cumulative expenses. The R factor is calculated in each 
accounting period, and once a threshold is crossed, then the new rate of the R factor will 
24 
apply in the next accounting period . The R factor is applied by the host state in the 
22 Bryan Land, supra note 5, p. 756-57. 
23 Bryan Land, supra note 5, p. 106. 
24 R factor is "calculated biy subtrac 
i 
tmig 
i 
the cumulative value of taxes paid (including royalty) from 
cumulative value of production and dividing the result by cumulative costs, including exploration costs. " 
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petroleum agreements using sliding scales for profit oil splits, royalties, and government 
participation. The R factor perfonns a function of a sliding scale into the sharing of the 
cost recovery, profit oil and royalty through calculation of the value of production rather 
than the volume of production itself 
The R factor is usually expressed in the following ratio: 
The Contractor's cumulative receipts (after royalty, tax and Government profit oil share 
to date) are divided by the Contractor into cumulative expenditures (Total cumulative 
expenditure, exploration, and appraisal expenses, development expenditures and 
operating costs incurred by the contractor). Under the R factor, the government's share 
of profit oil increases as the R-Factor increases. The R factor is currently used by many 
countries including the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Peru, Mozambique, Bahrain, Tunisia, 
Qatar, Colombia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Qatar. 
A typical instance of the R factor used in Petroleum contracts may be such as the 
Model Development & Production Sharing Agreement of Qatar of 2002 where the R 
Factor is used in determining a share of profit petroleum and it is calculated on an 
accrual basis as the ratio of the contractor's cumulative revenues divided by the 
contractor's cumulative petroleum costs. 25 
In most instances, the R factor is calculated for determining the respective share 
of the profit petroleum according to incremental scale varying with the value of the R- 
Dougherty, "Tunisia ", in the Oil and Gas Investor, pp. 32-34 (October, 1992). See also, Daniel Johnston, 
"International Contract Analysis: The Commercial Terins", in Geogre E. Kronman, Don B. Felio and 
Thomas EO' Connor (ed. ), International Oil and Gas Venture. - A business Perspective, The American 
Association of Petroleum Geologists, Tulsa, (2000), p. 89. 
25 R factor Contractor's share Government's Share 
R<1.25 18.9% 81.1% 
1.25<R<1.50 15.6% 84.4% 
R>1.50 11.8% 88.2% 
Qatar model Development & Production Sharing Agreement of 2002 between the Government of Qatar 
and Contractor (North Field) Barrows Basic Oil Laws and Contracts, Middle East, (supplement no. 155), 
p. 59. 
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Factor. 26 However, as empirical study suggests, in some cases, it is also used in 
determining royalty and cost recovery or royalty, cost recovery and profit petroleum 
separately in a single contract. 27 
The R factor can be flexible when it is calculated on a field by field basis and 
takes into account all the variables that affect the profitability of a project. In the R 
factor calculation, tax and royalties are progressively lower at an R value of less than 
one and progressively higher at an R value of one and above. It provides flexibility into 
the fiscal regime as it takes into account both cost and price simultaneously. In 
particular, this system is useful for marginal fields as it allows a lesser tax burden but 
provides higher returns to the government in case of profit. As a result, the contractor 
cannot gain an unreasonable benefit in case of price increase on the one hand and 
contractor's minimum return is protected, if costs go higher, on the other. 
5.2 Progressive Tax System: Utility of Additional Profit Tax 
The conventional means of taxing natural resource projects such as income tax can 
hardly respond to the changing circumstances caused by variations in price or bonanza 
discovery of new fields due to its inflexibility. If the income rate taxes are set high 
enough to maximise revenue, then it may act as a disincentive for further investment. 
On the other hand, if the tax rate is set too low, the host country will reap minimal 
returns when unforeseen developments such as world oil prices soar up or when 
26 See Turkmenistan Model PSC of 1999, Barrows supplement (Russia and NIS) No. 36, Colombia 
Model Association Agreement with Ecopetrol of January, 2000 Barrows supplement (South America) 
No. 149; Article 16 of Ivory Coast Model PSC of 1993, Article 11 of Model PSC of Mozambique (Bid 
Round 2000), Barrows (South and Central Africa) Supplement No. 146, p. 40; article 14.2 of the 
Colombia's Model Association Agreement with ECOPETROL of January, 2000, Barrows (South 
America) Supplement No. 149, p. 18; Production Sharing Contract between Union Texas/Commonwealth 
and Azerbaijan dated 2 June 1998, Barrows Supplement (Russia and NIS), No. 34, p. 3 1. 
27 In Bahrain, R factor is used in measuring cost recovery and in sharing profit petroleum. See, Chevron 
Offshore Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement with Government of Bahrain, Feb. 1998, 
Barrows Supplement (Middle East), No. 152, p. 29; in Peru, and Tunisia, the R factor is used to calculate 
the amount of royalty to be paid to the Government. See, Model License Contract for 2000 for 
Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbon of Peru, Barrows Supplement (South America) No. 148; 
Tunisia's Hydrocarbon Law of 99-93 OD dated 17 August 1999, Barrows Supplement (North Africa), 
No. 130, p. 139. 
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deposits of exceptional size or quality are discovered. This implication of a high rate of 
profit capture by the company and the consequent perception of exploitation of natural 
resources give rise to nationalistic sentiment in the host country and may trigger the 
po itica sk of expropriation. To obviate this situation, a method of providing an 
automatic adjustment of the increased profitability of the project to the host state was 
evolved, which is popularly known as the concept of 'economic resource rent'. 28 The 
concept was originally developed for mining and now is also applied in the petroleum 
sector. 
The concept of an additional profit tax (APT) is designed to raise revenue from 
C economic resource rent' and is implemented either by specific legislation to that effect 
or it may be specifically stipulated in the contract. 29This Additional Profit Tax (ATP) is 
to be imposed when a certain threshold or specified Rate of Return (ROR) is achieved 
on the investment. Thus, APT is added to the existing rate of income tax system and it is 
triggered only when under pre-detennined conditions are fulfilled. The additional profit 
tax is originally contemplated for the concession agreement, but it is also applied to the 
pSC. 30 It is particularly attractive to the new petroleum producing developing countries, 
which want to attract foreign investment as well as to capture economic rent in the 
circumstances of windfall profit by a price rise or a bonanza discovery. 
28 See detailed for the concept, Ross Gamaut & Anthony Clunies Ross, "Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and 
the Taxing of Natural Resource Projects", The Econornic Journal (1975), p. 272; See also, Ross Gamaut 
& Anthony Clunies Ross, supra note, 7. 
29The additional profit tax (ATP) was first applied in Papua New Guinea at the Ok Tedi project in 1976 
and then adopted as part of its' general tax regime for both mining and petroleum. Then it had been 
adopted by many other countries, including Malaysia, Peru, Thailand, Tanzania, Russia, Kazakhstan. A 
modem example of additional profit tax may be illustrated by Thailand's "Special Remuneratory Benefit 
(SRB) introduced in 1987 under its modernised concession agreement in order to pass to the Thai 
government a share of the additional profits arising from substantial increase in prices of petroleum, 
bonanza discoveries and or very low-cost discoveries. No SRB is payable except in accounting year 111 
which the concessionaire has "Petroleum Profit for the Year", i. e., petroleum costs for the current and 
past have been recovered. In calculating 'Petroleum profit for the year', Petroleum capital expenditure, 
Normal and necessary petroleum costs and special reduction (uplift) are deducted. The SRB will be 
calculated annually and on a block by block basis. If the concessionaire has 'Petroleum Profit for the 
Year, ' the SRB is calculated at the following rates, subject to a ceiling of 75% of Petroleum Profit for the 
year. See Comment section 7011 and Gas Law and Taxation Review (1987/88), p. 207. 
30 See, Article 13 of the Model PSC of Tanzania, 2001, Barrows supplement (North Africa), No. 150, p. 
118. 
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According to Garnaut and Ross, this system of taxation requires an assessment 
of annual quantum called "net assessable receipts", which is simply the sum of all 
receipts in respect of the establishment and operation of the project, less the "deductible 
payments" in the year. Then, separate taxes may be levied at more than one threshold 
interest rate. The process of accumulating at specified interest rates ensures that 
fluctuations in commodity prices and associated fluctuations in annual profits do not 
affect the internal rate of return at which Resource Rent Tax becomes payable .31 The 
threshold interest rate reflects the IOC's discount rate. In this regard, the threshold 
return must be assessed on fair and reasonable criteria. The APT system based on 
discounted cash flow rate of return analysis does not distort the investment decision and 
hence, promotes a greater degree of neutrality and transparency within the tax system. 32 
The main advantage of the additional profit is that the increased 'government take' 
contemplated in case of a price hike ensures the flexibility of the fiscal regime, which in 
turn enhances stability in the contractual relationship. On the other hand, if the price of 
petroleum falls or development costs increase there can be an automatic downward 
adjustment in the tax take to reflect the diminution in the size of economic rents. 33 Thus, 
it provides for an automatic system of adjusting the 'tax-take' in response to the rate of 
return earned by the investors. From an investor's viewpoint, APT provides a risk- 
sharing mechanism with government and it does not impose an early fiscal burden. 
The most important problem pertaining to it is at which rate the APT will be 
imposed, once the trigger rate of return has been achieved. In this regard, it should be 
mentioned that there is no single rate, which is appropriate to all projects under all price 
and cost conditions and at every point in the life of a project. The additional profits tax 
can be applied at separate rates to different projects depending upon its unique 
31 Ross Gamaut & Anthony Clunies Ross, supra note 28, pp. 284-85. 
32 See, Philip Daniel, Keith Palmer, Alistair Watson and Roland Brown, Review of the Fiscal Regimes for 
Mining and Hydro carbons ofPapua New Guinea, October 2000, p. 3 1. 
33 Alexander G. Kemp, "Petroleum exploitation and contract terms in developing countries after the oil 
price collapse", 13 Natural Resource Forum, (1989), p. 123. 
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conditions and rates, and may be based on field by field analysis or contract area or 
whole country. A general approach is discernible from the state practice which is that 
the rate of additional profits tax should be designed in a progressive scale and multi-rate 
system. This can introduce progressively higher charges upon income as profitability 
increases. 34 However, the rate should not be an unreasonably higher one and should 
strike a balance between the objectives of the goven-iment and the economic objectives 
of the IOCs. The tax rate should be set at a moderate level and the threshold rate should 
be close to the investors' discount rate. 
However, the APT system has several disadvantages to governments: first, it is 
difficult to formulate a rate of APT and administer it. Second, an arbitrary rate of APT 
fixed by government may act as a disincentive to the investment for the new 
exploration. Third, revenue derived from the APT system of taxation may destabilise 
the overall economy of a country in view of its tendency to be highly cyclical reflecting 
price cycles. In a country that has a high level of macro-economic dependence on 
revenues from petroleum, this could be highly de-stabilising factor. The practical 
solution to such a problem is to introduce stabilisation measures that will insulate the 
economy from the cyclical revenue receipts. 
5.3 Flexibility and Fairness in Accounting Procedure 
Modem petroleum contracts annex detailed accounting procedures and rules covering 
expenses, revenues, production and incidental charges. Accounting procedures of 
concerned petroleum contracts may stipulate that the accounting procedure should be 
based on a fair and equitable method. Thus, if the parties agree that if accounting 
procedures prove to be unfair or inequitable to any of the parties then the parties shall 
meet and in good faith endeavour to agree on such changes as are necessary to correct 
34 See, Michael Faber, "Some Old and New Devices in Mineral Royalties and Taxation", in: Legal and 
Institutional Arrangements in Mineral Development, Mining Journal Books, London (1982), pp. 112-13. 
see, Craig Emerson, supra note 3, p. 143, 
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any unfairness or inequity. 35 The contract may also provide that the accounting and 
financial procedure may be amended by agreement between the parties. 36 
5.4 Role of Stabilisation Clause 
From the investor's point of view, any increase or decrease in the taxes by an 
amendment of tax law, which brings a change in the profit rate of his investment, can be 
a deterrent or an incentive to private foreign investment. Despite the widespread 
practice of production sharing contracts, which is mostly based upon economic 
calculations of production and profits within the contract system rather than a legislated 
fiscal system, the importance of the stabilisation clause has not waned. A stabilisation 
clause may particularly intend to stabilise taxation law of the host state in order to 
prevent the state's legislative power to change the tax law that adversely affects the 
profitability of the companies. 37 A stabilisation clause for the purpose of stability of the 
fiscal regime encompasses a range of issues like the tax regime, general business levies, 
foreign currency. 
Due to the singular focus on the specific issue of tax increase, the tax 
stabilisation clause may be more effective than the stabilisation clause of broad 
competence, which intends to block all the future legislation. However, the legal effect 
of traditional stabilisation clauses intending to freeze the law of the host state has been 
fraught with conceptual difficulty. Instead, economic stabilisation has become a popular 
35Appendix 3, Article 1 of Azerbaijan -Union Texas/Commonwealth Production Sharing Agreement-2 
June 1998, printed Mi Barrows basic Oil Laws and Contracts, (Russia and NIS), Supplement No. 34, p. 97. 
36 Article 12 of the Mozambique Model PSC (Bid Round 2000), Barrows supplement (Central and South 
Africa), No. 146. 
37 For instance, article 16.11 of 1997 model contract for conducting surface operations in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, as approved by Decree 108 of 27 January, 1997: 
"The tax regime established by the Contract shall be in effect without alterations until the tern-iination of 
the Contract's validity, except for cases stipulated in the present paragraph. 
Any amendments in the tax legislation made after the contract was signed must not influence the tax 
obligations of the Contractor, except for the situation in which such an amendment is in its essence a 
change in the tax stipulated in the Contract and does not Invoke a change in the level of taxation as 
compared with the date of signing the contract. " 
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sta il ty mechanism with its focus on compensating the adverse fiscal and economic 
impacts of subsequent legislation to the contract. The economic stabilisation clause can 
be a more convenient tool to deal with the host countries' exercise of legislative power 
including imposing new tax and fiscal imposition. 
5.5 Guarantee against Foreign Exchange Risk 
One of the main concerns for the foreign investors in the petroleum sector is how to 
secure the repatriation of profits through convertible currency and in a non- 
discriminatory rate of exchange. The host government's imposition of a discriminatory 
exchange rate or restriction of foreign exchange convertibility to resolve balance of 
payments problems or the prohibition of a remittance of funds during the life time of the 
contract, or currency devaluation caused by inflation are treated as political risks that 
can affect the economic viability of the project significantly. Therefore, petroleum 
companies often demand specific contractual or legislative guarantees of convertibility, 
remittance of profits, non-discrimination and exemption from the applicability of the 
foreign exchange law and regulations of the host country. In response to these demands, 
the following contractual guarantees are available to the companies 38 : firstly, the 
contract may guarantee free conversion of the company's assets to convertible foreign 
currencies and free availability of foreign exchange generated by its petroleum export; 
secondly, it may guarantee the company to repatriate profits or export funds it owns in 
excess of local needs of host country without any discrimination; thirdly, the contract 
may guarantee non-discrimination regarding currency exchange rates; fourthly, the 
company can have the right to maintain, control and operate bank accounts in any 
38 See, article 11 of the Model license contract of Peru, 2000, Barrows supplement No. (South 
America)148, pp. 66-67; article 13 of the Model Contract of Ghana, Barrows supplement (South and 
Central Africa) No. 157, pp. 90-91; article 10 of Model PSC of Ecuador, 2002 Barrows supplement 
(South America) No. 152, pp. 81-82; art. 31 of Vanco Gabon Exploration and PSC dated 27 May 1997 
between the Republic of Gabon & Vanco Gabon Inc, Barrows supplement (South and Central Africa) No. 
142, p. 64. 
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currency both in the host country and abroad without any restrictions and to dispose of 
funds of such accounts abroad. The main objective of these guarantees is to keep intact 
the financial equilibrium of the contract through the imposition of restriction on 
regulation by the host State or its central bank. 
Besides the above, to mitigate foreign exchange convertibility risk, the host 
countries now allow petroleum companies to hold offshore accounts in order to limit 
local currency conversion requirements to meet only domestic expenditure obligations. 
The offshore account is widely used by the petroleum companies operating in many 
developing countries in order to reduce the transaction costs and uncertainty involved in 
obtaining foreign exchange. The companies also use it for the retention of sales 
proceeds to cover their foreign exchange needs such as debt repayments, interest and 
dividend payments, and foreign components of investment and operating costs. 
5.6 Legislative Assurance of Fiscal Stability 
Many host countries have separate legislative sanctions against ex post changes in tax or 
fiscal terms. For example, India's exploration licensing policy of 1997 provides a tax 
stabilisation mechanism through a separate petroleum tax code; Peru Is Organic 
Hydrocarbon Law guarantees to contractors that the foreign exchange and tax regimes 
in force as of the date of signing of the contract shall remain unaltered dunng the tenn 
thereof, for the purposes of each contract. For example, Article 4 of the Regulations for 
the Tax Stability Guarantee states: 
By means of the tax stability guarantee, the contractor shall only be subject to the tax system in force on 
the date he signed the contract. No taxes established at later date, nor any changes, which may be 
introduced in the source that generates the tax obligation, or in the amount of the tax, or in the 
exemptions, benefits, incentives and exclusions shall be applicable to him. 
39 
39 Regulations for the Tax Stability Guarantee and Tax Standards of the Organic Hydrocarbon Law of 
Peru, Supreme Decree No. 32-95-EF of February 27,1995, Printed in Barrows Basic Oil Laws and 
Contract (South America), Supplement No. 148, p. 90. 
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However, due to the generality of a legislative guarantee and the possibility of future 
changes of legislation by the host state, the legislative stability of the fiscal regime may 
have only a limited value to the foreign investor. The unilateral nature of the legislative 
guarantee does not bind the host state to afford protection to the investors in case of 
change of such a legislative guarantee. 
5.7 Use of Financial Incentives 
In the past decades, extensive financial incentives have been offered by host states 
through legislation, decrees or other means to attract foreign investment for petroleum 
exploration in frontier areas such as marginal fields or deepwater acreage, which carry 
more technological or geological risks than mature field. The need to provide fiscal 
incentives is primarily determined by the extent to which investors perceive the 
petroleum projects potential to generate economic rent. 40 The grant of fiscal incentives 
by the host state during the life time of contract can also help to promote stability in the 
contract by protecting many projects from their premature abandonment when it 
becomes burdensome for the companies to carry out the project due to increases in costs 
and declining of price. The wide ranging nature of such incentives which have been 
offered, include lower royalties, abolition of the ring-fence clause, elimination of the 
signature bonus, accelerated loss carry forward, reduced governmental shares in 
production sharing and the disappearance of many additional, investment credit, higher 
cost recovery, supplemental and special surtaxes. Whatever the form of a fiscal 
incentive , it adds to the 
favourable terms for the investors in the existing contract and 
facilitates stability in the fiscal regime of a petroleum contract by maintaining 
undiminished cash flow to companies. 
40 See, Graham K. Kellas, "Fiscal Versus Non-Fiscal Incentives", 2 Journal of Energy Finance & 
Development (1997), p. 121,132. 
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5.8 Income Tax Exemption 
Income tax being a part of the generally applicable tax laws of a country is subject to 
legislative changes by the government and, therefore, is potentially unstable. In order to 
counter this , in some petroleum producing countries (for example, Egypt, Bangladesh 
Nigena) 41 state oil companies pay the income tax on behalf of the company. The 
advantage of this system is that the IOC is insulated from changes to the tax laws as 
well as any specific changes applicable to the petroleum industry and thus, it reduces 
perceived political risk of change of tax laws and promotes stability in the fiscal regime. 
6. Summary 
This chapter reveals that the underlying assumptions of a stable fiscal regime require 
that the fiscal regime should be designed in fair, simple and equitable terms, which in 
turn promote the long-term revenue objective of a government and a minimum profit to 
the IOCs. On the other hand, an arbitrary, rigid and conventional tax system only 
promotes short-term revenue objectives of a government, which is not conducive to 
stable and sustainable economic growth of a country. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the developing countries have 
moved towards greater degree of flexibility in their fiscal regimes, which has enhanced 
the stability in the relationship between the host states and IOCs during the last two 
decades. They have made these adjustments in petroleum law and contracts to take into 
account oil price volatility situation, global market condition and fierce competition 
among the newly petroleum producing countries to attract investment during this 
period. The practice of developing countries mirrors the realisation that an inflexible 
41 For instance, article 18.5 of the PSC between Bangladesh and Cairn Energy, 1995 provides that 
PetroBangla shall assume, pay and discharges on behalf of contractor, contractor's Bangladesh Income 
Taxes out of the sums received by PetroBangla from the sale or other disposition of the PetroBangla's 
share of Petroleum under the contract. See, PSC between the Government of Bangladesh and Bangladesh 
011, Gas and Mineral Corporation and Cairn Energy, PLC Holland Sea Search Bangladesh B. V., 1995 
Bangladesh Block 15, Barrows supplement (Asia and Australasia), No. 145, p. 18,52. 
201 
fiscal regime characterised by indifference to petroleum deposits may lead to frequent 
changes in the fiscal terms and conditions as well as taxation law. Over the years, such 
flexibility has been introduced both in physical parameters (sliding scale mechanism) in 
relation to different field size, production level and costs on the one hand; and in 
external disciplining (stabilisation clause) of taxation laws and policy of a country on 
the other. These flexible devices designed both in the contractual provisions and in the 
tax laws and policy and forbidding change of taxation laws simply demonstrate how to 
cope with uncertainty and risk in the petroleum industry. The experience of petroleum 
producing developing countries suggests that a stable fiscal regime should be premised 
on the following fundamental factors: firstly; a balance between adequate government 
take and a fair return to the private investors, commensurate with the risks they have 
taken; secondly, a balance between fiscal tenns and geographical potential of a 
particular petroleum development venture; thirdly, a flexible fiscal system should help 
in reducing the possibility of political risk to unilateral change of contract tenns. The 
stability mechanisms in the fiscal regime of modem petroleum contracts have not only 
been directed towards a legitimate interest of companies from the project, but also in 
ensuring an equitable division of profits for the host governments of deve oping 
countries from the exploitation of their natural resources. 
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PART Three 
Environmental, Social and Human Risks in Petroleum 
Industry: Risk Management and Preventive Strategies 
203 
This PART deals with two different kinds of new risks that the petroleum industry is 
encountering today. They are: enviromnental regulation and liability risk with added 
costs to petroleum operations; envirom-nental and social conflict between companies 
and indigenous people/host community arising from negative social and environmental 
impacts and human rights concerns of the operations. While the fon-ner is initiated by 
the host government and is driven by the public interest goal, the latter is derived from 
the negative impact of the operation on society and community and consequent actions 
of the host community. Chapter six addresses the question of how legal and regulatory 
change of the environmental regime of the host country affects contract stability. 
Chapter seven discusses the non-conventional political risks in the petroleum sector. It 
highlights how demands for integration of social and human rights issues into petroleum 
law and policy pose challenges to contract stability as failure to address them can 
generate conflict between the company and host communities. Social and human rights 
concerns are given relatively scant attention partly due to the lack of understanding of 
these aspects by the parties, and partly because legal regime of petroleum operations is 
primarily concerned with ownership and revenue generation issues rather than the social 
concerns of the operations. It is found that long-term survival of a petroleum project 
depends on its social acceptability to the stakeholders and in this regard, the company's 
socially responsible operation is not only essential for sustainability of the project but 
also for enhancing its reputation. 
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Chapter 6 
Environmental Regulatory and Liability Risk: Stability of Petroleum 
Contract and Risk Management Strategies 
1. Introduction 
Environmental protection was a neglected issue for a long time in the petroleum 
development in the developing countries. But heightened global environmental 
awareness, public concern about the environmental consequences of petroleum 
exploitation and the emergence of sustainable development as a paradigm shift with, as 
one of its core elements the optimal and sustainable exploitation and use of natural 
resources for the well-being of future generations have led to a change of perception 
among developing countries and economies in transition about the urgency of 
environmental protection in petroleum development since the late 1980s. 1 This change 
of attitude has been reflected in the petroleum industry through increased integration of 
environmental concerns into laws and policy on petroleum development in these 
countries. 
It is axiomatic that petroleum exploration and development can produce a 
negative impact on environment, public health, and the safety of local population and 
employees of the companies. Growing concerns about these negative environmental 
impacts of petroleum operations coupled with increased public demands for 
environmental perfon-nance by the companies have resulted in a proliferation of 
1 The concept of sustainable development has three major consequences on petroleum and mining 
industry: First, the definition of environmental concerns was expanded to include the diverse social, 
cultural, economic and environmental impacts mining projects have on local inhabitants; second 
consequence is reflected in changing decision making process in the petroleum and mining industries. 
Thirdly, traditional valuation method of project has changed and the valuation method is now based on 
moral and community and environmental consideration rather than fully on economic consideration of 
material consumption. John A. Cordes, "Mining and the Environment: Driving forces for Change, 
industry and Environment", Oct. -1997, Vol. 20, No. 4, LTNEP, p. 26. See also, Jay G. Martin, 
Sustainable Development. - Impacts of Current Trends on Oil and Gas Development, 24 Journal of Land 
Resources and Environmental Law, (2004), pp. 257-275. 
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environmental and safety legislation for regulating the petroleum industry across the 
developing world and economies in transition. The phenomenal growth of 
environmental regulation and the imposition of liability intended to prevent 
environmental pollution have posed significant challenges to the petroleum companies 
as they may increase operating costs of petroleum projects significantly, which was not 
contemplated at the time the contract was concluded. The change of regulatory or 
liability regime that may affect the economic equilibrium of a petroleum project brings 
a new dimension to political risks perception of the company. This requires some 
investigation into how the tension of potential conflict between the concern for stability 
of contract and enviromnental legal risks of change in the regulatory and liability 
regime can be resolved. 
The chapter sets out to investigate how environmental regulatory change and the 
imposition of liability in the developing countries and economies in transition can affect 
the economic viability of a petroleum project undermining its stability. It attempts to 
focus on the prevailing environmental regulatory conditions in both developing 
countries and economies in transition and explains some of the underlying reasons for 
the current instability and uncertainty surrounding the environmental regime of these 
countries. 
The chapter attempts to identify the main potential environmental legal and 
regulatory risks in the petroleum industry and examines their legal implications for 
contract stability. It also examines the legal relationship between environmental 
regulatory change and stabilisation clauses in order to determine whether the presence 
of a contractual stabilisation guarantee can counter the host govenunent's power to 
adopt ex post enviromnental regulation. 
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2 The Current State of Play of Environmental Regulation 
2.1 The Developing Countries 
Environmental problems differ from region to region. However, irrespective of this 
difference, most of the developing countries adopted environmental legislation during 
the 1990s following the model of command and control for the common objective of 
environmental protection. Under this approach, the goverriments establish performance 
standards for the polluter and uniform technology based controls for certain types of 
activities causing pollution .2 Developing countries generally oppose stringent 
environmental regulation on the apprehension that compliance with the higher standards 
required by such regulation would put them in a competitively disadvantaged position 
in attracting foreign investment against goveniments with no such regulation. 3 This 
situation is changing with respect to many developing countries with their greater 
commitment to sustainable development and international environmental noirins. 
The environmental regulations in developing countries cannot be put in a 
uniform pattern. Rather an uneven level of envirom-nental liability rules and requirement 
of enviromnental standards is discernible. This can be explained by the fact that the 
degree of environmental standards and the level of environmental obligations in a given 
country are primarily determined by domestic political preferences and interests, the 
level of pollution, and the degree of environmental awareness, which can vary 
significantly among the countries. The environmental regulation of developing 
countries tends to be more unpredictable and unstable than those of developed countries 
for the following reasons: 
Firstly, many developing countries have adopted only framework envirom-nental 
laws laying down basic legal principles, starting with a declaratory statement of national 
2 See, Nell Gunningham, Peter Grabosky, and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, (1998), p. 4 -7. 
3 See Richard B. Stewart, "Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness", 102 Yale Law 
Journal, (1993), 203 9. 
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envirom-nental policies with the broader aim of environmental protection. A framework 
environmental law establishes the national environmental authority and allocates 
responsibilities among government agencies and deals with pollution prevention in 
general term. 4 The generality involved in framework legislation suggests that these are 
intended to be supplemented by more specific regulatory mechanisms in the near future 
with environmental needs identified, which in turn adds unpredictability and uncertainty 
to the environmental law making. 
Secondly, many developing countries have recently incorporated environmental 
protection as a fundamental human right in their constitutions. The environinental 
provisions of the constitution oblige the government to undertake adequate protection 
5 for the environment and to provide the citizens the right to a healthy environment. The 
elevation of environmental concerns to constitutional status has the following important 
legal consequences: firstly, States will be required to enact more enviromnental 
legislation and to develop policy regarding environmental protection. Secondly, the 
judiciary can interpret the environmental provisions widely as a State's constitutional 
duty to protect enviromnental rights of its citizens. Thirdly, NGOs and civil society 
groups may exert pressure on the governments to develop coherent environmental 
policy in the light of constitutional provision on the public policy ground. 
Thirdly, the environmental regimes in developing countries tend to be 
contradictory because in many cases their environmental laws are based on a 
transplantation of a western model, which often takes place as a fulfilment of the 
environmental conditionality of the international donor agencies and financial 
4 See for instance framework environmental law of Indian Environment Protection Act 1986, Bangladesh 
Environment Conservation Act 1995 and Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997. See, the aspect of 
framework environmental legislation in the Latin American countries. Lawrence J. Jensen, 
"Environmental Regulation in Latin America: A Rapidly Changing Legal Framework", 8 Natural 
Resources and Environment, (1993), p. 23,25. ("It is clear, however, that the framework laws portend an 
era of rapid and significant change in the number, type, and quality of regulations and in the regulatory 
climate in general on environmental matters in Latin America. "), p. 25. 
5 For example, see Constitution of Panama, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Mexico, Brazil, India, and Nigeria. 
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institutions as a part of the requirement of project financing in the developing countries. 
The environmental regulation modelled on those of developed countries is highly 
unlikely to be effective in the socio-econornic, legal and institutional settings of the 
developing countries and the cost of implementation of those regulations in the 
developing countries could be significantly higher. The developing countries often lack 
the necessary financial support, institutional capacity, technology and expertise to 
enforce such imported laws and standards. 6 Realising these impediments, developing 
countries may substitute these regulations by new ones that are workable in social, 
political and cultural fabric of the developing countries. 
Fourthly, sometimes the environmental regulation of developing countries tends 
to be formulated as a reaction to a major industrial pollution or disaster, rather as a 
genuine and systematic response to the need for environmental protection. 
Environmental regulation may also arise in reaction to industry practices, which may 
seem to be unsustainable to the host state. This emergency based and ad hoc 
environmental regulation can result in excessive costs, or contradictory requirements 
within the same legislative framework, and create confusion in the whole regulatory 
process. As a result, this may prompt subsequent rectification by the new legislation. 
2.2 The Economies in Transition 
The environmental regime in economies in transition reveals a complex relationship 
between the social and political change that the region is currently experiencing and the 
need for legal and regulation to keep pace with such changing social and political 
processes. The environmental regulatory development in the transition economies must 
6 See also, David Nelson, "The Increasingly Diverse Global Environmental Agenda Will Sign1ificantly 
Impact Current and Future Mining Operations", in: International Oil, Gas and Mining Development in 
Latin America, 5 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, (1994), p. 13A(l). 
7 See, Ayesha Dias, "The Oil and Gas Industry in the Tangled Web of Environmental Regulation: Spider 
or Fly? " in Zhiguo Gao, (ed), Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas, Kluwer Law International, 
London (1998), pp. 55-92. 
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respond to an unprecedented rate of political, economic and social change taking place 
there. Thus, environmental regulatory change in these countries can be well understood 
in terms of a broader process of social, economic, and political transformation that is 
undergoing there. In the communist era, in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
environmental problems were regulated by central planning, and command and control 
regulation; and enviromnental protection badly suffered due to centralised 
bureaucracies, the prioritizing other social goods over environment, and suppression of 
civil societies. As a result, popular dissatisfaction with the environmental and health 
problems in the communist regime was one of the important factors that helped to 
mobilise the political movement for democratic reform, which brought down 
communist regimes. 8 
After the political transformation, these countries are adopting both command 
and control regulation and economic instruments as a means of prevention of 
environmental pollution. However, the ongoing economic, social and political reforin 
process makes environmental regulation in these countries into one of the most unstable 
and an unpredictable area of law making activities that is also affecting the petroleum 
industry. This can be further explained by the following factors: 
Firstly, the political transformation in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
European has had important implications for environmental movements in this region. It 
led to growing public awareness of ecological problems, which were previously 
suppressed under the authoritarian character of the communist regime. 9 In the post 
communist era, the environmental movement for better conditions for the environment, 
health and safety is being translated into revision of existing envirom-nental regulations, 
a reforming of constitutions including the constitutional right to a healthy environment, 
8 See, Petr Pavlinek and John Pickles, Environmental Transitions. - Transformation and Ecological 
Defence in Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge, London and New York, (2000), p. 6,20. 
9 Piotr Jasinski, Environmental Regulation in the Process of Systematic Transformation, in: Plotr Jasinski 
and Helen Lawton Smith (eds), Environmental Regulation in Transforming Economies. - The Case for 
Poland, Ashgate, Aldershot, (1999), pp. 3-30. 
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and a proliferation of new environmental legislation and an emergence of a large 
number of environmental pressure groups and environmental NGOs in the region. 
Secondly, the political transformation in these countries was accompanied by a 
decentralisation movement that led to a consequent shift from central planning to local 
planning. The political movement of decentralisation and its resultant restructuring of 
local government as a form of self-government has important consequences for 
environmental protection. From the early 1990s the local govenu-nents have emerged as 
central actors in environmental regulation and pollution control of industrial activities 
those of petroleum industry. But in many instances, the reform of political units of 
government is carried out without proper apportionment of environmental responsibility 
regarding enforcement and environmental liability between local governments, and 
central governments. This problem mainly stems from the divergent environmental 
interests that different political units intend to pursue. While federal or central units try 
to bring uniformity to the standard of environmental regulation, local governments are 
interested in preserving the environment in their own ways. This divergence of 
enviromuental interests, lack of proper allocation of obligation on envirom-nental 
protection between the central and local authorities, and the growing involvement of 
local government in the extractive industry that often leads to a contradictory approach 
in environmental legislation, and are contributing to the overall instability in the 
environmental regime of the petroleum contract. 
Thirdly, the economies in transition are facing a challenge to make the legal 
structure and legal rules market-friendly and compatible with a free market economy. 
The political and economic transformation requires the reform of existing institutions, 
redefining the role of governments in the changed context and making economic 
policies and strategies compatible with a market economy. This also demands an 
overhaul of environmental laws and the refonn of environmental regulatory agencies. 
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As a result, these countries are developing new environmental legislation or updating 
existing legislation in an effort to make them compatible with the needs of emerging 
market economies. 
3. Organising an Environmental Regime for Petroleum Operations 
The environmental regime for petroleum operations normally takes a mainly regulatory 
or contractual approach or both. The environmental regulation in the petroleum industry 
is usually premised on the necessity to regulate petroleum operation in order to prevent 
its negative impact on the environment. The environmental regime of petroleum 
operation in a country can be governed either by an integrated legislative approach or a 
sectoral approach. The integrated legislative approach deals with environmental issues 
applicable to all sectors including the petroleum industry and provides a central 
institutional framework to ensure management and to attain a national environmental 
standard. 
On the other hand, the sectoral approach includes specific environmental 
legislation on petroleum operations. A sectoral approach that consolidates all relevant 
provisions in various national laws and covers all the enviromnental aspects of 
petroleum operations and delineates the environmental obligations of the petroleum 
companies clearly, is seen as the most desirable means for the avoiding of 
inconsistency, uncertainty and confusion in the petroleum environmental regulatory 
framework. 10 The sectoral approach to environmental legislation in the petroleum 
industry is necessitated by the fact that very often, the environmental regulatory regime 
of petroleum contracts in many of the developing countries tends to be broad as the 
environmental aspect of petroleum operations is not only to be regulated by the 
petroleum laws and contractual provisions, but also by the number of other 
10See, Zhiguo Gao, "Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: An 
Introduction and Overview", in: Zhiguo Gao, (ed), supra note 7, p. 39. 
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environmental laws such as planning laws, envirom-nental impact assessment, air and 
water pollution laws, marine pollution law, land use law, health and safety laws, 
national heritage protection laws, forest protection laws. Given this complex web of 
envirom-nental laws and their relevance to the petroleum operations combined with the 
possibility that government can change these laws, the environmental regime of 
petroleum contracts tends to be unstable and uncertain. This bewildering set of 
environmental laws often overlaps, and may be contradictory in their enforcement, 
which can create inconsistency and confusion in the regulatory approach. Against this 
background, there is a growing trend among the developing countries regarding the 
necessity of drafting specific environmental regulations for the petroleum and mining 
sector. The sectoral environmental regulations governing the petroleum industry 
provide for, inter alia, the system of pen-nit and license, requirements of environniental 
impact assessment and general performance standards for the petroleum operations by 
the petroleum companies, environmental management plan, rehabilitation programme, 
and establishment of an environmental department for the oversight of the enforcement 
of enviromnental regulation. " The sectoral approach should be preferred to integrated 
approach for bringing certainty in the regulatory activities. 
Secondly, petroleum contracts may contain provisions relating to environmental 
protection and obligations of the contractors to comply with environmental laws and 
regulations of the host state. The contractual provisions on the envirom-nent generally 
express policy expectations and regulatory requirements of the host country for the 
protection of the environment. A petroleum contract with comprehensive environmental 
protection provisions and well-defined environmental liability can help the companies 
to avoid compliance with cumbersome general legislative measures. From the 
11 See, Regulation of Equatorial Guinea, 1996 to the Petroleum Code (Decree Law 7/198 1) Barrows 
supplement (South and Central Africa), no. 144, p. 143-154; Environmental Regulations for Hydrocarbon 
in Ecuador, dated 2 February (Executive Decree 1215), Barrows supplement (South America), No. 154, 
p. 37. 
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companies' perspective, contractual regulation allows potentially burdensome 
environmental standards to be set forth in precise tenus which can make their 
environmental obligations calculable and certain. 12 An overlapping should be carefully 
avoided between contractual obligations and statutory obligations. 
But petroleum contracts began to address the enviroinmental issue with the 
incorporation of explicit provisions for environmental management of petroleum 
operation only in the early 1980s, albeit they imposed only general enviromental 
obligations upon the companies. ' 3 However, in contrast to petroleum contracts of the 
1980s, the environmental provisions of petroleum contracts of the 1990s impose a wider 
range of and relatively stricter obligations upon the IOCs such as the promotion of 
conservation of petroleum resources, preventive or precautionary measures to protect 
the envirorunent, the employment of the most advanced technology for the prevention 
of environmental damage, measures to prevent pollution and damage, remedial 
measures to mitigate environmental damage, carrying out environmental impact study 
and so on. 
The environmental obligations under petroleum contracts vary considerably 
across the developing countries given their need to attract foreign investment, the level 
of pollution and the degree of public awareness about the environment. For instance, 
Thailand's petroleum contract is silent about environmental protection and only require 
the company to exercise due diligence and carry out operations with good petroleum 
industry practice, 14 Bangladesh's model contract merely addresses environmental 
protection as a general obligation of the contractor without elaborating any specific 
12 Fabian von Schlabrendorff, "Environmental Provisions", in: Erich Schanze, et al (ed), Mining Ventures 
in Developing Countries, Kluwer, (1981), p. 213. 
13 Zhiguo Gao, "International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: A Comprehensive 
Envirom-nental Appraisal", 12 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, No. 2, (1994), pp. 240-56. 
According to him, environmental concerns were not accommodated and expressed in earlier concession 
agreements concluded in the first half of this century simply because lack of environmental consciousness 
and environmental impact of natural resource development. 
14 Thailand concession agreement No. 7/2539/54 awarded to Anschutz (Thailand) Company Ltd. 15 
November, 1996, Barrows supplement (Asia and Australasia) No. 153, p. 90. 
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standard regarding environmental performance. 15 This generality regarding 
environmental obligation provide no guidance to the companies as to their appropriate 
level of regulatory compliance. However, it is generally assumed by the use of 
expression of 'due diligence' or 'good industry petroleum industry practice' that 
company should adopt reasonable and objective standards such as good oil field 
practice in matters relating to the technology and operating practices which are 
internationally accepted standards in petroleum exploration. ' 6 Non-compliance with 
these standards may bring liability for companies. 
Some countries impose stricter environmental obligations in petroleum 
contracts. For example, a concession agreement of Ghana provides that contractor shall 
conduct petroleum operations in accordance with accepted petroleum industry practice 
and comply with national laws governing labour, health, safety and environrnental laws 
and regulation. 17 Similarly, the model concession agreement of Brazil lays down that 
company shall carry out petroleum operations in accordance with national legislation 
and rules about environment and in the absence or lack of national legislation, adopt oil 
industry best practice-' 8 
Several developing countries and economies in transition adopted more specific 
environmental standards and comprehensive environmental obligations with respect to 
environmental protection in conducting petroleum operations-combining both national 
and international standards, and industry guidelines. For instance, the service contract of 
Iran states that petroleum operation should be undertaken in accordance with the highest 
applicable standards of safety, health, and environmental sensitivity and performance 
standards should meet both applicable international laws and regulations, and national 
15 See, article 10.6 of the Model PSC of Bangladesh, 1997. 
16 "Good oil field practice means all those practices which are generally accepted as safe, economical and 
efficient in exploring for and exploiting petroleum. " Seee, K. W. Blinn, et al, Petroleum Exploration and 
Exploitation Arrangements, (Barrows Co., New York, 1986), p. 37. 
17 Ghana Model Petroleum Contract, 2001, Barrows supplement (South and Central Africa), No. 157, p. 
103. 
18 Model ANP Concession Agreement of Brazil, 2001, Barrows supplement (South America), No. 147, p. 
54. 
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laws and regulations. 19 A petroleum contract of Kazakhstan states that the conduct of 
petroleum operations will be in accordance with-(i) all applicable environmental, health 
and safety law of the host state, (ii) the principles and procedure in the Operator's 
Internal Management system; (iii) international obligations of the Republic as may be 
identified by the Republic from time to time regarding environmental protection, 
including International Good Oil field practice; and (iv) the highest reasonable 
international guidelines for environmental protection. 20 
From the above review, it is clear that environmental provisions in petroleum 
contracts are increasingly becoming more stringent and imposing stricter performance 
standards for the companies. Beside from the contractual and regulatory environmental 
obligation, or in case of contractual or regulatory vacuum, it is more likely that 
companies will accept oil and gas industry-specific guidelines of "best practices", as 
well as general industry guidelines developed by the international petroleum 
organisations or other standard organisations under pressure of project financiers or 
voluntarily to manage environmental risks and improve environmental perforniance. 21 
This soft law prescription on environmental obligation of petroleum companies is 
increasingly supplementing contractual and regulatory regime and contributing to the 
evolving global environmental standards for the petroleum exploration. 
4. Environmental Legal Risks in Petroleum Industry: Causes and Consequences 
Before analysing enviromnental. risks in detail, it is pertinent to discuss the concept of 
environmental costs, which is bound up the notion of environmental risk. Compliance 
with environmental regulation of petroleum operations clearly entails additional costs 
'9 Article 33 of Model Service Contract of Iran, 1999, Barrows supplement (Middle East) No. 145, p. 33. 
20 Article 25.2 PSC between Kazakhstan and Agip/BP/Etal dated November 1997 (In respect of the North 
Caspian Sea (Kashagan) Barrows supplement (Russia and NIS) No. 39, p. 66 
21 Some examples of industry guidelines on the environment are: Exploration and Production Forurn, 
International Association of Geophysical Contractors, national petroleum industry associations such as 
the American Petroleum Institute; general industry guidelines of International Chamber of Commerce. 
See, Kit Armstrong, Managing Environmental Legal Risks in Oil and Gas exploration and Production 
Activities, in: Zhiguo Gao, (ed), supra note 7, pp. 367-370; 
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for the companies. Indeed, the environmental cost of a petroleum operation is a major 
factor to be taken into consideration by foreign investors. The environmental costs of 
petroleum operations include compliance with environmental legislation, insurance 
costs to cover blow out and environmental damages, requirements of offshore 
abandonment and decommissioning, implementation of standards of best practice set by 
the intemational organisations, the cost of hazardous waste disposal, and the cost of 
environmental impact assessment, operational environmental management, and 
mitigation and monitoring programmes. Many of these environmental requirements can 
be imposed at the performance stage of the contract, which can significantly increase 
the economic burden for the company. 
From its qualitative aspects, environmental costs have been broadly classified 
into three categories: (1) potentially hidden costs that can result either from activities 
undertaken to comply with environmental law or voluntary costs beyond regulatory 
compliance. (2) Contingent costs- those costs which may or may not be incurred in the 
future, such as the most cost of remedying and compensating for future accidental 
pollution. (3) Image and relationship costs- those costs incurred to affect the subjective 
perception of stakeholders, such as the costs of annual envirom-nental reports and 
community relation activities. 22 
In view of the fact that environmental regulatory compliance is now a common 
phenomenon, the companies usually try to predict the environmental costs that they 
have to eventually bear in complying with environmental regulation and contractual 
stipulation on enviromnental protection. A reasonable degree of certainty 
in 
environmental cost is considered essential by the companies for the assessment of 
economic viability of a given petroleum project. 
22 See, Zherrun Wang, "Integrafing Enviromnental Considerations into Strateg1c Cap'tal Decisions", Vol. 
47, No. 3, Oil, Gas and Energy Quarterly, (1999), p. 587,594-95. 
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Environmental risk in the petroleum industry can be broadly classified into two 
categories: ex post regulatory risk and environmental liability risk. There are also 
ancillary risks that ensue from these two main kinds of risks mentioned above. 
4.1 Regulatory Risk 
In recent times, while the petroleum companies demonstrated their readiness to accept 
the obligations of compliance with environmental regulation, their main concern has 
rather been with unpredictability in environmental regulation that introduces an 
unexpected change towards a higher standard. 23 Ex post regulation can increase 
uncertainty in measuring environmental costs during the performance of the contract 
through the imposition of new standards for environmental protection, which can appear 
quite surprising to the companies. One of the important features of ex post 
environmental regulation is that it tends to be more stringent than the earlier one. 
Compliance with this new environmental legislation not contemplated at the time of 
making the agreement can delay the project operation or increase the costs of operations 
that can diminish the expected rate of return. The proliferation of environmental 
regulations creates not only considerable uncertainty as to the scope of such legislation 
on petroleum operations but also increases the possibility of companies' exposure to 
new liability for petroleum operations. In this way, unpredictability in environmental 
regulation and environmental criteria and procedure is considered now one of the most 
important sources of political risk in the petroleum industry. 
The environmental regulatory change can cause the following risks in the 
petroleum industry: firstly, non-compliance with or violation of the existing regulation 
or ex post enviromnental regulation can result in delay or rejection of the project, 
23 Gaetan Verhoosel, "Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic Environmental 
Policies: Striking a "Reasonable" Balance between Stability and Change", 29 Law and Policy in 
International Business (1998), p. 451,478. 
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suspension of operation or revocation of contract . 
24 Secondly, non-compliance with 
regulation can cause the loss of corporate reputation in the eyes of stakeholders. 
Thirdly, it is widely accepted that compliance with ex post environmental regulation 
may decrease investors' cash flow, which may affect the projected rate of return. 
The reasons causing ex post enviromnental regulatory change affecting the 
petroleum industry in the developing countries and economies in transition can be 
explained by the following factors: 
Firstly, environmental laws regulating petroleum industry in the developing and 
transitional countries are rapidly changing. Absence of well-developed environmental 
law, or generality and vagueness in the environmental provisions of investment or 
petroleum law at the time of the conclusion of the contract may be subsequently filled 
up or up dated by new or specific legislation during the performance of the contract to 
address evolving environmental standards or new sources of environmental degradation. 
Secondly, environmental law is one of the most rapidly growing bodies of 
international law and the impact of the changing landscape of international 
environmental law is also evident in national jurisdiction, which is contributing to the 
current environmental regulatory instability in many countries affecting petroleum 
contracts. With the state's undertaking of new international obligations towards 
environmental protection, new legislation may be enacted, which comes into conflict 
with existing agreements. 
Thirdly, the risk of ex post environmental regulation also occurs by the finding 
of the new scientific evidence and knowledge about the effect of the petroleum 
operations on the enviromnent. Consequently, new regulation can be adopted on the 
basis of new information on the effects of petroleum operations. Sometimes, new 
technologies may be required to be introduced entailing unexpected economic cost. 
24 For example, article 48(e) of the Supreme Decree no. 046-93 of Peru, which provides that non- 
II result in suspension 'for compliance or violation of Peruvian Petroleum environmental regulations wil 
I month, 2months, 3 months, or for good. ' 
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International environmental law tends to incorporate these evolving technical standards 
regarding environment and safety. As a result, it is expected that the host government 
will undertake new environmental law or modify the existing environmental law to 
incorporate these evolving scientific and technical standards. Contractual provisions 
may also need to be modified to respond to such new norms and standards. 
Fourthly, petroleum contracts of many developing countries and economies in 
transition stipulate that petroleum operations are to be conducted in accordance with 
present and future applicable laws governing safety, protection of public health and 
protection of the enviromnent. 25 This contractual stipulation of possibility of application 
of future regulation or international environmental standard to petroleum industry may 
give rise to ex post environmental regulatory risk by allowing the host government to 
enact environmental legislation without any legal constraints. 
4.2 Environmental Liability Risks 
Environmental liability has emerged as a main instrument to combat environmental 
pollution. Enviromnental liability refers to the future enviroinmental costs that should be 
paid for damaging the environment by those that cause damage. Environmental liability 
and change of liability regime is considered now a major risk factor in the petroleum 
industry. Usually, the companies may incur liability to pay compensation to the 
govemment authority or third party for enviromnental damage to the private property 
caused by the operation of the project. The main consequence of envirom-nental liability 
is that companies may be exposed to litigation for payment of damages to the affected 
25 Article 27.1 of Model PSC of Azerbaijan, 1999, Barrows supplement (Russia and CIS) see, p. 75; 
article 29.4 of the Monument Resources Production Sharing Agreement of Turkmenistan, 1998, Barrows 
supplement (Russia and NIS) No. 33, p. 82; see article xviii (b)of the Concession agreement of 2002 for 
Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation between Egypt and the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation 
and Dover Investments Limited, Barrows supplement (North Africa) No. 143, p. 62; article 25.2 of PSC 
between Kazakhstan and Agip/BP/Etal dated November 1997 (In respect of the North Caspian Sea 
(Kashagan) Barrows supplement (Russia and NIS) No. 39, p. 66. 
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persons; and defending of litigation and excessive claims can entail them additional 
costs. 
From the companies' perspective, ascertaining the extent of their environmental 
liability as clearly as possible prior to the commencement of the project is essential for 
quantifying and determining environmental cost. Therefore, petroleum companies often 
demand that envirom-nental liability rules for causing damage by the petroleum 
operation should be certain and sufficiently predictable so that they can assess the 
environmental costs beforehand. Unpredictability surrounding the assessment and 
quantification of environmental liability risks can act not only as a major deterrent 
factor for future investment in the petroleum industry but also cause uncertainty in the 
environmental cost for the existing operations. 26 As a consequence of a company's 
incurring environmental liability, their reputation may be seriously damaged and as a 
result, they may be denied access to the international capital market, their securities may 
be devalued by lenders or credit payments may be delayed. 
The liability risk can be statutory, contractual and residual in nature. 
4.2.1 Statutory Liability Risk 
It arises from a breach of environmental laws or relevant provisions of petroleum law on 
envirom, nental protection. Sometimes, ex post environmental regulatory change can be 
accompanied by retroactive liability or risk of a change of liability standards. Statutory 
liability may take the form of a civil or criminal in character. While civil liability is a 
commonplace in most of the legal systems, criminal liability which treats environmental 
degradation as a crime is increasingly practised in many developing countries. While 
civil liability is exacted through compensation or administrative charges, criminal 
26 A recent World Bank report indicates that the top 100 multinational firms rank the uncertainty of 
envirom-nental liability as one of the top disincentives to investment *in transitional economies. See, 
Deborah K. Espinosa, "Environmental Regulation of Russia's Offshore Oil and Gas Industry and Its 
Implications for the International Petroleum Market", 6 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, (1997), p. 
647,679. 
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liability may be realised through criminal sanctions such as punitive fines and 
imprisonment for individual violators. 
The possibility that a company can be implicated in several liabilities prescribed 
under different statutes for a single environmental damage, can be a significant risk 
factor to economic viability of a project as multiplied costs may be imposed on it in 
such cases. For instance, under Russian law, where different kinds of liability e. g. civil, 
administrative, and criminal liability are scattered in different legislations and codes, 
and may be imposed for a single environmental violation, this remains a great concern 
for the investor in the petroleum sector. 27 
4.2.2 Contractual Liability Risk 
Most of the petroleum contracts contain provision on civil liability for environmental 
pollution and require the companies to pay compensation for injury or damage caused to 
property of private persons. Many petroleum contracts impose strict liability without 
defining environmental damage in clear terms. As a result, this may give rise to a 
problem relating to establishing the threshold of identifying and quantifying liability for 
the determination of compensation. Therefore, contract should define environmental 
damage in clear terms in order to determine the extent of liability clearly. 
Usually, the contractual liability arises in the following manner: 
Firstly, a company's failure to fulfil the contractual requirement of strict 
compliance with environmental obligations under the development plan and 
environmental laws can give rise to their liability to provide compensation. 28 Secondly, 
many petroleum contracts lay down specific consequences for the failure of the 
27 John F. Sheedy, "Envirom-nental Liability under Russian PSA and Subsurface Licensing Regimes Slow 
to Change", Russian Petroleum Investor, June/July 2001, p. 54. 
28 For instance, several countries' contracts impose strict compliance obligation. See, Article 31.1 of 
Model PSC of Mozambique (Bid Round 2000), Barrows supplement (South and central Africa) No. 146, 
p. 77; article 24.1 of the Production sharing contract between China National Petroleum Corporation and 
Shell Exploration (China) Limited, 9 August 1996, Barrows supplement (Asia and Australasia) no. 142, 
p. 59. 
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companies to comply with the environmental obligations enumerated in the contract. 
For example, a failure by the companies to undertake remedial measures in case of 
envirom-nental pollution may result in discontinuance of petroleum operations 29 or non- 
compliance with the environmental requirements under the contract may give discretion 
to the host state to suspend the petroleum operations. 30 Thirdly, in some countries, 
petroleum contracts provide that when a failure to comply with the environmental 
requirements under contract by the company results in pollution or damage, the 
contractor is under an obligation to control the pollution and to undertake remedial 
measures for mitigation of damages. The failure of the company concerned to undertake 
such remedial measures where pollution results from its gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct, shall result in incurring its liability to pay the cost of clean-up and repair 
activities, which would otherwise be included as a petroleum cost under the 
31 
agreemen . 
Thus, the contractual liabilities of companies have significant implications on 
the stability of contract ranging from obligation of payment of compensation to closure 
of the operations. 
4.2.3 Residual Liability Risk 
The issue of residual liabilities has emerged as one of the significant risk factors for the 
petroleum companies in recent times. Residual liability arises when a new company 
faces environmental liability for the operations of the previous company operating in 
the same site, which has pulled out or transferred its operation into another company or 
when the company becomes liable for damage that may occur after 
it completes its 
29Article 29.4 Model PSC of Turkmenistan 1999 Barrows supplement (Russia and NIS), No. 36, p. 99. 
30 Article 7 of PSC dated January 1997 between Qatar and Atlantic Richfield 
Company (Qatar) Inc., 
Gulfstrearn Resources Limited, British Gas Exploration and Production Limited, and Wintershall 
(offshore block 11), Barrows supplement (Middle East) No. 147, p. 96. 
31 Article 17.5 of Ghana Model Contract, 2001, Barrows supplement (South and Central Africa), 
No. 157, 
p. 104; Article 31.6 of Model PSC of Mozambique (Bid Round 
2000), Barrows supplement (South and 
Central Africa) No. 146, p. 78. 
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activities under the agreement. The latter may arise from unremoved installations and 
structures after the abandonment or if the company fails to act in accordance with 
national laws or contractual provision or in the absence of regulatory or contractual 
provision, has failed to carry out decommissioning and abandonment in line with 
current international guidelines and standards. The possibility that hidden or past 
damage may be revealed after the companies have invested in the project is a matter of 
great concem to them. 
In the economies in transition, the practice of imposition of retroactive civil 
liability for damage caused by past operators has emerged as one of the destabilising 
factors in investment in the petroleum sector. Such residual liability to finance 
remediation of contaminated sites can involve significant costs for a company and add 
uncertainty to the calculation of environmental costs. 32 This uncertainty can be largely 
eliminated by a clear contractual provision regarding the allocation of past liability for 
environmental damage. 
33 
4.3 Arbitrary Interpretation of Environmental Law 
Uncertainty prevailing in the developing countries about how existing environmental 
regulation on petroleum operations will be interpreted - can also be a significant source 
of risk for the companies. The growing phenomenon of envirom-nental law making by 
the state judiciary can add uncertainty to the existing environmental regime of the 
contract. Courts often inspired by the constitutional provisions on enviromnental 
32 For instance, in Kazakhstan, the question of liability for past environmental damage has not resolved in 
the existing civil laws or decrees so as to apportion such liability between the past users and present users 
can cause significant difficulty in the petroleum exploration. See, Elena Novikova, "The legal Basis of 
Strategies for Assigning Environmental Obligations between New and Former Users of Natural 
Resources", in: Illias Bantekas, John Paterson and Maiden Suleimenov (eds), Oil and Gas Law in 
Kazakhstan: National and International Perspective, Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 457-467. 
33 See, See, Article 29 of the Monument Resources Production Sharing Agreement of Turkmenistan, 
1998, Barrows supplement (Russia and NIS) No. 33, p. 83. Article 29.2 provides that the contractor shall 
not be liable for environmental damage sustained prior to the commencement of petroleum operation. See 
also, Article 22.2 of Operating Agreement of Venezuela, 29 July 1997 between Corpoven, S. A. and 
Compania General De Combustibles S. A., and Carmanah Resources (Venezuela) Ltd, Barrows 
supplement (South America) No. 144, p. 113. 
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protection or the growing body of international environmental law tend to interpret 
these provisions or provide innovative remedies to the litigants to pursue public interest 
goals. Increasingly public interest groups are stepping into the shoes of public 
authorities in discharging environmental protection, when the latter have not acted to 
prevent environmental damage by petroleum operations. The expansive interpretation of 
environmental law by the domestic courts in such public interest litigations particularly 
in the countries with a common law legal system and the imposition of liability for 
environmental damage may cause delays of the operation or an increase in the costs of 
the operation. Interpretation of national and international environmental law by the 
municipal courts may often be arbitrary and biased affecting the fairness of such 
interpretation. Judicial activism prompted by public interest considerations and a 
consequent injunction or decree for exorbitant compensation or punitive damages to the 
affected community can be a significant risk factor to the petroleum company and halt 
the petroleum operations. 
4.4 Bureaucratic Environmental Decision-making Process 
In many countries, contractors have to obtain approval of different regulatory authorities 
before the development of petroleum projects begins. Such approval process at different 
levels entail obtaining the following kinds of consent: a development consent approving 
the detailed development plans; a planning consent which usually incorporates the 
environmental impact assessment; and operational consent which provides detailed 
information on operational activities, controls and limits, and often specifies the 
enforcement regime. In many developing countries, bureaucratic decision making and 
lack of well defined jurisdiction and coordination among the government agencies 
makes the approval process a complex and difficult task for the investors. 
34 Withholding 
34 See, Environmental Management in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Joint E&P Forum, UNEP 
Technical Publications. London, 1997, p. 25; See also, James D. Murphy, Stuart C. Williams, 
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such consent arbitrarily or delay in giving consent and approval owing to bureaucratic 
decision-making process may cause unnecessary delay in the development of the project 
and add additional costs. Environmental constraints on land access and ministerial and 
administrative discretion in environmental planning and development approvals are also 
discouraging factors to the investors. But more importantly, this bureaucracy in the 
approval process has a bearing on contract equilibrium when the contractor has 
expended considerable funds in compliance with applicable procedures and 
environmental assessments but he is awaiting approval of the project. 
In the operational stage of the contract, the overlapping of jurisdiction of 
different regulatory agencies and the potential for change in the regulatory bodies can 
also affect existing petroleum projects. The duplication of environmental 
responsibilities among the political units, issuance of standards and guidelines from 
different ministries or environmental agencies at their discretion in the absence of 
specific environmental regulation on petroleum industry and enforcement of these 
standards without overall coordination can cause considerable uncertainties for the 
companies in applying an appropriate environmental standard. 
4.5 Inconsistent Enforcement of Environmental Law 
Compliance with environmental standards requires efficient enforcement mechanisms 
including funding, monitoring mechanisms, inspection and fines, strong regulatory 
bodies, imposition of criminal and civil sanctions, insurance, and training of the 
personnel. Many of the petroleum producing developing countries lack the technical 
ability to assess the potential environmental and health problems associated with 
petroleum operations. They also lack adequate resource and expertise, institutional and 
managerial capacity to enforce and implement the environmental laws. Due to these 
"International Environmental Issues and Strategies", in: G. Kronnian, D. Fello , and T. 
0' Connor (eds. ), 
International Oil and Gas Ventures. - A Business Perspective, AAPG, pp. 332-35. 
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factors combined with ambiguity in environmental regulation or liability rules, 
enforcement of environmental law in the developing countries and economies in 
transition tends to be often inconsistent, and emergency and ad hoc based. 35 Lack of a 
coherent policy on enforcement and the scope of discretionary power of the 
envirom-nental agency often lead to arbitrary enf orcement resulting 
unplanned costs and legal consequences that negatively impact investments. 
Enforcement of environmental law in federal states may encounter a special problem 
because in the federal structure of government, a lack of proper apportiomnent of the 
responsibility among the different political units regarding environmental enforcement 
can lead to contradictory enforcement. 
5. Effectiveness of Stabilisation clauses in preventing environmental regulatory 
risks 
The relationship between environmental regulatory change and the stabilisation clause 
is worth investigating because the applicability of stabilisation techniques to prevent 
environmental regulation is often questioned on public interest grounds. Therefore, it is 
necessary to resolve whether stabilisation in stricto sensu comes into conflict with the 
host government's regulatory power of environmental protection. A related question 
arises of whether the stabilisation clause in a strict sense covers environmental 
regulation when it does not explicitly mention it. Closely associated with this issue, 
another question anses- whether the imposition of environmental regulation ex post 
despite a contractual clause of stabilisation constitutes a breach of contract incurring an 
35 See, David Nelson, "The Increasingly Diverse Global Environmental Agenda Will Significantly Impact 
Current and Future Mining Operations", in: International Oil, Gas, and Mining Development in Latin 
America, 5Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, pp. 13A(I to 2) (1994); Emilio J. Cardenas, 
"International Developments Affecting the Exploitation of Natural Resources in Latin America", in: 
International Oil, Gas, and Mining Development in Latin America, 5 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation, at 4-7. 
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obligation on the part of the concerned. host state to pay compensation to the affected 
company. 
It has been argued that the stabilisation clause effectively covers ex post 
environmental measures and hence, ex post environmental legislation during the 
lifetime of an investment project constitutes a breach of contract. 36 But a flurry of 
environmental law making activities in the last decades in petroleum producing 
countries, which have also undertaken stabilisation clauses in their petroleum contracts, 
discards this argument and ex post environmental regulation uncontested by the 
petroleum companies makes the legal protection of a stabilisation clause against 
environmental regulation a myth. Given the evolving international envirom-nental law 
standard and the necessity of protecting the environment from new sources of 
environmental degradation arising from petroleum operations, it is hardly possible to tie 
the state's legislative power to undertake environmental measures for a long time by the 
undertaking of contractual commitments. As a host country may become more 
integrated into international environmental nonris during the life-time of the contract, 
fettering its legislative power on enviromuental protection will have a chilling effect on 
the host government's willingness to meet its environmental obligations under 
international law. In this regard, a contractual obligation can hardly prevent the host 
state from accepting the international obligation regarding envirom-nental protection and 
implementing it through adoption of legislative measures. 
A stabilisation clause as a contractual mechanism to freeze the app ica e 
environmental regulatory framework from the effective date of the agreement means 
that the host state is left without protection against environmental damage caused by the 
petroleum operation if it is not covered by contract or existing legislation. Therefore, a 
36 Gaetan Verhoosel, supra note 23, pp. 456-57. 
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stabilisation clause should not be purported to thwart the host state's legislative power 
for environmental protection. 
In fact, survey of contractual and legislative practice In this regard reveals that 
there is a discernible trend of limiting the scope of stabilisation clauses in transitional 
countries and some developing countries by providing that the contract may be subject 
to changes in domestic laws that regulate national security, defence, ecological security, 
public health and ethics. This practice of exemption of environmental regulation from a 
stabilisation clause simply illustrates the importance of the changing nature of 
envirom-nental law and the urgency of states to adopt environmental regulation 
subsequent to the contract. The investment legislation and petroleum contracts of some 
developing countries and transitional economies exclude environmental regulation 
explicitly from the scope of the stabilisation clause in order to preserve their inherent 
right of legislation in the sphere of environmental law. For example, the Federal Law of 
Russia concerning production-sharing agreements provides that the stability provision 
of this law will not be applicable to the work safety, the natural environment and public 
health, and the protection of subsurface resources. It states: 
"This provision for altering the terms and conditions of the agreement shall not apply in the event that the 
legislation of the Russian Federation introduces changes to standards (norms, rules) for work safety and 
the protection of subsurface resources, the natural enviromnent and public health, including for the 
purposes of bringing them into line with similar standards (norm, rules) which are accepted and generally 
recognised in international practice. 1137 
Similarly, Article 6(3) of the Foreign Investment Law of Kazakhstan of 1995, which 
deals with guarantees from changes in legislation, states that these guarantees will not 
be applicable "to changes in the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the area of 
37 Article 17 of Federal Law 225-FZ 1995 Concerning Production Sharing Agreement as amended by 
Law 19-FZ of 7 January, 1999, Printed in Barrows basic Oil Laws and Contracts, (Russia and NIS), 
Supplement NO. 35, p. 100. 
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ensuring defense potential, national security, in the sphere of ecological safety, public 
,, 38 health, and ethics. 
This exemption of a stability guarantee with regard to environmental legislation 
is also found in contractual practice. For instance, the Model Exploration and PSA of 
Qatar, 1997, that contains an economic stabilisation clause to preserve the economic 
equilibrium of the agreement, exempts environmental regulation from its scope. " The 
main legal implication that follows from such provision is that while economic 
stabilisation envisages compensation for most of the ex post legislative activities 
affecting economic equilibrium of the contract, it does not require the host state to pay 
compensation for ex post legislation protecting health, safety and environment or 
security of the host state. These exceptions to stabilisation clauses which allow changes 
in domestic laws on overriding public interest grounds, signifies that the contractual 
stability guarantee should not act as a barrier in the host government's exercise of 
regulatory power in such areas when the vital interests of states warrant to do so. 
It should be mentioned here that environmental regulation is treated as one of 
the most important legitimate activities of the state, which is usually justified and 
covered by the umbrella of 'public purpose' or 'police power' of the state. Most of the 
developed and developing countries do not recognise the enviromnental regulatory 
taking concept or eminent domain on the premise that environmental protection is one 
of the most important public good and morally superior to any economic value. 
38 Kazakhstan Foreign Investment Law, 20 January, 1995, Bar-rows Basic Oil Laws and Contracts, Russia 
and NIS, supplement no. 35, p. 30. See also, paragraph 2 of article 7 of the Presidential Decree-Law on 
"The Subsurface and Subsurface Use' dated 27 January 1996, amended by RK laws of II may 1999 and 
II August 1999) which says that stability guarantee envisaged in the article for the foreign investors does 
not apply to changes in the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the sphere of ecological safety. 
39 Article 30.3 of the agreement states: "The parties acknowledge that their fiscal position has been based 
on this Agreement and the laws, which are in force in the State of Qatar as of the effective date. The 
Parties agree that in the event that the Government shall enact any new law or decree, which 
demonstrably has a material adverse effect on the contractor's fiscal position with respect to the 
Petroleum Operations, the Government shall take all steps as may be necessary to restore the fiscal 
benefit contemplated to be enjoyed by the parties under this Agreement. Notwithstanding the generality 
of the foregoing or anything to the contrary, the Parties acknowledge that the provisions of this article 
30.3 shall not apply if the new law or decree has been enacted by the Government with the intent of 
protecting health, safety, environment or security. " 1997 Model Exploration and PSA (EPSA), (Block 11), 
Barrows supplement. 150, Middle East, p. 57. 
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International law also recognises the right of governments to implement legitimate 
measures including environmental protection in the exercise of their police powers 
without incuMng an obligation to compensate if such measures diminish the value of 
foreign investment. 40 Thus, the government's inherent power to make environmental 
regulation is premised on the treatment of environmental protection as a 'public good'. 
The government can also enact envirom-nental regulation and control the use of private 
property under the rubric of the "public trust doctrine. 41 The environmental regulation 
articulates public values, and is the important instrument through which a State can 
discharge the important responsibility towards environmental protection. Such 
contention can be further supported by the international law's wide deference towards 
the state's regulatory power in the field of the environment. The State's right to promote 
environirnental objectives and to impose environmental obligations upon multinational 
companies and other non-state actors through regulation is recognised under 
intemational law. 
Envirom, nental protection also occupies a higher moral ground than the sanctity 
of contract. But stabilisation clause intending to prevent a State from environmental 
regulation will amount to a higher level of legal protection for the investment agreement 
than environmental protection. Accordingly, the state's legitimate right to 
environmental regulation has been placed on a higher plane than trade and investment 
promotion. This is fairly evident from the environmental concerns articulated in the 
recent multi-lateral investment treaties. For example, Article 104 of NAFTA provides 
that the provisions of several important international environmental agreements are to 
prevail over any inconsistent obligations in NAFTA. 42 And article 1114 of NAFTA 
40 See, J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29 
Golden Gate University Law Review (1999), 465,537. 
41 Todd J. Zywicki, "Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of 
Environmental Regulation and Reform", 73 Tulane Law Review (1999), p. 845,85 1. 
42 These agreements are the Basel Convention; the Convention on International trade in Endangered 
Species; the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; the Agreement between the 
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states that investment provisions are subject to a requirement of environmental 
protection. 43 Thus, according to NAFTA, environmental and social concerns will 
prevail over the consideration of promotion of trade and investment and environmental 
standards contained in national laws and regulations should not be lowered in order to 
attract an investment. 
6. Strategies for Mitigation of Environmental Risk: Enhancing Stability of 
Petroleum Contracts 
The role of risk assessment in the overall corporate decision-making process and nsk 
management through undertaking various strategies, policies and actions by the 
companies is increasingly emphasised in order to avoid and minimise regulatory and 
44 liability risks in the petroleum industry. Risk assessment signifies that the companies 
should anticipate all potential environmental impacts of a project, identify 
environmental conditions of a project area, and consider the potential environmental 
legal risks to which they may be exposed. On the other hand, the concept of nsk 
management is predominantly concerned with controlling the circumstances that give 
rise to risks. An integrated approach to strategies for risk management in the planning, 
implementation and closure stages of the project is a pre-requisite for reducing the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States Concerning the Trans-boundary 
Movement of Hazardous Waste; and the Agreement between the United States and Mexico on 
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Envirom-nent in the Border area. 
43 For example article 1114 of the NAFTA states: 
1. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a party from adopting, maintaining or 
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this chapter that it considers appropriate to 
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns. 
2. The Parties recogMse that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, 
safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, 
such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its 
territory of an investment of an investor 
44 Risk management has three basic elements-the setting of goals, whether explicitly or implicitly; the 
gathering and interpretation of information, and action to influence human behaviour, to physical 
structures or both. In public policy, 'risk management' has been commonly used to refer to an analytic 
technique for quantifying the estimated risks of a course of action and evaluating those risks against likely 
benefits. See, Risk. - Analysis, Perception and Management, Report of a Royal Society Study Group, 
London, The Royal Society (1992), pp. 136-137. 
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potential scope of environmental risks. A sound environmental risk management 
necessitates a systematic effort on the part of the company to identify regulatory 
requirements and compliance with them, minimising the causes of pollution, emergency 
preparedness, setting internal environmental performance, reviewing environmental 
targets for their continual improvement. In view of the fact that environmental legal 
risks can hardly be resisted by stability guarantees of host states, risk management 
remains an important tool for the companies for avoiding such risks. 
The key elements of environmental risk management in the petroleum industry 
are the following: 
6.1 Exercise of Environmental Due Diligence 
It is a commonplace that a company's failure to exercise due diligence in taking 
measures to prevent pollution can incur environmental liability. The concept of 'due 
diligence' refers to conduct that a reasonable and prudent operator would undertake 
under a particular circumstance. The exercise of due diligence can be an important 
defense against litigation against them arising out of for environmental damage. It can 
also be an important component of risk management and risk reduction strategies, in 
particularly when a contract or regulation does not prescribe strict liability. Even in the 
case of strict liability, proof of due diligence exercised by a company can avoid the 
imposition of excessive compensation or fines for environmental damage. An 
environmental due diligence helps to ensure that petroleum companies have adequately 
identified and assessed the impacts and risks associated with petroleum projects and 
companies have committed to appropriate risk management strategies to deal with 
negative impacts of operations and their compliance with all laws, and contractual 
obligations on environmental protection. 
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Due diligence involves both technical and legal considerations. Since 
enviromnental degradation tends to occur in high cost operations with obsolete 
technology, and inadequate environmental management, a company's application of 
Best Available technology (BAT), Best Enviromuental Practice (BEP) or 'good oil field 
practice' can prevent pollution and subsequent liability. The environmental best practice 
in seismic exploration, land-clearing, and use of best available technology in drilling 
and production, reducing waste such as oil and gas drilling fluids, cuttings, hazardous 
chemicals, and pipelines and reclamation and mitigation, should be deeply embedded in 
the project planning as a part of a due diligence exercise. Similarly, the companies' 
adherence to industry guidelines and standards developed by NGOs, extractive 
industries associations, and international organisations and their integration into the 
companies' risk management strategies can demonstrate their exercise of due diligence 
and at the same time can improve envirom-nental performance. 
6.2 Practice of Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIA has emerged as the most important trend in natural resource development projects. 
Use of EIA in petroleum development project is widely required by national and 
international environmental law, industry guidelines, international financial 
organisations and lending agencies for project approval and financing it. A sound EIA 
should be based on analysis of comprehensive baseline data about existing 
environmental and socio-cultural conditions of the proposed project, and it should 
assess the full range of possible environmental and socio-cultural impacts that could 
result from the operations and identify measures to mitigate adverse impacts; and 
suggest alternatives to the proposed project after comparing environmental costs with 
economic and social benefits. 
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The EIA predicts and evaluates the potential impacts of a project on the 
environment, identifies alternatives and mitigation measures by using its findings in 
planning and decision-making. In this way, the EIA provides a risk assessment by 
analysing infon-nation, assumptions and base line data in order to estimate the 
probability of hann to the enviromnent by the operation of the proposed project. It also 
provides an outline of the environmental management system to be used and 
documentation of the environmental implementation plan to ensure the provisions of the 
EIA are met and helps to prepare the environmental impact statement. 45 
The EIA should be carried out primarily by the host government and in the 
absence of regulatory prescription it should essentially be done by the company before 
starting the project. The scope of an EIA varies considerably, depending on the 
anticipated scale and significance of environmental effects of the operation under 
consideration and the location of the project. The EIA helps to prevent environmental 
damage by identifying and assessing the potential environmental effects of project 
activities before they are undertaken and by suggesting mitigation measures of 
anticipated negative impacts through an environmental management plan on the basis of 
information gained through the EIA. The suggested remedial measures by the EIA and 
implementing them through the environmental management system of the company can 
reduce the scope of potential environmental liability for pollution and contributes to 
make the petroleum project environmentally sound and sustainable. 46 
45 Maarten Smies, Chris Geerling and Steven De Bie, Environmental Impact Assessmentfor Oil and Gas 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States. - Investor Objectives and National Ambitions, Investment and 
Financefor the Oil and Gas Industries, A Paper presented at a seminar of CEPMLP and Petroconsultants, 
22-23 September, 1994, p. 3. 
46 Carole Klem-Chesivoir, "Avoiding Envirom-nental Injury: The Case for Widespread Use of 
Environmental Impact Assessments in International Development Projects", 30 Virginia Journal of 
International Law, (1990), pp. 517-518; B. D. Clark, Environmental Impact Assessment. - origins, 
evolution, scope and objectives, presented at II th International Seminar on EIA and Management, CEMP, 
Aberdeen, 1990. See Fundamental Principles for the Mining Sector, in Berlin Guidelines, Berlin 11 
Guidelines for Mining and Sustainable Development ("Berlin Guidelines") (United Nations, 2002) 
available at htW: //www. mineralresourcesforum. org/Berlin/index. htm., p. 4. 
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According to the Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Forum, the EIA has a 
number of advantages: firstly it can be beneficial to the project schedule and cost 
through 'significant financial savings' by the early identification and resolution of 
potential problems and conflicts, the avoidance of delays, and from improved decision- 
making and project planning; secondly, the EIA allows companies to demonstrate a 
management capability for self-regulation thus avoiding unnecessary regulation by 
governments. The EIA assists companies to demonstrate their scientific and technical 
credibility to manage environmental impacts and thus makes projects more 
environmentally acceptable to the local community of the project particularly in a 
sensitive area; thirdly, a sound EIA also addresses the infonnation needs of stakeholders 
and helps to generate trust and confidence among the stakeholders and in this way, 
enhances the company image. 47 
The efficacy and soundness of an EIA depends upon the following factors: 
firstly, the EIA should be carried out in a systematic and comprehensive way, not 
merely as a statutory requirement to get approval of the project. An EIA as an integrated 
approach to project development and envirom-nental consideration requires serious a 
commitment from both government and company; secondly, it should be carried out 
through a participatory and consultation process with the key stakeholders, including 
local and indigenous communities, local governments and civil society; thirdly, an EIA 
should be carried out by an independent and neutral body which should not be 
influenced by government or company. However, if the EIA is carried out by company 
or govenunent, it should be subjected to an outside and independent review in order to 
ensure credibility to the EIA by avoiding bias and political influence to satisfy the 
proponents of the project; fourthly, an EIA should be used as a management tool 
throughout the life cycle of a petroleum project, not merely an information source of 
47 Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Forum, Principlesfor Impact Assessment: the Environmental 
and Social Dimension, Report No. 2.74/ August 1997. 
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environmental impacts in the initial design requiring government approval. The life 
cycle of a petroleum project traditionally involves three sequential phases: design, 
implementation, and closure, which are preceded by a period of exploration . 
48 Finally, it 
should be equipped with a compliance assurance mechanism and should ensure 
mechanisms for post-decision monitoring. 
6.3 Environmental Risk Insurance 
Insurance is well known in the petroleum industry and is widely used for spreading 
different kinds of risks or hazards associated with the industry. Recently its scope has 
been extended to cover environmental pollution and environmental damages. Petroleum 
contracts of many developing countries now require an insurance policy to cover blow- 
out, environmental damages, clean-up and remediation expenses and third party liability 
for injury to the private property. For instance, the petroleum contracts of Ecuador and 
Venezuela prescribe that the contractor should purchase insurance and guarantee to 
cover the environmental risk . 
49Environmental risk insurance is mainly applied in case 
of sudden and accidental pollution exposing companies to unexpected liabilities rather 
than gradual and long-term contamination. Such environmental risk insurance acts as a 
mechanism for shifting risk from the companies to the insurer for environmental 
liability and can play an important role in risk management strategy. 
6.4 Adoption of Environmental Management System 
Adoption of internal EMS and its effective implementation in petroleum project by 
company provided in contract or on voluntary basis can help it to 
improve 
48 Meredith Sasson, "Effective Environmental Impact Assessment", in: Alyson Warhurst and Ligia 
Noronha (eds. ), Environmental Policy in Mining. - Corporate Strategy and Planning for Closure, Lewis 
Publishers, London, (2000), pp. 103-104. 
49Article 12.2 and 12.9 of Model PSC of Ecuador, October 2002 (for the exploration and exploitation of 
crude oil) barrows supplement (South America) no. 152, p. 84,85; Article 22.2 of 
Operating Agreement 
of Venezuela, 29 July 1997 between Corpoven, S. A. and Compama General 
De Combustibles S. A., and 
Carmanah Resources (Venezuela) Ltd, Barrows supplement (South America) No. 144, p. 114. 
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environmental performance and in turn, reduce potential legal liability. EMS usually 
signifies a set of rules, procedures, standards and practices for internal regulation of 
companies' activities in the environmental sphere and sets out targets of environmental 
performance, regulatory compliance and internal environmental standards to be 
achieved by the companies. A well crafted EMS can have a number of benefits by 
providing by integration of environmental management into the company's operations; 
helping it to identify and reduce environmental impacts; assisting the company to set 
and meet its own environmental targets; and, helping company managers to comply 
with existing legal requirements and to define management processes to be followed to 
50 control the impact of a corporation's activity on the environment . 
An EMS planning at the outset of the project can also avoid high costs of 
remediation and the possibilities of incurring enviromnental and safety liabilities after 
the closure of the operation. It should be noted that environmental management system 
is a continuous process that requires a long-term commitment to continual improvement 
of environmental perfonnance. This concept of continuous improvement embedded in 
EMS helps companies to move beyond mere compliance with environmental 
regulations. 
An efficient EMS should emphasise awareness building and training programme 
among the company personnel for instilling sufficient orientation regarding 
environmental performance, the use of best methods and technologies in the operation 
and incorporation of both host government regulatory requirements, and international 
best practices and standards set out in the industry guidelines. An effective 
implementation of EMS, which incorporates evolving environmental standards and best 
practices, can control and reduce environmental damage by the operation of the 
50 D. Wells, "Corporate Environmental Management Systems, " AMPLA Yearbook (1997), p. 530,533; 
Alexandra S Wawryk, "Adoption of International Environmental Standards by Transnational Oil 
Companies: Reducing the Impact of Oil Operations in Emerging Economies", in: 20 Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law (2002), p. 414. 
238 
petroleum project and thus, has great potential to reduce environmental legal risk that 
may be faced by the companies. 
6.5 Environmental Audit 
The environmental audit proffers a concrete mechanism to continually improve 
environmental performance of the company. In contrast to environmental impact 
assessment which focuses on the future impacts of the proposed project, environmental 
audit is concerned with the existing operations of a company and measuring a 
company's environmental performance. An environmental audit has been defined by the 
International Chamber of Commerce in the following manner: 
"A management tool comprising a systematic, documented, periodic and objective evaluation of how well 
environmental organisation, management and equipment are performing, with the aim of helping to 
safeguard the environment by: (i) facilitating management control of environmental practices; ii. 
Assessing compliance with company policies, which would include meeting regulatory requirements. " 
An environmental audit which requires a thorough and comprehensive investigation of a 
company's environmental practices and their impacts, verification of company's 
compliance with legal and technical requirements, can help to ensure the company's 
accountability towards environmental protection. 
Carrying out environmental audit may have the following benefits: it ensures 
legal conformity with environmental regulatory obligations and anticipated conformity 
with liability for new regulations; facilitates review of mitigative and ameliorative 
programmes; ensures monitoring of corporate envirom-nental policy and performance, 
and helps to implement corporate environmental programme measures. 
5 1 Audit also 
enhances increased internal and external awareness, communication, and credibility of 
company environmental activities among stakeholders through demonstrating a 
51 Grant Ledgerwood, and EliZabeth Street and Riki Therivel, The Environmental Audit and Business 
Strategy, Pitman Publishing, (1992), p. 73; See also, Zhiguo Gao, Environmental Regulation of Oil and 
Gas in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: An Introduction and Overview, in: Zhiguo Gao, (ed), supra 
note 7, p-42. 
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commitment to and achievement of responsible environmental management. 52 
Environmental audit implies an internal evaluation of the environmental management 
system, and helps to attain a targeted level of environmental performance. 
Envirom-nental auditing is an iterative process by which environmental plans, 
procedures and standards are continually assessed. 
An essential component of environmental audit is a monitoring of the impacts of 
the operations and evaluation of environmental performance. Such monitoring and 
evaluation should be carried out on a continuous basis and through a process of analysis 
of data, exchange of information between companies and government agencies. 
However credibility of environmental audit depends upon how far it is verified by the 
external, neutral and independent authority going beyond mere self-assessment by the 
company. It is also essential that the results of environmental audits carried out through 
monitoring and evaluation should be published in reports for the wider circulation to the 
public. Reporting of audit results can further enhance the reliability and accountability 
of managers and ensure fairness in the whole process. 
6.6 Decommissioning and Reclamation Programme 
Abandonment of offshore fields has potential effects on the wide marine environment 
53 
by the irretrievable disposal of large-scale structures on the seabed . Undertaking 
remediation or restoration of the project site after closure of the operations either as part 
of the environmental management system or a regulatory requirement can avoid 
or site residual liabilities. A closure plan should describe the rationale and methods f 
rehabilitation and reclamation. It requires an effective disposal of hazardous wastage 
and clean-up through appropriate technologies after decommissioning and integration of 
52 Environmental Management in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Joint E&P Foruni, UNEP 
Technical Publications 1997, p. 34. 
53 See, generally, Peter Cameron, "Decommissioning of Oil and Gas Installations: A Comparative 
Approach to the Legal and Contractual Issues", Barrows Company, New York, (1998). 
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planning for closure of the petroleum operation in the life cycle of the project. In the 
developing countries, there is a dearth of clear regulatory framework setting for closure 
of the petroleum operations and imposition of an obligation on the companies in respect 
of closure. However, many countries now require the companies to undertake 
reclamation and abandom-nent either through the provision of petroleum laws or 
contractual stipulation. Generally, companies may be required to undertake bonds, 
financial guarantees and funds to carry out decommissioning and abandonment costs. 
From the preceding discussions, it can be argued that if environmental risk 
management strategies are effectively implemented, they can reduce pollution, 
minimise liability and regulatory risks by offsetting costs of the potential civil and 
criminal environmental liability, and maximise the public's confidence in the companies 
to preserve and protect the environment. 
7. Contractual Risk Management versus Corporate Risk Management 
The discussion on the efficacy of environmental risk management very often turns on 
the question how far the risk management system is legally sanctioned to impose 
concrete obligations on a company. It should be mentioned that there are two main 
prevailing trends in respect of environmental risk management: contractual risk 
management and corporate risk management. Contractual risk management precisely 
creates a legal framework by setting out a variety of strategies and imposes a 
legal 
obligation on the companies to carry it. Many developing countries now require the 
companies to undertake an integrated environmental management system, exploration 
and production guidelines in accordance with the national laws, and an environmental 
work programme at every phase of petroleum operations, as well as environmental 
development assistance to a government environmental authority as a part of their 
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obligation of environmental protection. 54 Contractual prescription of an environmental 
management system to be developed within the company's internal system includes the 
fulfilment of the relevant legal and regulatory provisions, the prevention of 
contamination and improvement in the environmental performance, as well as 
verifications, inspections and audits. 55 Contractual provision regarding the 
envirom-nental work programme generally includes activities such as baseline 
environmental study, environmental impact assessment, environmental monitoring 
programme, emergency and contingency plans to attend any crude oil spills, handling of 
releases and hazardous substances; training all personnel and programme for preventing 
injuries. 56 
There is also a discernible trend regarding corporate risk management to 
environmental problems. Petroleum companies voluntarily undertake such nsk 
management to fill the gap of regulation, to prevent environmental pollution and to 
minimise the environmental impact, to enhance corporate image and to make the project 
sustainable. Many petroleum companies are also adopting environmental risk 
management in order to avoid future liability for failing to meet international standards 
even in the absence of the national law. 57 As a part of nsk management, companies also 
adhere to the standards, guidelines or principles of environmental risk management 
developed by the industry associations, the World Bank, international standard 
associations, and NGOs. 
54 Article 25.1of PSC between Kazakhstan and Agip/BP/Etal dated November 1997 (In respect of the 
North Caspian Sea (Kashagan) Barrows supplement (Russia and NIS) No. 39, p. 63-64; article 24.4 of the 
Production sharing contract between China National Petroleum Corporation and Shell Exploration 
(China) Limited, 9 August 1996, Barrows supplement (Asia and Australasia) no. 142, p. 60. 
55 Article 12.3 of Model PSC of Ecuador, October 2002 (for the exploration and exploitation of crude oil) 
barrows supplement (South America) no. 152, p. 84. 
56 Article 22.1 of Operating Agreement of Venezuela, 29 July 1997 between Corpoven, S. A. and 
Compania General De Combustibles S. A., and Carmanah Resources (Venezuela) Ltd, Barrows 
supplement (South America) No. 144, p. 113. 
57 G Pring, J. Otto and K Naito, "Trends in International Environmental Law Affecting Mineral Industry", 
(Part 1), 17 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (1999), p. 39,55. 
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Of the two approaches, the contractual approach to risk management should be 
the preferred option since laws and regulations hardly address nsk management 
strategies and even in some cases, where they might indeed do so, the enforcement of 
legislation can be inconsistent and fraught with legal difficulties. On the other hand, 
companies' voluntary risk management through codes and corporate policy are not 
always sufficient or satisfactory to prevent pollution. Corporate self-regulation through 
adoption of voluntary codes of conduct in many instances fails to satisfy the 
requirement of 'international best practice' and there is little uniformity in self- 
regulation practice as the level of commitment to this self-regulation varies across the 
companies operating in a country. 
But contractual risk management can create clear legal obligations on the 
companies with respect to the management of environmental risk. Moreover, in view of 
the lax strict enforcement of environmental regulation by the host government and in 
the absence of economic instruments in the developing countries, contractual safeguards 
may provide greater envirom-nental protection and increase government oversight. 
However, corporate risk management through self regulation can effectively supplement 
contractual and regulatory approaches to risk prevention. 
8. Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that environmental regulatory and liability change ex 
post to contract have emerged as important source of political risks today. The 
increasing stringency of environmental regulation with rapidly changing international 
environmental law and a change of liability rules to redefine environmental damage and 
new source of environmental degradation can negatively affect the economic 
equilibrium of the petroleum contract. The petroleum companies have to survive by 
adjusting themselves to regulatory changes and liability risks than challenging them. 
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It is argued that the enviromnental legal risks can hardly be countered by the 
contractual undertaking of stabilisation guarantees, and therefore, it is suggested that 
integration of environmental planning early in the project and undertaking preventive 
measures throughout the project life can better reduce the regulatory and liability risk 
than a traditional contractual guarantee of stability clause. There are seemingly 
emerging norms of preventive strategies shaped by the legal and contractual framework 
and corporate practice to reduce the adverse economic impact of ex post environmental 
regulation or the cost of unanticipated environmental liability. Companies' 
environmental risk assessment at the outset of the project and risk management through 
exercising environmental due diligence in the performance of the contract, 
environmental management system, integration of environmental consideration into 
planning can prevent reduce subsequent environmental liability which can expose them 
to litigation for extracting compensation for environmental damage. 
Both contractual and corporate environmental risk management from project 
planning to closure of the project can lead to sustainable petroleum development which 
is acceptable among the stakeholders. It is increasingly realised that the costs of 
preventive strategies can be offset against many financial benefits that these preventive 
strategies can bring to companies. These can include direct and immediate cost savings 
by avoiding unacceptable envirom-nental impacts caused by petroleum operations. 
Longer-tenn gains include reduced potential liability and regulatory risks and reduced 
outlays in performance bonds and risk insurance premiums. In order to avoid future 
regulatory and liability risk, a company should go beyond compliance with 
environmental regulation, and adopt comprehensive risk management as a way of 
minimising the environmental impact of petroleum production. A company can also 
enhance it reputation by way of responsible enviromnental management and 
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environmental regulatory compliance. The current attitude and practice of the petroleum 
companies also testifies to this assertion. 
On the host government perspective, their adoption of comprehensive 
enviromnental legislation, which is fine-tuned to evolving international standards, can 
protect the investors from subsequent 'regulatory chill. ' One important solution to 
reduce the excessive economic impact of environmental regulation may be that 
companies should be consulted about the proposed changes in existing environmental 
legislation that are likely to affect them. 
Having considered the environmental risks of petroleum operations, the next 
chapter will explore the social and human rights dimensions in petroleum development 
and analyse associated risks that pose a threat to contract stability. 
245 
Chapter 7 
Emerging Social and Human Rights Risks in Petroleum Operations: 
Contract Stability through Managing Risks 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the emerging social and human rights 
dimensions and trends in petroleum development in the developing countries and 
economies in transition. It notes that these new paradigms are increasingly constituting 
an important factor in contract negotiation and contract planning. While not absolutely 
new, social and human rights trends have assumed such a degree of importance that 
they challenge long-standing assumptions that companies make with respect to risk 
assessment in relation to contract stability. The chapter focuses on how adverse social 
impacts of petroleum operation and human rights violations of local and indigenous 
communities by the companies that has occurred in recent times can be translated into a 
risk factor for the company by the individual or collective action of the local or 
indigenous community. The chapter thus examines to what extent the social and human 
rights dimensions of petroleum development in recent years challenge the stability of 
petroleum contracts as discussed in the previous chapters. Chapter two has discussed 
how conventional political risks can threaten stability of petroleum contract and 
chapters three and four have demonstrated how these traditional risks can be managed 
through contractual and legislative undertaking on stability. But the risks generated by 
social impacts and human rights concerns are rather new phenomena and 
unconventional in nature by virtue of their quantitative impact in a wide variety of 
situations as well as the variety of their legal underpinnings. They present a challenge to 
long established patterns of behaviour of contract negotiation and contract drafting. It is 
argued that socially responsible behaviour of the company can reduce much of the 
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social and human rights tension between the company and host community and can 
contribute to the long term sustainability of a given petroleum project. 
Petroleum exploration and development is considered an engine of economic 
growth and development in the many developing countries and economies in transition. 
But it is also acknowledged that petroleum development can potentially be a socially 
disruptive process from the exploration stage to the closure of operations. Over the last 
two decades, social and human rights issues have assumed a greater significance in the 
petroleum industry due to various factors like the increased social awareness, demand 
for greater corporate accountability, activism of NGOs and civil society and enhanced 
understanding of the social dimension of petroleum projects driven by rising global 
expectations about corporate social responsibility. The increased remoteness of 
petroleum operations and consequent visibility of companies in these areas coupled with 
greater awareness of social impacts of operation can generate significant social tensions 
between company and local community. 
The concept of stakeholders' interest in natural resource exploitation and 
management has emerged as a new paradigm in the petroleum industry and their 
demand for increased openness, public participation and consultation with them appears 
to be the dominant theme in the current context of natural resource development. ' It is 
now acknowledged that the interest and concern of local and indigenous people, who 
are also referred to as a 'host community', is widely regarded as key to stakeholders in 
view of the fact that many petroleum explorations take place in the areas in which they 
1A "stakeholder" has been defined as "somebody" or a group of "some bodies", who has an interest, be it 
economic, legal, political or ethical, in the outcome of a project or a process and who therefore "holds a 
stake" in it. Olle Ostensson, "The Stakeholders: Interests and Objectives", in: James Otto and John 
Cordes, (ed. ), Sustainable Development and Future of Mineral Investment, (Paris: UNEP, 2000), p. 3-1. 
The author categorises stakeholders into 'core' and 'secondary' groups. The 'core' stakeholders include 
those who are materially affected by individual mining projects, such as petroleum and mining 
companies, local communities and government authorities at different levels. A second group of 
stakeholders consists of those whose objectives are generally of a broader political, ideological or cultural 
nature, for instance, NGOs. P. 3-2. 
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live and operations of project can significantly affect their life style .2 Improved 
communication and information technology, recognition of their rights at the legal and 
normative level have made it possible for local and indigenous conu-nunities to 
articulate their voice more clearly and to acquire greater leverage in the negotiation of 
petroleum development than ever before. Since the Brent Spar incidents, NGOs and 
civil society have also emerged as important stakeholders in petroleum projects. 3 it is 
widely believed that the involvement of NGOs and civil society is not only helpful for 
sustainable resource development, but also their concerted efforts and actions against 
companies persuaded by the negative impact of operations can substantially increase the 
social and human rights risks in the petroleum industry. 
The chapter argues that these non-conventional risks should be viewed from the 
broader social aspect of petroleum operation and distributional perspective of economic 
rent that goes beyond narrow economic, legal and technical aspects of the petroleum 
contracts. 
2. Social and Human Rights Impact of Petroleum Operation 
This section discusses social and human rights concerns in petroleum development. 
2.1 Social Impact 
The negative social impact of petroleum operations can be partially the inevitable 
consequence of the extractive process and partially can be attributed to the 
unsustainable practice and negligence of the operating company towards the local 
2 The expression 'host community' generally refers to the conununities that host the development of a 
petroleum project and usually comprise of local people or indigenous group of people of a particular 
locality in which the project is to be carried out. The expression local or indigenous community or 
host 
community has been used interchangeably in this chapter 
3 See, Sergei Vinogradov and Ibibia Lucky Worika, "Global Stakeholders: The Impact of International 
Law on the Resources Industry", in: International Resources Law and Projects, Mineral 
Law Series, vol. 
1999, Number 2, pp. lIA(I-22). See also, Philippe Le Billon, "Getting It Done: Instruments of 
Enforcement", in: Ian Bannon, Paul Collier, (eds. ), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and 
Actions, The World Bank, Washington, D. C., (2003), pp. 215-286. 
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community. Adverse social impact may arise in all phases of petroleum development, 
albeit in varying degrees. 4 However, the exploration and development stage can cause 
the greatest disruptions including displacement of indigenous peoples and their 
livelihood, environmental pollution, loss of biological diversity, deforestation, 
destruction of cultural properties, severe health problems and other social problems. At 
the stage of the establishment of pipelines, transportation and infrastructure, which 
requires acquisition of land, this can have a negative impact on the host community in 
enjoyment of human rights and effects of the provision of local goods and services to 
5 the project and local inflation of prices of goods. At the abandonment and closure 
phase of the project, local communities may lose their employment and livelihood. At 
this stage, inequitable distribution of economic rents from the project can also generate 
social tension in the producing areas. 
The next section identifies sources of human rights violations that can occur through 
petroleum operations. 
2.2 Five Sources of Human Rights Violations 
Alleged human rights violations by petroleum companies is one of the most debated 
and controversial issues as they with their huge economic leverage and global reach can 
4 The social and human rights impact pertaining to the process of exploration, development, extraction, 
transportation of petroleum resources have been well discussed in the recent times. See, George Sampson 
Akpan, 'Invironmental and Human Rights Problems in Natural Resources Development-Implications for 
Investment in Petroleum and Mineral Resources Sectors", CEPMLP Internet Journal, vol. 6-5a Article. 
5 For instance, the Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project has been criticised by NGOs on the 
apprehension that it could have serious implications for the human rights of the people living in the region 
as the Host Government Agreement (HGA), negotiated between pipeline Consortium-leader BP and the 
Turkish government, undermines Turkey's ability to protect human rights because Turkey has agreed to 
pay compensation to the Consortium if pipeline construction or operation is disturbed. It has been alleged 
that the construction and 40-60 year operation of the pipeline can produce following negative impacts: 
restriction on rights of redress for the people who will be forced to give up their land rights; inadequate 
enforcement of health and safety legislation to protect workers and local people; serious risks to the 
human rights of any individuals who protests against the pipeline; and a threat to access to water for local 
people. Amnesty International Report on the project: Human Rights on the Line. - The Baku-Thilisi- 
Ceyhan (BTQ Pipeline Project, London, (2003). However, BP, which holds the largest ownership share 
of the project and acts as the operator of the project, have countered the criticisms by undertaking 
extensive consultation process with villagers along the routes, and landowners as well as host 
government, local government, NGOs and international community on environmental, social and safety 
matters of the project. See, 
www. azer. com/aweb/categones/magazine/ail 14_folder/I 14_articles/I 14_bp. htrril 
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exercise profound influence in social and economic and political sphere of the 
developing countries and their activities can directly or indirectly affect enjoyment of 
human rights of the people of these countries. 
Activities of both state owned and private petroleum companies can lead to 
human rights abuse or violate human rights in the following ways: 
Firstly, both unintended and intended social impact of petroleum development can 
create significant obstacle in the enjoyment of social, economic and cultural rights of 
the local community including the right to self-determination, the right to an adequate 
standard of living, the right to life, the right to employment and the right to social 
security of the host community. 
Secondly, the petroleum companies often enter into secunty arrangements with 
the host state through employment of public or private security forces for the security 
and safety of their personnel, equipment, pipelines and other facilities on the sites. 
While the public security provided by the state to the project infrastructure is within the 
purview of the control of the government, private security providers can be under direct 
control of the companies. The security concerns can also be critical from the 
government's point of view, which perceive the petroleum industry as strategic 
infrastructure and central to the country's economic activity and as a result, government 
can assign public security forces for ensuring the uninterrupted operations of petroleum 
projects. Petroleum companies' use of security forces can directly violate civil and 
political rights of the host community by their use of force against local community 
disproportionately in the demonstration and protest and their non-adherence of security 
forces to human rights norms in protecting the installation against violence. 
Thirdly, a company can indirectly violate human rights by its complicity in the 
abuse of human rights by the host government through the support of, or acquiescence 
with activities of such governments. Petroleum companies operating in countries with 
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an autocratic regime may easily fall prey to complicity with human rights violations by 
6 maintaining silence and inactivity in the context of oppression by such governments. 
Sometimes, host governments may use petroleum companies in its human rights abuse. 
The governinent's overriding needs for foreign investment may exacerbate the situation. 
A host country may attract foreign investment at the expense of human rights 
considerations or they may simply overlook violations of human rights by the petroleum 
companies. Petroleum companies may also be implicated in human rights violations for 
their investment in countries with poor human rights records and rampant corruption .7 
Fourthly, the current trend of viewing environmental degradation as a violation 
of human rights can add to the complexity of the problem. The linkage between 
environment and human rights is now well established under international soft law 
prescription. 8 The relationship between human rights and environmental protection has 
been conceived in two main ways: firstly, environmental protection is seen as a means 
to the end of fulfilling human rights standards. Since degraded physical enviroments 
contribute directly to infringements of the human rights to life, health, and livelihood, 
acts leading to environmental degradation may constitute an immediate violation of 
internationally recognised human rights. Secondly, the legal protection of human rights 
is an effective means to achieving the ends of conservation and environmental 
protection. Thus the full realization of human rights can be possible only in the society 
6 See, Sir Geoffrey Chandler, "The Responsibilities of Oil Companies", in: Asbjorn Eide, Helge Ole 
Bergesen and Pia Rudolfson Goyer, (ed. ), Human Rights and the Oil Industry, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 
(2000), p. 14. 
7 For instance, the Chad-Cameron oil pipeline project- a joint venture of Exxon, Elf Aquitaine, and Royal 
Dutch/Shell, had been criticised by civil society and NGOs because of allegations of corruption and the 
poor human rights record in Chad and incidence of human rights violations in the area surrounding the 
pipeline, and lack of adequate environmental safeguards in the project. See, criticisms of the World 
Bank's involvement in the project, Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, "To Lend or Not to Lend: 011, Human 
Rights, and the World Bank's Internal Contradictions", 14 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2001), 197; 
See also, Korinna Horta, The Chad/Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project-Reaching a Critical Milestone, 
World Rainforest Movement, hltp: //www. wmi/oriz. uy/countries/cameroon/1-Iorta. html. 
8 For instance, the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 1972 recogruses the environment 
as an aspect of human rights. Principle I of that Declaration states that: 
"Man has the fundamental right to freedorn, equality and adequate conditions of life in an environment of 
a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and 
improve the environment for present and future generations. " Declaration of the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment, UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1(1972), reprinted in 11 I. L. M. 1416 (1972). 
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and political order in which claims for environmental protection are more likely to be 
respecte .9 
Fifthly, an important source of concern which leads to violation of social and 
economic rights in a broader context, relates to the inequitable allocation of project 
revenues. It is now widely believed that the contractual and legal arrangement of 
petroleum development, which denies equitable distribution of resource rent from a 
given petroleum project can generate a conflict between the local community and 
central government. Deprivation of the local communities and indigenous people from 
the economic outcome of petroleum projects can ultimately generate distrust toward 
companies, which are providing revenues to the central government. 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that social and human rights concerns 
arising out of petroleum development often tend to be inter-related and the borderline 
between them becomes increasingly blurred. The next section proceeds to identify the 
risks which can arise from the kind of social and human rights impacts outlined above. 
3. Contours of Social and Human Rights Risks to the Petroleum Project 
Failing to address social problems created by the petroleum operation can generate 
significant public opposition to the project which can expose the petroleum companies 
to the following kinds of risks, leading eventually to suspension or failure of the project. 
3.1 Conflict and Physical Security Risk 
The environmental and social problems caused by the petroleum operations can give 
rise to conflict between petroleum companies and the local or indigenous 
9 Michael R. Anderson, "Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview", in: 
Alan E. Boyle, and Michael R. Anderson (eds. ), Human Rights Approaches to environmental Protection, 
Clarendon Press: Oxford, (1996), p. 3. 
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communities. 10 imilarly, human rights violations by the companies can give rise to 
resentment amongst the local community and indigenous people, which can erupt into a 
popular movement against the ongoing petroleum project and thus, destabilise the 
relationship between the company and host community. For our purpose, the expression 
6conflict' can be used to describe both violent conflict and conflict short of violence 
which can be mired in sheer hostility and disruptive actions against companies caused 
by social pressures and campaigns. 
Conflicts driven by petroleum projects can occur at both micro and macro 
level. II At the micro level, conflict can occur directly between the company and local or 
indigenous communities for the immediate vicinity of a foreign investment, and 
localised impact of the operation on such communities or sometimes, past experience of 
the adverse social impacts of petroleum development can inspire them to oppose the 
present project by the host community. The conflict can be fuelled by pressure groups 
including local NGOs and local communities' whose coalition with other local and 
international activist groups can build vehement resistance to the development of a 
project through their concerted actions like dissemination of information, raising 
awareness-building activities in the host community about the negative impact of the 
petroleum operation, exposing companies' environmental and human rights abuses to 
the media, mobilising public support towards against companies' activities. As a result, 
10 See, for useful discussion on contexts of petroleum company-community conflict: Gary MacDonald 
and Timothy McLaughlin, "Extracting Conflict", in: Rory Sullivan (ed. ), Business and Human Rights: 
Dilemmas and Solutions, Greenleaf Publishing, (2003), pp. 232-242. See also, Manuel Eduardo 
Echeverra G., "Conflicts between Resource Development and Indigenous People", in: Mining and Oil & 
Gas Development in Latin America, Mineral Law Series, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, vol. 
2001, Number 3. (discussing many incidents of community/petroleum company conflict in Ecuador); See 
also, George S. Akpan, "Host Community Hostility to Mining Projects: A New Generation of Risk? 
" in: 
Elizabeth Bastida, Thomas Walde and Janeth Warden-Fernandez, (eds. ), International and Comparative 
Mineral Law and Policy. - Trends and Prospects, Kluwer Law International, The Hague (2005), pp. 311- 
329. 
Jessica Banfield, "From fuelling conflict to oiling the peace: Harnessing the peace-building potential of 
extractive- sector companies operating in conflict zones", M: Rory Sullivan (ed. ), supra note 
10, pp. 222- 
223. 
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companies can sometimes be compelled to withdraw operations when their operation is 
at stake. 
12 
At the macro level, a petroleum project may have a range of indirect impacts on 
existing conflicts or it may give rise to new conflicts, particularly where petroleum is 
the major source of revenue and social and economic development, but poor 
governance, corruption and lack of democratic institutions and accountability in the 
developing host countries causes mismanagement of such revenues and consequently, 
leads to deprivation of the vast majority of the people from the economic outcome of 
such project. This situation, which is popularly known as the 'resource curse' 
phenomenon, is often seen as a contributory factor to the escalating conflict between the 
government and the local community. Marginalisation of the local or indigenous or 
ethnic groups from petroleum revenue and their diminished status in the resource 
management can foment the resentment against government and can ultimately increase 
hostility towards foreign investors and thus, can create an unstable business climate. In 
this situation, companies which already committed significant capital cannot reverse 
their investment but they have to survive the challenge of host communities' hostile 
actions. 
The physical security of industry employees and facilities remains a great concern 
for the companies operating in situations of conflict arising out of negative social 
impact. The companies, which are already operating in conflict zones, can be vulnerable 
to security risks of attack by insurgent ethnic groups. Organised and violent protest of 
host communities or insurgent groups' actions to realise their demands may cause 
disruption of petroleum operations through hostage taking or kidnapping of companies 
12 For example, Shell chose to discontinue its operations in Colombia when the indigenous peoples Uwa 
threatened to commit mass suicide if Shell continued its drilling operations on their traditional lands. In 
late 199 1, Conoco Inc., a petroleum company operating in rainforest of Ecuador was compelled to leave 
the country in the face of mounting pressure from NGOs and activist groups. See, Robert Wasserstrorn, 
Susan Reider, "Oil firms in Environmentally Sensitive Areas learning to balance stakeholder interests", 
Oil and Gas Journal, August 18,1997, pp. 23-27. 
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personnel, sabotage, demonstration, riots, force occupation of petroleum installation, 
which may force companies to shut down operations and reduce the production rate 
leading to loss of revenue to both company and host government. ' 3 The physical 
security risks posed by host community action can lead the companies to take additional 
security measures which can entail additional costs for them. 
3.2 Risk of Reputation Loss 
The negative social impacts of operation and human rights abuse by the company can 
result in huge NGO campaigns, media coverage and public outrage against the 
concerned company. This concerted effort of accusation and publicity may bring serious 
negative consequences with financial implications. One of the most important 
consequences is reputation loss of an accused company which can prompt to boycotting 
of products and can lead to decreasing market value of the shares of the petroleum 
companies concerned. The disrepute brought to the company by the negative publicity 
may cause depreciation of their shares in the stock market and may lead to denial of 
access to new deposits in a particular country. 14 
13 In Indonesia, ExxonMobil was forced to shut down production for several months in early 2001 at its 
Arun LNG facility after its operation came under direct attack from Acelinese separatists. In early July of 
2003, hundred of unarmed women from surrounding communities occupied ChevronTexaco's oil 
tem-iinal at Escravos in the Niger Delta, while other took over several nearby flowstations. Chevron 
declared a force majeure and shut down its operation as a result of the activities of restive groups in the 
area. See, on conflict and physical security risk, Ikenna Nwosu, "Communities and NGOs as new 
Political Risks for Oil and Gas Investors: A Case Study of Nigeria", www. Rasandoil. com/ogel/ Volume 2, 
Issue 1, February 2004. See also, 0. Arowolo, "Social Responsibility of Multinational Oil Companies and 
the Challenge of Local Communities-Any Prospects for Reconciliation? " Oil and Gas Intelligence, 
www. gasandoil. coin/oge vol. 2 Issue-4. October 2004. See also, Martin Stone, "Security issues for the 
International Oil and Gas Industry", in: G. Kronman, D. Felio and T., 0' Connor, (eds. ), International Oil 
and Gas Ventures. - A Business Perspective, AAAPG, p. 321-328. 
14 For instance, oil exploration by the Consortium of Talisman (a Canadian company), Petrochina (the 
Chinese state-owned company), and Petronas (the Malaysian company) in Sudan where civil conflict and 
human rights violations is a regular phenomena, and the oil profits have fuelled governmental repression 
in the Southern region, gave rise huge public pressures on the operating companies. In particular, the 
Canadian company Talisman which faced severe criticism both in Canada and in the United States, was 
compelled to sell its share to another company and pulled out operation from Sudan due to the fact that 
disinvestment campaign caused the plummeting of its share. Jane Lampman, "Battle Against Oppression 
Abroad Turns to Wall Street Religious and Human Rights Activities Target Stocks and Capital markets to 
Stop a war of 'Genocide' in Sudan", Christian Science Monitor, March 3, (2000), p. 1. 
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3.3 Litigation Risk 
The petroleum companies accused of violations of human rights can be sued in both the 
host countries and their home countries for holding them accountable for the human 
rights abuse. The threat of litigation as a consequence of negative social and 
environmental impacts and human rights abuse is now considered to be one of the 
significant risk factors for petroleum companies. In host states, the possibility of 
litigating a company by non - state actors has been facilitated by the increased status of 
environmental protection as human rights, which offer the public interest groups the 
opportunities for bringing class action against companies in the host countries. The 
public interest litigation can be instituted by the public interest groups drawing 
inspiration from the growing body of international environmental law to prevent 
harmful activities or to seek redress for damage caused by the petroleum companies. 
Publicity generated by a host court's action can also be a very useful tool for the NGOs 
or other pressure groups to launch campaigns against the company in order to change 
the ways of dealing with the environinental and human rights issues. Litigation based on 
public interest may also delay the operation of the project as a result of which the 
company may incur additional costs in doing business. 
The probability that companies can be litigated in the domestic courts of their 
home states under extra-territorial application of law for human rights abuses, torts 
committed by them- also has emerged as a significant risk factor for them. There are 
several instances of litigation by the host populations in the domestic courts of the home 
countries such as Texaco had been sued by the indigenous people of Ecuador affected 
by its operation in 1993, Ogoni community of Nigeria sued Shell company in the UK 
Court in 1998 for alleged complicity of the company with the human rights violation by 
the Nigerian government; Unocal Corporation had been sued for complicity in human 
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rights violations committed by the Myanmar military government during construction 
of a natural gas pipeline; Occidental Petroleum company had been sued in 2003 for its 
corroborating with Colombian military in human rights abuses in Colombia in 1998 and 
ExxonMobil was sued for participating in human rights abuses in Indonesia. In most of 
these cases, claims were dismissed by the lower courts on the procedural grounds but 
some of the litigations were allowed for appeal in the higher courts. 15 
The value and implications of the suits does not lie only in the legal result of 
financial relief, rather their importance should be viewed from the context of the public 
pressure, reputation loss and the publicity that can be generated from these legal 
actions. 16 Generally, such litigation entails significant costs for the companies to defend 
these claims and generates a lot of negative publicity and public condemnation against 
them, which can badly damage their image. 
3.4 Home Country's Sanction Risk 
An important dimension of social and human risk is that companies may face economic 
sanctions from their home countries, especially the USA and the developed European 
states. As a result of the home country's economic sanction, the companies may be 
asked to leave the host state and to withdraw from the project incurring significant 
15 In Doe v. Unocal, the plaintiffs were Burmese peasants, who sued Unocal for complicity in human 
rights abuse by Burmese military in 1997. A U. S. Federal district court in Los Angeles agreed to hear 
Doe. Unocal. In 2000 the judge ruled that while there was evidence that Unocal knew of and benefited 
from the abuses, there was no evidence of "active participation" in any human rights violation that would 
subject the company to liability. The court dismissed the case on the ground that plaintiffs failed to show 
evidence that Unocal wanted the military to commit abuses. Plaintiffs have appealed this decision. In a 
groundbreaking decision on September 18,2002, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the District Court's decision allowing the lawsuit against Unocal to go forward. The 
three panel judge panel held that the District Court was wrong in determining that the plaintiffs had to 
show that Unocal controlled the Burmese military actions in order to establish Unocal's liability. (Doe v. 
Unocal., 2002 WL 31063976(9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit held that a corporate defendant can be held 
liable only for its own actions, where the corporation provides "knowing practical assistance or 
encouragement" that has a "substantial effect" on the perpetration of egregious human rights abuses. On 
February 14,2003, the Ninth Circuit granted the motion for rehearing the appeal before an eleven-judge 
en banc panel. (Doe v. Unocal corp., Nos. 00-56603,00-57197(9thCir. Feb. 14,2003). On June 17,2003, 
the Ninth Circuit, en banc, heard this case. However, parties settled case in December, 2004 before a 
decision could be rendered. See also http: earthrights. org/unocal/index. shtml 
16 See, George S Akpan, "Litigating Problems that Arise from Natural Resources Exploitation in Foreign 
Courts: Impediments to Justice", 20 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law No. 1, (2002), p. 55, 
76-77. 
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capital loss. Many of such sanctions that have recently been imposed on the petroleum 
companies by the home states, for their human rights abuses. For instance, the UK 
government asked Premier Oil to leave Myanmar in early 2000 in the midst of growing 
criticism of the company by pressure groups in the UK. Similarly, accusations against 
U. S. petroleum companies for complicity with human rights violations committed by 
the armed forces resulted in the unilateral sanction by U. S. administration against doing 
business by their companies in the host country. Unlike traditional economic sanctions 
which are mainly motivated by the home state's political and ideological pursuit, the 
new kind of sanctions may be prompted by concerted pressure of civil society and 
campaign of shareholders in the home states of the companies. 
From the foregoing review, it can be surmised that very often the social risk 
factors discussed above may be combined and one may arise as a consequence of 
another. From the companies' perspective, these risks can threaten the long-tenn 
security and stability of the contract. The cumulative impact of various risk factors can 
lead to a forced withdrawal from the project by the companies who have already made 
significant capital investments or costly delaying of the project. These risks, if realised, 
can bring an even greater threat to contract stability because in these situations, 
companies can be left uncompensated from the host state for the economic loss suffered 
by them by such closure or withdrawal caused by circumstances in which the host state 
has little control. The human rights and social risks can also be significant challenges 
for a host goverm-nent because suspension of production of petroleum caused by these 
risks can disrupt the flow of revenue, which is important for meeting its economic 
development needs and payment of external debt. 
It is worth mentioning that risks generated by social and human rights concerns 
are different from traditional political risks in many significant ways and they un erpin 
legal implications and consequences which are very much different from those of 
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conventional political risks of regulatory intervention as mentioned above. Traditional 
stability guarantees offered by the host state through contractual and legal techniques 
can be largely ineffective to deal with these non-conventional risks which are mostly 
generated by the actions of the non-state actors and hence, are often beyond the control 
of state authority. Rather these non-conventional risks require companies' innovative 
strategies, initiatives of a risk management system, and their commitment to social 
investment to the operating areas; and host countries' consti I legislative and 
policy measures to address the social and human rights issues arising from petroleum 
development. 
4. Preventive and Mitigation Strategies: The Way Forward 
It should be acknowledged that social and human rights dimensions of petroleum 
corporations go beyond economic imperatives of the profit motives of the companies 
and revenue generation of the host states. Rather, they embrace the questions of 
equitable distribution of revenues, mitigation of adverse social and environmental 
impact of operations and rectification of human rights abuses. The proper addressing of 
social and human rights dimensions of petroleum development is becoming an 
important factor for the stability and success of petroleum projects. 
Most of the potential social impacts and consequent risks can be avoided 
through preventive strategies. Adoption of preventive strategies has proved to be the 
most viable approach to resolve the social and human rights risks. On the other hand, 
mitigation measures aims at a retroactive solution of social impacts and requires their 
implementation by provisions of compensation to the affected local and indigenous 
communities and rehabilitation programmes. Compared to preventive measures, the 
mitigation measures can be a costly and complicated process. 
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4.1 The Role of Petroleum Companies 
The petroleum companies can undertake following preventive strategies to prevent or 
mitigate social and human rights risks: 
4.1.1 Social Planning and Social Impact Assessment 
Considering the fact that failure to understand community needs and aspiration at the 
initial stage of the project can sow the seeds of social tensions and potential conflict in 
the future, social planning and its integration should be an integral part of the project 
design and implementation. Carrying out social planning to address social and human 
rights issues in the petroleum project is important for increasing the public acceptability 
and success of the project, obtaining a licence to operate, and reducing risks of potential 
conflict and consequent uncertainties. However, integration of social concerns is not an 
easy task. Successful integration depends on factors which can be divided into two 
broad categories: human resource issues within companies such as developing an 
appreciation of the importance of integration, recognition of the value of building social 
and human capital, appointment of social scientists at the project level, and fostering an 
understanding among technical, environmental and social specialists of the legitimacy 
and importance of each other's contributions; and secondly, processes that should be 
followed to ensure successful integration. 17 As communities' expectations may change 
and evolve over the life span of the project, companies' social policy may need to 
be 
revised and updated to match a changing scenario. 
Apart from social planning, a social impact assessment for the project is crucial 
to understanding the social and human rights risks the company may 
face. A social 
impact assessment is the main instrument for balancing the social concerns on the one 
hand and the economic gains in petroleum on the other. While companies are 
familiar 
17 Kathryn McPhail and Aidan Davy, Integrating Social Concerns into Private Sector Decision 
Making: 
A Review of Corporate Practices in the Mining, Oil and Gas Sectors, World 
Bank Discussion Paper No. 
384, Washington, D. C., pp. 55-56. 
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with environmental impact assessment and carry it out comprehensively, the area of 
social impact assessment is less developed and is usually carried out as part of an 
environmental impact assessment. This can be attributed to several factors such as a 
lack of understanding of the social aspects of the project, and a priority on 
environmental considerations over social ones. However, in view of the fact that the 
social impacts of the operation can be a significant risk factor for the companies, a 
separate and self- contained social impact assessment increasingly become essential. 
The necessity of a separate social impact assessment can be justified on the underlying 
difference between the nature of environmental and social impact of petroleum 
operation. While environmental impact is largely limited to the physical environment 
and can be mostly mitigated through technological solutions, the social impact can have 
far reaching effects on society and its management requires different approaches and 
strategies. 
Carrying out an independent and comprehensive social impact assessment in all 
phases of contract - from the project evaluation stage to the decommissioning and 
nlý abandonment stage, and the continuing monitoring social and human rights 
developments, which may arise as a result of exploration - can be a valuable tool for 
eliminating early misunderstandings and conflicts. While it should be carried out on a 
mandatory basis in all petroleum projects, the level of assessment can depend on the 
sensitivity of the project location. For instance, extensive impact assessment is specially 
needed particularly for the project in the sensitive physical and human environments 
where indigenous peoples live. 
A Social Impact Assessment (SIA) generally includes the study of social, 
economic, cultural and health impacts of a given operation in a particular area, local 
history, populations and demographic change, political institutions, social and power 
structure in the local community, likely changes in the values and nonns of the society 
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by the operation of the project. 18 The SIA denotes a process of evaluation, prediction 
and reflection on both intended and unintended consequences of the proposed project on 
society. The main objectives of an SIA can be identified are: to identify and assess the 
potential social impact of a proposed project, to suggest alternative solutions, to 
integrate community concerns in the project design, and to develop management and 
measures to mitigate any negative social impact and to make the project more 
compatible with human rights norms. 19 
Public perception of fairness in the process of social impact assessment is 
crucial for its credibility and effectiveness. Transparency and impartiality in the process 
of SIA and its exposure to external independent verification and opportunity to appeal 
from the decision can enhance its public acceptability and legitimacy. Participation of 
the community by way of involving the interested and affected parties and 
accommodating their input and concerns in the whole process is seen as a pre-requisite 
for ensuring credibility and public acceptability of the SIA . 
20 A SIA should not be 
carried out for the mere purpose of obtaining approval of the project, but it should truly 
reflect a consultative process. 
4.1.2 Conflict Risk Assessment 
A company's internal risk assessment on the host state's investment climate prior to the 
undertaking of the project about likelihood of the project to increase existing conflict or 
escalate new conflict can be an important instrument to avoid conflict risks. Companies 1) 
anticipation of social and human rights risks early in the design of the project and a 
systematic and comprehensive conflict risk assessment and designing appropriate risk 
'8 See, Mining &Envirom-nent Research Network Research Bulletin and Newsletter No. 11/12, (1997), 
Special Edition, p. 130. 
19 Margaret Jungk, "A Practical Guide to Addressing Human Rights Concerns for Companies Operating 
Abroad", in: Michael K. Addo (ed. ), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, (1999), p. 184. 
20 Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment Best Practice, International Association 
for Impact 
Assessment, Institute of Environmental Assessment UK, 1998. 
262 
management is crucial for a stable contractual relationship. A conflict risk assessment is 
specially required for the companies operating in a country with long history of ethnic 
or civil conflict to grasp the potential implications of such conflict on the operations of 
the project. Companies operating in the conflict zone have to take into consideration 
whether previous companies operating in those areas were accused of complicity of 
human rights violation or directly involved in human rights abuse. 
Risk assessment provides the company with an opportunity to examine the 
overall human rights contexts, political stability and the situation of the rule of law 
prevailing in the country in which they operate. A conflict risk assessment should also 
include identification of security risks to the personnel and installations, and assessment 
of human rights records of public security forces. A conflict risk assessment provides 
the company with an opportunity to adopt effective preventive strategies and 
appropriate mitigatory measures to minimise conflict related risks. jr- 
4.1.3 Stakeholder Consultation 
Currently, most of the petroleum contract negotiation process is carried out in the binary 
process in which the government and company participate to the exclusion of local 
community or indigenous people. In view of the fact that total exclusion of host 
communities in the natural resource development is one of the underlying causes of 
conflict, public participation in natural resource development and consultation with 
stakeholders has emerged as an essential component of sustainable development process 
and considered as the most significant new trend in natural resource development and 
management in the twenty-first century. 2 1 Consultation appears to be the principal 
21 Participation 'explosion' has occurred due to following reasons: (1) the democratisation trends and 
pressures of the 1990s in the former soviet union countries, Africa, and Asia and Latin America, 2. 
adoption of the new international legal paradigm of sustainable development, of which public 
participation is a central tenet, 3. the international environmental movement; 4. incorporation of public 
participation in lending requirements, 5. human rights law regimes designating public participation as a 
political right; 6. increasing recognition of rights of indigenous and tribal and local communities; and 7. 
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modality of public participation in resource development projects to engage a company 
with various stakeholders and identify appropriate measures to reduce the scope of 
disagreements. 22 Consultation should be a continuing process of participation of all 
stakeholders in decision-making throughout the formulation and execution of a project. 
The importance of stakeholder consultation as a means of public participation 
has assumed wider significance in mineral and petroleum development since the Ok 
Tedi case, which first time dealt with social conflict between the company and company 
in participatory ways. 23 The value of stakeholder consultation 11 1 " es in the fact that it is 
one of the ways to involve civil society, and indigenous peoples in the decision making 
process of the petroleum development and to reflect their concerns in the petroleum 
development, which indeed serves to obtain free and informed consent of local 
communities before the undertaking of the project. In this ways, stakeholder 
consultation prevents the tragic consequences of destructive resource development, 
includes host communities in resource management decisions that can help improve the 
social enviromnent of business. 
24 
the Internet, which has so greatly increased the public's ability to obtain, analyse, and disseminate 
information and views. See, George (Rock) Pring and Susan Y. Noe, "The Emerging International Law of 
Public Participation Affecting Global Mining, Energy and Resource Development", in: Donald N. 
Zillman, Alastair Lucas and George (Rock) Prmg (ed. ), Human Rights in Natural Resource Development. - 
Public Participation in the Sustainable Development ofMining and Energy Resources, Oxford University 
Press, (2002), p. 13. 
22 Public consultation has been defined by the International Finance Corporation (IFC 1998: 3) as follows: 
"Public consultation ... is a tool for managing two way communications 
between the project sponsor and 
the public. Its goal is to improve decision-making and build understanding by activity involving 
individuals, groups and organisations with a stake in the project. This involvement will increase a 
project's long-term viability and enhance its benefit to locally affected people and other stakeholders. " 
23 In Ok Tedi case, local communities brought legal action against BHP, an Australian company for 
compensation for environmental pollution. However, the parties settled the dispute out the court and 
entered into negotiated agreement while pending the case. The agreement spells out a new trend of 
environmental participation by local communities in the developing countries; secondly, the local 
communities not only got compensation for past pollution of their environment but also ensured a 
commitment to payment for future pollution. The case exposed BHP/OTML and the government of PNG 
to adverse local and international publicity. See, Zhiguo Gao, George Akpan and Jim Vanjik, "Public 
Participation in Mining and Petroleum M Asia and the Pacific: The Ok Tedi case and its Implications", in: 
Donald N. Zillman, et al supra note 2 1, pp. 679-694. 
24 See, Gerald P. Neugebauer, Indigenous Peoples as Stakeholders: Influencing Resource-Management 
Decisions Affecting Indigenous Community Interests in Latin America, 78 New York University Law 
Review (2003), p. 1227-1261. 
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Public participation and stakeholder consultation in the natural resource 
management has been institutionalised to some extent by the efforts of the UN. For 
example, one of the fundamental principles of the first UN-initiated 'Berlin Guidelines" 
of 1991 is that governments, mining companies and the mineral industry should ensure 
the participation and dialogue with the affected community and other directly interested 
parties on the environmental aspects of all phases of mining activities. The Berlin 
Guideline 11 particularly emphasises on conflict prevention role of public participation. 
It provides: 
"The participation of the affected communities in the decision-making process is an essential pre- 
condition for a responsible environmental policy and for avoiding subsequent conflict. Notwithstanding 
the possibility of granting more extensive rights, participation is primarily ensured by giving affected 
25 
communities access to relevant information at all stages of mining activities. " 
The host communities' participation in the project that is perceived to be open- 
ended, transparent and fair, can develop trust in the host community and company 
relationship and thus, can contribute to the building of sustainable contractual 
relationship in the long-term project. Effective participation of the community in the 
petroleum project can empower the communities and strengthen their role; reduce 
conflict among competing indigenous and local interests, ensure accountability of the 
decisions makers and increase public acceptance of a given project. Public participation 
can play an instrumental role in making the project sustainable by ascribing a greater 
degree of legitimacy and acceptability to the project. The evolving norms of 
international human rights law clearly recognise the rights of indigenous peoples to 
26 
participation in natural resource development in their lands . 
25 United Nations, Envirom-nental Guideline for mining Operations, ch. 5, ST/TCD/20 (Nov. 1999), 
available at http: //mineralresourcesforum. unep. ch/Berlin/index. htm. 
26 For instance, article 15 (2) of the ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989 requires the State to consult with 
indigenous peoples in case of exploration or exploitation of natural resources in their 
land with a view to 
ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced 
by such activities. Article 
17(2) states that the peoples concerned shall be consulted whenever consideration is 
being given to their 
capacity to alienate their lands or otherwise transmit their rights outside their own community. 
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It has been contended that the involvement of indigenous peoples in mineral and 
petroleum agreements is likely to increase the level of uncertainty associated with 
security of tenure by complicating the nature of negotiations since involvement of them 
in social-cultural issues is outside their customary experience and expectations and 
hence, can be counter productive to the sanctity of contract . 
27 The other popular 
criticisms levelled against public participation are: that it can increase the cost of a 
project and it can be time consuming process; and given wide divergence in the 
constitution of the public and their diverse interest, reaching an agreement will be very 
difficult task. The participation of local communities can have some negative effects 
with respect to sustainable development, as there is always the possibility that the 
present generation of local community interests may prove short-term in its approach to 
development, to the detriment of wealth creation for future generations and also strictly 
28 local concerns may prevail over the wider national benefits of a mining development . 
While many of the above criticisms and limitations are valid, nevertheless it can 
be argued that meaningful involvement of local and indigenous communities in resource 
development is conducive to contract stability because ignoring their interests and 
concerns can undermine the acceptability and legitimacy of the project. As a result, 
accumulated discontent of the host community finally can erupt into violent disruptions, 
which can lead to a decline in production and a closure of the project, which carries 
even greater risks to the continuation of the contract. Companies' proactive and open 
dialogue with wider interest groups such as host communities, local governments, and 
See also the draft declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 1994. Article 30 of the draft declaration 
emphasises informed consent of and participation of the indigenous people in the exploitation of natural 
resources on their land. It states: "Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities 
and strategies for the development, or use of their lands, territories and other resources, including the right 
to require that states obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting 
their lands, territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources... " 
27 John A. Cordes, Mining and Indigenous Peoples, A paper presented at International Mining Course, 
CEPMLP, UrUversity of Dundee, June 16,1997.913-28-29. 
28 Peter D. Cameron and Ernesto Correa, "Towards the Contractual Management of Public -Participation 
issues: A Review of Corporate Initiatives", in: Donald N. Zillman, et al, supra note 2 1, p. 229. 
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civil society can facilitate an understanding of the structural issues that underpin such 
conflict. Therefore, the importance of early and continuing consultation during the life 
cycle of a project with potentially affected stakeholders in a transparent manner is 
increasingly emphasised for the stability of the contract. 29 
However, it should be acknowledged that to yield desired goals, consultation as 
a process of public participation should not be carried out merely to observe legal 
requirements, but should be spontaneous, demonstrate equitable representation of the 
community including voices of poor and marginalised segments and be channelled 
through transparent process. Consultation between the company and local communities 
may encounter various problems such as relevant information may not be accessible or 
is not disclosed to communities or local communities may be threatened or harassed or 
most vulnerable groups may not included for consultation. Therefore, the effectiveness 
of the consultation process depends upon its degree of participatory interactions, 
exchange of background information on the proposed project, mutual understanding of 
the parties, and overcoming the cultural and linguistic barriers of local and indigenous 
communities, creation of appropriate settings and locations for the consultations, 
recognition of the time frames of communities, respect for indigenous leadership pattern 
and religious beliefs. 30 
It should, however, be acknowledged that the community consultation process 
can be extremely difficult where local communities raise unrealistically high 
expectations from the project and reaching consensus on all demands of heterogeneous 
communities with opposing interests could be particularly frustrating task. This 
underscores the necessity for a genuine and realistic consultation process, which makes 
a balance between the needs, interests, and constraints of all stakeholders and project's 
limitation to meet those needs. 
29 See, Robert Wasserstrom, Susan Reider, supra note 12. 
30 Best Practices in Dealing with the Social Impacts of Oil and Gas Operations, see, 
http: //www. worldbank. org/o, gsimpact/cpoverview. htm. 
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4.1.4 Negotiating Agreements with the Host Community 
Companies' negotiation of a separate agreement with the local community can also be 
an important modality of their channelling concerns and interest and social pressure 
which can be important step in reaching a durable solution of community-company 
conflicts. The negotiation of such community agreements is already a wel I-establi shed 
practice in the mining industry, and it can address a number of community rights issues 
such as project related employment and business opportunities for the communities, 
access to infonnation relating to enviromnental data, planned operational policies, 
safety, and health, revenue to local municipalities, and community relations. 
Negotiation of a separate agreement is increasingly becoming a viable alternative to 
articulate and accommodate public participation, social provision and the compensation 
issue. 
Obviously, negotiating with local communities can often be problematic to deal 
with diverse interests of the unarticulated groups and it is also difficult to anticipate all 
the legal issues and challenges that might surround such agreement. For this reason, 
establishing a consensus among the key stakeholders on core interests and demands is 
needed to facilitate such negotiation. The negotiation of community agreements can 
further be fraught with problems of inequality of bargaining power between the 
company and the local or indigenous community which are often economically 
disadvantaged sections of the society lacking proper education and appropriate legal 
skills to negotiate with companies having sophisticated negotiating skills. The local and 
indigenous groups with multi-cultural and linguistic background may often not 
be 
effectively represented in the negotiation process. This problem can be resolved by the 
formation of a small, appropriately resourced and skilled group from the community to 
negotiate, and by providing external legal and financial support and community 
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development programmes for meaningfully engaging the communities with the 
company. 
31 
4.1.5 Addressing Human Rights and Security Arrangements 
The companies should undertake strong and positive steps to protect and promote 
human rights in their operating areas in order to meet social expectations regarding their 
human rights obligations towards the community. Companies' proactive efforts to 
protect human rights within their own operations and to promote human rights where 
the corporation has the possibility of influencing the government with human rights 
records can be seen as key elements of their compliance with human rights 
obligations. 32 In their internal operation, companies' human rights responsibilities 
should ensure that the basic rights of workers and other employees of the company 
concerned are well protected and that their subcontractors conform to the same levels of 
human rights standards. On the other hand, in the sphere of its external influence, 
companies should persuade the government not to resort to an illegitimate use of force 
in regard to demonstrators and striking workers in the local field of operations of the 
company. 33 Companies' recognition that human rights protection and promotion can 
matter as much as their profit motive can have profound impact on a sustained 
relationship with the host community. For this purpose, it is essential that companies 
operate in accordance with international human rights norms and respect basic civil and 
political rights of local or indigenous community in the operating area. 
In order to prevent human rights abuse, companies should ensure that their 
security arrangements are consistent with international and national human rights norms 
31 Geoff Gishubl, Negotiating Community Agreements- Some Issues Arising From the Yandicoogina 
Experience, A paper presented at International Bar Association seminar on Minerals, Energy and 
Resources Law, Edinburgh, April 2002. 
32 See, Jens Scierbeck, "Operational Measures for Identifying and Implementing Human Rights issues in 
Corporate Operations", in: Asbjorn Eide, et al, supra note 6, p. 168. 
33 Asbjorn Eide, "Globalisation and the Human Rights Agenda: The Petroleum Industry at Crossroads", 
in: Asbjorn Eide, et al, supra note 6, p. 43. 
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and practices. The pattern of security arrangements, the attitude of security forces 
towards the community and their past records of human rights abuse may be one of the 
underlying reasons that explain the prevailing uneasy relationship between the 
companies and communities. It is necessary to realise that in providing security 
arrangements, a balance should be struck between the company's legitimate need to 
meet real security concerns and an overriding concern for the protection of the human 
rights of the local communities. 
In this regard, the following steps are considered to be necessary for balancing 
security needs and human rights concerns of the host community: Firstly, companies 
should ensure transparency in the appointment of security forces through consultation 
with the host communities and making security arrangements public. Secondly, 
companies should provide appropriate training to the private security forces about basic 
civil and political rights and the prevailing laws of the host country and ensure adequate 
disciplinary measures for non-compliance with these laws. Thirdly, the companies 
should ensure that security forces adhere to international humanitarian law particularly, 
operating in the conflicting zones. Finally, the companies should adhere to the voluntary 
principles and emerging best practices developed by industry, and governments recently 
developed on the use of security forces in maintaining the safety and security of their 
operations. 34 An integration of voluntary principles on security arrangements by the 
companies' policy, training and operating guidelines and procedures and community 
agreements can reduce much of the concern of the community. 
4.1.5 Payment of Compensation to the Affected Communities 
Payment of compensation is one of the most contentious issues pertaining to conflict 
between the community and the state vis a vis the company, the resolution of which is 
34 See for details on voluntary principles, Bennett Freeman and Genoveva Hernandez Unz, Managing 
Risk and Building Trust, in: Rory Sullivan (ed. ), supra note 10, pp. 243-259. 
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necessary for a stable contractual relationship. Currently, in most jurisdictions, 
compensation is payable to the individual landowners for acquisition of surface rights or 
land and it remains only the direct fiscal benefits to the host communities in the 
petroleum producing areas. Generally, compensation is payable by the host state under 
the relevant legislation and the rate and amount of compensation is determined by the 
land tenure system, and land acquisition laws and practice of a particular country. 
However, in some countries, companies may be liable to pay compensation for 
acquisition of lands. 
Payment of compensation by the companies can be confronted by the various 
problems. The local and indigenous communities demand for compensation can be 
hindered by the non-recognition of traditional rights by the forinal laws of a country. 
Moreover, communities can claim that compensation paid is not fair or inadequate or be 
perplexed by inordinate delay and complex procedure. These problems can be resolved 
by the legal and contractual framework which should lay down transparent procedure 
for early determination of the compensation issue before the project starts its operation. 
A perspective of fairness in determination of the amount of compensation is crucial for 
satisfaction of the key stakeholders. 
Apart from land acquisition, compensation should be payable to the affected 
communities for negative social impacts as mitigatory measures. However, in this 
regard, the compensation issue may represent a delicate problem for the companies 
because the determination of compensation for the social impact in monetary terms may 
be extremely difficult and such determination may not be satisfactory to all the 
competing groups of interests. In this regard, there are two alternative ways of dealing 
with these problems: compensation can be given directly in the form of cash or kind to 
the local and indigenous community; or the company should employ social investment 
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in the form of social infrastructure development, education, health and social amenities 
for the affected communities. 
However, the determination of what is a fair amount of compensation can be 
problematic in both situations. An inadequate amount of compensation, lack of 
transparency, or delay may be a source of friction between the company and 
community. To ensure fairness in compensation, compensation should be measured by 
the transparent process and with the consultation of affected communities, where 
appropriate. Another fundamental problem relating to payment of compensation in cash 
or in kind can arise regarding whether the local or indigenous community has sufficient 
institutional and management capacity to deal with an influx of cash flow and what are 
the possible short and long term impacts of such cash flow. Direct cash flow can inflate 
their life style artificially and can have disruptive social impacts on the community and 
there is also the possibility that such cash flow can exacerbate conflict among the 
competing groups. Moreover, financial compensation can produce only short term 
benefits ignoring the interests of future generations who will bear the legacy of negative 
impact of the operation. Thus, financial compensation can be a short term solution for 
acquisition of land, but for addressing social impact, it can be suggested that socia 
investment of establishing schools, hospital, enhanced employment opportunity, and 
training aiming at overall improvement of social and economic conditions in those 
affected areas should be the most desirable altemative. 
4.1.6 Social Performance Bond 
Like the envirom-nental performance bond, a social performance bond can be introduced 
in the petroleum contract for the compliance with social obligations by the companies. 
Conditionality of social performance bonds by the govenunent and project financiers 
can ensure a performance guarantee by the company concerning social obligations from 
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the initial phase to the closing phase of the project. Social bonds charges can be 
determined similar ways of environmental bond for environmental reclamation. 35 A 
social performance bond can be an important incentive for discharging social 
responsibility since it allows the company to receive a refund of its money for 
perfon-ning. It can also act as insurance in the mitigation of social risks. 
4.1.7 Social Reporting 
Social reporting can play an important role in ensuring that companies' activities in 
relation to social aspects of the projects are reported to the wider public. Social 
reporting is a means of assessing the social impact and ethical behaviour of the 
company towards wider society and has been proved to be effective tool to regulate 
corporate behaviour. 36 A social report usually starts when the company enters into 
operational stage of exploration. Social report aims to evaluate companies' social 
perfon-nance against the given set of standards or expectations and acts like an audit. 
The social report can help to achieve corporate social responsibility by promoting its 
accountability to the public through disclosure of their activities and evaluation of 
public expectations from the companies regarding discharging their social obligations. 
The social report can be prepared by petroleum companies themselves in its 
annual or other periodic assessment. However, to achieve credibility, companies' social 
reporting should be verified by the external standards and objectivity should be ensured 
in the process. It can also be prepared by a govenunental agency or NGOs, or a civil 
society group after consultation with and participation by affected peoples like 
35 Jennifer Cook Clark, "Law and Policy concerning Social and Cultural Issues in Mining", Mining and 
Environment Research Network Bulletin No., 11 & 12,1997, Special Edition, p. 2 8. 
36 See also, John Elkington, "The 'Triple Bottom Line' for Twenty- first-century Business", in: John V. 
Mitchell (ed. ), Companies in a World of Conflict, Earthscan Publications Ltd, London, (1998), pp. 32-69. 
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indigenous peoples and communities. 37 An effective reporting requires identification of 
key performance indicators for measuring and monitoring the company's impacts. A 
harmomsed system of reporting guideline also needs to be developed with a broad set of 
principle and operational guidelines in the light of experience and cooperation of 
multilateral organisations, civil society organisation and the intemational organisation 
of standardization. 
38 
5. Petroleum Companies' Responses: An Appraisal 
In recent time, many petroleum companies have realised the need for integration of 
social concerns into the decision making process and have acknowledged the urgency of 
including respect for human rights as one of their core responsibilities. This corporate 
response to social and human rights issues has mainly been driven by the fear of 
negative campaign, publicity of their human rights abuses and attendant reputation loss, 
and litigation risk for their failure to behave socially and their attempts to improve their 
image in the public sphere. Since the mid 1990s, petroleum companies have placed 
increasing emphasis on integration of stakeholder concerns into the overall project 
management cycle. Many companies now consider socially responsible behaviour as an 
essential element of good business practice and a means to fulfil social expectations 
from the company activities, which may eventually enhance the prospects of gaining 
access to new licences. The recent movement of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
is also considered an important contributory factor behind the corporate initiatives. CSR 
encompasses a company's responsibility to a broad range of stakeholders throughout the 
society and it denotes the idea that companies should not be seen as merely legal entities 
operating for the benefits of shareholders, but that they are also expected to be agents to 
37 See also Draft Commentary on the Norms of Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2003/XX, 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2003? WG. 2/WP. 1. 
38 Breaking New Ground: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, The Report of the MMSD 
Project, Earthscan, London, 2002, p. xxxii. 
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assume greater responsibility for the economic and social impacts of their corporate 
activities and well being for society. 
The current social responses of the companies can be divided into two broad 
categories: firstly, adoption of voluntary codes and principles on social 
responsibilities. 39 Many petroleum companies have responded to demands for improved 
social and human rights performance by adopting voluntary codes for internal 
management of social and environmental concerns, accepting the industry-specific 
voluntary codes and guidelines, making policy statements, incorporating CSR principles 
in the business principles, or accepting voluntary international standards. 40 
While these codes and guidelines acknowledge the trend of acceptance of 
ethical, social and human rights responsibility in petroleum operation by companies, the 
effectiveness of this self-regulation is questionable. Because these internal codes of 
conduct in most cases act as a moral reflection of a company's societal view and these 
are seen as devices for avoiding criminal and civil liability of any misdeeds. Moreover, 
the credibility of such codes can be eroded by the lack of their binding force and 
implementation; and even in the case of implementation, such codes are not subject to 
monitoring and external verification. According to one author, the overall impact of 
39 In this regard, three types of self-regulating code can be identified. Some codes relate to minimum 
standard regulating condition of work by the company and its associates. Some codes support increased 
involvement by the company in human rights in the larger community M which it operates. Some 
establish ethical criteria by which a company's investment should be guided. Christopher McCrudden, 
"Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: What Can the Sullivan and MacBride Principles 
Tell Us? " 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (1999), p. 169. 
40 For instance, in response to the fierce criticism and public condemnation for complicity in human rights 
abuses in Nigeria, and for Brent Spar incident, Dutch-Shell had reviewed its business strategy and 
brought changes in corporate management level by undertaking various steps to mitigate the impacts 
including public consultation process, adoption of a voluntary code of conduct for respecting human 
rights obligations, making explicit commitment in mission statement to sustainable development and the 
promotion of human rights in the sphere of its operation. Shell also formulated a comprehensive guideline 
on Social Impact Assessment in June 1996. The guideline not only deal with the management of social 
risks in the petroleum industry, but also intended to raise managers' awareness of the potential social 
impacts of the operation. See, The Shell Report 1999. - People, Planet and Profits: An Act of Commitment, 
London, Shell, 1; See also, Kristian Tangen, Kare Rudsar and Helge Ole Bergesen, "Confronting the 
Ghost: Shell's Human Rights Strategy", in: Asbjorn Eide, et al supra note 6, pp. 185-198. Similarly, 
British Petroleum (BP) made explicit reference to human rights in its business principle. Its health, safety 
and environmental performance policy places particular emphasis on consultation with local communities 
and public interest groups. Rio Tinto sets outs the communities policy in its annual report of 1996 which 
is premised on good relationship with neighbouring conununities is fundamental to its long-term success. 
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such codes on corporate behaviour is unclear, with different companies and industries 
adopting stronger or weaker codes, each of which is observed with varying degree of 
seriousness. 41 Thus, companies' self-regulation is only of limited value. However, these 
codes can provide an ideal mechanism for creating awareness and respect for human 
rights within the structure of a company. 
Secondly, it should be mentioned that some companies are currently undertaking 
various efforts including stakeholder consultation, community programmes, partnership 
building, social benefits, training and education to the local and indigenous 
community. 
42 
The above discussion clearly demonstrates that a change is currently taking 
place in the companies' attitude towards community participation and accommodating 
their interest, which they previously opposed on the ground of sanctity of contract. This 
emerging practice of policy commitments to social and community concerns and their 
actual actions reflect companies' increased understanding of the social and ethical 
dimensions of the petroleum industry. 
However, a note of caution should be sounded regarding limits on the ability of 
the companies to discharge social responsibilities: firstly, the companies' ability to the 
shoulder social responsibility can be tied up within the limits of the financial capability 
of the project and their expectation of a reasonable rate of return. The local communities 
may not always behave altruistically and sometimes their actions may be driven by a 
41 Steven R. Ratner, "Corporation and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, " 111 Yale Law 
Journal (2001), p. 443,532; See also, Charles Woolfson and Matthias Beck, "Corporate Social 
Responsibility Failures in the Oil Industry", in: Rory Sullivan (ed. ), supra note 10, pp. 114-124. 
42 In the Camisea project in the Inca region of Peru, Shell Prospecting and Development Peru (SPDP) 
has 
undertaken extensive consultation process and provided social benefits to the 
local communIties in the 
key areas of health, training, and education, and has reached agreement with Red 
Ambiental Peruana, a 
network of 35 social and environmental NGOs in Peru, to undertake independent third party monitoring 
of their social and environmental performance. BP has undertaken community 
development strategy in 
the Casanare region of Colombia in order to help the departmental and municipal authorities to 
develop 
the capacity to manage substantial oil revenues, as the basis for the long term sustainable 
development of 
local communities. For this purpose, BP and its partners (state-owned Ecopetrol, 
Total and Tritonl) have 
developed a far reaching social investment strategy known as Casanare 2000. In Baku-Tbilisi pipeline 
project, BP has undertaken extensive consultation process with local communities who are 
likely to be 
affected by the project to avoid adverse impacts of the project. 
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selfish and opportunistic attitude. Both local and indigenous communities should 
recognise the financial limitations of the project, particularly when the returns from a 
project are marginal, and huge requirements of social provisions may profoundly affect 
a project's viability. Secondly, obsolescing bargaining can come into play and shifting 
bargaining strength to the host country and local cornmunity at the development stage of 
the contract can inspire the host state and host community to demand unrealistic social 
provision, which ultimately can go against the financial capabilities of the companies 
and viability of the project. 
6. The Role of Host Governments 
The host government's measures relating to managing social and human rights risks can 
be following: 
6.1 Legal and Regulatory Measures 
At the national level, the appropriate legal framework, monitoring mechanisms, and 
capacity building of relevant government agencies are imperative for managing social 
risks and distribution of a share of rent to the local communities. It is imperative that the 
government's legal and policy measure should posit social impact assessment as a pre- 
condition for approval and development of the project, should clearly reflect the 
community Is concerns, delineate companies 1) responsibility regarding social and human 
rights issues, lay down appropriate procedures for the use of land and public 
consultation requirements. A clear legal framework either in the petroleum law or code 
or impact assessment legislation can remove much of the uncertainty regarding the 
extent of the companies' social obligation regarding social and human rights impacts of 
the operation. The host government's development of the legal or contractual 
framework on social provision can also furnish the legal basis of social and human 
rights obligation of the companies which is mostly seen as merely voluntary 
in nature. 
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But for the credibility and effectiveness of such legislation, it is essential that 
government formulate them after consultation with and input from industry and 
stakeholders. 
Only a few states require companies to carry out a social impact assessment 
prior to undertaking a petroleum project. For instance, Papua New Guinea's Oil and Gas 
Act of 1998 makes social mapping and landowner identification studies a condition for 
granting a petroleum licence to the licensee. The Act provides that prior to the entry on 
to the license area for the purpose of exploration, the licensee shall undertake a 
preliminary social mapping study and landowner identification study of the customary 
owners and the occupants of the land comprised in the licence area and after discovery 
43 
of petroleum, the licensee shall conduct a full scale study of both . 
It should be mentioned that many developing countries might be more interested 
in gaining large economic benefits from the petroleum project and ignoring the social 
and environmental aspect of the operation. In fact, the role of host governments in 
managing the social and human rights risks in the petroleum sector are very often found 
to be inadequate and less developed. The governments' efforts to deal with human 
rights abuses and social impacts can be severely limited by their desire to attract the 
necessary foreign investment over and above the social and human rights aspects of the 
proj ects. 
6.2 Equitable Revenue Sharing 
Much of the source of discontent of the host communities may lie in deprivation of local 
communities from the revenue extracted from the petroleum project as economic rent 
derived from it is often treated as government income. A petroleum contract's fiscal 
regime, which is quite insensitive to the needs of the local communities and indigenous 
43 Article 47 of the Oil and Gas Act 1998 (No. 49 of 1998) (Certified on: 5 February 1999), Barrows 
supplement Asia and Australasia (Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts), No. 146, p. 40. 
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people and directed exclusively towards providing revenue to the central government, 
may be viewed as an inequitable and unjust arrangement by the local and indigenous 
communities. Host communities may also be dissatisfied with existing compensation 
arrangements and social provisioning, and may demand that these are little compared to 
the amount of economic benefits extracted from their land. This perception of 
deprivation of communities' from the project revenue can lead to tension between the 
local and indigenous community and the central government; which may have spill over 
effects on host community-company relationship. To counter this, it becomes 
imperative that central or national government allocates an appropriate share of revenue 
from the petroleum development to the affected communities. The rationale of such 
arrangements for revenue sharing should not only be viewed from the perspective of 
merely negative impacts of the operation, but also from the context of social justice 
requiring adoption of the affirmative action policy towards the affected communities 
who are often marginalised and poverty stricken compared to the segments of 
mainstream population. Equity and social justice perspective can be dominant criteria 
behind the underlying philosophy of revenue sharing with the community or local 
govenunent. 
But the issue of revenue sharing may be confronted with the following 
problems: firstly, in most of the instances, the companies negotiate with central 
goverm-nents and regional or local governments or communities are marginalised or 
excluded; secondly, the communities' demand for a share of revenue can be constrained 
by the legal and constitutional arrangements which can vest management or control over 
the whole natural resources in the central or national govenunent which can utilise and 
allocate the revenue for payment of external debt, overall economic and social 
development of its citizens, and for promoting economic growth. Thirdly, determination 
of fair and equitable revenue sharing can be inherently problematic. Fourthly, 
it may be 
279 
difficult to make an equitable balance between the interests of the affected area where 
petroleum is developed and other areas of a country. Particularly, distribution of a 
project's revenue among federal, state, local governments and local and indigenous 
communities may be highly complex and may be fraught with a lack of consensus 
among the political units. 
The first two problems can be resolved by delineating the rights of the 
communities to share revenue in a clear legal or contractual framework on the basis that 
many of the external costs of exploiting petroleum resources are localised. The next two 
problems can be resolved by devising appropriate formula for sharing revenue among 
the central government, affected communities and local governments and other parts of 
the areas of a country. In determining a fair and equitable division of revenue across 
these units, there are two accepted principles, which should be taken into consideration. 
Firstly, the principle of derivation, eg, allocating revenue on the basis of how much of it 
is derived from a particular part of the country. The 'derivation' principle denotes the 
proportion of contribution to production in the particular area. Secondly, the principle of 
'need', e. g., sharing of revenue on the basis of the number of affected populations, level 
of economic and social development among them, and the degree of impact an in case 
of allocating local govemments, the level of their financial expenditures and 
obligations, and the number of populations affected within the particular local area. 44 
Another important way for community's involvement in revenue sharing that is 
worth mentioning is that the right of affected local government and communities to 
negotiate a participating interest in the petroleum project. Such a participation right has 
been recognised in some countries. For example, in Papua New Guinea, affected 
provincial govennnents, local governments and project area landowners of a petroleum 
project can negotiate with a licensee to acquire from the licensee, on freely negotiated 
44 See, Ike Ogulne, "Nigeria's Oil Revenues and the Oil Producing Areas", 17 Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resources Law (1999), p. 114. 
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commercial terms, a participating interest in a petroleum project, addition to the state's 
45 
participating interest. However, the efficacy of such community equity participation is 
yet to be tested and may face many practical problems. 
6.3 Transparency in Revenue Management 
The importance of improving transparency and accountability of petroleum revenues in 
many developing countries and economies in transition lies in the fact that 
misappropriation or mismanagement of revenue and resultant deprivation of vast 
majority of people of economic benefits of projects can fuel conflict and increase social 
instability, which, in tum, may negatively affect investment climate. Lack of 
transparency in oil revenue management can breed corruption, strengthen authoritarian 
regimes, increase the poverty level and social inequality, and consequently can create an 
unstable business environment in a State. 
Ensuring revenue transparency requires the host states' measures like making 
disclosure of basic information on revenue earned from oil and gas development, 
maintaining proper accounts, establishing linkages to the overall budget and public 
expenditure management, identifying priority areas for expenditures and ensuring 
oversight monitoring and control of the expenditure of the revenue. Legal and policy 
reform regarding public disclosure requirements relating to payments made to the 
governments by the companies and how governments spend revenues can contribute to 
the transparency and accountability in the revenue management. 
7. The Role of Project Financiers 
The role of international financial institutions is traditionally pre-occupied with 
managing the political risks through providing risk insurance for the companies 
45 Article 175 of the Oil and Gas Act 1998. 
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operating in the politically volatile host states. Very recently, these institutions also 
have attempted to set out conditions on improved social and environmental perfon-nance 
by the companies and modifying government policy and regulation for addressing these 
issues in their voluntary codes, guidelines and loan agreements. It is widely recognised 
that the financial institutions can use their financial leverage and political influence to 
press both host governments and operating companies for the adoption of measures and 
policies for management of social and environmental issues through their lending 
requirements. The principles, criteria, guidelines and standards set out by them on 
private sector investment and their implementation can secure a reasonable return on 
investment as well as address social concerns arising out of projects' environmental and 
social impacts. 
For instance, the International Finance Corporation has various policy and 
procedural requirements for projects in which IFC invests to ensure certain levels of 
envirom-nental and social responsibility to be camed out by the corporations. 
46 The 
Operational Guidelines of the World Bank requires social and environmental impact 
assessment as part of the development of projects including petroleum and mineral 
projects. Very recently, some international financial organisations (Banks) have 
developed and adopted "the Equator Principles"- a voluntary set of guidelines for 
identifying environmental and social issues in private project finance lending and 
47 
managing environmental and social risks in the petroleum projects. The main 
46 See, IFC's 1998 Procedure for Environmental and Social Review of Projects; IFC's Policy on 
Disclosure Information, and IFC Operational Policies OP 4.01. According to IFC's categorisation, public 
consultation and information disclosure are required for Category A projects, and for 
Category B projects 
where deemed appropriate. Projects Category A are defined as likely to 
have significant adverse 
envirom-nental impacts that are sensitive, diverse or unprecedented. A potential 
impact is deemed 
sensitive if it may be irreversible, affect vulnerable groups or ethnic minorities, involve involuntary 
displacement and resettlement, or affect significant cultural heritage. Projects Category B are those which 
potential adverse impacts is less adverse than Category A projects. 
47 The Equator Principles intend to serve a baseline and common framework for implementation of 
internal envirom-nental and social procedures and standards for project 
financing activities across all 
industry sector globally. The Framework of the Equator Principles is based on the environmental and 
social standards used by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector 
lending arm of the 
World Bank group. Four Banks were pivotal in developing the Equator Principles: ABN 
AMRO, 
Barclays, Citigroup and WestLB. The main reasons for inspiring such initiative were: financial 
loss, 
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objective of the principles is that a concerned bank in a lending project should screen 
the level of envirom-nental and social risk in the project and require its borrowers to 
prepare an environmental risk assessment and develop an environmental management 
plan in order to have access to project financing from the bank. The principles provide 
that in addition to conforming to host country laws, a project must meet the IFC's 
enviromnental, health, and safety guidelines applicable to the specific industry. 
While these guidelines of the lending agencies can be helpful for assessing the 
social impact of the operations, their active involvement at an early stage of the projects 
financed by them and their social conditionality can ensure greater management of 
social risks. The World Bank's ability to manage social, human rights and 
environmental risk is now being critically tested in the Chad-Cameron projeCt48, which 
illustrates the fact that project lenders' efforts and involvement can play an important 
role in managing social risks for durable contractual relationship. There is a growing 
demand that the project lenders should initiate an open consultation process with the 
stakeholders in order to ascertain the environmental and social sustainability of the 
project and its impact on host communities. The involvement of an international 
financial institution in the project and its efforts for social and human rights concern can 
reduce the companies' social risk perception. Project financiers should require the host 
government to adopt transparent revenue management as a condition of funding a 
proj ect. 
increased awareness of the risks, public pressures and reputation damage. For financiers, adoption of the 
Equator Principles Will entail adoption or refinement of environmental strategies in such areas as internal 
controls, financial and credit risk, public relations and marketing. See, William L Thomas, "Equator-Risk 
and Sustainability", Yearbook of Project Finance International, 2004, pp. 10-16; See also Robert 
Wasserstrom, Susan Reider, "Oil Project lending faces new environmental litmus test", Oil and Gas 
Journal, Oct. 13,2003, pp. 35-36. See also, http: //www. equator-principles. com/pftn2. shtml 
48The World Bank has undertaken measures on transparent and equitable revenue management III Chad, 
the environmental management plan, and the establishment of the International Advisory Group to 
monitor the social and environmental protection measures. 
However, one of the important conditionalities 
of financial support of the project by Bank 
is the establishment of an off-shore escrow account into which 
royalties, dividend and interests will 
be paid to such account for the re-payment of debt before the balance 
is handed over to the Chadian government. 
See, risk minimisation measures of the World Bank on Chad- 
Cameroon Project, htti): //www. worldbank. oriz/afr/ccproj/project/td44305. pd 
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The World Bank Extractive Review, 2003 explicitly recognises the World Bank 
Group's role in the petroleum and mineral sector in making the projects compatible with 
sustainable development and states that their intervention is allowed in extractive 
industries in order to contribute to poverty alleviation. 49 The Report also lays down 
conditionality of WBG's support of the petroleum and mining projects that such 
projects benefit all affected groups, and in ensuring this, it require companies to engage 
in consent processes with communities and groups directly affected by projects in order 
to obtain their free prior and infonned consent; and require host government to share 
revenue with local communities, encourages the incorporation of public health 
components in all extractive industries projects. 50 
The fundamental problem, however, arises of how to reconcile the lending role 
of project lenders who seek repayment of their debt from the cash flow of project and 
their social role in the project for managing social and human rights risks. A balanced 
view suggests that a reconciliation of these two conflicting goals is desirable and 
possible. There are already some positive indications that many financial institutions are 
adapting their organisational structures and developing their policies and procedures to 
better manage envirom-nental and social matters, which will play a significant role in 
reducing social and human rights concerns in petroleum development. 
8. Summary 
It is found in this chapter that emerging social and human risks in the petroleum sector 
and associated costs to mitigate these risks have become the most important challenges 
for the stability of petroleum contracts in the 21s' century. An understanding of the 
49 The Final Report of the Extractive Industries Review: Striking a Better Balance, December 2003, 
www. eireview. org. The report states more elaborately about pro-poor governance as the following 
conditions: promote transparency in revenue flows, promote 
disclosure of project documents, develop the 
capacity to manage fluctuating revenues, develop the capacity to manage revenues responsibly, 
help 
government develop modem policy and regulatory 
frameworks, and integrate the public in decision 
making processes at local and national levels. 
io See, The Report p. ix. 
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social issues in petroleum operations by the companies is a pre-requisite for sustainable 
petroleum development and a sustained community and company relationship. It is now 
increasingly appreciated that contract stability is strongly tied to stability of social 
surrounding of the project. The chapter has revealed that in the planning and 
implementation of petroleum projects, social, human rights and environmental issues 
should be taken into consideration for sustainability of the project as well as protecting 
legitimate interests of the wider community. Because in many developing countries, a 
stable contractual relationship becomes increasingly dependent upon maintaining a 
hannonious relationship with the key stakeholders throughout the life of the project. 
Managing social risks and a better integration of social and enviromnental concerns into 
the decision-making process of companies can enhance stable relationship between the 
host communities and companies, particularly those which are operating in 
environmentally sensitive and socially fragile areas. Developing a strong community 
relations programme early in the project, enhanced employment opportunities for local 
communities, strengthening community participation, improving social provision, 
integration of social policy into companies' decision making are widely considered as 
essential to the success of a project. But in doing so, a balance has to be struck between 
the necessity of petroleum development, which can accelerate economic and social 
development, and the need to address societal concerns in the development of such a 
proj ect. 
The characteristic features of social and human rights risks distinguishes them 
from political risks of traditional types in many ways, such as in the case of 
actualisation of the former, companies cannot be afforded protection under international 
or national law and by typical contractual mechanisms of stability. Rather these risks 
can be mitigated through the regulation of corporate behaviour and by understanding 
and addressing the social aspects of operation, 
discharging social and human rights 
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obligations by the companies towards the wider community, and pro-active engagement 
with stakeholders. They also require a host government's legislative and policy 
measures for addressing social impacts including a clear legal framework for impact 
assessment, consultation, and equitable distribution of revenue among the affected 
communities. The role of project finance should be properly emphasised and evaluated 
in social and environmental management and in this regard, lenders in financing project 
should ensure that projects they finance are developed in a manner that is socially 
responsible and environmentally sound. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that in managing a human rights risk, a 
trade-off has to be found between the economic imperatives of securing a reasonable 
profit for the company and accommodating social concerns in the project for its 
continuation. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Introduction 
The purpose of the thesis has been to identify and examine lessons from the experience 
of developing countries and economies in transition for the stability of petroleum 
contracts during the period of 1980-2002. The preceding chapters tried to bring together 
the issues relating to contemporary aspects of stability in petroleum contracts by 
investigating the questions raised and have provided an analysis of internal and external 
factors shaping such stability in the contract. This concluding part of the thesis intends 
to surnmarise the findings of the study and draw some general conclusions in the light 
of these findings. 
Revisiting the finding of chapters 
Two closely related themes interwoven throughout the present study are stability and 
change in the petroleum contracts. The conflict between stability and change mirrors the 
underlying tension between certainty and flexibility in the contractual relationship. The 
need for a reasonable degree of stability in petroleum contracts is always recognised by 
all parties as a means of achieving mutual interests and the objectives of such contracts. 
PART one of the study which laid down the conceptual framework of thesis, has 
assessed the importance of stability in petroleum contract, reflected on defining features 
of notion of stability and its instrumentalities, and examined doctrinal trends on legal 
protection of foreign investment in the light of current perspective of contract 
negotiation. Chapter one noted that notion of contract stability has undergone 
evolutionary changes in its dimensions and forms with the emergence of new contract 
forms and in the historical context of the evolution of fiscal terms. The situation of 
general distrust towards foreign investment and the climate of instability which was 
characteristic feature in foreign investment in the petroleum sector in 1960s and 1970s 
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began to change from the early 1980s with the developing countries' changing and 
favourable attitude towards foreign investment and their appreciation that natural 
resource development is urgent for acceleration of their economic and social 
development. The underlying nuance of stability in petroleum contracts during the last 
two decades has been profoundly influenced by these factors in the changed perspective 
of the investment climate. The transformation in the petroleum investment climate 
clearly illustrates the need for investment protection and stability of contractual 
arrangements as a pre-requisite to foreign investment in the petroleum sector. With the 
end of ideological euphoria and the developing countries' realisation that the stability of 
contractual arrangements can enable them to pursue their long term economic interests 
rather than serving short-term ones by changing contract terms through an arbitrary 
exercise of state power or the undue exercise of regulatory intervention with the 
property rights have led them to offer legal and contractual guarantees of stability of 
petroleum contract in the last two decades. 
The modem notion of stability is characterised by the necessity of balance 
between flexibility and certainty. The long-term nature of petroleum contracts suggests 
that it must not be seen simply as a rigid formula, but as a flexible process in which the 
rights and obligations of both parties may change over time as specific factors change. 
But the need for flexibility has to be balanced against the necessity of a relative degree 
of certainty in the rules of the game. A minimum degree of certainty should be ensured 
through clear rules and regulations so that flexibility in contract can be clearly matched 
with certainty in regulation and policy of the goverment. A functional notion of 
stability should, thus, take practical necessity of continuity in the contractual 
relationship with the necessary flexibility in contract but not necessarily at the expense 
of a reasonable degree of regulatory and policy certainty. It is well established that 
stability of petroleum contract is shaped by location specific factors such the investment 
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climate in a given state, degree of the stability guarantees provided to the operating 
companies and government's credibility of compliance with these guarantees. 
Chapter two examined political risks phenomena in petroleum industry and 
reviewed orthodox views on legal protection of foreign investment. It has been 
contended in this chapter that political risk perception with its various forms appears to 
be a perennial problem posing a threat to the stability of contract at all times. It noted 
that although the possibility of outright nationalisation or expropriation of foreign 
property has largely disappeared now, the host government's regulatory and 
administrative interventions in the changing bargaining conditions are considered 
dominant forms of interference to the extractive industry and will continue to be so in 
the foreseeable future. The impact of regulatory uncertainty in the extractive industry 
figures prominently in the discourse of stability. This is more evident in the petroleum 
sector which is less reversible than other sectors like manufacturing industry and hence, 
is more vulnerable to uncertain future changes of regulation provoked by an 
"obsolescing bargaining" situation. 
In re-assessing the principles of protection of foreign investment, chapter two 
has showed that despite recognition of the necessity of sanctity of contract 
arrangements, the notion in its absolutist form lost much of its appeal in the present 
context. Rising economic nationalism, and the emergence of concept of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources in 1960s and 1970s led the developing countries to 
demand for ownership and greater control over management in natural resources, and 
also to challenge the traditional legal principles and theories on sanctity of contract for 
their perceived bias towards foreign investors. 
The classical doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which requires near absolute 
performance of contractual obligations, is no longer tenable in the prevailing 
circumstances as the state's right to protect the overriding public interest may warrant 
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change in contract terms or the necessity of accommodating changes in external 
circumstances becomes inevitable for the continuity of the relationship. Underpinnings 
of contemporary practice of contract negotiation and drafting strongly posit that while 
sanctity of contract should be protected, it should be balanced with mutability of 
interests of the parties. 
PART two of thesis has investigated fonns and efficacy of contractual 
mechanisms of stability used in the modem petroleum contract. Stability guarantees are 
usually sought by the companies to prevent political risks generated by an "obsolescing 
bargain" situation and to yield their expected rate of return from the project. In view of 
the fact that uncertainty in the legal and policy environment may lead the companies to 
impose a high risk premium but the credibility of the compliance with legal and 
contractual arrangements with the foreign investors can bring long term benefits in the 
global market has influenced the developing countries and economies in transition to 
proffer stability guarantees on an extensive scale. 
Chapter three has examined scope, typologies of stabilisation clauses and 
assessed their legal validity and efficacy. It is found that stabilisation clauses which 
main y act as political risk mitigation strategy and long being used in the petroleum 
contracts of the developing countries raised great deal of controversy about its 
nonnative aspects and validity. Although legal validity of the stabilisation clauses are 
strongly affirmed, their practical efficacy, in particular of the stabilisation clause in the 
Stri . cto sensu as risk prevention strategy remain highly contested and frequently disputed 
on the nonnative grounds as ex post regulation intended to serve overriding public 
interest goal of state may prevail over contractual undertakings. Traditional stabilisation 
clauses which intend to freeze the contractual relationship by preventing legislation, 
denies the dynamism of the petroleum contract which is long term in nature and as such, 
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it tends to view the contract as discrete transaction being devoid of economic and social 
reality. 
Moreover, the stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu loses its efficacy when 
contract is concluded with illegitimate government and later on, the contract is repealed 
or renegotiated by successive legitimate government, or when the host government's 
new legislative measures improve, rather than act as detriment to the IOCs' bargained- 
for interest under a petroleum contract. Against this backdrop, economic stabilisation 
clause seemingly appears to be a compromising formula of managing political risks, 
through mitigating adverse impact of regulation and avoiding rigidity in traditional 
stabilisation clause. Economic stabilisation clause can also avoid legal battle for 
compensation that may arise for breach of stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu by 
providing automatic provision for compensation. In view of the limited legal 
protectional value of stabilisation clause in the stricto sensu, the economic stabilisation 
clauses as both instrument of achieving commercial interest of private parties and risk 
management device are gaining popularity in petroleum contracts. 
Chapter four has noted that renegotiation and adaptation remain other important 
contractual and legal devices that are increasingly used in petroleum contracts for 
maintaining stability of the contractual relationship. The scope of renegotiation clause is 
much wider than stabilisation clause which mainly deals with political risks. While 
stabilisation clause is intended to exclusively benefit IOCs, renegotiation and adaptation 
clauses recognises mutability of the interests of the parties through making provision for 
modification of contract in change of circumstance or when full information about 
certain aspects of contract are available. The renegotiation deals with change of 
circumstances brought by both political events and normal commercial risks inherent in 
the long term contract and is mainly concerned with achieving contract fairness and 
preserving economic equilibrium of the contract. But success of effective renegotiation 
291 
of the contract not only depends on compliance with formal procedure and adherence to 
express provision to this effect, but also on parties' adherence to non-legal and extra 
contractual rules such as values of trust, and co-operation. 
Chapter four has arrived at the conclusion that the advantage of renegotiation or 
revision c auses lies in their stabilising value that enables the contract to withstand the 
change of circumstances and to adapt it to new conditions or circumstances. One of the 
principal thrusts of this study is to lend support to the idea of continuation of contract 
through express provision renegotiation or revision of contract tenns in order to re- 
adjust parties' contractual obligation in case of change of circumstances rather than the 
tennination of contract. The current context of contract practice also endorses the view 
that it may be more realistic to deal a petroleum contract as a continuing relationship 
which can be adjusted to the rapidly changing legal environment in which it operates 
rather than viewing it as frozen in the detailed provisions for long duration. It should be 
acknowledged that unlike the past, the present context of renegotiation or adaptation 
does not stem from historical or ideological context rather it ensues from the current 
perspective of contract negotiation and contract drafting which allows considerable 
flexibility in contract terms in order to maintain economic equilibrium of the contract. 
The other important clauses that accommodate change in the petroleum contract are 
force majeure and hardship clauses, which are also extensively used as legal devices to 
facilitate the continuing performance of petroleum contract in the context of changed 
circumstances. Renegotiation and adaptation of contract have the advantage of 
reconciling between flexibility and sanctity of the contract and can promote stability in 
the contractual relationship by reducing the potential of political risks and maintaining 
contractual equilibrium in changed context. 
Aside from these legal approaches to stability guarantees, a stable contractual 
relationship depends upon the designing fiscal terms in fair, efficient and equitable 
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manner which reconciles the long-ten-n revenue objective of a government and 
minimum profit to the IOCs- This has been indicated in chapter five. It is found in this 
chapter that developing countries and economies in transition have moved towards 
greater flexibility in their fiscal regimes for its proven ability to enhance the stability in 
the contract. Price volatility, global market condition and fierce competition among the 
newly petroleum producing countries influenced the developing countries and 
economies in transition in the last two decades to offer fiscal stability guarantees and 
extensive fiscal incentives to attract investment in the petroleum sector. The current 
practice of developing countries mirrors the realisation that inflexible fiscal regime 
which is indifferent to petroleum deposits may lead to frequent changes in the fiscal 
tenns and conditions as well as taxation law. As a result, flexibility has been introduced 
both in physical parameters (sliding scale mechanism) in relation to different field size, 
production level and costs on the one hand; and in external disciplining (stabilisation 
clause) of taxation laws and policy of a country on the other and in incorporation of 
progressive tax system (economic resource rent). A stable fiscal regime should be 
premised on the balancing factors between adequate government take and a fair return 
to the private investors on the one hand and between fiscal ternis and geographical 
potential of a particular petroleum development venture on the other. Thus, the 
important lessons from the experience of the developing countries and economies in 
transition is that setting fixed terms for the government's share of the benefits from 
petroleum project may lead to instability of the contract and therefore, is increasingly 
replaced by the flexible sharing fonnula in which govenunent can take increase with 
price hike or other economic parameters changes. 
This fact is becoming more revealing in view of the current climate of high oil 
prices developed over the last five years that led to volatility in global oil market and 
provided developing countries negotiating advantages that they have not enjoyed during 
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low price scenario since the mid of 1980s. As a result, petroleum contracts were 
renegotiated in several developing countries in order to reap the windfall profits gains 
by IOC from price volatility. In particular, given the possibility of continuation of oil 
price hike, it is highly likely that stability of petroleum contract regimes, in particular 
those relating to marginal and frontiers oil fields, which are more sensitive to price 
volatility, will be affected with the passage of new laws or changes in fiscal regime by 
the host states for capturing windfall profits. In this context, use of flexible mechanisms 
based on actual profits can be useful to maintain contract stability without necessity to 
renegotiate the contract terins. 
The gap between rhetoric and reality in stability of contract is becoming apparent 
due to emerging environmental and social rights risks in the petroleum industry. This 
has been captured in part three of thesis. Chapter six has demonstrated that growing 
public concerns of the negative environmental impacts of the petroleum operations 
coupled with increased public demands for environmental performance by the 
companies and a resultant proliferation of environmental and safety legislation for 
regulating the petroleum industry and change of liability regime to prevent pollution 
across the developing world and economies in transition remains an important political 
risk factor to the petroleum companies throughout the last two decades. The 
implications of environmental regulatory and liability risks are mainly predicated on 
increasing operating costs affecting economic equilibrium of the contract, suspension or 
cancellation of petroleum contract on the alleged ground of non-compliance with 
contractual or regulatory prescription by the company. Environmental protection which 
occupies a higher moral value and articulates societal concerns about preservation of 
environment , justifies the 
host states' regulatory and liability intervention to override 
contractual obligations. It has been argued in this chapter that the tension between the 
concern for stability of contract and protection of environment and public health should 
294 
be resolved by undertaking preventive strategies rather than the technique of legal 
protection of the foreign investors by stabilisation guarantees. The past decade's 
experience reveals that companies now recognise the necessity of environmental 
regulation of their operation and they have learned to survive the regulatory 'chill' 
through not challenging the state's right to enviromnental protection but responding to 
this challenge by adopting risk mitigation and preventive strategies, which can lead to 
sustainable petroleum development and can reduce the extent of future liability and 
regulatory risks. 
Chapter seven noted that in recent times, social and human rights risks in the 
form of an increasing volume of litigation, negative campaign, and violent conflict have 
assumed a wider significance in petroleum development explicating that stability of 
contract should be strongly intertwined with the management of these risks. The issue 
of public participation, human rights, and stakeholders' demands for consultation in 
natural resource development have emerged as new challenges to the traditional concept 
of management and negotiation of the petroleum projects. These new dimensions of 
petroleum development are partly shaped by a growing awareness of the social impact 
of the petroleum operations and partly influenced by rising societal expectations from 
the activities of the petroleum companies. Ignoring these essential social and human 
rights aspects can generate various types of risks ranging from conflict between 
company and host community to reputation loss through negative campaigns and 
exposure of the companies to class action litigation. 
But these unconventional political risks can hardly be countered through legal or 
contractual means of stability by the host state. The existing framework of an 
international investment treaty regime or conventional political risk insurance 
programmes is also inadequate or inappropriate to counter these risks effectively 
for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, these issues tend to be politicised and complicated with the 
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involvement of diverse social groups, and interests. Secondly, they need to be viewed 
from a broader social perspective of petroleum development than a narrow legal and 
technical context. These new risk factors underpin unique legal and policy implications 
for both the companies and the host states and require innovative approaches to risk 
management w ic requires preventive strategies and mi ive itigatory measures. Preventi 
and mitigation measures including changes in the design of the project and traditional 
modes of negotiation, integration of social concerns into the project, stakeholder 
consultation, addressing human rights issues, and social provisioning b companies as 
outlined in chapter seven are seen to be more effective tools to manage these risks than 
legal guarantees of stability offered to a company to manage traditional political risks. 
It is now widely believed that the integration of social concerns has a minimal impact 
on project costs, but it can ensure greater ease in gaining the necessary approvals and 
avoidance of costly delays or disruption during project planning, can promote long-term 
stability of the contract through enhancing its legitimacy, and enhance the reputation of 
the companies. The benefits of such integration also outweigh the costs of litigation, 
conflict and stringent regulation in the enviromnental and social sphere. Equally, the 
importance of involvement of all the stakeholders through public participation and 
consultation with them in the petroleum development has also gained widespread 
acceptance for its potential benefits in reducing local resistance to the project by early 
resolving conflict and by building trust in the host community and company 
relationship. But at the same time, it should be recognised that stakeholder consultation 
may give rise delicate problems that may arise from a wider constitution of the host 
community coupled with complexity involved in delineating their divergent interests in 
a precise manner which may change in the course of time and thus, can hinder the 
effectiveness of such a process. It is also vital that a trade-off should be made between 
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the financial capability of a company commensurate with its economic imperatives of 
reasonable profit and the managing these risks for the continuation of the project. 
Prevention of these risks requires discharging social responsibilities of all the 
parties involved in a petroleum project - host government, company, and project 
financier, who should realistically acknowledge the social implications of the projects 
and share the responsibilities to mitigate risk factors. The host government has the 
primary responsibility to address the social impact and human rights concerns through 
providing a clear legal and regulatory framework. The explicit commitment of company 
to respect the human rights of the local and indigenous communities is crucial for the 
preventing and managing risks and sustainability of the project. The company should 
devote its managerial, financial and technological resources to address such risks. 
Project financiers should employ its economic leverage in the project to pressurise both 
the host government and company to undertake risk management efforts. 
In recent time, many petroleum companies have accepted the need to address the 
environmental, social and human rights concerns in petroleum development. The 
corporate social responsibility movement, fear of divestment by shareholders through 
negative campaigning by stakeholders alleging the companies are guilty of 
irresponsible behaviour remain, however, as critical drivers behind this corporate 
positive response to these concerns. In fact, there is a discernible change of attitude in 
the company management level about how their profit objectives can be reconciled with 
achieving the goal of sustainable development in petroleum exploration and 
development. However, even now these corporate initiatives are grounded in 
'voluntansm' and limited to a few leading edge companies. In this context, a 
government's regulatory and legal framework to manage these risks is seen as critically 
important for a level playing field and to filling the gap of the corporate self- regu ation. 
297 
General Research Findings and Conclusions 
From the foregoing discussions, which reviewed the specific findings of the individual 
chapters in this study, some general conclusions could be found applicable to the whole 
body of the thesis, which also demonstrate the lessons from the experiences of the 
developing countries and economies in transition in the stability of petroleum contracts: 
First, traditional principles based on classical contract doctrine of sanctity of 
contract and international law principles of pacta sunt servanda, acquired rights, 
internationalisation of contract that demands near-absolute expectations of performance 
of contract and reinforce rigid notion of stability, have been transformed and challenged 
by the new norms of international law as well as dynamism of long term nature of 
petroleum that requires a reasonable degree of adaptability in changing circumstances. 
However, such adaptability is conditioned and shaped by reasonable degree of stability 
and investment backed expectations of foreign investors and achieving economic 
equilibrium of contract. 
Second, the study observed that a government's commitment to the stability of 
petroleum contracts can be addressed mainly through two approaches: the legal 
approach and the economic approach. The former includes contractual mechanisms 
(stabilisation clauses, renegotiation, and revision clauses) and legislative means of 
guaranteeing contract sanctity or investment agreements. Economic approach refers to 
self-enforcing rules and techniques employed in the fiscal system. The contractual 
mechanisms of stability such as stabilisation clauses, and renegotiation clauses and 
flexibility in fiscal terms are seen to be principal political risk management strategies in 
the petroleum contracts for the following reasons: firstly, legislative guarantees are 
general and unilateral in nature; secondly, legal protection under international law can 
be costly process and investment protection under bilateral treaties and multilateral 
treaties can not be directly invoked by the companies; thirdly, contractual stability 
in a 
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negotiated agreement can be tailored to the specific needs of the investors and 
peculiarities of the projects. 
Third, the developing countries and economies in transition have opted for 
flexibility in contractual, legal and fiscal approach to stability in contract. Such legal 
and contractual flexibility is grounded on their pragmatism towards foreign investment 
as well as delicate balance between necessity of stability in contractual arrangement and 
public interests paradigm embedded in natural resource exploitation. 
Fourth, dunng the last twenty years, there have been important changes in the 
way in which risk perception is assessed in relation to petroleum development. Political 
risk assessment which has long been used by the companies to determine the level of 
political risk in a given country is essentially narrowed to exclude social and human 
rights risks. Apart from political risk assessment, social and environmental impact 
assessments are becoming increasingly important requirements in the development of 
the petroleum projects so that petroleum development is conducted in a way that is not 
socially and environmentally disruptive for the community. Placing both EIA and SIA 
in the earlier stages of project development for scoping and screening social, 
environmental and human rights risks can indeed provide valuable background 
information for sound environmental and social management, and can avoid potential 
conflicts between the companies and the host communities. 
Fifth, the study has found that the traditional notion of stability is essentially 
understood to mean the host govermnent-company relationship where States' arbitrary 
actions are treated as predominant destabilising factors. Thus, the traditional discourse 
on stability in state contracts is essentially 'statist' emphasising actions of the state 
apparatus. But the phenomena of socio-political risks generated by the actions of the 
non-state actors that are treated as a significant source of contract instability, dictate that 
the notion of stability in petroleum contracts should broadly be defined not only with 
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reference to the host state and company relationship, but also to the dynamics of the 
host community and company relationship which is influenced by the growing activism 
of non-state actors. The study submits that the importance of social and human rights 
dimensions of petroleum development should be taken into account in addressing the 
stability in petroleum projects and that the new and unconventional political risk factors 
should be given due consideration by host government, company and project financers 
in designing and implementing a petroleum project. 
Sixth, closely related to the above, a point should be made that the notion of 
stability should not be viewed from a narrow perspective of legal and contractual 
aspects of the host government and company relationship that can be strained by 
regulatory and administrative measures, but rather in a broader perspective of overall 
sustainability of the project which depends on co-ordination of opposing interests of 
host government, company and host community in the legal framework of contract. 
Seventh, traditional stability guarantees included in legislation, treaty and 
contracts can hardly address the social, environmental and human rights risks due to 
their unique legal underpinnings and context of their origin. It should be argued that 
preventive and mitigatory strategies should be employed by the host state and 
companies to better manage these risks and address their implications in broader 
societal context in which petroleum projects operate. Thus, a comprehensive 
management approach to risks associated with envirom-nental, social and human rights 
concerns remains a fundamental consideration that should be taken into account by 
companies and host governments in petroleum development in future. 
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